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computation and storage. However, outsourcing to third parties may cause some
risks in user privacy protection.
This monograph focuses on key technologies of data service outsourcing and pri-
vacy protection in mobile Internet, including the existing methods of data analysis
and processing, the fine-grained data access control through effective user privacy
protection mechanism, and the data sharing in the mobile Internet, which provide
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Chapter 1
Why Outsourcing and Privacy
Protection Matter for Data Service
in the Mobile Internet
1.1. Mobile Internet
With the continuous development of science and technology, the mobile Inter-
net (MI) has become an important part of our daily lives. It is a product of the
convergence of mobile communication technologies and Internet technologies,
which has a wide range of network coverage, convenience, and instant features.
Smartphone is the main carrier of the mobile Internet. Through smartphones,
people can make voice calls, send text messages, and take video communications as
well as surf the Internet at any time (including browsing the web, sending and
receiving e-mails, watching movies, etc.). In other words, using smartphones, users
are more capable of creating, implementing, and managing novel and efficient
mobile applications. Nowadays, the MI has become an important portal and major
innovation platform for Internet businesses and an important hub for the exchange
of information resources among various social media, business service companies,
and new application software.
1.1.1 Mobile Internet
The mobile Internet, defined as the platform where the user’s wireless access to
the digitized contents of the Internet via mobile devices, consists of the following:
• Internet service provider is an organization that provides services such as
Internet access, Internet transit, domain name registration, web hosting,
Usenet service, and collocation.
• Users can get different services from the mobile Internet such as points of
interest services, music services, fitness services, and mobile commerce
services by using mobile applications.
In the MI, mobile devices, which include smartphones, tablets, PCs, e-books,
MIDs, etc., enable users to stay connected with not only the network service pro-
viders through LTE and NFC techniques but also the physically close peers through
short-range wireless communication techniques. In fact, each individual user has a
personalized behavior pattern, which can influence the reliability and efficiency of
the network in the MI. Moreover, the MI has a wide range of applications such as
wireless body area networks (WBANs), mobile e-commerce, mobile social net-
works, mobile ad hoc networks, etc. The common scenarios of the MI will be shown
in Figure 1.1.
1.1.2 Application
The mobile Internet offers a huge number of applications to the users. Most of
these applications have many unique features or special functions, but the main
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technology of the applications remains the same as other services. The popular
applications in the mobile Internet are briefly reviewed below.
1.1.2.1 Mobile social networks
Social networking has already become an important integral part of our daily
lives, enabling us to contact our friends and families. Nowadays, the pervasive use
of the mobile Internet and the social connections fosters a promising mobile social
network (MSN) where reliable, comfortable, and efficient computation and com-
munication tools are provided to improve the quality of our work and life.
MSN is social networking where individuals with similar interests converse and
connect with one another through their mobile phone and/or tablet. Much like web-
based social networking, mobile social networking occurs in virtual communities [1].
Similar to many online social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter,
there are just as many social networks on mobile devices. They offer vast number of
functions including multimedia posts, photo sharing, and instant messaging. Most
of these mobile applications offer free international calling and texting capabilities.
Today, social networking applications are not just for the social aspect but are
frequently used for professional aspects as well, such as LinkedIn, which is still
constantly growing. Along with sharing multimedia posts and instant messaging,
social networks are commonly used to connect immigrants in a new country. While
the thought of moving to a new country may be intimidating for many, social media
can be used to connect immigrants of the same land together to make assimilation a
little less stressful [2].
1.1.2.2 Mobile ad hoc networks
Due to the limitation of the applications in the wire communication, the need
of the extension of applications via the mobile Internet becomes necessary. The
Figure 1.1.
The common scenarios of the MI.
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growth of laptops and 802.11/Wi-Fi wireless networks has made mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) a popular research topic since the mid-1990s.
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET), also known as wireless ad hoc network [3]
or ad hoc wireless network, is continuously self-configuring, infrastructure-less
network of mobile devices connected using wireless channels [4]. Each device in a
MANET is free to move independently in any direction and will therefore change its
links to other devices frequently. Such networks may operate by themselves or may
be connected to the larger Internet. They may contain one or multiple and different
transceivers between nodes. This results in a highly dynamic, autonomous
topology [5].
MANETs can be used in many applications, ranging from sensors for environ-
ment, vehicular ad hoc communications, road safety, smart home, peer-to-peer
messaging, air/land/navy defense, weapons, robots, etc. A typical instance is health
monitoring, which may include heart rate, blood pressure, etc. [6]. This can be
constant, in the case of a patient in a hospital or event driven in the case of a
wearable sensor that automatically reports your location to an ambulance team in
case of an emergency. Animals can have sensors attached to them in order to track
their movements for migration patterns, feeding habits, or other research pur-
poses [7]. Another example is used in disaster rescue operations. Sensors may also
be attached to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance or environment
mapping [8]. In the case of autonomous UAV-aided search and rescue, this would
be considered an event mapping application, since the UAVs are deployed to search
an area but will only transmit data back when a person has been found.
1.1.2.3 Mobile payment
Since the rapid economic growth, the methods of payment have changed a lot all
over the world. Given by the development of the mobile Internet, the mobile
payment becomes more pervasive in Asian countries, especially in China.
Mobile payment (also referred to as mobile money, mobile money transfer, and
mobile wallet) generally refers to payment services operated under financial regu-
lation and performed from or via a mobile device. Instead of paying with cash,
check, or credit cards, a consumer can use a mobile to pay for a wide range of
services and digital or hard goods.
Although the concept of using non-coin-based currency systems has a long
history [9], it is only recently that the technology to support such systems has
become widely available.
1.1.3 Mobile Internet and user behavior
Since entering the twenty-first century, the China’s Internet has developed rap-
idly. In particular, the mobile Internet further enhances this speed. We soon dis-
covered that today’s Internet is used in e-commerce shopping, map navigation,
mobile payment, stock financing, online booking, government office, recharge, and
other aspects that are completely different from the original. It seems that every-
thing can be done on the Internet. You can rely on your phone instead of taking it
out. In the mobile Internet, users and mobile terminals are closely related. The
accumulation of user behavior in the mobile Internet is of great value. Smartphones
and other mobile terminals are no longer simple communication tools but become
mobile terminals that integrate communication, computing, and sensing functions.
It can continuously generate and collect various data information [10]. Various
sensing devices on the mobile terminal can sense the surrounding environment and
generate various data information; at the same time, the mobile terminal serves as
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an entrance for the user to enter the mobile Internet and can collect data informa-
tion generated by other users. By combining various data related to mobile users,
user behaviors can be modeled and predicted, and important statistical data for
specific services can be extracted. For example, mobile users’ GPS information and
historical travel habits can be used to generate traffic statistics and travel
advice [11]. It can be seen that, based on the data information generated in the
mobile Internet, we can satisfy the different requirements of different users in
different scenarios in the first time by judging the user information needs and
accurately sorting the information categories, thereby providing users with person-
alized high-quality information and improving users’ service experience.
The relevant data show that in the 3 years of rapid development of the mobile
Internet, the total amount of data and information generated by humans has
exceeded 400 years in the past. The global data volume has reached 1.8 ZB in 2011,
and it is expected that the global data volume will reach 35 ZB by 2020. However,
with the accumulation of data information, the amount of data available for analysis
and mining continues to increase, and the entropy of information (i.e., the ratio of
total information to valuable information) tends to increase. The increasing amount
of data information makes information overload, information redundancy, and
information search become new issues in the mobile Internet era. Search engines
and recommendation systems provide very important technical means for solving
these problems. When users search for information on the Internet, the search
engine performs information matching in the background of the system with the
keywords from the users and displays the results for users. However, if the user
cannot accurately describe the keywords they need, then the search engine is
powerless. Unlike search engines, the recommendation system does not require
users to provide explicit requirements but simulates the user’s interests by analyzing
their historical behavior, thereby actively recommending to users’ information that
meets their interests and needs. In recent years, e-commerce has been booming, and
the dominant position of the recommendation system in the Internet has become
increasingly apparent. However, in the mobile Internet, data are not only more and
more large scale but also have a variety of models, complex relationships, and
reliability uncertainties. Diversified models make the data content difficult to
understand. The complexity of the association makes the data difficult to be effec-
tively identified. The uncertainty of credibility makes it difficult to determine the
authenticity of the data. Such data features make the perception, expression,
understanding, and calculation of the data face new challenges. The complexity of
space-time complexity in the traditional computing model greatly limits our ability
to design data-efficient computing models for the mobile Internet. How to quantify,
define, and extract the essential characteristics and internal correlation of data in
the mobile Internet, then study its internal mechanism, and provide support for the
recommendation service is an urgent problem to be solved.
1.1.4 Behavior and data
At the same time, due to the characteristics of large scale, diverse models, and
complex relationships in data in the mobile Internet, data analysis and processing
processes have certain requirements for computing resources, while mobile termi-
nals such as smartphones have limited computing resources (such as computational
processing capabilities, etc.). Therefore, analysis and processing of the mobile
Internet data is often done on devices such as third-party data processing servers
that have sufficient computing resources. However, users and mobile terminals in
the mobile Internet are closely related, and their data contains a large amount of
user privacy information. This will bring a series of security issues. Since the users
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facing the outsourced data application system are not a specific user, there may be
any users who are connected to the Internet. These users can submit data query
requests to outsourcing. Different users have different requirements for
outsourcing. It is precisely because of this particularity that the outsourcing system
may be completely open to any external potential users. It is not enough to protect
the privacy of outsourced data only through system-level access control, cryptog-
raphy, and other technical means. According to statistics from the Beijing
Zhongguancun police station, telecommunication fraud reported for the whole year
of 2012 accounted for 32% of the cases filed, which is the highest proportion of the
types of crimes. Fraudulent often uses six kinds of methods:
• The impersonation of an individual or a circle of friends after the disclosure of
information, such as criminals posing as frauds by public security organs,
postal services, telecommunications, banks, social security staff, or friends and
relatives, accounts for 42% of the total number of fraud cases.
• After the leakage of shopping information, the seller is guilty of fraud.
• The winning fraud is caused by the leakage of telephone, QQ, or e-mail.
• The false recruitment information is received after job information leakage.
• The Internet dating fraud after the leakage of dating information.
• Kidnapping fraud after the disclosure of family information. It can be seen that
many third parties have disclosed users’ personal information to varying degrees.
When people realized that they wanted to protect their privacy and tried to hide
their actions, they did not think that their actions were already on the Internet;
especially, different social locations in the network generate many data footprints.
This kind of data has the characteristics of being cumulative and relevant. The
information of a single place may not reveal the privacy of the user, but if a lot of
people’s behaviors are gathered from different independent locations, his privacy
will be exposed because there has been enough information about him. This hidden
data exposure is often unpredictable and controllable by individuals. The leakage of
personal privacy information has caused panic among some users, which has nega-
tively affected the sharing of data resources in the mobile Internet. The issue of
privacy protection has become increasingly important.
As a carrier of personal information, mobile smart terminals are characterized
by mobility, diversity, and intelligence. The various types of applications attached
to them present complex types, their execution mechanisms are not disclosed, a
large amount of data, etc. These factors are superimposed and cause them to face
much greater threats than before. In terms of presentation, the security issues of
mobile smart terminals are mainly concentrated on the following aspects: firstly,
illegally disseminating content; secondly, maliciously absorbing fees; thirdly, user
privacy is stolen; and fourthly, mobile terminal viruses and illegal brushing cause
the black screen, system crashes, and other issues. The following is an example of
the mobile phone malicious code and user privacy theft. Due to the mobile mali-
cious code problem caused by the negligence of the design and implementation
process of mobile smart terminal operating systems, more or less system vulnera-
bilities may be exploited by malicious code. In particular, with the continuous
maturation of the mobile Internet hacking technology, malicious code for mobile
smart terminals poses a great threat to their security. Mobile malicious code is a
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destructive malicious mobile terminal program. It usually uses SMS, MMS, e-mail,
and browsing websites through mobile communication networks or uses infrared
and Bluetooth to transfer between mobile smart terminals. At present, the highest
market share of mobile smart terminal operating system is Google Android operat-
ing system, followed by Apple iOS operating system and Microsoft Windows Phone
operating system. As smart terminal operating systems become more and more
uniform, the spread of malicious code has been accelerated, and it has evolved from
a simple suction to sophisticated fraud and hooliganism. In addition, with the
increase in the binding of mobile terminals and bank accounts, such as mobile
terminals and third-party payment, the generation and spread of mobile phone
viruses are accelerating toward the direction of traffic consumption, malicious
deductions, and private information theft. In particular, with the rapid develop-
ment of the Android-based operating system, mobile smart terminals using the
operating system have gradually become the main targets of hacker attacks. In the
first half of 2015, there were 5.967 million new Android virus data packets nation-
wide, an increase of 17.41% year on year, and the number of infected users reached
140 million, an increase of 58% from the same period last year. The total number of
mobile payment users reached 11.455 million. How to outsource the data storage in
the mobile Internet to a third-party server securely under the premise of ensuring
the privacy of users and the realization of fine-grained access control of mobile
Internet data is an urgent problem to be solved.
1.2. Research topics of the mobile Internet
1.2.1 Ontology-based information retrieval
Information retrieval is an important way of information exchange between
users and data, which have been studied by many researches. Traditional ways of
information retrieval are always based on keyword index and retrieval document.
But the data on the mobile Internet have four features: large scale, complicated
modules, diversified data format, and incongruous data sources. So, there is always
a problem that different keywords can be the same meaning. The results of the
search can be inaccurate or incomplete.
To deal with this situation, paper [12] gives us the definition of ontology-based
information retrieval. This model includes the four main processes of an IR system:
indexing, querying, searching, and ranking. However, as opposed to traditional
keyword-based IR models, in this approach, the query is expressed in terms of an
ontology-based query language (SPARQL), and the external resources used for
indexing and query processing consist of an ontology and its corresponding KB. The
indexing process is equivalent to a semantic annotation process. Instead of creating
an inverted index where the keywords are associated with the documents where
they appear, in the case of the ontology-based IR model, the inverted index contains
semantic entities (meanings) associated with the documents where they appear.
The relation or association between a semantic entity and a document is called
annotation. The overall retrieval process consists of the following steps:
• The system takes as input a formal SPARQL query.
• The SPARQL query is executed against a KB, returning a list of semantic
entities that satisfy the query. This process is purely Boolean (i.e., based on an
exact match), so that the returned instances must strictly hold all the
conditions of the formal query.
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• The documents that are annotated (indexed) with the above instances are
retrieved, ranked, and presented to the user. In contrast to the previous phase,
the document retrieval phase is based on an approximate match, since the
relation between a document and the concepts that annotate it has an inherent
degree of fuzziness.
The steps listed above are described in more detail in the following subsections,
from indexing to query processing, document retrieval, and ranking.
In this model, it is assumed that a KB has been built and associated with the
information sources (the document base), by using one or several domain otologies
that describe concepts appearing in a document text. The concepts and instances in
the KB are linked to the documents by means of explicit, non-embedded annota-
tions of the documents. In this model, keywords appearing in a document are
assigned weights reflecting the fact that some words are better at discriminating
between documents than others. Similarly, in this system, annotations are assigned
weights that reflect the discriminative power of instances with respect to the docu-
ments. And, the weight dx of an instance x for a document d is computed as
dx ¼
f reqx;d
maxy f reqy,d
 log |D|
nx
(1.1)
where f reqx;d is the number of occurrences in d of the keywords attached to x
and D is the set of all documents in the search space.
The query execution returns a set of tuples that satisfy the SPARQL query. Then,
extract the semantic entities from those tuples, and access the semantic index to
collect all the documents in the repository that are annotated with these semantic
entities. Once the list of documents is formed, the search engine computes a
semantic similarity value between the query and each document, using an adapta-
tion of the classic vector space IR model. Each document in the search space is
represented as a document vector where each element corresponds to a semantic
entity. The value of an element is the weight of the annotation between the docu-
ment and the semantic entity, if such annotation exists, and zero otherwise. The
query vector is generated weighting the variables in the SELECT clause of the
SPARQL query. For testing purposes, the weight of each variable of the query was
set to 1, but in the original model, users are allowed to manually set this weight
according to their interest. Once the vectors are constructed, the similarity measure
between a document d and the query q is computed as
simðd, qÞ ¼ d q
|d|  |q| (1.2)
If the knowledge in the KB is incomplete (e.g., there are documents about travel
offers in the knowledge source, but the corresponding instances are missing in the
KB), the semantic ranking algorithm performs very poorly: SPARQL queries will
return less results than expected, and the relevant documents will not be retrieved
or will get a much lower similarity value than they should. As limited as might be,
keyword-based search will likely perform better in these cases. To cope with this,
the ranking function combines the semantic similarity measure with the similarity
measure of a keyword-based algorithm. Combine the output of search engines, and
compute the final score as
λ  simðd, qÞ þ ð1 λÞ  ksimðd, qÞ (1.3)
7
Why Outsourcing and Privacy Protection Matter for Data Service in the Mobile Internet
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79903
where ksim is computed by a keyword-based algorithm and λ∈ ½0; 1.
A lot of information retrieval models have been put forward to improve the
performance of information retrieval, and some of the combinations of these tech-
nologies have been proven to be effective. But faced with the rich data in the MI,
the great improvement needs to be done for getting the search more intelligent and
efficient.
1.2.2 Deep learning
Machine learning is a field of computer science that gives computer systems the
ability to “learn” (i.e., progressively improve performance on a specific task)with data,
without being explicitly programmed. It learns from the external input data through
algorithm analysis to obtain the regularity for recognition and judgment.With the
development of machine learning, it is classified as shallow learning and deep learning
and plays an important role in the field of artificial intelligence. Due to the large-scale
data, multiple model, and complex correlation, traditional shallow learning algorithms
(such as the support vector machine algorithm [13]) are still subject to certain restric-
tions in dealing with complex classifications [14] even if widely used.
Deep learning is a new field in the study of machine learning; the motive is to
establish and simulate human brain analysis neural network to learn. It mimics the
human brain to explain the mechanism of data, such as images, sound, and text. As
with machine learning methods, deep machine learning methods also have super-
vised learning and unsupervised learning. Supervised learning algorithms experi-
ence a data set containing features, but each example is also associated with a label
or target. For example, the iris data set is annotated with the species of each iris
plant. A supervised learning algorithm can study the iris data set and learn to
classify iris plants into three different species based on their measurements.
Unsupervised learning algorithms experience a data set containing many features
and then learn useful properties of the structure of this data set. In the context of
deep learning, we usually want to learn the entire probability distribution that
generated a data set, whether explicitly as in density estimation or implicitly for
tasks like synthesis or deionizing. Some other unsupervised learning algorithms
perform other roles, like clustering, which consists of dividing the data set into
clusters of similar examples. The learning model established under different learn-
ing frameworks is very different. For example, the convolutional neural network
(CNN) is a kind of machine learning model of deep learning under the supervision
of the deep place letter (deep belief networks, referred to as DBNs), which is a kind
of machine learning model in the case of unsupervised learning.
The concept of deep learning was proposed in 2006 by Hinton [15]. Based on the
deep belief network (DBN), the algorithm is proposed to solve the optimization
problem of the deep structure, and then the deep structure of multilayer automatic
encoder is proposed. In addition, the convolution neural network proposed by
Lecun et al. [16] is the first real multilayer structure learning algorithm, which uses
the space relative relation to reduce the number of parameters to improve the
training performance. Deep learning is a method of representing learning in
machine learning. Observations (such as an image) can be represented in a variety
of ways, such as vectors for each pixel’s strength value, or more abstracted into a
range of edges, specific shapes, etc. It is easier to learn a task from an instance using
some specific presentation methods (e.g., face recognition or facial expression rec-
ognition). The advantage of deep learning is to replace the manual acquisition
feature with non-supervised or semi-supervised feature learning and hierarchical
feature extraction.
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Deep learning architectures such as deep neural networks, deep belief networks,
and recurrent neural networks have been applied to fields including computer
vision, speech recognition, natural language processing, audio recognition, social
network filtering, machine translation, bioinformatics, and drug design [13], where
they have produced results comparable to and in some cases superior [14] to human
experts.
The work [17] firstly proposed a novel context-dependent (CD) model for
large vocabulary speech recognition (LVSR). This model is a pre-trained deep
neural network-hidden Markov model (DNN-HMM) hybrid architecture that
trains the DNN to produce a distribution over senones (tied triphone states) as its
output. Although the experiments show that CD-DNN-HMMs provide dramatic
improvements in recognition accuracy, many issues remain to be resolved. First,
although CD-DNN-HMM training is asymptotically quite scalable, in practice, it is
quite challenging to train CD-DNN-HMMs on tens of thousands of hours of data.
Second, highly effective speaker and environment adaptation algorithms for DNN-
HMMs must be found, ideally ones that are completely unsupervised and inte-
grated with the pre-training phase. Third, the training in this study used the
embedded Viterbi algorithm, which is not optimal. In addition, the study views
the treatment of the time dimension of speech by DNN-HMM and GMM-HMMs
alike as a very crude way of dealing with the intricate temporal properties of
speech. Finally, although Gaussian RBMs can learn an initial distributed represen-
tation of their input, they still produce a diagonal covariance Gaussian for the
conditional distribution over the input space given the latent state (as diagonal
covariance GMMs also do). Ji et al. [18] developed a 3D CNN model for action
recognition. This model construct features from both spatial and temporal dimen-
sions by performing 3D convolutions. The developed deep architecture generates
multiple channels of information from adjacent input frames and performs con-
volution and subsampling separately in each channel. The final feature represen-
tation is computed by combining information from all channels. Evaluated by the
TRECVID and the KTH data sets, the results show that the 3D CNN model out-
performs compared with the methods on the TRECVID data, while it achieves
competitive performance on the KTH data, demonstrating its superior perfor-
mance in real-world environments. Furthermore, Cho et al. [19] proposed a novel
neural network model called RNN encoder-decoder that is able to learn the map-
ping from a sequence of an arbitrary length to another sequence, possibly from a
different set, of an arbitrary length. The encoder and decoder of the proposed
model are jointly trained to maximize the conditional probability of a target
sequence given a source sequence. The performance of a statistical machine trans-
lation system is empirically found to improve by using the conditional probabili-
ties of phrase pairs computed by the RNN encoder-decoder as an additional
feature in the existing log-linear model. But one approach that was not investi-
gated is to replace the whole or a part of the phrase table by letting the RNN
encoder-decoder propose target phrases. A multi-context deep learning framework
for saliency detection is proposed in [20]. Different pre-training strategies are
investigated to learn the deep model for saliency detection, and a task-specific pre-
training scheme for the presented multi-context deep model is designed. Tested by
the contemporary deep models in ImageNet image classification challenge, their
effectiveness in saliency detection is investigated.
Although deep learning has shown great success in various applications such as
objection recognition [21] and speech recognition [17], especially language model-
ing [22], paraphrase detection [23], and word embedding extraction [24], the work
implemented in the MI is still worthy to investigate.
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1.2.3 Outsourced attribute-based encryption system
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising cryptographic primitive,
which has been widely applied to design fine-grained access control system
recently. Data access control has been evolving in the past 30 years, and various
techniques have been developed to effectively implement fine-grained access
control [25], which allows flexibility in specifying differential access rights of indi-
vidual users. However, traditional access control systems are mostly designed for
in-house services and depend greatly on the system itself to enforce authorization
policies. Thus, they cannot be applied in cloud computing because users and cloud
servers are no longer in the same trusted domain. For the purpose of helping the
data owner impose access control over data stored on untrusted cloud servers, a
feasible consideration would be encrypting data through certain cryptographic
primitives but disclosing decryption keys only to authorized users. One critical issue
of this branch of approaches is how to achieve the desired security goals without
introducing high complexity of key management and data encryption. Existing
works resolve this issue either by introducing a per-file access control list (ACL) for
fine-grained access control or by categorizing files into several filegroups for effi-
ciency. As the system scales, however, the ACL-based scheme would introduce an
extremely high complexity which could be proportional to the number of system
users. The filegroup-based scheme, on the other hand, is just able to provide coarse-
grained access control of data.
To provide fine-grained access control over encrypted data, a novel public-key
primitive, namely, attribute-based encryption (ABE) [26], is introduced in the
cryptographic community, which enables public-key-based one-to-many encryp-
tion. In ABE system, users’ keys and ciphertexts are labeled with sets of descriptive
attributes and access policies, respectively, and a particular key can decrypt a
ciphertext only if the associated attributes and policy are matched. Though ABE is a
promising primitive to design fine-grained access control system in cloud comput-
ing, there are several challenges remained in the application of ABE.
• One of the main drawbacks of ABE is that the computational cost in decryption
phase grows with the number of attributes specified in the access policy. The
drawback appears more serious for resource-constrained users such as mobile
devices and sensors. Therefore, one challenge is how to reduce the decryption
complexity of ABE such that it can be applied to fine-grained access control for
users with resource-constrained devices.
• Beyond decryption, generating users’ private key in existing ABE schemes also
requires a great quantity of modular exponentiations. Furthermore, the
revocation of any single user in existing ABE requires key update at authority
for remaining users who share his/her attributes. All of these heavy tasks
centralized at the authority side would make it become the efficiency
bottleneck in the whole access control system. Therefore, another challenge is
how to reduce the key-issuing complexity of ABE such that scalable access
control can be supported.
To improve the practical application level of the attribute-based encryption
system, researchers began to attempt to introduce outsourced computing to the
attribute-based encryption system. In 2011, Green et al. [27] proposed a scheme that
outsourced the decryption operation in the attribute-based cryptosystem to a third
party in order to improve the client’s operational efficiency and enable the attribute-
based cryptosystem to run on devices with limited computational resources such as
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smart cards. The ciphertext length in this scheme increases linearly with the num-
ber of access policy attributes. In [27], the third party uses the conversion key sent
by the user to convert the encrypted ciphertext with the higher decryption cost into
the ElGamal-encrypted ciphertext with the lower decryption cost and transmits the
converted ciphertext back to users. And then, users can use their own decryption
keys to complete the decryption locally. Li et al. [28] simplified the client’s compu-
tational complexity in the attribute-based cryptosystem from the perspective of
outsourced cryptographic operations. After outsourcing cryptographic operations,
the user only needs to perform constant exponentiation operations for encryption
regardless of the number of attributes and can encrypt any access policy. Li et al.
[29] proposed an attribute-based encryption scheme that supports outsourced key
generation and outsourced decryption operations. Meanwhile, the scheme proposed
a fine-grained access control system based on this scheme. Lai et al. [30] pointed out
that the solution proposed by the user in [27] validates the results returned by the
third party and that the security of the solution depends on the random oracle
model. On the basis of [27], the literature [30] proposes a verifiable outsourced
attribute-based encryption scheme. By adding redundant information, users can
verify the conversion results returned by third parties to ensure the accuracy of
conversions. The security of the new program is based on the standard model. Li
et al. [31] proposed an attribute-based encryption scheme that can both reduce
attribute authority and user computing burden and also support user authentica-
tion, on the basis of [27, 28, 31] and so on. By outsourcing part of the key generation
and decryption operations to different service providers, the attribute authority and
the user’s local computing burden are greatly reduced. Lin et al. [32] pointed out
that the method of adding redundant information in [30] can not only achieve the
purpose of verifying the returned result, but also increases the computational load
and communication burden of the system. The literature [32] proposes an
outsourced attribute-based encryption scheme that uses a hybrid encryption system
and a commitment mechanism to complete user authentication. The length of the
ciphertext and the calculation of cryptographic operations in this scheme are only
half that of the scheme mentioned in [30], and the security of the scheme is based
on the standard model. Ma et al. [33] presented the concept of innocent proof for
the first time. The user who holds the private key cannot report cloud server
operation errors and proposed an attribute-based encryption scheme that supports
both outsourced encryption and decryption operations and verifiable and innocent
proofs. Mao et al. [34] proposed an attribute-based encryption scheme that verifies
outsource decryption, and experiments show that the scheme is more concise and
less computational than cryptographic schemes proposed in [30] but still with the
number of attributes linearly related. Xu et al. [35] proposed a circuit-based
ciphertext-policy-based attribute-based hybrid encryption system to ensure data
integrity in cloud computing environments and implement fine-grained access
control and verifiable delegation mechanisms.
It can be known from the existing work that currently existing secure
outsourced attribute-based encryption schemes cannot achieve a fixed ciphertext
length, and these solutions not only improve the computational efficiency but also
increase the communication load of mobile devices. However, the work of achiev-
ing fine-grained access control of data in the MI and promoting the sharing of data
in the MI is still worthy to investigate.
1.2.4 Proxy re-encryption system
Since cloud users do not fully trust cloud computing service providers (CSPs),
they do not want any unauthorized personnel (including cloud service providers) to
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view their own data. This cannot rely on administrative constraints or ethics. The
rules to be solved can only adopt technical means to ensure that cloud service
providers and other non-authorized personnel cannot obtain any uploading cloud
data from the customer, and any unauthorized changes to the customer data in the
cloud will be accepted by the customers. Therefore, user data usually needs to be
encrypted on the client before being transmitted to the cloud. However, in the
cloud computing environment, there are a large number of data sharing scenarios.
When data sharing is performed, if decryption is performed in the cloud, there is a
risk of leakage of user data, which is not completely trusted by the cloud computing
service provider for the user. The situation is impossible. If you need the user to
re-encrypt the file, this is very inconvenient for the user. Therefore, the proxy
re-encryption (PRE) scheme for distributed data storage can well solve this problem.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), initially introduced by Blaze et al. [36], enables a
semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext encrypted under the public key of
delegator into another ciphertext under the public key of delegatee without leaking
the underlying encrypted messages or private keys of delegator/delegatee to the
proxy. This special kind of public-key encryption seems to be an optimal candidate
to ensure the security of sharing data in cloud computing. Supposedly, the data
owner (say, Alice) intends to share the sensitive data stored in the cloud with
another granted user (say, Bob). It is desirable that the requested data can be
accessed by nobody other than Bob. Inspired by the primitive of PRE, Alice can
encrypt the sensitive data under her own public key before uploading the shared
data to the semi-trusted cloud. After receiving the request of data sharing from Bob,
Alice generates a proxy re-encryption key using her own private key and Bob’s
public key and sends this proxy re-encryption key to the semi-trusted cloud server.
Equipped with this proxy re-encryption key, cloud server can transform the
ciphertext encrypted under the public key of Alice into an encryption under the
public key of Bob. By utilizing the PRE primitive, the transformed ciphertext can
only be decrypted by Bob, whereas the cloud server is unable to learn the plaintext
or private keys of Alice or Bob. Finally, Bob can download and decrypt the
requested data with his own private key. In this way, the costly burden of secure
data sharing can be uploaded to the semi-trusted cloud server with abundant
resources.
In 2005, Ateniese et al. [37] proposed the first unidirectional PRE scheme.
Similar to the scheme of Blaze et al. [36], both of the schemes are secure only
against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). In 2007, Canetti et al. [38] designed a
bidirectional PRE scheme with chosen-ciphertext security. In 2008, Libert et al.
[39] introduced a replayable chosen-ciphertext secure (RCCA) unidirectional PRE
scheme. Since then, various PRE schemes have been proposed in the literature (e.g.,
[40–44]).
PRE can be extended in the context of identity-based encryption. In 2007, Green
and Ateniese [45] proposed the first identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE)
scheme, which is CCA secure in the random oracle model, where hash functions are
assumed to be fully random. Chu and Tzeng [30] constructed a CCA secure IBPRE
scheme in the standard model. After that, many identity-based proxy re-encryption
(IBPRE) schemes have been proposed, such as [47–53].
However, among all of the aforementioned schemes, the semi-trusted proxy can
use a given re-encryption key to transform all the ciphertexts of a delegator into
those of a delegatee. But in reality, the delegator does not want to transform all of
his data for the delegatee. Therefore, type-based PRE [54] and conditional PRE
(CPRE) [55, 56] were proposed, in which the proxy can only fulfill ciphertext
conversion conditionally. Later, Liang et al. [57, 58] proposed two IBCPRE schemes
with CCA secure in the standard model. However, He et al. [59] presented the
12
Data Service Outsourcing and Privacy Protection in Mobile Internet
security analysis to show that their schemes only achieve CPA security. In 2016, He
et al. [60] proposed an efficient identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption
(IBCPRE) scheme with CCA secure in the random oracle model.
PRE can be extended in the attribute-based setting. Attribute-based proxy re-
encryption (ABPRE) can effectively increase the flexibility of data sharing. In 2009,
Liang et al. [61] first defined the notion of ciphertext-policy ABPRE (CP-ABPRE),
where each ciphertext is labeled with a set of descriptive conditions and each re-
encryption key is associated with an access tree that specifies which type of cipher-
texts the proxy can re-encrypt, and they presented a concrete scheme supporting
and gates with positive and negative attributes. After that, several CP-ABPRE
schemes (e.g., [62]) with more expressive access policy were proposed. In 2011,
Fang et al. [63] proposed a key-policy ABPRE (KP-ABPRE) scheme in the random
oracle model, whereby ciphertext encrypted with conditions W can be re-encrypted
by the proxy using the CPRE key under the access structure TT if and only if
TðWÞTðWÞ ¼ 1. More recent ABPRE systems can be seen in [64–66].
In 2016, Lee et al. [67] proposed a searchable hierarchical CPRE (HCPRE)
scheme for cloud storage services, and cloud service provider is able to generate a
hierarchical key, but the re-encryption key generation algorithm also requires the
private keys of the delegator and delegatee.
So far, the proxy re-encryption has been extensively investigated. However, the
concrete proxy re-encryption schemes with different properties still need to be
proposed and applied to the special environment for the MI.
1.3. Organization
The core material of this book consists of the following:
• Chapters 1 and 2, discussing the importance of outsourcing and privacy
protection for data service in the mobile Internet and the basics of data service
outsourcing and privacy protection in the mobile Internet
• Chapters 3–5, introducing information retrieval, classical machine learning,
and deep learning
• Chapters 6 and 7, introducing attribute-based encryption for flexible and fine-
grained access control and motivating proxy re-encryption for secure access
delegation
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Chapter 2
Foundations
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a brief review of all the necessary crypto-
graphic concepts needed in the following chapters. We start with the mathematical
backgrounds and associated hard problems. The other aspect of this chapter is some
facts regarding the classical symmetric cryptography and public-key cryptosystem.
Finally, a concise description of provable security will be presented in the rest of
this chapter. We remark that this introduction is by no means exhaustive such that
the approaches used to speed up pairing computations or select suitable parameters
of elliptic curve are really beyond the scope of this book.
2.1. Mathematical concepts and properties
2.1.1 Concepts from number theory
2.1.1.1 Primes and divisibility
Let Z be the set of integers. We say that a divides b (denoted as a|b) if there
exists an integer c satisfying ac ¼ b for a, b, c∈ RZ. If a does not divide b, we write
a∤b. Despite that this definition makes sense even when one or more of these
integers are negative or zero, we are only interested in the case when a, b, c are all
positive. A direct observation is that if a|b and a|c, then a|ðxbþ ycÞ for any x, y∈ RZ.
If a|b and a is positive, a is regarded as a divisor or factor of b. Furthermore, a is
also called a nontrivial factor of b in case a∉ {1;b}. A positive integer pð> 1Þ is
considered as prime if it has no nontrivial factors, i.e., it has only two divisors: 1 and
p itself. A positive integer greater than 1 is called composite if this integer is not a
prime number. It is the convention to know that “1” is neither prime nor composite.
According to the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, every integer greater than
1 can be expressed uniquely as a product of primes. Namely, any positive integer
n > 1 can be written as n ¼
Y
i
peii such that {pi} are distinct primes and ei ≥ 1 for
all i; furthermore, the {pi} and {ei} are uniquely determined up to ordering.
Proposition 2.1
Let a and b be two integers and b > 0. Then there exist unique integers q, r satisfying
a ¼ qbþ r and 0≤ r < b.
c is known as the greatest common divisor of two nonnegative integers a and b
(written as gcdða, bÞ) if c is the largest integer satisfying c|a and c|b. It is noted that
gcdð0;0Þ are not defined, whereas gcdðb;0Þ ¼ gcdð0;bÞ ¼ b. The notion of greatest
common divisor also makes sense when either or both of a, b are negative, but we
will never need this; therefore, when we write gcdða, bÞ, we always assume that
a, b ≥0. Note that if p is prime, then gcdða, pÞ is either equal to 1 or p. a and b are
called relatively prime if gcdða, bÞ ¼ 1.
Proposition 2.2
Let a, b be two positive integers. Then there exist x, y∈Z such that
axþ by ¼ gcdða, bÞ. Furthermore, gcdða, bÞ is the smallest positive integer that can be
expressed in this manner.
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Proof. Let I denote the set {axþ by} where x, y are chosen from Z. Note that I
certainly contains some positive integers since at least a, b∈ I such that
a ¼ a 1þ b 0 and b ¼ a 0þ b 1. Let d denote the smallest positive integer
in I. We claim that d ¼ gcdða, bÞ due to the fact that d can be represented as
d ¼ axþ by for some x, y∈Z (recall that d∈ I). In addition, to show that
d ¼ gcdða, bÞ, we must show that d|a and d|b and that d is the largest integer with
this property. In fact, we can show that d divides every element in I. To prove this,
take arbitrary c∈ I such that c ¼ ax0 þ by0 with x0, y0 ∈Z. According to Proposition
2.1, we have c ¼ qdþ r with q and r being integers and 0 ≤ r < d. Then
r ¼ c qd ¼ ax0 þ by0  qðaxþ byÞ ¼ ðx0  qxÞaþ ðy0  qyÞb∈ I: (2.1)
There is a contradiction between r 6¼ 0 and the choice of d as the smallest
positive integer in I. Thus, it is obvious that r ¼ 0 and hence d|c.
Since both a and b are elements in I, the above shows that d|a and d|b. Suppose
there exists d0 > d such that d0|a and d0|b. Then d0|axþ by; since the latter is equal to
d, this means d0|d, which is impossible if d0 is larger than d. It is concluded that d is
the largest integer dividing both a and b and hence d ¼ gcdða, bÞ.
Given a and b, the Euclidean algorithm can be used to compute gcdða, bÞ in
polynomial time. The extended Euclidean algorithm can be used to compute the
coefficients x, y (as in Proposition 2.1) in polynomial time as well. Interested readers
can refer to [68] for more details.
Proposition 2.3
If c|ab and gcdða, cÞ ¼ 1, then c|b. In particular, if p is prime and p|ab, then either
p|a or p|b.
Proof. It is easy to observe that c α ¼ ab for some integer α since c|ab. From
gcdða, cÞ ¼ 1 then, according to the previous proposition, there exist integers x, y
such that 1 ¼ axþ cy. Multiplying both sides by b, we obtain
b ¼ axbþ cyb ¼ abxþ cyb ¼ c αxþ cyb ¼ c  ðαxþ ybÞ: (2.2)
Since ðαxþ ybÞ is an integer, it follows that c|b.
The second part of this proposition follows from the fact that if p∤a, then
gcdða, pÞ ¼ 1.
Proposition 2.4
If p|N, q|N, and gcdðp, qÞ ¼ 1, then pq|N.
Proof.We can see pα ¼ N and qβ ¼ N from p|N and q|N and obtain 1 ¼ pxþ qy
from Proposition 2.2, where α, β, x, y are all integers. Multiplying both sides of the last
equation byN, we obtainN ¼ pxN þ qyN ¼ pxqβ þ qypα ¼ pqðxβ þ yαÞ: Thus, pq|N.
2.1.1.2 Modular arithmetic
Let a, b,N be integers with N > 1. Let ½a mod N denote the remainder of a∈Z
upon division by N. In more detail, according to Proposition 2.1, there exist unique
q and r such that a ¼ qN þ r and 0 ≤ r < N, and ½a mod N is defined as this
remainder r. Namely, 0≤ ½a mod N < N. The process of mapping a to ½a mod N is
called reduction modulo N.
a and b are regarded as congruent modulo N (written as a ¼ b mod N) if
½amodN ¼ ½bmodN, that is to say, the remainder when a is divided by N is
equivalent to the remainder when b is divided by N. In this manner, a ¼ b mod N if
and only if N|ða bÞ. Note that a ¼ ½b mod N implies a ¼ b mod N, but not vice
versa. For example, 36 ¼ 18 mod 18 but 36 6¼ ½18 mod 18 ¼ 0.
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We remark that congruence modulo N is an equivalence relation, i.e., it is
reflexive ða ¼ a mod N for all a), symmetric (a ¼ b mod N implies b ¼ a mod N),
and transitive (if a ¼ b mod N and b ¼ c mod N, then a ¼ c mod N). Congruence
modulo N also obeys the standard rules of arithmetic with respect to addition,
subtraction, and multiplication, so if a ¼ a0 mod N and b ¼ b0 mod N, then
ðaþ bÞ ¼ ða0 þ b0Þ mod N and ab ¼ a0b0 mod N. Thus, the calculations of congru-
ence modulo N can be simplified by “reducing and then adding/multiplying”
instead of “adding/multiplying and then reducing.”
Example 1. Let us compute ½3193015 590702 mod 100. Since
3193015 ¼ 15 mod 100 and 590702 ¼ 2 mod 100, we have
3193015 590702 ¼ ½3193015 mod 100  ½590702 mod 100 mod 100
¼ 15 2 ¼ 30 mod 100:
The cost of alternate approach to derive the answer (viz., computing the product
3193015 590702 and then reducing the answer modulo 100) is much more expensive.
Different from addition, subtraction, and multiplication, the division operation in
congruence modulo N has not been involved. That is to say, if a ¼ a0 mod N
and b ¼ b0 mod N, then it is not necessarily true that a=b ¼ a0=b0 mod N; in fact,
the expression “a=bmodN” is not, in general, defined well. As a specific example related
to the division, ab ¼ cb mod N does not necessarily imply that a ¼ c mod N.
Example 2. Take N ¼ 12. Then 3 3 ¼ 9 ¼ 3 7 mod 12, but 3 6¼ 7 mod 24.
However, a meaningful notion of division has also been defined for congruence
modulo N. If for a given integer a there exists an integer a1 such that
a a1 ¼ 1 mod N, a1 is viewed as a (multiplicative) inverse of amoduloN, and a is
considered as invertible moduloN. It is obvious to observe that if α is a multiplicative
inverse of amodulo N, then so is ½α mod N; furthermore, if α0 is another multiplica-
tive inverse, then ½αmodN ¼ ½α0modN. We can simply let a1 denote the unique
multiplicative inverse of a that lies in the range {0;…, N  1} if a is invertible.
In this way, division by amoduloN is defined as multiplication by a1 moduloN
if a is invertible modulo N (i.e., c=a is defined as c a1 mod NÞ. We stress that
division by a is only defined when a is invertible. If c a ¼ b a mod N and a are
invertible, then we may divide each side of the equation by a (or, equivalently,
multiply each side by a1) to obtain
ðc aÞ  a1 ¼ ðb aÞ  a1 mod N ) c ¼ b mod N: (2.3)
We see that in this case, division works “as expected” by adopting the idea of
invertible integers. The natural question is that which integers are invertible mod-
ulo of a given modulus N. To answer this question fully, Proposition 2.2 is used in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5
Let a,N be integers with N > 1. Then a is invertible modulo if and only if
gcdða,NÞ ¼ 1.
Proof. Assume a is invertible modulo N, and let b denote its inverse. It is
evident that a 6¼ 0 since 0 b ¼ 0 mod N regardless of the value of b. Since
a b ¼ 1 mod N, the definition of congruence modulo N implies that
a b 1 ¼ αN for some α∈Z. Equivalently, b a αN ¼ 1. According
to Proposition 2.2, this implies gcdða,NÞ ¼ 1.
Conversely, if gcdða,NÞ ¼ 1, then according to Proposition 2.2, there exist
integers x, y such that axþNy ¼ 1. Reducing each side of this equation, modulo N
gives ax ¼ 1 mod, and it is easy to see that x is a multiplicative inverse of a.
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Example 3. Let N ¼ 13 and a ¼ 10. Then 10 4þ ð3Þ  13 ¼ 1, and so
4 ¼ ½4 mod 13 is the inverse of 10. One can verify that 10 4 ¼ 1 mod 13.
2.1.2 Concepts from abstract algebra
2.1.2.1 Group theory
Assume G be a set. A binary operation ∘ defined over the set G (written as g ∘ h if
g, h∈G) is simply a function that takes as input two elements of G and outputs
another element in the set G. The formal definition of a group is described as
follows:
Definition 2.1. A group is a set G pairing with a binary operation ∘ such that:
Closure law: For all g, h∈G, the result of g ∘ h still remains in the set G.
Identity law: There exists an identity element e∈G such that for all g∈G,
e ∘ g ¼ g ¼ g ∘ e.
Inverse law: For all g∈G, there exists an element h∈G such that
g ∘ h ¼ e ¼ h ∘ g. Such an h is called an inverse element of g.
Associative law: For all g1, g2, g3 ∈G, ðg1 ∘ g2Þ ∘ g3 ¼ g1 ∘ ðg2 ∘ g3Þ.
In this way, the set G along with the binary operation ∘ is defined as a group.
When the set G has a finite number of elements, ðG, ∘ Þ is viewed as a finite group,
and |G| denotes the order of the group, that is, the number of elements in G.
If g ∘ h ¼ h ∘ g for all g, h∈G, this group is called abelian group or commutative
group. In this book, wewill always deal with finite and abelian (commutative) groups.
If ðG, ∘ Þ is a group, a set H⊆G pairing with the operation ∘ is called a subgroup
of ðG, ∘ Þ if the set H forms a group under the involved operation ∘ . To check that
ðH, ∘ Þ is a subgroup, we need to verify closure, existence of identity and inverses,
and associativity according to Definition 2.1. (In fact, associativity is inherited auto-
matically from the group ðG, ∘ Þ.) Every group ðG, ∘ Þ always has the trivial subgroups
ðG, ∘ Þ and ({e}, ∘ ). ðH, ∘ Þ is called a strict subgroup of ðG, ∘ Þ if H 6¼ G.
Associativity implies that the notation of long expression g1 ∘ g2 ∘⋯ ∘ gn without
parentheses is unambiguous since it does not matter in what order we perform the
operation ∘ .
It is easy to see that the identity element in a group ðG, ∘ Þ is unique, and thus we
can therefore refer to the identity element of a group. One can also demonstrate that
each element g of a group has a unique inverse element.
In general, the abstract notation ∘ will not be used to denote the group operation
directly. Either the additive notation or the multiplicative notation will be used
instead depending on the involved group. In case the additive notation has been
adopted, the group operation applied to two elements g, h in the group is denoted as
g þ h; the identity element is denoted as “0,” and the inverse element of g is denoted
as g. In case the multiplicative notation has been employed, the group operation
applied to g, h in the group is denoted as g  h or simply gh; the identity element is
denoted as “1,” and the inverse element of g is denoted as g1. As in the case of
multiplication modulo N, we also define division by g as multiplication by g1
(i.e., ½ðh=gÞ mod N is defined as ½ðh g1Þ mod N]). Finally, we remark that this
does not imply that the group operation corresponds to the addition or multiplica-
tion operation for integers. Instead, this merely serves as useful general notation.
Example 4. A set may be formed as a group under one operation, but not another
operation. For example, the set of integers Z forms an abelian group under the addition
operation: the identity element is “0,” and every integer g has inverse identity g. On the
other hand, it does not form a group under multiplication operation since, for example,
the multiplicative inverse of the integer “0” does not make sense.
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Example 5. The set of complex numbers C is not a group under multiplication, since
“0” does not have a multiplicative inverse. The set of nonzero complex numbers, however,
is an abelian group under multiplication with identity “1.”
Example 6. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer. The set {0;…, N  1} with respect to addition
modulo N is an abelian group of order N: closure is obvious; associativity and commuta-
tivity follow from the fact that the integers satisfy these properties; the identity element is
0; and, since aþ ðN  aÞ ¼ 0 mod N, it follows that the inverse element of any element a
is ½ðN  aÞ mod N. We denote this group by ðZN,þÞ. (Occasionally, the notion ZN will
also be used to denote the set {0;…, N  1} without involving any particular operation.)
The “cancelation law” for groups has been demonstrated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.1 Let ðG,Þ be a group and a, b, c∈G. If a c ¼ b c, then a ¼ b. In
particular, if a c ¼ c, then a is the identity element in G.
Proof.We know a c ¼ b c. Multiplying both sides by the unique inverse
element c1 of the element c, we obtain a ¼ b. In detail
a ¼ a 1 ¼ a ðc c1Þ ¼ ða cÞ  c1 ¼ ðb cÞ  c1 ¼ b ðc c1Þ ¼ b 1 ¼ b: (2.4)
Group exponentiation: It is often useful to be able to describe the group oper-
ation applied n times to a fixed element g, where n is a positive integer. As for the
additive operation, we demonstrate this as n  g or ng, that is,
ng ¼ n  g ¼def  g þ⋯þ g|fflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflffl}
n    times
: (2.5)
Note that n is an integer, while g is a group element. So ng does not represent the
group operation applied to n and g (indeed, we are working in a group where
the group operation is written additively). However, the operation “behaves
fortunately as it should,” for example, if g∈G and n, n0 are integers, then
ðngÞ þ ðn0gÞ ¼ ðnþ n0Þg, nðn0gÞ ¼ ðnn0Þg and 1  g ¼ g. In an abelian group G with
g, h∈G, ðngÞ þ ðnhÞ ¼ nðg þ hÞ.
As for the multiplicative operation, we demonstrate application of the group
operation n times to an element g by gn. That is,
gn ¼def  g ⋯ g|fflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflffl}
n   times
: (2.6)
The familiar rules of exponentiation follow: gn  gn0 ¼ gnþn0 , ðgnÞn0 ¼ gnn0 , and
g1 ¼ g. Also, if G is a commutative group and g, h∈G, then gn  hn ¼ ðghÞn.
The above notation can be extended to the case when n is zero or a negative
integer in the natural way. Generally, we leave gr undefined if r is not an integer. As
for additive operation, we have 0  g¼def0 and ðnÞ  g¼defn  ðgÞ such that n is a
positive integer. (Note that in the equation “0  g ¼ 0,” the “0” on the left-hand side
is the integer 0, while the “0” on the right-hand side is the identity element in the
group.) As one would expect, it can be shown that ðnÞ  g ¼ ðngÞ. As for multi-
plicative notation, g0 ¼def1 and gn ¼defðg1Þn. Again, as expected, one can show that
gn ¼ ðgnÞ1.
Theorem 2.1
If ðG,Þ is a finite group with the order m ¼ |G|, then for any element g∈G, gm ¼ 1.
Proof.We prove the theorem only for the commutative group ðG,Þ (despite it
holds for any finite group). Fix arbitrary g∈G, and let g1,⋯, gm be the elements
of G. We claim that
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g1  g2 ⋯ gm ¼ ðg  g1Þ  ðg  g2Þ ⋯ ðg  gmÞ: (2.7)
It is noted that g  gi ¼ g  gj implies gi ¼ gj according to the cancelation law
shown in Lemma 2.1. Thus m elements in parentheses on the right-hand side of the
displayed equation are pairwise different from each other. By considering that there
are exactly m elements in G, the m elements being multiplied together on the right-
hand side are simply all elements of G in some permuted order. The order in which
all elements of the group are multiplied does not matter due to the fact that the
group ðG,Þ is commutative, and thus the result of the right-hand side is identical
to the result of left-hand side.
Fueled by the fact that ðG,Þ is commutative, all occurrences of the element g
can be pulled out, and we can obtain
g1  g2 ⋯ gm ¼ ðg  g1Þ  ðg  g2Þ ⋯ ðg  gmÞ ¼ gm  ðg1  g2 ⋯ gmÞ: (2.8)
Once again by the cancelation law in the group, it is obvious that gm ¼ 1.
Corollary 2.1
If ðG,Þ is a finite group with the order m ¼ |G| > 1, then for any element g∈G and
any integer i, gi ¼ g½i mod m.
Proof. According to Proposition 2.1, i can be expressed as qmþ r, where q, r are
integers and r can be demonstrated as ½i mod m. By Theorem 2.1,
gi ¼ gqmþr ¼ gqm  gr¼ 1q  gr ¼ gr (2.9)
holds.
Example 7. As for the additive operation, the above corollary means that if g is an
element in a group with order m, then i  g ¼ ½i   mod m  g. As an example, consider the
group Z25 of order m ¼ 25, and take g ¼ 13. The corollary can be instantiated as
303  13 ¼ ½303 mod 15  13 ¼ 3  13 ¼ 13þ 13þ 13 ¼ 39 ¼ 14 mod 25: (2.10)
Corollary 2.2
Let ðG,Þ be a finite group with order m ¼ |G| > 1. Let e > 0 be an integer, and
define the function fe : G! G by f eðgÞ ¼ ge. If gcdðe, mÞ ¼ 1, then f e is a permutation.
Furthermore, if d ¼ ½e1 mod m, then f d is the inverse of f e.
Proof. According to Proposition 2.5, e is invertible modulo m due to the fact that
gcdðe,mÞ ¼ 1. To show that fd is the inverse of f e, for any g∈G, we have
f dðf eðgÞÞ ¼ f dðgeÞ ¼ ðgeÞd ¼ ged ¼ g½ed mod m ¼ g1 ¼ g: (2.11)
2.1.2.2 Group (ZN,)
As mentioned before, the set ZN ¼ {0;…, N  1} pairing with the addition oper-
ation moduloN can be regarded as a group. One natural problem is that whether the
set {0;…, N  1} associated with the multiplication operation modulo N can be
viewed as a group or not. It is obvious that “1” can be considered as the identity
element for the multiplication modulo N. However, not every element in this set is
invertible associated with the multiplication modulo N, for example, the multipli-
cative inverse element of “0” obviously does not make sense. What make matters
worse, if N ¼ 8, then the elements “2,” “4,” and “6” are not invertible by exhaus-
tively trying every possible elements in {0;…; 7}. Thus, it is necessary to identify
which elements in {0;…, N  1} are invertible modulo N. Depending on Proposition
2.5, the element a∈ {0;…, N  1} is invertible if and only if gcdða,NÞ ¼ 1. It is also
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easy to observe that the inverse element of a resides in the range {0;…, N  1}. This
results in the definition of the following set for N > 1:
Z

N¼
def
{a∈ {1;…, N  1}|gcdða,NÞ ¼ 1}: (2.12)
In other words, ZN includes integers in the set {1;…, N  1} that are relatively
prime to N.
Based on the discussion above, the identity element and inverse element associ-
ated with each element can be found in ZN. Furthermore, the commutativity and
associativity features inherit from ZN directly. To discuss the feature of closure, let
a, b∈ZN and c ¼ ½a b mod N, and then assume c∉ZN . This implies that
gcdðc, NÞ 6¼ 1, and so a prime p exists such that p|N and p|c. From
c ¼ ½a b mod N, we see that a b ¼ qN þ c for some integer q and thus p|a b.
Based on Proposition 2.3, we obtain p|a or p|b and, thus, contradict either
gcdða,NÞ ¼ 1 or gcdðb,NÞ ¼ 1 (recall that a, b∈ZN). In short, the set ZN with
respect to the multiplication operation modulo N forms a group.
Proposition 2.6
Z

N is a commutative group pairing with the multiplication operation modulo N when
N > 1 is an integer.
Let ϕðNÞ denote the order of the group ðZN,Þ such that ϕðNÞ ¼
def
|ZN |
 
and ϕ
is called the Euler phi function. To compute the value of ϕðNÞ, we first consider the
case when N is prime, i.e., N ¼ p. In this case, all elements in {1;…, p 1} are
relatively prime to p, and so ϕðpÞ ¼ |Zp| ¼ p 1. We then consider the case
N ¼ p q such that p, q are distinct primes. We see that either p|a or q|a if an
integer a∈ {1;…, N  1} is not relatively prime to N. Note that a cannot be divided
by both p and q simultaneously since this would imply pq|a and contradict
a < Nð¼ p qÞ. The elements in {1;…, N  1} that can be divided by p are exactly
the ðq 1Þ elements p; 2p; 3p,…, ðq 1Þp, and the elements that can be divided by q
are exactly the ðp 1Þ elements q; 2q,…, ðp 1Þq. Thus, the number of elements
that are neither divisible by p or q is therefore given by
N  1 ðq 1Þ  ðp 1Þ ¼ p q p qþ 1 ¼ ðp 1Þðq 1Þ: (2.13)
That is to say, ϕðNÞ ¼ ðp 1Þðq 1Þ when N is the product of two distinct
primes p and q.
Theorem 2.2
Let N ¼Qipeii , where the {pi} are distinct primes and ei ≥ 1. Then
ϕðNÞ ¼ N Qið1 1pi1Þ.
Example 8. Take N ¼ 24 ¼ 3  23. Then Z24 ¼ {1; 5; 7; 11; 13; 17; 19; 23} and
|ZN | ¼ 8 ¼ 24 ð1 12 Þ  ð1 13Þ ¼ ϕð24Þ. The inverse identity of 5 in ZN is 5 itself,
since 5 5 ¼ 25 ¼ 1 mod 24.
Until now, the set ZN under the multiplication operation modulo N is shown to
be a group with order ϕðNÞ. According to the Theorem 2.1, we get the following
theorem directly:
Theorem 2.3
Take arbitrary N > 1 and a∈ZN; then we obtain
aϕðNÞ ¼ 1 mod N: (2.14)
For the specific case when N ¼ p is prime and a∈ {1;…, p 1}, we have
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ap1 ¼ 1 mod p: (2.15)
By Corollary 2.2, we obtain the following theorem easily:
Theorem 2.4
Let N > 1 be an integer. For integer e > 0, we define f e : Z

N ! ZN as
f eðxÞ ¼ xe mod. If e is relatively prime to ϕðNÞ, then f e is a permutation. Moreover, if
d ¼ ½e1 mod ϕðNÞ, then f d is the inverse of f e.
Definition 2.2. A function f : G! H is said to be an isomorphism from a group
(G, ∘ GÞ to another group ðH, ∘ HÞ if (1) f is a bijective mapping, and (2) for all
g1, g2 ∈G, we have f ðg1 ∘ G g2Þ ¼ f ðg1Þ ∘ H f ðg2Þ. If these properties hold, then we say
the group (G, ∘ GÞ and the group ðH, ∘ HÞ are isomorphic and write this as G ffi H.
Group isomorphisms: An isomorphism from a group to another group provides an
alternate and equivalent approach to think about the structure of groups. For example,
if the group (G, ∘ GÞ is finite and G ffi H, then the group ðH, ∘ HÞmust be finite and
have the same order as G. Also, if there exists an isomorphism f from a group (G, ∘ GÞ
to another group ðH, ∘ HÞ, then f1 is an isomorphism from ðH, ∘ HÞ to (G, ∘ GÞ.
Example 9. The bijective mapping f where f ðnÞ ¼ 2n is an isomorphism from the
group ðZ,þÞ to the group ðZ2n,þÞ because f ðaþ bÞ ¼ 2ðaþ bÞ ¼ 2aþ 2b ¼
f ðaÞ þ f ðbÞ, where Z2n denotes the set of even integers and þ is the addition operation
for the integers.
Example 10. The bijective mapping f where f ðnÞ ¼ 3n is an isomorphism from
the group ðZ6,þÞ to the group ðZ7,Þ, where þ and  denote the addition operation
modulo 6 and the multiplication operation modulo 7. On the one hand, 30 ¼ 1, 31 ¼ 3,
32 ¼ 2, 33 ¼ 6, 34 ¼ 4, and 35 ¼ 5. On the other hand, f ð2þ 3Þ ¼ 3ð2þ3Þ¼ 32  33 ¼
f ð2Þ  f ð3Þ.
2.1.2.3 Chinese remainder theorem
Theorem 2.5
Let n1, n2,…, nk be integers that are pairwise relatively prime, i.e., gcd ðni, njÞ ¼ 1 for
i 6¼ j. Then there exists a unique solution modulo of the product n ¼ n1  n2 …nk to the
following system of congruences:
x  a1 ðmod n1Þ
x  a2 ðmod n2Þ
⋮
x  ak ðmod nkÞ
: (2.16)
The solution to the system of congruences shown in Theorem 2.5 can be calcu-
lated as
x ¼ ∑
k
i¼1
aiNiMi mod n (2.17)
where
Ni ¼ n
ni
(2.18)
and
Mi ¼ N1i  mod ni: (2.19)
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The solution can also be represented in a slightly different way which makes it
easier to be understood. Namely, we can rewrite Eq. (2.1) as
x ¼ ∑
k
i¼1
ai  ei mod n (2.20)
such that
ei 
1 ðmod niÞ
0 ðmod njÞ, j 6¼ i
:

(2.21)
So the solution of the Chinese remainder theory can be regarded essentially as an
integer version of Lagrange interpolation, where a polynomial is created according
to k points by calculating a similar set of coefficients that are either 0 or 1 and thus
enforce the desired behavior at the given points.
Example 11. Consider the following system of congruences:
x  2 ðmod 3Þ ¼ a1 ðmod n1Þ
x  3 ðmod 5Þ ¼ a2 ðmod n2Þ:
x  2 ðmod 7Þ ¼ a3 ðmod n3Þ
(2.22)
According to the solution of the Chinese remainder theorem, we see that
n ¼ n1  n2  n3 ¼ 3 5 7 ¼ 105
N1 ¼ n
n1
¼ 105
3
¼ 35
N2 ¼ n
n2
¼ 105
5
¼ 21
N3 ¼ n
n3
¼ 105
7
¼ 15
M1 ¼ N11  mod n1 ¼ 21 mod 3 ¼ 2
M2 ¼ N12  mod n2 ¼ 31 mod 5 ¼ 1
M3 ¼ N13  mod n3 ¼ 21 mod 7 ¼ 1
(2.23)
so that
x ¼ ða1 N1 M1 þ a2 N2 M2 þ a3 N3 M3Þ mod 105
¼ ð2 35 2þ 3 21 1þ 2 15 1Þ mod 105
¼ 23 mod 105:
(2.24)
In this example we can also think of the solution as finding integers e1, e2, and e3
such that
x ¼ ð2 e1 þ 3 e2 þ 2 e3Þ mod 105 (2.25)
e1 ¼ 70 
70 ðmod 3Þ
0 ðmod 5Þ
0 ðmod 7Þ
8><>:
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e2 ¼ 21 
0 ðmod 3Þ
21 ðmod 5Þ
0 ðmod 7Þ
8><>:
and
e3 ¼ 15 
0 ðmod 3Þ
0 ðmod 5Þ
15 ðmod 7Þ
:
8><>: (2.26)
2.1.2.4 Cyclic groups and generators
Let ðG,Þ be a finite group with order m. For arbitrary g∈G, consider the set
〈 g〉 ¼def  { g0, g1,…, }: (2.27)
According to Theorem 2.1, gm ¼ 1. If i≤m denotes the smallest positive integer
for which gi ¼ 1, then the above sequence repeats after i terms (i.e., gi ¼ g0,
giþ1 ¼ g1,⋯, g2i ¼ g0, etc.), and so
〈g〉 ¼ {g0,…, gi1}: (2.28)
It is obvious to see that 〈g〉 contains exactly i elements since if gj ¼ gk with
0 ≤ j < k < i, then gkj 6¼ 1 thanks to the choice of i.
It is easy to observe that ð〈g〉,Þ can be regarded as a subgroup of ðG,Þ, which
is generated by the element g. If the order of the subgroup ð〈g〉,Þ is i, then i is
called the order of the element g.
Definition 2.3. If ðG,Þ is a finite group and g is randomly chosen from G, then
the order of element g is defined as the smallest positive integer i such that gi ¼ 1.
Proposition 2.7
If G is a finite group, and g∈G is an element with order i, then for any integer x, we
have gx ¼ g½x mod i.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Corollary 2.1, and
thus we omit it here.
Proposition 2.8
If G is a finite group and g∈G is an element with order i, then gx ¼ gy if and only if
x ¼ y mod i.
Proof. If x ¼ y mod i, then ½x mod i ¼ ½y mod i, and according to the previous
proposition, we directly have
gx ¼ g½x mod i ¼ g½y mod i ¼ gy: (2.29)
On the other hand, from gx ¼ gy, we can easily obtain gx0 ¼ gy0 from the
previous proposition, where x0 ¼ ½x mod i and y0 ¼ ½y mod i. We in turn get
gx
0ðgy0Þ1 ¼ gx0y0 ¼ 1. If x0 6¼ y0, the difference x0  y0 is then a nonzero integer
smaller than i since both x0 and y0 are smaller than i. There is contradiction between
the fact that i is the order of the element g and the fact that x0  y0 is a nonzero
integer smaller than i. Therefore, we obtain x ¼ y0 directly.
The identity element of any group ðG, ∘ Þ, features with the order 1, can
generate the group ð〈e〉, ∘ Þ. Furthermore, identity element is known as the only
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element with order 1. On the other hand, if an element g∈G features with the order
m (where m denotes the order of the group ðG, ∘ Þ) can be found, then 〈g〉 ¼ G. In
other words, G can be generated by the element g and considered as a cyclic group.
Here, g is called a generator of G. (Different from the identity element, a cyclic
group may have multiple generators.) If g is a generator of cyclic group ðG, ∘ Þ, then,
by definition, every element h∈G can be derived by computing gx for some
x∈ {0;…, m 1}.
Proposition 2.9
Let ðG, ∘ Þ be a finite group with order m, and the element g∈G features with the
order i. Then i|m.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1, gm ¼ 1. According to Proposition 2.7, we have
gm ¼ g½m mod i in case the element g features with the order i. If i∤m, then
i0 ¼def ½m mod i is a nonzero integer smaller than i such that gi0 ¼ 1. This contradicts
the fact that i is the order of the element g.
Corollary 2.3
If ðG, ∘ Þ is a group with prime order p, then this group is cyclic. Furthermore, all
elements of G other than the identity element are generators of ðG, ∘ Þ.
Proof. Based on Proposition 2.9, the only possible orders of elements in the
group ðG, ∘ Þ are 1 and p. Only the identity element features with the order 1, and so
all other elements own order p and can generate the original group.
In addition to the groups of prime order, the additive group ZN, for N > 1,
provides another example of a cyclic group, whereas the element 1 offers the
function of generator.
Theorem 2.6
If p is prime, then ðZp,Þ forms a cyclic group.
The proof of this theorem is outside the scope of this book, and the interesting
reader can refer to for more details.
Example 12. Consider the group ðZ11,Þ, which is cyclic by the previous theorem.
We have 〈10〉 ¼ {1; 10}, and so 10 is not a generator. However,
〈2〉 ¼ {1; 2;4; 8; 5; 10; 9; 7; 3; 6} ¼ Z11, (2.30)
and so 2 is a generator of Z11.
Given a cyclic group G with order q, we can represent this group by a generator
g∈G as G ¼ {g0, g1,⋯, gq1}. In other words, each element h∈G can be expressed
as h ¼ gx such that x∈Zq. Correspondingly, x is called the discrete logarithm of h
with respect to the generator g such that x ¼ log gh. Note that the logarithms in this
case are regarded as “discrete” because these logarithm values range over a finite
range, as opposed to “standard” logarithms from calculus whose values are within
an infinite set.
The discrete logarithm problem in a cyclic group G with respect to a given
generator g is to calculate x such that gx ¼ h with the input of a random element
h∈G. Formally speaking, G is a polynomial-time algorithm with the input 1n to
output a cyclic group G with order q and a generator g∈G. In addition, the group
operation in G is required to be computed efficiently (i.e., in time polynomial in n).
Consider the following experiment between a given algorithmA and the algorithm G:
The discrete logarithm experiment DLog
A,GðnÞ
1. Given the parameter n, the algorithm G outputs (G, q, g), where G denotes a
cyclic group with order q and g is a generator of G such that ||q|| ¼ n.
2. Choose h G randomly.
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3.Given {G, q, g, h}, the task of A is to output x∈Zq.
4.This experiment outputs 1 if gx ¼ h and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.4. The discrete logarithm problem is said to be hard relative to the
algorithm G if, for all probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms A, the probability
Pr½DLog
A,GðnÞ ¼ 1 is negligible.
By way of example, groups of the form Zp, where p is prime number, offer one
family of cyclic groups in which the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be
hard [69, 70].
2.1.3 Elliptic curve groups
Different from Zp, another interesting class of groups, which is used widely in
cryptographic applications, is those consisting of points on elliptic curves. Despite
elliptic curve groups being very crucial in practical construction of cryptographic
primitives, our treatment of such groups in this book is rather minimal and sacri-
fices generality in favor of simplicity. The basic reason about this approach is due to
the fact that most cryptographic primitives based on elliptic curve groups can be
understood and investigated by treating the underlying group in a completely
generic manner without involving any particular group used to instantiate the
primitive. Namely, cryptographic primitives can be built on arbitrary cyclic groups,
and the security of these schemes can be proven as long as the related computa-
tional problem in the underlying group is believed to be hard no matter how the
group is actually instantiated. Therefore, mathematical background needed for a
deeper understanding of elliptic curve groups is beyond the scope of this book.
Interested readers can refer to [71] for more details.
Define Zp as {0;…, p 1} for p ≥ 5 be a prime. Despite the elliptic curves can in
fact be defined over arbitrary (finite or infinite) fields, only the case such that p 6¼ 2
or 3 is taken into consideration to eliminate the additional complications. The
elliptic curve E over Zp represents the set of points ðx, yÞ defined by the equation
y2 ¼ x3 þ axþ b mod p with a, b∈ RZp and with the discriminant 4a3 þ 27b2 6¼
0 mod p (this condition ensures that the equation x3 þ axþ b ¼ 0 mod p has no
repeated roots). This set of points on Zp along with a distinguished point O at
infinity {ðx, yÞ|x, y∈Zp ∧Eðx, yÞ ¼ 0}∪ {O} outlines the curve E. The elements of
the set EðZpÞ are called the points on the elliptic curve E defined by
y2 ¼ x3 þ axþ b mod p, and O is called the “point at infinity.”
Example 13. An element y∈Zp is called a quadratic residue modulo p if there exists
an x∈Zp such that x
2 ¼ y mod p, while x is regarded as a square root of y in this case.
According to [68], every quadratic residue modulo p that has exactly two square roots for
p > 2 is prime.
Let f ðxÞ be a function such that f ¼ x3 þ xþ 6 and consider the curve E : y2 ¼
f ðxÞ mod 11. Each value of x for which f ðxÞ is a quadratic residue modulo 11 yields
two points on the curve; a value of x for which f ðxÞ ¼ 0 mod 11 gives one point on
the curve EðZ11Þ. The points on the curve EðZ11Þ (shown in Table 2.1) can be
identified and explained as follows:
• f ð0Þ ¼ 6 mod 11, a quadratic nonresidue modulo 11.
• f ð1Þ ¼ 8 mod 11, a quadratic nonresidue modulo 11.
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• f ð2Þ ¼ 5 mod 11, a quadratic residue modulo 11 with square roots 4 and 7. This
yields the points ð2;4Þ, ð2; 7Þ∈EðZ11Þ.
• f ð3Þ ¼ 3 mod 11, a quadratic residue modulo 11 with square roots 5 and 6. This
yields the points ð3; 5Þ, ð3; 6Þ∈EðZ11Þ.
• f ð4Þ ¼ 8 mod 11, a quadratic nonresidue modulo 11.
• f ð5Þ ¼ 4 mod 11, a quadratic residue modulo 11 with square roots 2 and 9. This
yields the points ð5; 2Þ, ð5; 9Þ∈EðZ11Þ.
• f ð6Þ ¼ 8 mod 11, a quadratic nonresidue modulo 11.
• f ð7Þ ¼ 4 mod 11, a quadratic residue modulo 11 with square roots 2 and 9. This
yields the points ð7; 2Þ, ð7; 9Þ∈EðZ11Þ.
• f ð8Þ ¼ 9 mod 11, a quadratic residue modulo 11 with square roots 3 and 8. This
yields the points ð8; 3Þ, ð8; 8Þ∈EðZ11Þ.
• f ð9Þ ¼ 7 mod 11, a quadratic nonresidue modulo 11.
• f ð10Þ ¼ 4 mod 11, a quadratic residue modulo 11 with square roots 2 and 9.
This yields the points ð10; 2Þ, ð10; 9Þ∈EðZ11Þ.
Including the point O at infinity, there are 7 points in EðZ11Þ.
A common approach to conceptualize EðZpÞ intuitively is to observe the graph
with equation y2 ¼ x3 þ axþ b over the reals (rather than the equation y2 ¼ x3þ
axþ b mod p) as in Figure 2.1. Despite that this figure does not correspond exactly
to EðZpÞ because EðZpÞ consists only a finite number of points (recall that Zp is a
finite set), while there are an infinite number of solutions to the same equation over
the real numbers, the picture offers insightful intuition. In such figure, the point
at infinity O can be viewed as sitting at the top of the y-axis and lying on every
vertical line.
Observations from Figure 2.2 demonstrate that every line intersecting with the
elliptic curve EðZpÞ intersects this curve in exactly three points. In case the elliptic
line is tangent to the curve at the point P, the point P is counted twice, and the point
O is also counted (when the line is vertical). A binary operation (called “addition”)
can be defined from this fact and denoted by “+” on points of EðZpÞ as follows:
• The pointO is defined as the identity element such that PþO ¼ O þ P ¼ P for
all P∈EðZpÞ
• We obtain
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x3 þ xþ 6 mod 11 6 8 5 3 8 4 8 4 9 7 4
Quadratic residue or nonresidue modulo 11?   ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓
y 4 5 2 2 3 2
7 6 9 9 8 9
Table 2.1.
The points on the elliptic curve y2  x3 þ xþ 6 mod 11.
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P1 þ P2 þ P3 ¼ O: (2.31)
for P1, P2, P3 are colinear points on E. (Note that the ordering of P1, P2, P3 has
been disregarded in the sense that the addition operation is commutative for all
points and associative for colinear points.)
Negation. On input a point P, the negation of P is defined as the point P such
that Pþ ðPÞ ¼ O. If P ¼ O, it is easy to see that P ¼ O. Otherwise, due to the
fact that Pþ ðPÞ þO ¼ ðPþ ðPÞÞ þO ¼ O þO ¼ O and Eq. (2.2), it is evident
Figure 2.2.
Addition operations on points on an elliptic curve.
Figure 2.1.
Graph of the elliptic curve y2 ¼ x3 þ xþ 6 such that Δ > 0.
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that the negation of P corresponds to the third point on the line passing through
P and O or, in other words, the vertical line passing through P. According to
Figure 2.2, P is simply the reflection of P in the x-axis, that is, if P ¼ ðx, yÞ, then
P ¼ ðx, yÞ ¼ ðx,  yÞ.
Addition of points: To evaluate the sum P1 þ P2 for two arbitrary points
P1, P2 6¼ O on the elliptic curve E, we can draw the line through P1, P2 (if P1 ¼ P2
then draw the line tangent to E at P1) and identify the third point of intersection P3
of this line with the curve E. From Eq. (2.2), we can directly derive P1 þ P2 ¼ P3.
If P3 ¼ O, then P1 þ P2 ¼ O ¼ O. Otherwise, if the third point of intersection of
the line through P1 and P2 is the point P3 ¼ ðx, yÞ 6¼ O, then
P1 þ P2 ¼ P3 ¼ ðx,  yÞ: (2.32)
It is straightforward but tedious to carry out the addition law concretely. Assume
P1 ¼ ðx1, y1Þ and P2 ¼ ðx2, y2Þ are two points in EðZpÞ with P1, P2 6¼ O and E is
represented by the equation y2 ¼ x3 þ axþ b mod p. The slope of the line through
these points can be computed as
λ ¼
y2y1
x2x1 mod p, P1 6¼  P2
3x21þa
2y1
 mod p, P1 ¼  P2
:
(
(2.33)
The line passing through P1 and P2 can be outlined by the equation
y ¼ λ  ðx x1Þ þ y1 mod p: (2.34)
To find the third point of intersection of this line with E, substitute Eq. (2.3) into
y2 ¼ x3 þ axþ b mod p to obtain
ðλ  ðx x1Þ þ y1Þ2 ¼ x3 þ axþ b mod p: (2.35)
The values of x that satisfy this equation are x1, x2 and ½λ2  x1  x2 mod p. The
first two solutions correspond to the original points P1 and P2, while the third is the
x-coordinate of the third point of intersection P3. The y-value corresponding to this
third value of x is y ¼ ½λ  ðx x1Þ þ y1 mod p. That is, P3 ¼ ðx3, y3Þ where
x3 ¼ ðλ2  x1  x2Þ mod p       y3 ¼ ½λ  ðx1  x3Þ  y1 mod p: (2.36)
It is straightforward that the set of points EðZpÞ pairing with the addition law
defined above forms an abelian group. All the necessary properties have almost
been shown: closure under addition law depends on the fact (the proof is omitted
due to the space limit) that any line intersecting E intersects this curve in exactly
three points, O serves as the identity element, inverse element of each point on
EðZpÞ can also be found in EðZpÞ, and commutativity of addition law rests on
Eq. (2.2). The final property to verify is associativity, which the interested reader
can check themselves with tedious calculation.
According to Table 2.1, there are seven points in the set EðZ11Þ with the curve
E : y2 ¼ x3 þ xþ 6 mod 11 such that
EðZ11Þ ¼ {O, ð2;4Þ, ð2; 7Þ, ð3; 5Þ, ð3; 6Þ, ð5; 2Þ, ð5; 9Þ, ð7; 2Þ, ð7; 9Þ, ð8; 3Þ,
ð8; 8Þ, ð10; 2Þ, ð10; 9Þ}: (2.37)
Suppose P ¼ ð2; 7Þ, 2P ¼ Pþ P can be computed as follows:
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First, the slope of the line can be calculated as follows:
λ ¼ 3 2
2 þ 1
2 7  mod 11 ¼
2
3
 mod 11 ¼ 8: (2.38)
After that, we obtain
x3 ¼ ð82  2 2Þ mod 11 ¼ 5
y3 ¼ ½8 ð2 5Þ  7 mod 11 ¼ 2:
(2.39)
Therefore, 2P ¼ ð5; 2Þ. Similarly, we can also get 3P ¼ ð8; 3Þ, 4P ¼ ð10; 2Þ,
5P ¼ ð3; 6Þ, 6P ¼ ð7; 9Þ, 7P ¼ ð7; 2Þ, 8P ¼ ð3; 5Þ, 9P ¼ ð10; 9Þ, 10P ¼ ð8; 8Þ,
11P ¼ ð5; 9Þ, 12P ¼ ð2;4Þ, and 13P ¼ O.
It is easy to see that EðZ11Þ along with the addition operation forms a commuta-
tive group with the generator P ¼ ð2; 7Þ.
Similar to Zp, elliptic curve groups provide another family of cyclic groups in
which the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be hard [71].
2.1.4 Bilinear pairing
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with the generator g and the prime order p
and GT be another multiplicative cyclic group of the same order p. A bilinear
pairing refers to a map e^ : GG! GT featured with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For all g1, g2 ∈G, and a, b∈Z

p, e^ðga1 , gb2Þ ¼ e^ðg1, g2Þab.
2.Nondegeneracy: There exist g1, g2 ∈G such that e^ðg1, g2Þ 6¼ 1GT .
3. Computability: For all g1, g2 ∈G, there is an efficient algorithm to compute
e^ðg1, g2Þ.
The modifiedWeil pairing [77] or Tate pairing [72] defined on the elliptic curves
can be adopted to implement such an admissible bilinear map.
2.2. Public-key cryptography
The discussion thus far has been very general. We now show some concrete
examples of concrete public-key encryption and signature schemes in the tradi-
tional PKI and ID-PKC settings, respectively. As mentioned in [73], public-key
encryption enables two parties to communicate with each other securely without
any shared secret information in advance. Let us call the sender Alice and the
receiver Bob. Bob first selects the key pair ðpkB, skBÞ and sends the public key pkB to
Alice over any channel but keeps the private key skB secure and secret. Before
sending the sensitive message m to Bob, Alice generates the ciphertext c by
performing the encryption algorithm c ¼ EncpkBðmÞ under Bob’s public key. To
recover the message m, Bob decrypts the ciphertext c by carrying out the inverse
decryption DecskBðcÞ with his own private key skB. According to [74], digital signa-
ture allows a user to generate a signature on the given message with secret key sk in
such a way that any other party who knows this user’s corresponding public key pk
can ensure that the message indeed originated from this user and has not been
altered in any way. Let us call the sender Alice and the receiver Bob. The sender
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Alice first generates a public/secret key pair ðpkA, skAÞ and then distributes pkA in
some reliable way to the other users in the system while keeping skA secret. When
the message m originated from Alice needs to be authenticated, Alice can generate
a digital signature σ on the message m using her private key skA; the pair ðm, σÞ
will be then sent. Anyone who knows the public key pkA can verify the authenticity
of m by checking whether Vrf ypkðm, σÞ ¼
? 1 or not. In this section, we have chosen
to focus on the most well-known and long-standing public-key primitives in this
section.
Observing that all existing constructions of public-key encryption and signature
schemes are proven secure under some assumptions associated with the hardness of
solving some mathematical problems. Therefore, the number-theoretic hard prob-
lems related to these constructions have been first reviewed here.
Definition 2.5. (RSA problem) Let N ¼ p q, where p and q are two distinct
odd prime numbers. Let e be a random prime number such that gcdðe, ðp 1Þ
ðq 1ÞÞ ¼ 1, and let G be a cyclic subgroup of ZN . Given ðN, eÞ and y∈G, the RSA
problem consists of finding z∈ZN such that y ¼ ze.
Definition 2.6. (Discrete logarithm (DL) problem) Let G be a finite cyclic group
and g be a generator of G. Given a random element h∈G, the DL problem consists
of computing the exponent x such that h ¼ gx.
Definition 2.7. (Weil Diffie-Hellman (WDH) problem) Given a generator P of
G and a triple < aP, bP, cP > for random a, b, c∈Zp, the WDH problem is to com-
pute e^ðP,PÞabc ∈GT.
Definition 2.8. (Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem) Given a generator
P of G and a tuple < aP, bP, cP > for a, b, c∈Zp, the DDH problem is to decide
whether c ¼? ab mod q holds or not.
Definition 2.9. (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem) Given a gen-
erator P of G and a tuple < aP, bP > for a, b∈Zp, the CDH problem is to compute
abP.
2.2.1 Public-key encryption algorithms
2.2.1.1 Framework of public-key encryption
Definition 2.10. A public-key encryption scheme (see Figure 2.3) consists of the
following three algorithms:
1. Gen: Given a security parameter 1n, this algorithm outputs a pair of public and
secret keys ðpk, skÞ.
2. Enc: On input a public key pk and a messagem from some underlying plaintext
space, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext c, which can be denoted as
c EncpkðmÞ.
3.Dec: On input a private key sk and a ciphertext c, this algorithm outputs a
message m or a special symbol ⊥ to denote failure, which can be written as
m ¼ DecskðcÞ.
We make the consistency constraint that if for every n, every ðpk, skÞ generated
by Genð1nÞ, every message m in the appropriate underlying plaintext space, and
c ¼ EncpkðmÞ, then DecskðcÞ ¼ m.
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2.2.1.2 RSA encryption scheme
The RSA encryption scheme [75] is the most widely used public-key encryption
scheme, and its security depends on the intractability of the RSA problem. Con-
cretely, the RSA encryption scheme consists of the following three algorithms:
Gen: To create the public key and the corresponding secret key, the following
steps are performed:
1. Randomly choose two prime numbers p and q such that |p| ≈ |q|.
2. Compute N ¼ p q.
3. Compute ϕðNÞ ¼ ðp 1Þ  ðq 1Þ.
4.Randomly choose an integer e < ϕðNÞ such that gcd ðe,ϕðNÞÞ ¼ 1, and
compute the integer d such that e d  1 mod ϕðNÞ.
5. Publish ðN, eÞ as the public key, and keep d as the corresponding private key.
Note that p, q and ϕðNÞ will be destroyed safely.
Enc: Before sending a sensitive message m < N, the sender creates the cipher-
text c ¼ me mod N. (Note that the plaintext message space is in fact ZN.)
Dec: To decrypt the ciphertext c, the corresponding receiver computes
m ¼ cd mod N.
2.2.1.3 ElGamal encryption scheme
The ElGamal encryption scheme [76] is constructed based on the DL problem.
Concretely, the ElGamal encryption scheme consists of the following three
algorithms:
Gen: To create the public key and the corresponding secret key, the following
steps are performed:
1. Choose a random multiplicative generator g of Zp such that p is a random
prime number.
2. Pick a random number 1 ≤ x ≤ p 2 as the private key.
Figure 2.3.
Intuition of public-key encryption.
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3.Compute the corresponding public key by y ¼ gxð mod pÞ.
4.Publish ðp, g, yÞ as the public key, and keep x as the corresponding private key.
Enc: Before sending a sensitive message m∈Zp, the sender picks 1 ≤ k ≤ p 2
and computes the ciphertext as follows:
c1 ¼ gkðmod pÞ, c2 ¼ ykðmod pÞ: (2.40)
Dec: To decrypt the ciphertext ðc1, c2Þ, the following steps are performed:
m ¼ c2=cx1ðmod pÞ: (2.41)
2.2.1.4 Framework of ID-based encryption scheme
Definition 2.11. An ID-based encryption scheme (see Figure 2.4) consists of the
following three algorithms:
Setup: On input a security parameter k, this algorithm is performed by the PKG
to create the system parameters params and the master secret key master-key such
that params will be distributed to all users in the system and master-key will be kept
secret by PKG itself.
Extract: On input params, master-key, and an arbitrary identity ID∈ {0; 1},
this algorithm is performed by the PKG to generate a private key dID. After that, dID
will be sent to the corresponding user secretly.
Enc: On input params, ID, and m, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
Dec: On input params, ID, c, and the corresponding private key dID, this
algorithm recovers m.
2.2.1.5 Boneh-Franklin IBE
The first practical identity-based encryption scheme is constructed by Boneh
and Franklin [77] based on bilinear pairings, and its security depends on the WDH
problem. First the basic Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme which is not secure against an
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack1 is presented. The only reason for describing the
basic scheme is to improve the readability of the full scheme. After that, the full
scheme extends the basic scheme to achieve security against an adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attack.
Figure 2.4.
Intuition of ID-based encryption.
1 The detail of adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack can be found in Section 2.3.
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Boneh-Franklin IBE (basic scheme): Concretely, the basic Boneh-Franklin IBE
scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup: The algorithm works as follows:
1. Let e^ : GG! GT be a symmetric bilinear pairing defined in Section 2.1.4.
2. Pick a random s∈Zq and set Ppub ¼ sP.
3. Choose two cryptographic hash functions H1: {0; 1}
 ! G and H2 :
GT ! {0; 1}n.
The system parameters params ¼ {P, Ppub, H1, H2} are published to everyone in
the system, while master-key s∈Zq is kept secret by PKG.
Extract: On input a string ID∈ {0; 1}, this algorithm is performed by the PKG
as follows:
1. Compute dID ¼ s H1ðIDÞ as the private key associated with the identity ID.
2. Send dID to the user ID secretly.
Encrypt: To encrypt m under the public-key ID, r is chosen from Zq, and the
ciphertext is generated as follows:
c ¼ 〈rP,m⊕H2 ðgrIDÞ〉 where gID ¼ e^ðH1ðIDÞ, PpubÞ∈GT: (2.42)
Decrypt: Given a ciphertext c ¼ 〈U,V〉 encrypted using the public-key ID. The
plaintext message can be recovered as follows:
V⊕H2ðe^ðdID, UÞÞ ¼ m: (2.43)
Boneh-Franklin IBE (full scheme): Concretely, the full Boneh-Franklin IBE
scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup and Extract: The algorithms are the same as those in the above basic
scheme. In addition, two additional hash function H3: {0; 1}
n  {0; 1}n ! Zq and
H4: {0; 1}
n ! {0; 1}n are required.
Encrypt: To encrypt m under the public-key ID, choose a random γ ∈ {0; 1}n, set
r ¼ H3ðγ, mÞ, and generate the ciphertext as follows:
C ¼ 〈rP, γ⊕H2ð grIDÞ, m⊕H4ðγÞ〉 where gID ¼ e^ðH1ðIDÞ, PpubÞ: (2.44)
Decrypt: Let 〈U,V,W〉 be a ciphertext encrypted using the public-key ID.
Given a ciphertext c ¼ 〈U,V,W〉 encrypted using the public-key ID. The plaintext
message can be recovered as follows:
1. Compute V⊕H2ðe^ðdID, UÞÞ ¼ γ.
2. ComputeW⊕H4ðγÞ ¼ m.
3. Set r ¼ H3ðγ, mÞ. Test that U ¼ rP. If not, reject the ciphertext.
4.Output m.
2.2.2 Signature algorithms
2.2.2.1 Framework of digital signature
Definition 2.12. A signature scheme (see Figure 2.5) consists of the following
three algorithms:
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Gen: Given a security parameter 1n, this algorithm outputs a pair of public and
secret keys ðpk, skÞ.
Sign: On input a private key sk and a message m from some underlying message
space, this algorithm outputs a signature σ, which can be written as σ  SignskðmÞ.
Verify: On input a public key pk, a message m, and a signature σ, this algorithm
returns 1 for accept or 0 for reject.
We make the consistency constraint that if for every n, every ðpk, skÞ generated
by Gen, and every message m, it holds that
Verif ypkðm, SignskðmÞÞ ¼ 1: (2.45)
2.2.2.2 RSA signature scheme
The RSA cryptosystems [75] may be used to provide both encryption and digital
signature. The RSA digital signature is described as follows:
Gen: To create the public key and the corresponding secret key, the following
steps are performed:
1. Randomly choose two prime numbers p and q such that |p| ≈ |q|.
2. Compute N ¼ p q.
3. Compute ϕðNÞ ¼ ðp 1Þ  ðq 1Þ.
4.Randomly choose an integer e < ϕðNÞ such that gcd ðe,ϕðNÞÞ ¼ 1, and
compute the integer d such that e d  1 mod ϕðNÞ.
5. Publish ðN, eÞ as the public key, and keep d as the corresponding private key.
Noted that p, q and ϕðNÞ will be destroyed safely.
Sign: To create a signature of message m∈ZN, the signer creates σ ¼ md mod N.
Verify: Given a message-signature pair ðm, sÞ, this algorithm outputs 1 if
m ¼ σe mod N and returns 0 otherwise.
2.2.2.3 ElGamal signature scheme
The ElGamal cryptosystems [75] may be used to provide both encryption and
digital signature. The ElGamal digital signature is described as follows:
Figure 2.5.
Intuition of digital signature.
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Gen: To create the public key and the corresponding secret key, the following
steps are performed:
1. Choose a random multiplicative generator g of Zp such that p is a random
prime number.
2. Pick a random number 1 ≤ x ≤ p 2 as the private key.
3.Compute the corresponding public key by y ¼ gxð mod pÞ.
4.Publish ðp, g, yÞ as the public key, and keep x as the corresponding private key.
Sign: To create a signature of messagem∈Zp, the signer picks a random number
1 ≤ k ≤ p 2 and generates a signature ðr, sÞ such that
r ¼ gkð mod pÞ, s ¼ k1ðm x rÞð mod p 1Þ: (2.46)
Verify: Given a message-signature pair ðm, ðr, sÞÞ, this algorithm outputs 1 if
yr  rs ¼ gmð mod pÞ and returns 0 otherwise.
2.2.2.4 Schnorr signature scheme
Many variations of the basic ElGamal signature scheme have been proposed, and
Schnorr signature scheme [78] is one well-known variant of the ElGamal scheme.
The ElGamal digital signature is described as follows:
Gen: The system parameters are generated as follows:
1. Choose two prime numbers p and q such that q|p 1.
2. Choose an element g∈Zp of order q.
3. Select a cryptographic hash function H: {0; 1} ! Zq.
4.Select a random number x∈ RZq as the secret key and compute y ¼ gxð mod pÞ
as the public key. Publish ðp, q, g, y,HÞ as the public key and keep x as the
corresponding secret key.
The parameters ðp, q, g, HÞ are publicized for use by system-wide users.
Sign: To create a signature on message m∈ {0; 1}, the signer picks a random
number k from Zq at random and computes a signature such that r ¼ gkð mod pÞ,
e ¼ Hðm||rÞ, and s ¼ kþ x eð mod qÞ.
Verify: Given a message-signature pair ðm, ðe, sÞÞ, this algorithm outputs 1 if
r0 ¼ gs  yeð mod pÞ and e0 ¼ Hðm||r0Þ and returns 0 otherwise.
2.2.2.5 Digital signature standard
In 1991, a digital signature algorithm (DSA) has been presented by the US
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and later been called the
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [79] by the US Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS 186). DSS is regarded as the first digital signature scheme recog-
nized by the US government and is described as follows:
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Gen: The system parameters are generated as follows:
1. Select a prime number q such that 2159 < q< 2160.
2. Choose t such that 0 ≤ t ≤ 8, and select a prime number p where 2511þ64t <
p< 2512þ64t and q|ðp 1Þ.
3. Select a generator g of the unique cyclic group with order q in Zp.
a. Select an element h∈Zp and compute g ¼ hðp1Þ=qmod p.
b. If g ¼ 1 then go to previous step.
4.Select a random integer x such that 1 ≤ x ≤ q 1 and compute y ¼ gxmod p.
5. ðp, q, g, yÞ is published as the public key, while x is kept secret as the private key
of the corresponding user.
Sign: To create a signature on message m∈ {0; 1}, the following steps are
performed.
1. Select a random secret integer k such that 0 < k < q.
2. Compute r ¼ ðgk mod pÞ mod q.
3. Compute k1 mod q.
4.Compute s ¼ k1{hðmÞ þ xr} mod q.
5. ðr, sÞ is returned as the signature on the message m.
Verify: Given a message-signature pair ðm, ðr, sÞÞ, the following steps are
performed to check the validity of the signature.
1. Compute u1 ¼ s1  hðmÞ mod q and u2 ¼ r  s1 mod q.
2. Output 1 if r ¼ ðgu1yu2  mod pÞ mod q and return 0 otherwise.
2.2.2.6 Framework of ID-based signature scheme
An ID-based encryption scheme (see Figure 2.6) consists of the following three
algorithms:
Setup: On input a security parameter k, this algorithm is performed by the PKG
to create the system parameters params and the master secret key master-key such
that params will be distributed to all users in the system and master-key will be kept
secret by PKG itself.
Extract: On input params, master-key, and an arbitrary identity ID∈ {0; 1},
this algorithm is performed by the PKG to generate a private key dID. After that, dID
will be sent to the corresponding user secretly.
Sign: Given a message m, an identity ID, a private key dID, and params, this
algorithm generates the signature σ on the message m under the identity ID.
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Verify: Given a signature σ, a message m, an identity ID, and params, this
algorithm returns 1 for accept or 0 for reject.
2.2.2.7 Cha-Cheon IBS
Inspired by [77], an ID-based signature scheme has been proposed by Cha
and Cheon [80] using gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups, where GDH group
is a cyclic group where the CDH problem is hard, but the DDH problem is
easy. The Cha-Cheon identity-based signature scheme is described as follows:
Setup: Let e^ : GG! GT be a symmetric bilinear pairing defined in Section
2.1.4. Choose a generator P from the group G, pick a random s∈Zp, set Ppub ¼ sP,
and choose cryptographic hash functions H1: {0; 1}
 G! Zp and H2: {0; 1} ! G.
The system parameter ðP, Ppub, H1, H2Þ is published, while the master secret key s is
kept secret by PKG.
Extract: Given an identity ID, this algorithm computes dID ¼ sH2ðIDÞ and sends
it to the user associated with identity ID secretly.
Sign: Given a secret key dID and a message m, pick a random number r∈Zp and
output a signature σ ¼ ðU,VÞ such that U ¼ rH2ðIDÞ, h ¼ H1ðm,UÞ, and
V ¼ ðrþ hÞdID.
Verify: To verify a signature σ ¼ ðU,VÞ on a message m under an identity ID,
this algorithm outputs 1 if e^ðU þ hH2ðIDÞ, PpubÞ ¼ e^ðP,VÞ and returns 0 otherwise,
where h ¼ H1ðm,UÞ.
2.2.2.8 Bellare-Neven-Namprempre IBS
Bellare et al. [81] proposed the first pairing-free identity-based signature scheme
based on the DL problems. The Bellare-Neven-Namprempre identity-based signa-
ture scheme is described as follows:
Setup: Generate an elliptic curve E over a finite field Zp, a prime q dividing the
number of points on E, and a curve point P of order q, pick a random x∈Zq, and
compute Ppub ¼ xP. Choose two cryptographic hash functions H1, H2: {0; 1} ! Zp.
〈Zp, E, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2〉 is published as the system parameter, and x is kept secret
as the master secret key by PKG.
Extract: Given an identity ID, PKG picks a random r∈Zq and computes R ¼ rP,
c ¼ H1ðID, RÞ, and s ¼ rþ cx mod q. ðR, sÞ is sent to the user associated with ID
secretly.
Figure 2.6.
Intuition of ID-based signature.
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Sign: Given a secret key pair ðR, sÞ associated with ID and a message m, pick a
random t∈Zq and compute T ¼ tP, h ¼ H2ðID,m, R, TÞ, and
z ¼ tþ hs mod q: (2.47)
The resulting signature is σ ¼ ðR,T, zÞ.
Verify: To verify a signature σ ¼ ðR, T, zÞ of a message m for an identity ID,
compute h ¼ H2ðID,m, R, TÞ and c ¼ H1ðID, RÞ and check whether
zP ¼ T þ hðRþ cPpubÞ (2.48)
holds or not.
2.3. Provable security
Provable security, which involves the exact definitions, precise assumptions,
and rigorous security proof of cryptographic primitives, is regarded as the method-
ology unavoidable in designing, analyzing, and evaluating new primitives [82–84].
The basic reason for the necessity of provable security originates from the fact that
the security of a cryptographic primitive cannot be checked in the same way that
software is typically checked. Without a proof that no adversary with enough
computational resources can break the primitive, we can only depend on our intu-
ition about the security of the mentioned primitive. Unfortunately, history has
already demonstrated that intuition in cryptography and information security is
disastrous in the sense that countless examples of unproven schemes or schemes
only with heuristic security proof were broken (sometimes immediately or some-
times years after being published or deployed).
Instead of indiscreetly assuming a given cryptographic primitive is secure,
provable security assumes that some mathematical problems are hard to solve and
then to prove that the given primitive is secure provided this assumption. Con-
cretely, the proof proceeds by presenting an explicit reduction showing how to
construct an efficient algorithm C that succeeds in solving certain computational
tasks that was assumed to be hard from any efficient adversary A that succeeds in
breaking the primitive with nonnegligible probability. The steps of such a proof can
be outlined in a high level as follows:
We first assume that some mathematical problem X cannot be solved by any
polynomial-time algorithm except with negligible probability. To prove that some
cryptographic primitive Π is secure, the following steps are performed.
Initial: Assume an efficient adversary A attempts to attack the cryptographic
primitive Π and denotes A’s success probability by ε.
1. An efficient adversary C is constructed by employing adversary A as a
subroutine to solve problem X. Given some input instance of mathematical
problem X, the algorithm C will simulate an execution of Π for the adversary
A such that:
a. The view of A when it is invoked as a subroutine by C should be identical
to the view of A when it interacts with the real primitive Π itself.
b.Furthermore, if A succeeds in breaking the execution of Π which is being
simulated by C, this should enable C to solve the given instance of X with
inverse polynomial probability 1p.
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2. From Step 1, it is obvious that if ε is not negligible, then the problem X can be
solved by C with nonnegligible probability εp, which contradicts the initial
assumption. Therefore, we conclude that, given the assumption associated
with X, no efficient algorithm A can succeed with nonnegligible probability ε;
in other words, Π is proven to be computationally secure formally.
2.3.1 Public-key encryption
As for the security model of public-key encryption, we begin our definitional
treatment by considering the case of an eavesdropping adversary who observes a
single ciphertext that it wishes to crack. In other words, the eavesdropping adver-
sary does not have any further interaction with the sender or the receiver after
receiving a (single) ciphertext. Intuitively speaking, the security model for the
public-key encryption is depicted by the definition of indistinguishability. Particu-
larly, consider an experiment PubKeavA,ΠðnÞ between an eavesdropping adversary A
and a corresponding simulator/challenger C, in which A outputs two messages m0
andm1 with equal length and in turn is given an encryption of one of these messages
randomly chosen by C using a randomly generated key. According to the definition
of indistinguishability, a public-key encryption scheme Π is said to be secure if, in
this experiment, no adversary A can distinguish which message is encrypted better
than a naive guess. We now give the formal definition of PubKeavA,ΠðnÞ as follows:
Given a public-key encryption scheme Π ¼ ðGen,Enc,DecÞ and an adversary A,
the eavesdropping experiment PubKeavA,ΠðnÞ is defined as follows:
1. The algorithm Genð1nÞ is performed by C to calculate keys ðpk, skÞ.
2. After receiving the public key pk A outputs a pair of messages ðm0, m1Þ such
that |m0| ¼ |m1|.
3.After receiving ðm0, m1Þ, C chooses a random bit b {0; 1} and sends to A a
ciphertext c EncpkðmbÞ. Here, c is called the challenge ciphertext.
4.After receiving c, A outputs a bit b0 and wins the experiment if b0 ¼ b.
Definition 2.13. A public-key encryption scheme Π ¼ ðGen, Enc, DecÞ is
regarded to achieve indistinguishability against an eavesdropper if for all probabi-
listic, polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A in the eavesdropping
experiment PubKeavA,ΠðnÞ, defined as AdvindeavΠ ðAÞ ¼ |2Pr½b0 ¼ b  1|, is negligible.
2.3.1.1 Security against chosen-plaintext attacks
In view of the fact that a relatively weak attacker who only passively eavesdrops
on the communication has been modeled in the eavesdropping experiment, a more
powerful type of adversarial attacker who is allowed to query encryptions of multi-
ple messages in an adaptive manner should be considered to simulate the attacker’s
capabilities in the real world. Thus, a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) has been
defined to enable the adversary A to interact freely with an encryption oracle to
encrypt messages of A’s choice.
Specifically, consider the following experiment defined for public-key encryp-
tion scheme Π ¼ ðGen, Enc,DecÞ; the CPA indistinguishability experiment
PubK
cpa
A,ΠðnÞ between the adversary A who can mount chosen-plaintext attack and a
corresponding simulator/challenger C is defined as follows:
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Initial: The algorithm Genð1nÞ is performed by C to calculate keys ðpk, skÞ.
Phase 1: After receiving the public key pk, A issues a sequence of queries to the
oracle EncpkðÞ adaptively.
Challenge: After deciding Phase 1 is over, A outputs a pair of messages ðm0, m1Þ
with equal length. C now chooses a random bit b {0; 1} and sends to A a cipher-
text c EncpkðmbÞ. Here, c is called the challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2: The adversary A now issues a second sequence of queries to the oracle
EncpkðÞ adaptively again as in Phase 1.
Guess: After receiving c, A outputs a bit b0 and wins the experiment if b0 ¼ b.
Definition 2.14. A public-key encryption scheme Π ¼ ðGen, Enc,DecÞ is
regarded to achieve indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks if for all
probabilistic, polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A in the experiment
PubK
cpa
A,ΠðnÞ, defined as AdvindcpaΠ ðAÞ ¼ |2Pr½b0 ¼ b  1|, is negligible.
2.3.1.2 Security against chosen-ciphertext attacks
To strengthen the adversary’s capabilities further, a third type of adversary,
which is more powerful than the former two types of adversaries and can mount
chosen-ciphertext attack [85, 86], should be taken into consideration. In this attack
model, the adversary is not only allowed to encrypt any messages of its choice as in
the chosen-plaintext attack model but also enabled the adversary to decrypt any
ciphertexts of its choice. Therefore, the chosen-ciphertext attack is regarded as the
most powerful attack associated to the public-key encryption so far.
Specifically, consider the following experiment defined for public-key encryption
scheme Π ¼ ðGen, Enc, DecÞ; the CCA indistinguishability experiment PubKccaA,ΠðnÞ
(shown in Figure 2.7) between the adversary A who can mount chosen-ciphertext
attack and a corresponding simulator/challenger C is defined as follows:
Initial: The algorithm Genð1nÞ is performed by C to calculate keys ðpk, skÞ.
Phase 1: After receiving the public key pk, A issues a sequence of queries to the
encryption oracle EncpkðÞ and the decryption oracle DecskðÞ adaptively.
Challenge: After deciding Phase 1 is over, A outputs a pair of messages ðm0, m1Þ
with equal length. C now chooses a random bit b {0; 1} and sends to A a cipher-
text c EncpkðmbÞ. Here, c is called the challenge ciphertext.
Figure 2.7.
CCA experiment PubKccaA;ΠðnÞ for public-key encryption.
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Phase 2: After receiving c, A now issues a second sequence of queries to the
oracles EncpkðÞ and DecskðÞ adaptively again as in Phase 1 with the restriction that
the challenged ciphertext cannot be queried to the decryption oracle.
Guess: A outputs a bit b0 and wins the experiment if b0 ¼ b.
Definition 2.15. A public-key encryption scheme Π ¼ ðGen, Enc,DecÞ is
regarded to achieve indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks if for all
probabilistic, polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A in the experiment
PubKccaA,ΠðnÞ, defined as AdvindccaΠ ðAÞ ¼ |2Pr½b0 ¼ b  1|, is negligible.
2.3.2 ID-based encryption
Different from the public-key encryption in the traditional PKI, the definition of
chosen-ciphertext security must be strengthened a bit in the ID-PKC due to the fact
that the attacker might already own the private keys of users ID1,⋯, IDn of her
choice when she attacks another public key ID. To ensure the security of encryption
scheme in the ID-based environment [77], the definition of chosen-ciphertext
security must enable the attacker to obtain the private key associated with any
identity of her choice (other than the challenged public key ID being attacked).
2.3.2.1 Security against chosen-ciphertext and identity attacks
Specifically, consider the following experiment defined for ID-based encryption
scheme Π ¼ ðSetup, Extract, Encrypt, DecryptÞ; the CCA indistinguishability experi-
ment IBEcca, cida
A,Π ðnÞ (shown in Figure 2.8) between the adversary A who can mount
chosen-ciphertext attack and a corresponding simulator/challenger C is defined as
follows:
Initial: The algorithm Setup is performed by the challenger C to generate the
system parameters params, which will be forwarded to the adversary A.
Phase 1: A can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries in an adap-
tive manner as follows:
1. Upon receiving an identity IDi, C runs private key extraction oracle ExtractðÞ
on IDi and forwards the associated private key to A.
Figure 2.8.
CCA experiment IBEcca;cida
A;Π ðnÞ for ID-based encryption.
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2.Upon receiving a tuple ðIDi, ciÞ, C runs decryption oracle DecryptðÞ on ðIDi, ciÞ
and sends the result to A.
Challenge: After deciding Phase 1 is over, adversary submits two plaintexts
ðm0, m1Þ with equal length and an identity ID to C such that the identity ID must
not have sent to the private key extraction oracle ExtractðÞ in Phase 1. After receiving
ðm0, m1Þ, C selects a random bit b∈ {0; 1}, sets c ¼ Encryptðparams, ID, mbÞ, and
forwards c to the adversary as the challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2: This is identical to Phase 1 with the restriction that:
1.A must not have sent ID* to the private key extraction oracle ExtractðÞ.
2.A must not have sent ðID, cÞ to the decryption oracle DecryptðÞ.
Guess: A outputs a bit b0 and wins the experiment if b0 ¼ b.
Definition 2.16. An ID-based encryption scheme
Π ¼ ðSetup, Extract, Encrypt, DecryptÞ is regarded to achieve indistinguishability
against chosen-ciphertext attacks if for all probabilistic, polynomial-time adversar-
ies A, the advantage of A in the experiment IBEcca, cida
A,Π ðnÞ, defined as
AdvindccaibeΠ ðAÞ ¼ |2Pr½b0 ¼ b  1|, is negligible.
2.3.3 Digital signature
To capture the adversary’s power in the digital signature, a security property
called existential unforgeability against a chosen message attack [87] should be
achieved in the sense that the existential unforgeability means that the adversary
should not be able to generate a valid signature on any message, and the chosen
message attack means that the adversary is able to obtain signatures on any mes-
sages it wishes during its attack. We now give the formal definition of existential
unforgeability against a chosen message attack as follows:
2.3.3.1 Security against chosen message attacks
Let Π ¼ ðGen, Sign, Verif yÞ be a signature scheme, and consider the following
experiment Sig  f orgecma
A,ΠðnÞ (shown in Figure 2.9) between an adversary A and a
corresponding challenger/simulator C as follows:
Figure 2.9.
Unforgeability experiment Sig  f orcecma
A;ΠðnÞ for signature.
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Initial: The algorithm Gen is run by C to obtain keys ðpk, skÞ such that the public
key pk is forwarded to the adversary A, whereas the private key sk is kept secret
by C itself.
Attack: After receiving the public key pk, A is given to access the signing oracle
SignskðÞ which returns a signature SignskðmÞ for any message m of A’s choice.
Forgery: A outputs a message and signature pair ðm, σÞ. A wins this experiment
if Verif ypkðm, σÞ ¼ 1 with the restriction that σ has not been queried to the
oracle SignskðÞ.
Definition 2.17. A signature scheme Π ¼ ðGen, Sign, Vrf yÞ is said to achieve
existentially unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack if for all prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A wins the experiment
Sig  f orgecma
A,ΠðnÞ is negligible.
2.3.4 ID-based signature
The security model of existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen mes-
sage attack in the traditional PKI can be extended to the identity-based environ-
ment naturally [80, 81]. We now give the formal definition of existential
unforgeability against a chosen message attack for the ID-based signature as
follows:
2.3.4.1 Security against chosen message and identity attacks
Let Π ¼ ðSetup, Extract, Sign, Verif yÞ be a signature scheme, and consider the
following experiment IBS f orgecma, cida
A,Π ðnÞ (shown in Figure 2.10) between an
adversary A and a corresponding challenger/simulator C as follows:
Initial: The algorithm Setup is performed by the challenger C to generate the
system parameters params, which will be forwarded to the adversary A.
Attack:A can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries in an adaptive
manner as follows:
• Upon receiving an identity IDi, C runs private key extraction oracle ExtractðÞ
on IDi and forwards the associated private key to A.
Figure 2.10.
Unforgeability experiment IBS f orgecma, cida
A;Π ðnÞ for ID-based signature.
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• Upon receiving a tuple ðID,mÞ, C runs signing oracle SignðÞ on ðID,mÞ and
forwards the result to A.
Forgery: A outputs a message m, an identity ID, and a signature σ. A is said to
succeed in the experiment IBS f orgecma, cida
A,Π ðnÞ if the following requirements are
satisfied:
1. Verify(params, ID, m, σ) = 1.
2. ID has not been queried to the private key extraction oracle ExtractðÞ.
3. (ID, m) has not been queried to the signing oracle SignðÞ.
Definition 2.18. An ID-based signature scheme Π ¼ ðSetup, Extract, Sign, Verif yÞ
is said to achieve existentially unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message
attack if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A
wins the experiment IBS f orgecma, cida
A,Π ðnÞ is negligible.
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Chapter 3
Information Retrieval
3.1. Introduction
Information retrieval is a very simple concept with everyone having practical
experience in its use. The scenario of a user having an information need, translating
that into a search statement and executing that search to locate the information, has
become ubiquitous to everyday life. The Internet has become a repository of any
information a person needs, replacing the library as a more convenient research
tool. An information retrieval system is a system that ingests information, trans-
forms it into searchable format, and provides an interface to allow a user to search
and retrieve information. The most obvious example of an information retrieval
system is Google, and the English language has even been extended with the term
“Google it” to mean search for something.
So, everyone has had an experience with information retrieval systems, and with
a little thought, it is easy to answer the question: does it work? Everyone who has
used such systems has experienced the frustration that is encountered when looking
for certain information. Given the massive amount of intellectual effort that is
going into the design and evolution of a “Google” or other search systems, the
question comes to mind why is it so hard to find what you are looking for.
One of the goals of this chapter is to explain the practical and theoretical issues
associated with information retrieval that makes the design of information retrieval
systems one of the challenges of our time. The demand for and expectations of users
to quickly find any information they need continues to drive both the theoretical
analysis and development of new technologies to satisfy that need. To scope the
problem, one of the first things that need to be defined is “information.” Twenty-
five years ago, information retrieval was totally focused on textual items. That was
because almost all of the “digital information” of value was in textual form. In
today’s technical environment, most people carry with them most of the time the
capability to create images and videos of interest, that is, the cell phone. This has
made modalities other than text to become as common as text. That is coupled with
the Internet Web sites that allow and are designed for ease of the use of uploading
and storing those modalities which more than justify the need to include other than
text as part of the information retrieval problem. There are a lot of parallelisms
between the information processing steps for text, images, audio, and video.
Although maps are another modality that could be included, they will only be
generally discussed.
In general, information that will be considered in information retrieval systems
includes text, images, audio, and video. The term “item” shall be used to define a
specific information object. This could be a textual document, a news item from an
RSS feed, an image, a video program, or an audio program. It is useful to make a
distinction between the original items from what is processed by the information
retrieval system as the basic indexable item. The original item will always be kept
for display purposes, but a lot of preprocessing can occur on it during the process of
creating the searchable index. The term “item” will refer to the original object. On
occasion the term document will be used when the item being referred to is a
textual item.
An information retrieval system is the hardware and software that facilitates a
user in finding the information the user needs. Hardware is included in the
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definition because specialized hardware is needed to transform certain modalities
into digital processing format (e.g., encoders that translate composite video to digital
video). As the detailed processing of items is described, it will become clear that an
information retrieval system is not a single application but is composed of many
different applications that work together to provide the tools and functions needed to
assist the users in answering their questions. The overall goal of an information
retrieval system is to minimize the user overhead in locating the information of value.
Overhead from a user’s perspective can be defined as the time it takes to locate the
needed information. The time starts when a user starts to interact with the system
and ends when they have found the items of interest. Human factors play signifi-
cantly in this process. For example, most users have a short threshold on frustration
waiting for a response. That means in a commercial system on the Internet, the user is
more satisfied with a response less than 3 s than a longer response that has more
accurate information. In internal corporate systems, users are willing to wait a little
longer to get results, but there is still a trade-off between accuracy and speed. Most
users would rather have the faster results and iterate on their searches than allowing
the system to process the queries with more complex techniques providing better
results. All of the major processing steps are described for an information retrieval
system, but in many cases, only a subset of them are used on operational systems
because users are not willing to accept the increase in response time.
The evolution of information retrieval systems has been closely tied to the evolu-
tion of computer processing power. Early information retrieval systems were focused
on automating the manual indexing processes in libraries. These systemsmigrated the
structure and organization of card catalogs into structured databases. They
maintained the same Boolean search query structure associated with the database that
was used for other database applications. This was feasible because all of the assign-
ment of terms to describe the content of a document was done by professional
indexers. In parallel, there was also academic research work being done on small data
sets that considered how to automate the indexing process making all of the text of a
document part of the searchable index. The only place that large systems designed to
search on massive amounts of text were available was in government and military
systems. As commercial processing power and storage significantly increased, it
became more feasible to consider applying the algorithms and techniques being
developed in the universities to commercial systems. In addition, the creation of the
original documents also was migrating to digital format so that they were in a format
that could be processed by the new algorithms. The largest change that drove infor-
mation technologies to become part of everyone’s experience was the introduction
and growth of the Internet. The Internet became a massive repository of unstructured
information, and information retrieval techniques were the only approach to effec-
tively locate information on it. This changed the funding and development of search
techniques from a few government-funded efforts to thousands of new ideas being
funded by venture capitalists moving the more practical implementation of univer-
sity algorithms into commercial systems.
3.2. Objectives of information retrieval system
The general objective of an information retrieval system is to minimize the time
it takes for a user to locate the information they need. The goal is to provide the
information needed to satisfy the user’s question. Satisfaction does not necessarily
mean finding all information on a particular issue. It means finding sufficient
information that the user can proceed with whatever activity initiated. This is very
important because it does explain some of the drivers behind the existing search
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systems and suggests that precision is typically more important than recalling all
possible information. For example, a user looking for a particular product does not
have to find the names of everyone that sells the product or every company that
manufactures the product to meet their need of getting that product. Of course, if
they did have total information, then it is possible that they could have gotten it
cheaper, but in most cases, the consumer will never know what they missed. The
concept that a user does not know how much information they missed explains why
in most cases the precision of a search is more important than the ability to recall all
possible items of interest; the user never knows what they missed, but they can tell
if they are seeing a lot of useless information in the first few pages of search results.
That does not mean that finding everything on a topic is not important to some
users. If you are trying to make decisions on purchasing a stock or a company, then
finding all the facts about that stock or company may be critical to prevent a bad
investment. Missing the one article talking about the company being sued and
possibly going bankrupt could lead to a very painful investment. But providing
comprehensive retrieval of all items that are relevant to a user’s search can have the
negative effect of information overload on the user. In particular there is a tendency
for important information to be repeated in many items on the same topic. Thus,
trying to get all information makes the process of reviewing and filtering out
redundant information very tedious. The better a system is in finding all items on a
question (Recall), the more important techniques to present aggregates of that
information become.
From the user’s perspective, time is the important factor that they use to gage
the effectiveness of information retrieval. Except for users that do information
retrieval as a primary aspect of their job (e.g., librarians and research assistants),
most users have very little patience for investing extensive time in finding infor-
mation they need. They expect interactive response from their searches with replies
within 3 C4s at the most. Instead of looking through all the hits to see what might be
of value, they will only review the first one, and at most second pages before
deciding, they need to change their search strategy. These aspects of the human
nature of searchers have had a direct effect on the commercial Web sites and the
development of commercial information retrieval. The times that are candidates to
be minimized in an information retrieval system are the time to create the query,
the time to execute the query, the time to select what items returned from the query
the user wants to review in detail, and the time to determine if the returned item is
of value. The initial research in information retrieval focused on the search as the
primary area of interest. But to meet the user’s expectation of fast response and to
maximize the relevant information returned require optimization in all of these
areas. The time to create a query used to be considered outside the scope of techni-
cal system support. But systems such as Google know what is in their database and
what other users have searched on; so as you type a query, they provide hints on
what to search on. This vocabulary browse capability helps the user in expanding
the search string and helps in getting better precision.
In information retrieval, the term “relevant” is used to represent an item
containing the needed information. In reality, the definition of relevance is not a
binary classification but a continuous function. Items can exactly match the infor-
mation need or partially match the information need. From a user’s perspective,
“relevant” and needed are synonymous. From a system perspective, information
could be relevant to a search statement (i.e., matching the criteria of the search
statement) even though it is not needed/relevant to user (e.g., the user already
knew the information or just read it in the previous item reviewed).
Relevant documents are those that contain some information that helps answer
the user’s information need. Nonrelevant documents do not contain any useful
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information. Using these definitions, the two primary metrics used in evaluating
information retrieval systems can be defined. They are Precision and Recall:
Precision ¼ Number_Retrieved_Relevant
Number_Total_Retrieved
:
Recall ¼ Number_Retrieved_Relevant
Number_Possible_Relevant
:
(3.1)
Number_Possible_Relevant is the number of relevant items in the database,
Number_Total_Retrieved is the total number of items retrieved from the query, and
Number_Retrieved_Relevant is the number of items retrieved that are relevant to the
user’s search need.
Precision is the factor that most users understand. When a user executes a search
and has 80% precision, it means that four out of five items that are retrieved are of
interest to the user. From a user’s perspective, the lower the precision the more likely
the user is wasting his resource (time) looking at nonrelevant items. From a metric
perspective, the precision figure is across all of the “hits” returned from the query.
But in reality most users will only look at the first few pages of hit results before
deciding to change their query strategy. Thus, what is of more value in commercial
systems is not the total precision but the precision across the first 20C50 hits. Typi-
cally, in a weighted system where the words within a document are assigned weights
based upon how well they describe the semantics of the document, precision in the
first 20C50 items is higher than the precision across all the possible hits returned. But
when comparing search systems, the total precision is used.
Recall is a very useful concept in comparing systems. It measures how well a
search system is capable of retrieving all possible hits that exist in the database.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate except in very controlled environments.
It requires in the denominator the total number of relevant items in the database. If
the system could determine that number, then the system could return them. There
have been some attempts to estimate the total relevant items in a database, but there
are no techniques that provide accurate enough results to be used for a specific
search request. In Chapter 3.3 on “Information Retrieval Evaluation,” techniques
that have been used in evaluating the accuracy of different search systems will be
described. But it is not applicable in the general case.
3.3. Classic information retrieval
In this section we briefly present the three classic models in information
retrieval, namely, the Boolean, the vector, and the probabilistic models.
3.3.1 Basic concepts
The classic models in information retrieval consider that each document is
described by a set of representative keywords called index terms. An index term is
simply a (document) word whose semantics helps in remembering the document’s
main themes. Thus, index terms are used to index and summarize the document
contents. In general, index terms are mainly nouns because nouns have meaning by
themselves and, thus, their semantics is easier to identify and to grasp. Adjectives,
adverbs, and connectives are less useful as index terms because they work mainly as
complements. However, it might be interesting to consider all the distinct words in
a document collection as index terms. We postpone a discussion on the problem of
how to generate index terms, where the issue is covered in detail.
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Given a set of index terms for a document, we notice that not all terms are
equally useful for describing the document contents. In fact, there are index terms
which are simply vaguer than others. Deciding on the importance of a term for
summarizing the contents of a document is not a trivial issue. Despite this difficulty,
there are properties of an index term which are easily measured and which are
useful for evaluating the potential of a term as such. For instance, consider a
collection with a hundred thousand documents. A word which appears in each of
the 100,000 documents is completely useless as an index term because it does not
tell us anything about which documents the user might be interested in. On the
other hand, a word which appears in just five documents is quite useful because it
narrows down considerably the space of documents which might be of interest to
the user. Thus, it should be clear that distinct index terms have varying relevance
when used to describe document contents. This effect is captured through the
assignment of numerical weights to each index term of a document.
Let ki be an index term, dj be a document, and wi, j ≥0 be a weight associated
with the pair (ki, dj). This weight quantifies the importance of the index term for
describing the document semantic contents.
Definition 3.1. Let t be the number of index terms in the system and ki be a
generic index term. K = kl,…, kt is the set of all index terms. A weight wi, j > 0 is
associated with each index term ki of a document dj. For an index term which does
not appear in the document text, wi, j ¼ 0. With the document dj is associated an
index term vector dj
!
represented by dj
!
= (w1, j, w2, j,…, wt, j). Further, let gi be
a function that returns the weight associated with the index term ki in any
t-dimensional vector (i.e., giðdj
!Þ ¼ wi, j).
As we later discuss, the index term weights are usually assumed to be mutually
independent. This means that knowing the weightwi, j associated with the pair (ki, dj)
tells us nothing about the weight wiþ1, j associated with the pair (kiþ1, dj). This is
clearly a simplification because occurrences of index terms in a document are not
uncorrelated. Consider, for instance, that the terms computer and network are used
to index a given document which covers the area of computer networks. Frequently,
in this document, the appearance of one of these two words attracts the appearance of
the other. Thus, these two words are correlated and their weights could reflect this
correlation. While mutual independence seems to be a strong simplification, it does
simplify the task of computing index term weights and allows for fast ranking com-
putation. Furthermore, taking advantage of index term correlations for improving the
final document ranking is not a simple task. In fact, none of the many approaches
proposed in the past has clearly demonstrated that index term correlations are
advantageous (for ranking purposes) with general collections. Therefore, unless
clearly stated otherwise, we assume mutual independence among index terms. In
Chapter 5, we discuss modern retrieval techniques which are based on term correla-
tions and which have been tested successfully with particular collections. These
successes seem to be slowly shifting the current understanding toward a more favor-
able view of the usefulness of term correlations for information retrieval systems.
The above definitions provide support for discussing the three classic informa-
tion retrieval models, namely, the Boolean, the vector, and the probabilistic models,
as we now do.
3.3.2 Boolean model
The Boolean model is a simple retrieval model based on set theory and Boolean
algebra. Since the concept of a set is quite intuitive, the Boolean model provides a
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framework which is easy to grasp by a common user of an IR system. Furthermore,
the queries are specified as Boolean expressions which have precise semantics.
Given its inherent simplicity and neat formalism, the Boolean model received great
attention in the past years and was adopted by many of the early commercial
bibliographic systems (Figure 3.1).
Unfortunately, the Boolean model suffers from major drawbacks. First, its
retrieval strategy is based on a binary decision criterion (i.e., a document is
predicted to be either relevant or nonrelevant) without any notion of a grading
scale, which prevents good retrieval performance. Thus, the Boolean model is in
reality much more a data (instead of information) retrieval model. Second, while
Boolean expressions have precise semantics, frequently it is not simple to trans-
late an information need into a Boolean expression. In fact, most users find it
difficult and awkward to express their query requests in terms of Boolean
expressions. The Boolean expressions actually formulated by users often are quite
simple (see Chapter 10 for a more thorough discussion on this issue). Despite
these drawbacks, the Boolean model is still the dominant model with commercial
document database systems and provides a good starting point for those new to
the field.
The Boolean model considers that index terms are present or absent in a docu-
ment. As a result, the index term weights are assumed to be all binary, that is,
wi, j ∈ {0; 1}. A query q is composed of index terms linked by three connectives: not,
and, and or. Thus, a query is essentially a conventional Boolean expression which
can be represented as a disjunction of conjunctive vectors (i.e., in disjunctive normal
form (DNF)). For instance, the query [q ¼ ka ∧ ðkb∨¬kcÞ] can be written in disjunc-
tive normal form as [ddnf
! ¼ ð1; 1; 1Þ∨ð1; 1;0Þ∨ð1;0;0Þ], where each of the compo-
nents is a binary weighted vector associated with the tuple (ka, kb, kc). These
binary weighted vectors are called the conjunctive components of qdnf
! . Figure 2.3
illustrates the three conjunctive components for the query q.
Definition 3.2. For the Boolean model, the index term weight variables are all
binary, that is,wi, j ∈ {0; 1}. A query q is a conventional Boolean expression. Let qdnf
! be
Figure 3.1.
The three conjunctive components for the query ½q ¼ ka ∧ ðkb∨¬kcÞ.
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the disjunctive normal form for the query q. Further, let qcc
! be any of the conjunctive
components of qdnf
! . The similarity of a document dj to the query q is defined as
1 if  ∃q!cc|ðq
!
cc ∈ q
!
dnf Þ∧ ð∀ki , giðd
!
jÞ ¼ giðq
!
ccÞÞ
0 otherwise
:
(
(3.2)
If sim(dj, q) = 1, then the Boolean model predicts that the document dj is relevant
to the query q (it might not be). Otherwise, the prediction is that the document is
not relevant.
The Boolean model predicts that each document is either relevant or
nonrelevant. There is no notion of a partial match to the query conditions. For
instance, let dj be a document for which dj
!¼ ð0; 1;0Þ. Document dj includes the
index term kb but is considered nonrelevant to the query [q ¼ ka ∧ ðkb∨¬kcÞ].
The main advantages of the Boolean model are the clean formalism behind the
model and its simplicity. The main disadvantages are that exact matching may lead
to retrieval of too few or too many documents (see Chapter 10). Today, it is well
known that index term weighting can lead to a substantial improvement in retrieval
performance. Index term weighting brings us to the vector model.
3.3.3 Vector model
The vector model [88, 89] recognizes that the use of binary weights is too
limiting and proposes a framework in which partial matching is possible. This is
accomplished by assigning nonbinary weights to index terms in queries and in
documents. These term weights are ultimately used to compute the degree of simi-
larity between each document stored in the system and the user query. By sorting
the retrieved documents in decreasing order of this degree of similarity, the vector
model takes into consideration documents which match the query terms only par-
tially. The main resultant effect is that the ranked document answer set is a lot more
precise (in the sense that it better matches the user information need) than the
document answer set retrieved by the Boolean model.
Definition 3.3. For the vector model, the weight wi, j associated with a pair
(ki, dj) is positive and nonbinary. Further, the index terms in the query are also
weighted. Let wi,q be the weight associated with the pair [ki, q], where wi,q ≥0.
Then, the query vector q! is defined as q! ¼ ðw1,q, w2,q,…, wt,qÞ where it is the total
number of index terms in the system. As before, the vector for a document dj is
represented by dj
!¼ ðw1, j, w2;j,…, wt, jÞ.
Therefore, a document dj and a user query q are represented as t-dimensional
vectors as shown in Figure 3.2. The vector model proposes to evaluate the degree of
similarity of the document dj with regard to the query q as the correlation between
the vectors dj
!
and q!. This correlation can be quantified, for instance, by the cosine of
the angle between these two vectors. That is,
simðdj, qÞ ¼
dj
!
• q
!
jdj
!j  jq!j
¼ ∑
t
i¼1wi, j wi,qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑ti¼1w
2
i, j
q

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑tj¼1w
2
i,q
q , (3.3)
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where jdj
!j and jq!j are the norms of the document and query vectors. The factor
jq!j does not affect the ranking (i.e., the ordering of the documents) because it is the
same for all documents. The factor jdj
!j provides a normalization in the space of the
documents.
Since wi, j ≥0 and wi, j ≥0, simðq, djÞ varies from 0 to +1. Thus, instead of
attempting to predict whether a document is relevant or not, the vector model ranks
the documents according to their degree of similarity to the query. A document
might be retrieved even if it matches the query only partially. For instance, one can
establish a threshold on simðdj, qÞ and retrieve the documents with a degree of
similarity above that threshold. But to compute rankings, we need first to specify
how index term weights are obtained.
Index term weights can be calculated in many different ways. The work by
Salton and McGill [88] reviews various term-weighting techniques. Here, we do not
discuss them in detail. Instead, we concentrate on elucidating the main idea behind
the most effective term-weighting techniques. This idea is related to the basic
principles which support clustering techniques, as follows.
Given a collection C of objects and a vague description of a set A, the goal of a
simple clustering algorithm might be to separate the collection C of objects into two
sets: the first one which is composed of objects related to the set A and the second
one which is composed of objects not related to the set A. Vague description here
means that we do not have complete information for deciding precisely which
objects are and which are not in the set A. For instance, one might be looking for a
set A of cars which have a price comparable to that of a Lexus 400. Since it is not
clear what the term comparable means exactly, there is not a precise (and unique)
description of the set A. More sophisticated clustering algorithms might attempt to
separate the objects of a collection into various clusters (or classes) according to
their properties. For instance, patients of a doctor specializing in cancer could be
classified into five classes: terminal, advanced, metastasis, diagnosed, and healthy.
Again, the possible class descriptions might be imprecise (and not unique), and the
problem is one of deciding to which of these classes a new patient should be
assigned. In what follows, however, we only discuss the simpler version of the
clustering problem (i.e., the one which considers only two classes) because all that
is required is a decision on which documents are predicted to be relevant and which
ones are predicted to be not relevant (with regard to a given user query).
To view the IR problem as one of clustering, we refer to the early work of Salton.
We think of the documents as a collection C of objects and think of the user query
as a (vague) specification of a set A of objects. In this scenario, the IR problem can
be reduced to the problem of determining which documents are in the set A and
Figure 3.2.
The cosine of θ is adopted as simðdj, qÞ.
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which ones are not (i.e., the IR problem can be viewed as a clustering problem). In a
clustering problem, two main issues have to be resolved. First, one needs to deter-
mine what the features are which better describe the objects in the set A. Second,
one needs to determine what the features are which better distinguish the objects in
the set A from the remaining objects in the collection C. The first set of features
provides for quantification of intra-cluster similarity, while the second set of features
provides for quantification of inter-cluster dissimilarity. The most successful clus-
tering algorithms try to balance these two effects.
In the vector model, intra-clustering similarity is quantified by measuring the raw
frequency of a term ki inside a document dj. Such term frequency is usually referred to
as the tf factor and provides one measure of how well that term describes the docu-
ment contents (i.e., intra-document characterization). Furthermore, inter-cluster dis-
similarity is quantified by measuring the inverse of the frequency of a term ki among
the documents in the collection. This factor is usually referred to as the inverse
document frequency or the idf factor. The motivation for the usage of an idf factor is
that terms which appear in many documents are not very useful for distinguishing a
relevant document from a nonrelevant one. As with good clustering algorithms, the
most effective term-weighting schemes for IR try to balance these two effects.
Definition 3.4. Let N be the total number of documents in the system and ni be
the number of documents in which the index term ki appears. Let f rei, j be the row
frequency of term ki in the document dj (i.e., the number of times the term ki is
mentioned in the text of the document dj). Then, the normalized frequency f i, j of
term ki in document dj is given by
f i, j ¼
f reqi, j
maxl  f reql, j
, (3.4)
where the maximum is computed over all terms which are mentioned in the text
of the document dj. If the term ki does not appear in the document dj, then f i, j ¼ O.
Further, let idf i, inverse document frequency for ki, be given by
idf i ¼ log
N
ni
: (3.5)
The best known term-weighting schemes use weights which are given by
wi, j ¼ f i, j  log
N
ni
(3.6)
or by a variation of this formula. Such term-weighting strategies are called tf-idf
schemes.
Several variations of the above expression for the weight wi, j are described in an
interesting paper by Salton and Buckley which appeared in 1988 [90]. However, in
general, the above expression should provide a good weighting scheme for many
collections.
For the query term weights, Salton and Buckley suggest
wi,q ¼ 0:5þ
0:5 f reqi,q
maxl  f reql,q
 !
 log N
ni
, (3.7)
where f reqi,q is the raw frequency of the term ki in the text of the information
request q.
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The main advantages of the vector model are:
1. Its term-weighting scheme improves retrieval performance.
2. Its partial-matching strategy allows retrieval of documents that approximate
the query conditions.
3. Its cosine ranking formula sorts the documents according to their degree of
similarity to the query.
Theoretically, the vector model has the disadvantage that index terms are
assumed to be mutually independent [Eq. (2.3) does not account for index term
dependencies]. However, in practice, consideration of term dependencies might be
a disadvantage. Due to the locality of many term dependencies, their indiscriminate
application to all the documents in the collection might in fact hurt the overall
performance.
Despite its simplicity, the vector model is a resilient ranking strategy with
general collections. It yields ranked answer sets which are difficult to improve upon
without query expansion or relevance feedback within the framework of the vector
model. A large variety of alternative ranking methods have been compared to the
vector model, but the consensus seems to be that, in general, the vector model is
either superior or almost as good as the known alternatives. Furthermore, it is
simple and fast. For these reasons, the vector model is a popular retrieval model
nowadays.
3.3.4 Probabilistic model
In this section, we describe the classic probabilistic model introduced in 1976 by
Robertson and Sparck Jones [91] which later became known as the binary indepen-
dence retrieval (BIR) model. Our discussion is intentionally brief and focuses mainly
on highlighting the key features of the model. With this purpose in mind, we do not
detain ourselves in subtleties regarding the binary independence assumption for the
model. The section on bibliographic discussion points to references which cover
these details.
The probabilistic model attempts to capture the IR problem within a probabilis-
tic framework. The fundamental idea is as follows. Given a user query, there is a set
of documents which contains exactly the relevant documents and no other. Let us
refer to this set of documents as the ideal answer set. Given the description of this
ideal answer set, we would have no problems in retrieving its documents. Thus, we
can think of the querying process as a process of specifying the properties of an
ideal answer set (which is analogous to interpreting the IR problem as a problem of
clustering). The problem is that we do not know exactly what these properties are.
All we know is that there are index terms whose semantics should be used to
characterize these properties. Since these properties are not known at query time,
an effort has to be made at initially guessing what they could be. This initial guess
allows us to generate a preliminary probabilistic description of the ideal answer set
which is used to retrieve the first set of documents. An interaction with the user is
then initiated with the purpose of improving the probabilistic description of the
ideal answer set. Such interaction could proceed as follows.
The user takes a look at the retrieved documents and decides which ones are
relevant and which ones are not (in truth, only the first top documents need to be
examined). The system then uses this information to refine the description of the
ideal answer set. By repeating this process many times, it is expected that such a
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description will evolve and become closer to the real description of the ideal answer
set. Thus, one should always have in mind the need to guess at the beginning the
description of the ideal answer set. Furthermore, a conscious effort is made to
model this description in probabilistic terms.
The probabilistic model is based on the following fundamental assumption.
Definition 3.5. Assumption (probabilistic principle). Given a user query q and a
document dj in the collection, the probabilistic model tries to estimate the proba-
bility that the user will find the document dj interesting (i.e., relevant). The model
assumes that this probability of relevance depends on the query and the document
representations only. Further, the model assumes that there is a subset of all docu-
ments which the user prefers as the answer set for the query q. Such an ideal answer
set is labeled R and should maximize the overall probability of relevance to the user.
Documents in the set R are predicted to be relevant to the query. Documents not in
this set are predicted to be nonrelevant.
This assumption is quite troublesome because it does not state explicitly how to
compute the probabilities of relevance. In fact, not even the sample space which is
to be used for defining such probabilities is given.
Given a query q, the probabilistic model is assigned to each document dj, as a
measure of its similarity to the query, the ratio P(dj relevant to q)=P(dj nonrelevant
to q) which computes the odds of the document dj being relevant to the query q.
Taking the odds of relevance as the rank minimizes the probability of an erroneous
judgment [92, 93].
Definition 3.6. For the probabilistic model, the index term weight variables are
all binary, i.e., wi, j ∈ {0; 1} and wi,q ∈ {0; 1}. A query q is a subset of index terms. Let
R be the set of documents known (or initially guessed) to be relevant. Let R be the
complement of R [i.e., the set of nonrelevant documents). Let PðR|dj
!Þ be the prob-
ability that the document dj is relevant to the query q and PðR|dj
!Þ be the probability
that dj is nonrelevant to q. The similarity sim(dj, q) of the document dj to the query
q is defined as the ratio:
simðdj, qÞ ¼
PðR|d!jÞ
PðR|dj
!Þ
: (3.8)
Using Bayes’ rule,
simðdj, qÞ ¼
Pðd!j|RÞ  PðRÞ
Pðdj
!
|RÞ  PðRÞ
: (3.9)
Pðdj
!
|RÞ stands for the probability of randomly selecting the document dj from
the set R of relevant documents. Further, PðRÞ stands for the probability that a
document randomly selected from the entire collection is relevant. The meanings
attached to Pðdj
!
|RÞ and PðRÞ are analogous and complementary.
Since PðRÞ and PðRÞ are the same for all the documents in the collection, we write
simðdj, qÞ  	  
Pðd!j|RÞ
Pðdj
!
|RÞ
: (3.10)
Assuming independence of index terms,
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simðdj, qÞ  	  
Y
giðdj
!¼1Þ Pðki|RÞ


Y
giðdj
!¼0Þ Pðki|RÞ

Y
giðdj
!¼1Þ Pðki|RÞ


Y
giðdj
!¼0Þ Pðki|RÞ
 : (3.11)
Pðki|RÞ stands for the probability that the index term k is present in a document
randomly selected from the set R. Pðki|RÞ stands for the probability that the index term
ki is not present in a document randomly selected from the set R. The probabilities
associatedwith the setR havemeanings which are analogous to the ones just described.
Taking logarithms, recalling that Pðki|RÞ þ Pðki|RÞ ¼ 1, and ignoring factors
which are constant for all documents in the context of the same query, we can
finally write
simðdj, qÞ  	  ∑
t
i¼1
wi,q wi, j  log Pðki|RÞ1 Pðki|RÞ þ log
1 Pðki|RÞ
Pðki|ðRÞÞ
 
, (3.12)
which is a key expression for ranking computation in the probabilistic model.
Since we do not know the set R at the beginning, it is necessary to devise a
method for initially computing the probabilities Pðki|RÞ and Pðki|RÞ. There are many
alternatives for such computation. We discuss a couple of them below.
In the very beginning (i.e., immediately after the query specification), there are
no retrieved documents. Thus, one has to make simplifying assumptions such as (a)
assume that Pðki|RÞ is constant for all index terms ki (typically, equal to 0.5) and (b)
assume that the distribution of index terms among the nonrelevant documents can
be approximated by the distribution of index terms among all the documents in the
collection. These two assumptions yield
Pðki|RÞ ¼ 0:5
Pðki|RÞ ¼ ni
N
,
(3.13)
where, as already defined, ni is the number of documents which contain the
index term ki and N is the total number of documents in the collection. Given this
initial guess, we can then retrieve documents which contain query terms and pro-
vide an initial probabilistic ranking for them. After that, this initial ranking is
improved as follows.
Let V be a subset of the documents initially retrieved and ranked by the probabi-
listic model. Such a subset can be defined, for instance, as the top r ranked documents
where r is a previously defined threshold. Further, let Vi be the subset of V composed
of the documents in V which contain the index term ki. For simplicity, we also use V
and V i to refer to the number of elements in these sets (it should always be clear
when the used variable refers to the set or to the number of elements in it). For
improving the probabilistic ranking, we need to improve our guesses for Pðki|RÞ and
Pðki|RÞ. This can be accomplished with the following assumptions: (a) we can
approximate Pðki|RÞ by the distribution of the index term ki among the documents
retrieved so far and (b) we can approximate Pðki|RÞ by considering that all the non-
retrieved documents are not relevant. With these assumptions, we can write
Pðki|RÞ  ¼   vi
V
Pðki|RÞ  ¼   ni  Vi
N  V :
(3.14)
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This process can then be repeated recursively. By doing so, we are able to
improve on our guesses for the probabilities Pðki|RÞ and Pðki|RÞ without any assis-
tance from a human subject (contrary to the original idea). However, we can also
use assistance from the user for definition of the subset V as originally conceived.
The last formulas for Pðki|RÞ and Pðki|RÞ pose problems for small values of V and
V i which arise in practice (such as V ¼ 1 and Vi ¼ 0). To circumvent these prob-
lems, an adjustment factor is often added in which yields
Pðki|RÞ ¼ vi þ 0:5
V þ 1
Pðki|RÞ ¼ ni  V i þ 0:5
N  V þ 1 :
(3.15)
An adjustment factor which is constant and equal to 0.5 is not always satisfac-
tory. An alternative is to take the fraction ni=N as the adjustment factor which
yields
Pðki|RÞ ¼ vi þ
ni
N
V þ 1
Pðki|RÞ ¼ ni  Vi þ
ni
N
N  V þ 1 :
(3.16)
This completes our discussion of the probabilistic model.
The main advantage of the probabilistic model, in theory, is that documents are
ranked in decreasing order of their probability of being relevant. The disadvantages
include (1) the need to guess the initial separation of documents into relevant and
nonrelevant sets, (2) the fact that the method does not take into account the
frequency with which an index term occurs inside a document (i.e., all weights are
binary), and (3) the adoption of the independence assumption for index terms.
However, as discussed for the vector model, it is not clear that independence of
index terms is a bad assumption in practical situations.
3.3.5 Brief comparison of classic models
In general, the Boolean model is considered to be the weakest classic method.
Its main problem is the inability to recognize partial matches which frequently
leads to poor performance. There is some controversy as to whether the proba-
bilistic model outperforms the vector model. Croft performed some experiments
and suggested that the probabilistic model provides a better retrieval perfor-
mance. However, experiments done afterward by Salton and Buckley refute that
claim. Through several different measures, Salton and Buckley showed that the
vector model is expected to outperform the probabilistic model with general
collections. This also seems to be the dominant thought among researchers,
practitioners, and the Web community, where the popularity of the vector model
runs high.
3.4. Text retrieval
3.4.1 Formats
There is no single format for a text document, and an IR system should be able to
retrieve information from many of them. In the past, IR systems would convert a
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document to an internal format. However, that has many disadvantages, because
the original application related to the document is not useful anymore. On top of
that, we cannot change the contents of a document. Current IR systems have filters
that can handle most popular documents, in particular those of word processors
with some binary syntax such as Word, WordPerfect, or FrameMaker. Even then,
good filters might not be possible if the format is proprietary and its details are not
public. This is not the case for full ASCII syntax, as in TeX documents. Although
documents can be in a binary format (e.g., parts of a Word document), documents
that are represented in human-readable ASCII form imply more portability and are
easier to modify (e.g., they can be edited with different applications).
Other text formats were developed for document interchange. Among these we
should mention the rich text format (RTF), which is used by word processors and
has ASCII syntax. Other important formats were developed for displaying or print-
ing documents. The most popular ones are the portable document format (PDF)
and PostScript (which is a powerful programming language for drawing). Other
interchange formats are used to encode electronic mail, for example, multipurpose
internet mail exchange (MIME). MIME supports multiple character sets, multiple
languages, and multiple media.
On top of these formats, nowadays many files are compressed. Text compression
is treated in detail, but here we comment on the most popular compression software
and associated formats. These include compress (Unix), ARJ (PCs), and ZIP (e.g.,
gzip in Unix and WinZip in Windows). Other tools allow us to convert binary files,
in particular compressed text, to ASCII text such that it can be transmitted through
a communication line using only seven bits. Examples of these tools are uuencode/
uudecode and BinHex.
3.4.2 Modeling natural language
Text is composed of symbols from a finite alphabet. We can divide the symbols
in two disjoint subsets: symbols that separate words and symbols that belong to
words. It is well known that symbols are not uniformly distributed. If we consider
just letters (a to z), we observe that vowels are usually more frequent than most
consonants. For example, in English, letter “Ie” has the highest frequency. A simple
model to generate text is the binomial model. In it, each symbol is generated with a
certain probability. However, natural language has a dependency on previous sym-
bols. For example, in English, letter “f” cannot appear after letter “c,” and vowels or
certain consonants have a higher probability of occurring. Therefore, the probabil-
ity of a symbol depends on previous symbols. We can use a finite context or
Markovian model to reflect this dependency. The model can consider one, two, or
more letters to generate the next symbol. If we use k letters, we say that it is a k-
order model (so, the binomial model is considered an O-order model). We can use
these models taking words as symbols. For example, text generated by a five-order
model using the distribution of words in the Bible might make sense (i.e., it can be
grammatically correct) but will be different from the original. More complex
models include finite-state models (which define regular languages) and grammar
models (which define context-free and other languages). However, finding the
right grammar for natural language is still a difficult open problem.
The next issue is how the different words are distributed inside each document.
An approximate model is Zipf ’s law, which attempts to capture the distribution of
the frequencies (i.e., number of occurrences) of the words in the text. The rule
states that the frequency of the ith most frequent word is 1=iθ times that of the most
frequent word. This implies that in a text of n words with a vocabulary of V words,
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the ith most frequent word appears n=ðiθHVðθÞÞ times, whereHVðθÞ is the harmonic
number of order θ of V, defined as
HVðθÞ ¼ ∑
V
j¼1
1
jθ
, (3.17)
so that the sum of all frequencies is n. The left side of Figure 3.3 illustrates the
distribution of frequencies considering that the words are arranged in decreasing
order of their frequencies. The value of θ depends on the text. In the most simple
formulation, θ ¼ 1, and therefore HVðθÞ ¼ Oð log nÞ. However, this simplified ver-
sion is very inexact, and the case θ > 1 (more precisely, between 1.5 and 2.0) fits
better the real data. This case is very different, since the distribution is much more
skewed, and HVðθÞ ¼ Oð1Þ. Experimental data suggests that a better model is
k=ðcþ iÞθ where c is an additional parameter and k is such that all frequencies add
to n. This is called a Mandelbrot distribution.
Since the distribution of words is very skewed (i.e., there are a few hundred
words which take up 50% of the text), words that are too frequent, such as
stopwords, can be disregarded. A stopword is a word which does not carry meaning
in natural language and therefore can be ignored (i.e., made not searchable), such as
“a,” “the,” “by,” etc. Fortunately, the most frequent words are stopwords, and,
therefore, half of the words appearing in a text do not need to be considered. This
allows us, for instance, to significantly reduce the space overhead of indices for
natural language texts. For example, the most frequent words in the TREC-2 col-
lection are ‘the,” “of,” “and,” “a,” “to,” and “in.”
Another issue is the distribution of words in the documents of a collection. A
simple model is to consider that each word appears the same number of times in
every document. However, this is not true in practice. A better model is to consider
a negative binomial distribution, which says that the fraction of documents
containing a word k times is
FðkÞ ¼ aþ k 1
k
 
pkð1þ pÞαk, (3.18)
where p and α are parameters that depend on the word and the document
collection. For example, for the Brown Corpus [94] and the word “said,” we have
p ¼ 9:24 and α ¼ 0:42 [95]. The latter reference gives other models derived from a
Poisson distribution.
The next issue is the number of distinct words in a document. This set of words
is referred to as the document vocabulary. To predict the growth of the vocabulary
size in natural language text, we use the so-called Heaps’ law [96]. This is a very
precise law which states that the vocabulary of a text of size n words is of size
V ¼ Knβ ¼ OðnβÞ, where K and β depend on the particular text. The right side of
Figure 3.3 illustrates how the vocabulary size varies with the text size. K is normally
between 10 and 100, and β is a positive value less than one. Some experiments on
the TREC-2 collection show that the most common values for β are between 0.4 and
0.6. Hence, the vocabulary of a text grows sublinearly with the text size, in a
proportion close to its square root.
Notice that the set of different words of a language is fixed by a constant (e.g.,
the number of different English words is finite). However, the limit is so high that it
is much more accurate to assume that the size of the vocabulary is OðnβÞ instead of
Oð1Þ, although the number should stabilize for huge enough texts. On the other
hand, many authors argue that the number keeps growing anyway because of
typing or spelling errors.
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Heaps’ law also applies to collections of documents because, as the total text size
grows, the predictions of the model become more accurate. Furthermore, this
model is also valid for the World Wide Web.
The last issue is the average length of words. This relates the text size in words
with the text size in bytes (without accounting for punctuation and other extra
symbols). For example, in the different subcollections of the TREC-2 collection, the
average word length is very close to five letters, and the range of variation of this
average in each subcollection is small (from 4.8 to 5.3 letters). If the stopwords were
move, the average length of a word increases to a number between 6 and 7 (letters).
If we take only the words of the vocabulary, the average length is higher (about
8 or 9). This defines the total space needed for the vocabulary.
Heaps’ law implies that the length of the words in the vocabulary increases
logarithmically with the text size and, thus, that longer and longer words should
appear as the text grows. However, in practice, the average length of the words in
the overall text is constant because shorter words are common enough (e.g.,
stopwords). This balance between short and long words, such that the average word
length remains constant, has been noticed many times in different contexts and can
also be explained by a finite-state model in which (a) the space character has a
probability close to 0.2, (b) the space character cannot appear twice subsequently,
and (c) there are 26 letters. This simple model is consistent with Zipf ’s and Heaps’
laws.
The models presented in this section are used in Chapters 8 and 13, in particular
Zipf’s and Heaps’ laws.
3.4.3 Similarity models
In this section, we define notions of syntactic similarity between strings and
documents. Similarity is measured by a distance function. For example, if we have
strings of the same length, we can define the distance between them as the number
of positions that have different characters. Then, the distance is 0 if they are equal.
This is called the Hamming distance. A distance function should also be symmetric
(i.e., the order of the arguments does not matter) and should satisfy the triangle
inequality (i.e., distanceða, cÞ ≤ distanceða, bÞ þ distanceðb, cÞ).
An important distance over strings is the edit or Levenshtein distance mentioned
earlier. The edit distance is defined as the minimum number of characters, inser-
tions, deletions, and substitutions that we need to perform in any of the strings to
make them equal. For instance, the edit distance between “color” and “colour” is
Figure 3.3.
Distribution of sorted word frequencies (left) and size of the vocabulary (right).
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one, while the edit distance between “survey” and “surgery” is two. The edit
distance is considered to be superior for modeling syntactic errors than other more
complex methods such as the Soundex system, which is based on phonetics [97].
Extensions to the concept of edit distance include different weights for each opera-
tion, adding transpositions, etc.
There are other measures. For example, assume that we are comparing two
given strings and the only operation allowed is deletion of characters. Then, after all
non-common characters have been deleted, the remaining sequence of characters
(not necessarily contiguous in the original string, but in the same order) is the
longest common subsequence (LCS) of both strings. For example, the LCS of
“survey” and “surgery” is “surey.”
Similarity can be extended to documents. For example, we can consider lines as
single symbols and compute the longest common sequence of lines between two files.
This is the measure used by the diff command in Unix-like operating systems. The
main problem with this approach is that it is very time-consuming and does not
consider lines that are similar. The latter drawback can be fixed by taking a weighted
edit distance between lines or by computing the LCS over all the characters. Other
solutions include extracting fingerprints (any piece of text that in some sense charac-
terizes it) for the documents and comparing them or finding large repeated pieces.
There are also visual tools to see document similarity. For example, Dotplot draws a
rectangular map where both coordinates are file lines and the entry for each coordi-
nate is a gray pixel that depends on the edit distance between the associated lines.
3.5. Document preprocessing
Document preprocessing is a procedure which can be divided mainly into five
text operations (or transformations):
1. Lexical analysis of the text with the objective of treating digits, hyphens,
punctuation marks, and the case of letters.
2. Elimination of stopwords with the objective of filtering out words with very
low discrimination values for retrieval purposes.
3. Stemming of the remaining words with the objective of removing affixes (i.e.,
prefixes and suffixes) and allowing the retrieval of documents containing
syntactic variations of query terms (e.g., connect, connecting, connected, etc.).
4.Selection of index terms to determine which words/stems (or groups of words)
will be used as indexing elements. Usually, the decision on whether a particular
word will be used as an index term is related to the syntactic nature of the
word. In fact, noun words frequently carry more semantics than adjectives,
adverbs, and verbs.
5. Construction of term categorization structures such as a thesaurus, or
extraction of structure directly represented in the text, for allowing the
expansion of the original query with related terms (a usually useful
procedure).
In the following, each of these phases is discussed in detail. But, before proceed-
ing, let us take a look at the logical view of the documents which results after each
of the above phases is completed. Figure 3.4 is repeated here for convenience as
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Figure 3.4. As already discussed, by aggregating the preprocessing phases, we are
able to move the logical view of the documents (adopted by the system) from that
of a full text to that of a set of high-level indexing terms.
3.5.1 Lexical analysis of the text
Lexical analysis is the process of converting a stream of characters (the text of
the documents) into a stream of words (the candidate words to be adopted as index
terms). Thus, one of the major objectives of the lexical analysis phase is the identi-
fication of the words in the text. At the first glance, all that seems to be involved is
the recognition of spaces as word separators (in which case, multiple spaces are
reduced to one space). However, there is more to it than this. For instance, the
following four particular cases have to be considered with care [98]: digits,
hyphens, punctuation marks, and the case of the letters (lower and upper case).
Numbers are usually not good index terms because, without a surrounding
context, they are inherently vague. For instance, consider that a user is interested in
documents about the number of deaths due to car accidents between the years 1910
and 1989. Such a request could be specified as the set of index terms: deaths, car,
accidents, years, 1910 and 1989. However, the presence of the numbers 1910 and
1989 in the query could lead to the retrieval, for instance, of a variety of documents
which refer to either of these 2 years. The problem is that numbers by themselves
are just too vague. Thus, in general it is wise to disregard numbers as index terms.
However, we have also to consider that digits might appear mixed within a word.
For instance, “51OB.C.” is a clearly important index term. In this case, it is not clear
what rule should be applied. Furthermore, a sequence of 16 digits identifying a
credit card number might be highly relevant in a given context and, in this case,
should be considered as an index term. A preliminary approach for treating digits in
the text might be to remove all words containing sequences of digits unless specified
otherwise (through regular expressions). Further, an advanced lexical analysis pro-
cedure might perform some date and number normalization to unify formats.
Hyphens pose another difficult decision to the lexical analyzer. Breaking up
hyphenated words might be useful due to inconsistency of usage. For instance, this
allows treating “state-of-the-art” and “state of the art” identically. However, there
are words which include hyphens as an integral part, for instance, giltedge, B-49,
etc. Again, the most suitable procedure seems to adopt a general rule and specify the
exceptions on a case-by-case basis.
Normally, punctuation marks are removed entirely in the process of lexical
analysis. While some punctuation marks are an integral part of the word (for
instance, “5lOB.C.”), removing them does not seem to have an impact in retrieval
Figure 3.4.
Logical view of a document throughout the various phases of text preprocessing.
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performance because the risk of misinterpretation in this case is minimal. In fact, if
the user specifies “5lOB.C” in his query, removal of the dot both in the query term
and in the documents will not affect retrieval. However, very particular scenarios
might again require the preparation of a list of exceptions. For instance, if a portion
of a program code appears in the text, it might be wise to distinguish between the
variables “x.id” and “xid.” In this case, the dot mark should not be removed.
The case of letters is usually not important for the identification of index terms.
As a result, the lexical analyzer normally converts all the text to either lower or
upper case. However, once more, very particular scenarios might require the
distinction to be made. For instance, when looking for documents which describe
details about the command language of a Unix-like operating system, the user
might explicitly desire the non-conversion of upper cases because this is the con-
vention in the operating system. Further, part of the semantics might be lost due to
case conversion. For instance, the words Bank and bank have different meanings—a
fact common to many other pairs of words.
As pointed out by Fox, all these text operations can be implemented without
difficulty. However, careful thought should be given to each one of them because
they might have a profound impact at document retrieval time. This is particularly
worrisome in those situations in which the user finds it difficult to understand what
the indexing strategy is doing. Unfortunately, there is no clear solution to this
problem. As already mentioned, some Web search engines are opting for avoiding
text operations altogether because this simplifies the interpretation the user has of
the retrieval task. Whether this strategy will be the one of choice in the long term
remains to be seen.
3.5.2 Elimination of stopwords
As discussed in Chapter 2, words which are too frequent among the documents
in the collection are not good discriminators. In fact, a word which occurs in 80% of
the documents in the collection is useless for purposes of retrieval. Such words are
frequently referred to as stopwords and are normally filtered out as potential index
terms. Articles, prepositions, and conjunctions are natural candidates for a list of
stopwords.
Elimination of stopwords has an additional important benefit. It reduces the size
of the indexing structure considerably. In fact, it is typical to obtain a compression
in the size of the indexing structure (for instance, in the size of an inverted list, see
Chapter 8) of 40% or more solely with the elimination of stopwords.
Since stopword elimination also provides for compression of the indexing struc-
ture, the list of stopwords might be extended to include words other than articles,
prepositions, and conjunctions. For instance, some verbs, adverbs, and adjectives
could be treated as stopwords. In [99], a list of 425 stopwords is illustrated.
Programs in C for lexical analysis are also provided.
Despite these benefits, elimination of stopwords might reduce recall. For
instance, consider a user who is looking for documents containing the phrase “to be
or not to be.” Elimination of stopwords might leave only the term bemaking it
almost impossible to properly recognize the documents which contain the phrase
specified. This is one additional reason for the adoption of a full-text index (i.e.,
insert all words in the collection into the inverted file) by someWeb search engines.
3.5.3 Stemming
Frequently, the user specifies a word in a query, but only a variant of this word is
present in a relevant document. Plurals, gerund forms, and past tense suffixes are
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examples of syntactical variations which prevent a perfect match between a query
word and a respective document word. This problem can be partially overcome
with the substitution of the words by their respective stems.
A stem is the portion of a word which is left after the removal of its affixes (i.e.,
prefixes and suffixes). A typical example of a stem is the word connect which is the
stem for the variants connected, connecting, connection, and connections. Stems
are thought to be useful for improving retrieval performance because they reduce
variants of the same root word to a common concept. Furthermore, stemming has
the secondary effect of reducing the size of the indexing structure because the
number of distinct index terms is reduced.
While the argument supporting stemming seems sensible, there is controversy
in the literature about the benefits of stemming for retrieval performance. In fact,
different studies lead to rather conflicting conclusions. Frakes [99] compares eight
distinct studies on the potential benefits of stemming. While he favors the usage of
stemming, the results of the eight experimental studies he investigated do not allow
us to reach a satisfactory conclusion. As a result of these doubts, many Web search
engines do not adopt any stemming algorithm whatsoever.
Frakes distinguishes four types of stemming strategies: affix removal, table
lookup, successor variety, and n-grams. Table lookup consists simply of looking
for the stem of a word in a table. It is a simple procedure but one which is
dependent on data on stems for the whole language. Since such data is not readily
available and might require considerable storage space, this type of stemming
algorithm might not be practical. Successor variety stemming is based on the
determination of morpheme boundaries, uses knowledge from structural linguis-
tics, and is more complex than affix removal stemming algorithms. N-grams
stemming is based on the identification of digrams and trigrams and is more a
term clustering procedure than a stemming one. Affix removal stemming is intu-
itive and simple and can be implemented efficiently. Thus, in the remainder of
this section, we concentrate our discussion on algorithms for affix removal stem-
ming only.
In affix removal, the most important part is suffix removal because most vari-
ants of a word are generated by the introduction of suffixes (instead of prefixes).
While there are three or four well-known suffix removal algorithms, the most
popular one is that by Porter because of its simplicity and elegance. Despite being
simpler, the Porter algorithm yields results comparable to those of the more sophis-
ticated algorithms.
The Porter algorithm uses a suffix list for suffix stripping. The idea is to apply a
series of rules to the suffixes of the words in the text. For instance, the rule
s! /0 (3.19)
is used to convert plural forms into their respective singular forms by substitut-
ing the letter s by nil. Notice that to identify the suffix we must examine the last
letters in the word. Furthermore, we look for the longest sequence of letters which
matches the left-hand side in a set of rules. Thus, application of the two following
rules
sses !  ss
s !  /0 (3.20)
to the word stresses yields the stem stress instead of the stem stresse. By sepa-
rating such rules into five distinct phases, the Porter algorithm is able to provide
effective stemming while running fast.
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3.5.4 Index terms selection
If a full-text representation of the text is adopted, then all words in the text are
used as index terms. The alternative is to adopt a more abstract view in which not all
words are used as index terms. This implies that the set of terms used as indices
must be selected. In the area of bibliographic sciences, such a selection of index
terms is usually done by a specialist. An alternative approach is to select candidates
for index terms automatically.
Distinct automatic approaches for selecting index terms can be used. A good
approach is the identification of noun groups (as done in the INQUERY sys-
tem [73]) which we now discuss.
A sentence in natural language text is usually composed of nouns, pronouns,
articles, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and connectives. While the words in each
grammatical class are used with a particular purpose, it can be argued that most of
the semantics is carried by the noun words. Thus, an intuitively promising strategy
for selecting index terms automatically is to use the nouns in the text. This can be
done through the systematic elimination of verbs, adjectives, adverbs, connectives,
articles, and pronouns.
Since it is common to combine two or three nouns in a single component (e.g.,
computer science), it makes sense to cluster nouns which appear nearby in the text
into a single indexing component (or concept). Thus, instead of simply using nouns
as index terms, we adopt noun groups. A noun group is a set of nouns whose
syntactic distance in the text (measured in terms of number of words between two
nouns) does not exceed a predefined threshold (for instance, three).
When noun groups are adopted as indexing terms, we obtain a conceptual
logical view of the documents in terms of sets of nonelementary index terms.
3.5.5 Text compression
Text compression is about finding ways to represent the text in fewer bits or
bytes. The amount of space required to store text on computers can be reduced
significantly using compression techniques. Compression methods create a reduced
representation by identifying and using structures that exist in the text. From the
compressed version, the original text can be reconstructed exactly.
Text compression is becoming an important issue in an information retrieval
environment. The widespread use of digital libraries, office automation systems,
document databases, and the Web has led to an explosion of textual information
available online. In this scenario, text compression appears as an attractive option
for reducing costs associated with space requirements, input/output (I/O) over-
head, and communication delays. The gain obtained from compressing text is that it
requires less storage space, it takes less time to be transmitted over a communica-
tion link, and it takes less time to search directly the compressed text. The price paid
is the time necessary to code and decode the text.
A major obstacle for storing text in compressed form is the need for IR systems
to access text randomly. To access a given word in a compressed text, it is usually
necessary to decode the entire text from the beginning until the desired word is
reached. It could be argued that a large text could be divided into blocks that are
compressed independently, thus allowing fast random access to each block. How-
ever, efficient compression methods need to process some text before making
compression effective (usually more than 10 kilobytes). The smaller the blocks, the
less effective compression is expected to be.
Our discussion here focuses on text compression methods which are suitable for
use in an IR environment. For instance, a successful idea aimed at merging the
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requirements of compression algorithms and the needs of IR systems is to consider
that the symbols to be compressed are words and not characters (character-based
compression is the more conventional approach). Words are the atoms on which
most IR systems are built. Moreover, it is now known that much better compression
is achieved by taking words as symbols (instead of characters). Further, new word-
based compression methods allow random access to words within the compressed
text which is a critical issue for an IR system.
Besides the economy of space obtained by a compression method, there are
other important characteristics to be considered such as compression and decom-
pression speed. In some situations, decompression speed is more important than
compression speed. For instance, this is the case with textual databases in which it is
common to compress the text once and to read it many times from disk.
Another important characteristic of a compression method is the possibility of
performing compressed pattern matching, defined as the task of performing pattern
matching in a compressed text without decompressing it. In this case, sequential
searching can be speeded up by compressing the search key rather than decoding
the compressed text being searched. As a consequence, it is possible to search faster
on compressed text because much less text has to be scanned. Chapter 8 presents
efficient methods to deal with searching the compressed text directly.
When the text collection is large, efficient text retrieval requires specialized
index techniques. A simple and popular indexing structure for text collections are
the inverted files. Inverted files (see Chapter 8 for details) are especially adequate
when the pattern to be searched for is formed by simple words. Since this is a
common type of query (for instance, when searching the Web), inverted files are
widely used for indexing large text collections.
An inverted file is typically composed of (a) a vector containing all the distinct
words in the text collection (which is called the vocabulary) and (b) for each word
in the vocabulary a list of all documents (identified by document numbers) in
which that word occurs. Because each list of document numbers (within the
inverted file) is organized in ascending order, specific compression methods have
been proposed for them, leading to very efficient index compression schemes. This
is important because query processing time is highly related to index access time.
Thus, in this section, we also discuss some of the most important index compression
techniques.
We first introduce basic concepts related to text compression. We then present
some of the most important statistical compression methods, followed by a brief
review of compression methods based on a dictionary. At the end, we discuss the
application of compression to inverted files.
There are two general approaches to text compression: statistical and dictionary
based. Statistical methods rely on generating good probability estimates (of appear-
ance in the text) for each symbol. The more accurate the estimates are, the better
the compression obtained. A symbol here is usually a character, a text word, or a
fixed number of characters. The set of all possible symbols in the text is called the
alphabet. The task of estimating the probability on each next symbol is called
modeling. A model is essentially a collection of probability distributions, one for
each context in which a symbol can be coded. Once these probabilities are available,
the symbols are converted into binary digits, a process called coding. In practice,
both the encoder and decoder use the same model. The decoder interprets the
output of the encoder (with reference to the same model) to find out the original
symbol.
There are two well-known statistical coding strategies: Huffman coding and
arithmetic coding. The idea of Huffman coding is to assign a fixed-length bit
encoding to each different symbol of the text. Compression is achieved by assigning
66
Data Service Outsourcing and Privacy Protection in Mobile Internet
a smaller number of bits to symbols with higher probabilities of appearance.
Huffman coding was first proposed in the early 1950s and was the most important
compression method until the late 1970s, when arithmetic coding made higher
compression rates possible.
Arithmetic coding computes the code incrementally, one symbol at a time, as
opposed to the Huffman coding scheme in which each different symbol is pre-
encoded using a fixed-length number of bits. The incremental nature does not allow
decoding a string which starts in the middle of a compressed file. To decode a
symbol in the middle of a file compressed with arithmetic coding, it is necessary
to decode the whole text from the very beginning until the desired word is
reached. This characteristic makes arithmetic coding inadequate for use in an IR
environment.
Dictionary methods substitute a sequence of symbols by a pointer to a previous
occurrence of that sequence. The pointer representations are references to entries in
a dictionary composed of a list of symbols (often called phrases) that are expected
to occur frequently. Pointers to the dictionary entries are chosen so that they need
less space than the phrase they replace, thus obtaining compression. The distinction
between modeling and coding does not exist in dictionary methods, and there are
no explicit probabilities associated to phrases. The most well-known dictionary
methods are represented by a family of methods, known as the Ziv-Lempel family.
Character-based Huffman methods are typically able to compress English texts
to approximately five bits per character (usually, each uncompressed character
takes 7–8 bits to be represented). More recently, a word-based Huffman method has
been proposed as a better alternative for natural language texts. This method is able
to reduce English texts to just over two bits per character. As we will see later on,
word-based Huffman coding achieves compression rates close to the entropy and
allows random access to intermediate points in the compressed text. Ziv-Lempel
methods are able to reduce English texts to fewer than four bits per character.
Methods based on arithmetic coding can also compress English texts to just over
two bits per character. However, the price paid is slower compression and decom-
pression, and the impossibility of randomly accessing intermediate points in the
compressed text.
Before proceeding, let us present an important definition which will be useful
from now on.
Definition 3.7. Compression ratio is the size of the compressed file as a fraction
of the uncompressed file.
3.6. Index construction and compression
3.6.1 Inverted files
An inverted file (or inverted index) is a word-oriented mechanism for indexing
a text collection in order to speed up the searching task. The inverted file structure
is composed of two elements: the vocabulary and the occurrences. The vocabulary is
the set of all different words in the text. For each such word, a list of all the text
positions where the word appears is stored. The set of all those lists is called the
“occurrences” (Figure 3.5 shows an example). These positions can refer to words or
characters. Word positions (i.e., position i refers to the ith word) simplify phrase
and proximity queries, while character positions (i.e., the position i is the ith
character) facilitate direct access to the matching text positions.
Some authors make the distinction between inverted files and inverted lists. In
an inverted file, each element of a list points to a document or file name, while
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inverted lists match our definition. We prefer not to make such a distinction
because, as we will see later, this is a matter of the addressing granularity, which can
range from text positions to logical blocks.
The space required for the vocabulary is rather small. According to Heaps’ law,
the vocabulary grows as OðnβÞ, where β is a constant between 0 and 1 dependent on
the text, being between 0.4 and 0.6 in practice. For instance, for 1 Gb of the TREC-2
collection, the vocabulary has a size of only 5 Mb. This may be further reduced by
stemming and other normalization techniques as described.
The occurrences demand much more space. Since each word appearing in the
text is referenced once in that structure, the extra space is O(n). Even omitting
stopwords (which is the default practice when words are indexed), in practice the
space overhead of the occurrences is between 30 and 40% of the text size.
To reduce space requirements, a technique called block addressing is used. The
text is divided in blocks, and the occurrences point to the blocks where the word
appears (instead of the exact positions). The classical indices which point to the
exact occurrences are called “full inverted indices.” Using block addressing not only
can the pointers be smaller because there are fewer blocks than positions, but also
all the occurrences of a word inside a single block are collapsed to one reference (see
Figure 3.6). Indices of only 5% overhead over the text size are obtained with this
technique. The price to pay is that, if the exact occurrence positions are required
(for instance, for a proximity query), then an online search over the qualifying
blocks has to be performed. For instance, block addressing indices with 256 blocks
stop working well with texts of 200 Mb.
Table 3.1 presents the projected space taken by inverted indices for texts of
different sizes, with and without the use of stopwords. The full inversion stands for
inverting all the words and storing their exact positions, using four bytes per
Figure 3.5.
A sample text and an inverted index built on it. The words are converted to lower case, and some are not
indexed. The occurrences point to character positions in the text.
Figure 3.6.
The sample text splits into four blocks, and an inverted index uses block addressing built on it. The occurrences
denote block numbers. Notice that both occurrences of “words” collapsed into one.
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pointer. The document addressing index assumes that we point to documents which
are of size 10 kb (and the necessary number of bytes per pointer, that is, one, two,
and three bytes, depending on text size). The block addressing index assumes that
we use 256 or 64K blocks (one or two bytes per pointer) independently of the text
size. The space taken by the pointers can be significantly reduced by using com-
pression. We assume that 45% of all the words are stopwords and that there is one
non-stopword each 11.5 characters. Our estimation for the vocabulary is based on
Heaps’ law with parameters V ¼ 30n0:5. All these decisions were taken according to
our experience and experimentally validated.
The blocks can be of fixed size (imposing a logical block structure over the text
database), or they can be defined using the natural division of the text collection
into files, documents, Web pages, or others. The division into blocks of fixed size
improves efficiency at retrieval time, that is, the more variance in the block sizes,
the more amount of text sequentially traversed on average. This is because larger
blocks match queries more frequently and are more expensive to traverse.
Alternatively, the division using natural cuts may eliminate the need for online
traversal. For example, if one block per retrieval unit is used and the exact match
positions are not required, there is no need to traverse the text for single-word
queries, since it is enough to know which retrieval units to report. But if, on the
other hand, many retrieval units are packed into a single block, the block has to be
traversed to determine which units to retrieve.
It is important to notice that in order to use block addressing, the text must be
readily available at search time. This is not the case for remote text (as in Web
search engines) or if the text is in a CD-ROM that has to be mounted, for instance.
Some restricted queries not needing exact positions can still be solved if the blocks
are retrieval units.
Four granulates and three collections are considered. For each collection, the
right column considers that stopwords are not indexed, while the left column
considers that all words are indexed.
3.6.2 Blocked sort-based indexing
The basic steps in constructing a non-positional index. We first make a pass
through the collection assembling all termdocID pairs. We then sort the pairs with
the term as the dominant key and docID as the secondary key. Finally, we organize
the docIDs for each term into a postings list and compute statistics like term and
document frequency. For small collections, all this can be done in memory. In this
chapter, we describe methods for large collections that require the use of secondary
storage.
To make index construction more efficient, we represent terms as termIDs,
where each termID is a unique serial number. We can build the mapping from
Index Small collection
(1 Mb)
Medium collection
(2 Mb)
Large collection
(2 Gb)
Addressing words 45% 73% 36% 64% 35% 63%
Addressing documents 19% 26% 18% 32% 26% 47%
Addressing 64K block 27% 41% 18% 32% 5% 9%
Addressing 256 blocks 18% 25% 1.7% 2.4% 0.5% 0.7%
Table 3.1.
Sizes of an inverted file as approximate percentages of the size of the whole text collection.
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terms to termIDs on the fly while we are processing the collection, or, in a two-pass
approach, we compile the vocabulary in the first pass and construct the inverted
index in the second pass. The index construction algorithms described in this
chapter all do a single pass through the data. Section 4.7 gives references to
multipass algorithms that are preferable in certain applications, for example, when
disk space is scarce.
We work with the Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1) collection as our model
collection in this chapter, a collection with roughly 1 GB of text. It consists of about
800,000 documents that were sent over the Reuters newswire during a 1-year
period between August 20, 1996, and August 19, 1997. A typical document is shown
in Figure 3.7, but note that we ignore multimedia information like images in this
book and are only concerned with text. Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1) covers a
wide range of international topics, including politics, business, sports, and (as in
this example) science. Some key statistics of the collection are shown in Table 3.2.
Values are rounded for the computations in this book. The unrounded values are
806,791 documents, 222 tokens per document, 391,523 (distinct) terms, 6.04 bytes
per token with spaces and punctuation, 4.5 bytes per token without spaces and
punctuation, 7.5 bytes per term, and 96,969,056 tokens
Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1) has 100 million tokens. Collecting all termID-
docID pairs of the collection using 4 bytes each for termID and docID therefore
requires 0.8 GB of storage. Typical collections today are often one or two orders of
magnitude larger than Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1). You can easily see how
Symbol Statistic Value
N Documents 800,000
L Avg. number of tokens per document 200
M Terms 400,000
Avg. number of bytes per token (incl. spaces/punct.) 6
Avg. number of bytes per token (without spaces/punct.) 4.5
Avg. number of bytes per term 7.5
T Tokens 100,000,000
Table 3.2.
Collection statistics for Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1).
Figure 3.7.
Document from the Reuters newswire.
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such collections overwhelm even large computers if we try to sort their termID-
docID pairs in memory. If the size of the intermediate files during index construc-
tion is within a small factor of available memory, then the compression techniques
introduced in Chapter 5 can help; however, the postings file of many large collec-
tions cannot fit into memory even after compression (Figure 3.7).
With the insufficient main memory, we need to use an external sorting algo-
rithm, that is, one that uses disk. To achieve acceptable sorting efficiency, the
central requirement of such an algorithm is that it minimizes the number of random
disk seeks during sorting-sequential disk reads are far faster than seeks as we
explained in Section 4.1. One solution is the blocked sort-based indexing algorithm
or BSBI in Figure 3.8. BSBI (i) segments the collection into parts of equal size, (ii)
sorts the termID-docID pairs of each part in memory, (iii) stores intermediate
sorted results on disk, and (iv) merges all intermediate results into the final index.
The algorithm parses documents into termID-docID pairs and accumulates
the pairs in memory until a block of a fixed size is full (PARSENEXTBLOCK in
Figure 3.8). We choose the block size to fit comfortably into memory to permit a
fast in-memory sort. The block is then inverted and written to disk. Inversion
involves two steps. First, we sort the termID-docID pairs. Next, we collect all
termID-docID pairs with the same termID into a postings list, where a posting is
simply a docID. The result, an inverted index for the block we have just read, is then
written to disk. Applying this to Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1) and assuming we
can fit 10 million termID-docID pairs into memory, we end up with ten blocks, each
an inverted index of one part of the collection.
In the final step, the algorithm simultaneously merges the 10 blocks into 1 large
merged index. An example with two blocks is shown in Figure 3.9, where we use di
to denote the ith document of the collection. To do the merging, we open all block
files simultaneously and maintain small read buffers for the ten blocks we are
reading and a write buffer for the final merged index we are writing. In each
iteration, we select the lowest termID that has not been processed yet using aprior-
ity queue or a similar data structure. All postings lists for this termID are read and
merged, and the merged list is written back to disk. Each read buffer is refilled from
its file when necessary.
How expensive is BSBIFI. Its time complexity is ΘðT logTÞ because the step with
the highest time complexity is sorting and T is an upper bound for the number of
items we must sort (i.e., the number of termID-docID pairs). But the actual
indexing time is usually dominated by the time it takes to parse the documents
(PARSENEXTBLOCK) and to do the final merge (MERGEBLOCKS). Exercise 4.6
asks you to compute the total index construction time for RCV1 that includes these
steps as well as invert the blocks and write them to disk (Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.8.
Blocked sort-based indexing. The algorithm stores inverted blocks in files f 1;…;f n and the merged index in
fmerged.
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Notice that Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1) is not particularly large in an age
when one or more GB of memory is standard on personal computers. With appro-
priate compression, we could have created an inverted index for RCV1 in memory
on a not overly beefy server. The techniques we have described are needed, how-
ever, for collections that have several orders of larger magnitude.
3.6.3 Single-pass in-memory indexing
Blocked sort-based indexing has excellent scaling properties, but it needs a data
structure for mapping terms to termIDs. For very large collections, this data struc-
ture does not fit into memory. A more scalable alternative is single-pass in-memory
indexing or SPIMI. SPIMI uses terms instead of termIDs, writes each block’s dictio-
nary to disk, and then starts a new dictionary for the next block. SPIMI can index
collections of any size as long as there is enough disk space available.
The SPIMI algorithm is shown in Figure 3.10. The part of the algorithm that
parses documents and turns them into a stream of termdocID pairs, which we call
tokens here, has been omitted. SPIMI-INVERT is called repeatedly on the token
stream until the entire collection has been processed. Tokens are processed one by
Figure 3.9.
Merging in blocked sort-based indexing. Two blocks (postings lists to be merged) are loaded from disk into
memory, merged in memory (merged postings lists), and written back to disk. We show terms instead of termIDs
for better readability.
Figure 3.10.
Inversion of a block in single-pass in-memory indexing.
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one (line 4) during each successive call of SPIMI-INVERT. When a term occurs for
the first time, it is added to the dictionary (best implemented as a hash), and a new
postings list is created (line 6). The call in line 7 returns this postings list for
subsequent occurrences of the term.
A difference between BSBI and SPIMI is that SPIMI adds a posting directly to its
postings list (line 10). Instead of first collecting all termID-docID pairs and then
sorting them (as we did in BSBI), each postings list is dynamic (i.e., its size is
adjusted as it grows), and it is immediately available to collect postings. This has
two advantages: it is faster because there is no sorting required, and it saves mem-
ory because we keep track of the term a postings list belongs to, so the termIDs of
postings need not be stored. As a result, the blocks that individual calls of SPIMI-
INVERT can process are much larger, and the index construction process as a whole
is more efficient.
Because we do not know how large the postings list of a term will be when we
first encounter it, we allocate space for a short postings list initially and double the
space each time it is full (lines 8–9). This means that some memory is wasted, which
counteracts the memory savings from the omission of termIDs in intermediate data
structures. However, the overall memory requirements for the dynamically
constructed index of a block in SPIMI are still lower than in BSBI.
When memory has been exhausted, we write the index of the block (which
consists of the dictionary and the postings lists) to disk (line 12). We have to sort
the terms (line 11) before doing this because we want to write postings lists in
lexicographic order to facilitate the final merging step. If each block’s postings lists
were written in unsorted order, merging blocks could not be accomplished by a
simple linear scan through each block.
Each call of SPIMI-INVERT writes a block to disk, just as in BSBI. The last step
of SPIMI (corresponding to line 7 in Figure 3.8; not shown in Figure 3.10) is then to
merge the blocks into the final inverted index.
In addition to constructing a new dictionary structure for each block and elimi-
nating the expensive sorting step, SPIMI has a third important component: com-
pression. Both the postings and the dictionary terms can be stored compactly on
disk if we employ compression. Compression increases the efficiency of the algo-
rithm further because we can process even larger blocks and because the individual
blocks require less space on disk. We refer readers to the literature for this aspect of
the algorithm.
The time complexity of SPIMI is ΘðTÞ because no sorting of tokens is required
and all operations are at most linear in the size of the collection.
3.6.4 Dictionary compression
This section presents a series of dictionary data structures that achieve increas-
ingly higher compression ratios. The dictionary is small compared with the postings
file as suggested by Table 5.1. So, why compress it if it is responsible for only a
small percentage of the overall space requirements of the IR system?
One of the primary factors in determining the response time of an IR system is
the number of disk seeks necessary to process a query. If parts of the dictionary are
on disk, then many more disk seeks are necessary in query evaluation. Thus, the
main goal of compressing the dictionary is to fit it in the main memory, or at least a
large portion of it, to support high query throughput. Although dictionaries of very
large collections fit into the memory of a standard desktop machine, this is not true
of many other application scenarios. For example, an enterprise search server for a
large corporation may have to index a multiterabyte collection with a comparatively
large vocabulary because of the presence of documents in many different languages.
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We also want to be able to design search systems for limited hardware such as
mobile phones and onboard computers. Other reasons for wanting to conserve
memory are fast start-up time and having to share resources with other applica-
tions. The search system on your PC must get along with the memory-hogging word
processing suite you are using at the same time (Figure 3.11).
3.7. XML retrieval
Information retrieval systems are often contrasted with relational databases.
Traditionally, IR systems have retrieved information from unstructured text ¨C by
which we mean raw text without markup. Databases are designed for querying
relational data: sets of records that have values for predefined attributes such as
employee number, title, and salary. There are fundamental differences between
information retrieval and database systems in terms of retrieval model, data struc-
tures, and query languages shown in Table 3.3.
Some highly structured text search problems are most efficiently handled by a
relational database (RDB), for example, if the employee table contains an attribute
for short textual job descriptions and you want to find all employees who are
involved with invoicing. In this case, the SQL query, select lastname from employees
where job_desc like invoic%, may be sufficient to satisfy your information need with
high precision and recall.
However, many structured data sources containing text are best modeled as
structured documents rather than relational data. We call the search over such
structured documents and structured retrieval. Queries in structured retrieval can
be either structured or unstructured, but we will assume in this chapter that the
collection consists only of structured documents. Applications of structured
retrieval include digital libraries, patent databases, blogs, text in which entities like
persons and locations have been tagged (in a process called named entity tagging),
and output from office suites like OpenOffice that save documents as marked up
text. In all of these applications, we want to be able to run queries that combine
textual criteria with structural criteria. Examples of such queries give me a
Figure 3.11.
Storing the dictionary as an array of fixed-width entries.
RDB search Unstructured retrieval Structured retrieval
Objects Records Unstructured documents Trees with text at leaves
Model Relational model Vector space & others ?
Main data structure Table Inverted index ?
Queries SQL Free text queries ?
Table 3.3.
RDB (relational database) search, unstructured information retrieval, and structured information retrieval.
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full-length article on fast Fourier transforms (digital libraries), give me patents
whose claims mention RSA public-key encryption and that cite US 4,405,829 pat-
ents, or give me articles about sightseeing tours of the Vatican and the Coliseum
(entity-tagged text). These three queries are structured queries that cannot be
answered well by an unranked retrieval system. As we argued in Example 1.1
(p. 15), unranked retrieval models like the Boolean model suffer from low recall.
For instance, an unranked system would return a potentially large number of
articles that mention the Vatican, the Coliseum, and the sightseeing tours without
ranking the ones that are most relevant for the query first. Most users are also
notoriously bad at precisely stating structural constraints. For instance, users may
not know for which structured elements the search system supports search. In our
example, the user may be unsure whether to issue the query as sightseeing AND
(COUNTRY:Vatican OR LANDMARK:Coliseum), as sightseeing AND (STATE:
Vatican OR BUILDING:Coliseum), or in some other form. Users may also be
completely unfamiliar with structured search and advanced search interfaces or
unwilling to use them. In this chapter, we look at how ranked retrieval methods can
be adapted to structured documents to address these problems.
There is no consensus yet as to which methods work best for structured retrieval
although many researchers believe that XQuery will become the standard for struc-
tured queries.
We will only look at one standard for encoding structured documents, Extensi-
ble Markup Language or XML, which is currently the most widely used such
standard. We will not cover the specifics that distinguish XML from other types of
markup such as HTML and SGML. But most of what we say in this chapter is
applicable to markup languages in general.
In the context of information retrieval, we are only interested in XML as a
language for encoding text and documents. A perhaps more widespread use of XML
is to encode non-text data. For example, we may want to export data in XML format
from an enterprise resource planning system and then read them into an analytic
program to produce graphs for a presentation. This type of application of XML is
called data-centric because numerical and non-text attribute-value data dominate
and text is usually a small fraction of the overall data. Most data-centric XML is
stored in databases—in contrast to the inverted index-based methods for text-
centric XML that we present in this chapter.
We call XML retrieval a structured retrieval in this chapter. Some researchers
prefer the term semistructured retrieval to distinguish XML retrieval from data-
base querying. We have adopted the terminology that is widespread in the XML
retrieval community. For instance, the standard way of referring to XML queries
is structured queries, not semistructured queries. The term structured retrieval is
rarely used for database querying, and it always refers to XML retrieval in this
book.
There is a second type of information retrieval problem that is intermediate
between unstructured retrieval and querying a relational database, parametric and
zone search, which we discussed in Section 6.1 (p. 110). In the data model of
parametric and zone search, there are parametric fields (relational attributes like
date or file size) and zones ¨C text attributes that each takes a chunk of unstruc-
tured text as value. The data model is flat, that is, there is no nesting of attributes.
The number of attributes is small. In contrast, XML documents have the more
complex tree structure that we see in Figure 3.13 in which attributes are nested. The
number of attributes and nodes is greater than in parametric and zone search.
After presenting the basic concepts of XML in Section 3.71, this chapter first
discusses the challenges we face in XML retrieval (Section 3.72). Next, we describe a
vector space model for XML retrieval (Section 3.73). Presents INEX, a shared task
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evaluation that has been held for a number of years and currently is the most
important venue for XML retrieval research.
3.7.1 Basic XML concepts
An XML document is an ordered, labeled tree. Each node of the tree is an XML
element and is written with an opening and closing tag. An element can have one or
more XML attributes. In the XML document in Figure 3.12, the scene element is
enclosed by the two tags 〈scene…〉 and 〈=scene〉. It has an attribute number with value
vii and two child elements, title and verse.
Figure 3.13 shows Figure 3.12 as a tree. The leaf nodes of the tree consist of text,
for example, Shakespeare, Macbeth, and Macbeth’s castle. The tree’s internal nodes
encode either the structure of the document (title, act, and scene) or metadata
functions (author).
The standard for accessing and processing XML documents is the XML Docu-
ment Object Model or DOM. The DOM represents elements, attributes, and text
within elements as nodes in a tree. Figure 3.13 is a simplified DOM representation
of the XML document in Figure 3.12. With a DOM API, we can process an XML
document by starting at the root element and then descending down the tree from
parents to children.
XPath is a standard for enumerating paths in an XML document collection. We
will also refer to paths as XML contexts or simply contexts in this chapter. Only a
small subset of XPath is needed for our purposes. The XPath expression node selects
all nodes of that name. Successive elements of a path are separated by slashes, so act/
scene selects all scene elements whose parent is an act element. Double slashes
indicate that an arbitrary number of elements can intervene on a path: play//scene
selects all scene elements occurring in a play element. In Figure 3.13, this set consists
of a single scene element, which is accessible via the path play, act, and scene from
the top. An initial slash starts the path at the root element. /play/title selects the plays
title in Figure 3.12, /play//title selects a set with two members (the plays title and the
scenes title), and /scene/title selects no elements. For notational convenience, we
allow the final element of a path to be a vocabulary term and separate it from the
element path by the symbol #, even though this does not conform to the XPath
standard. For example, title#“Macbeth” selects all titles containing the termMacbeth.
We also need the concept of schema in this chapter. A schema puts constraints
on the structure of allowable XML documents for a particular application. A schema
for Shakespeare’s plays may stipulate that scenes can only occur as children of acts
and that only acts and scenes have the number attribute. Two standards for schemas
for XML documents are XML DTD (document-type definition) and XML schema.
Figure 3.12.
An XML document.
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Users can only write structured queries for an XML retrieval system if they have
some minimal knowledge about the schema of the collection
A common format for XML queries is NEXI (Narrowed Extended XPath I). We
give an example in Figure 3.14. We display the query on four lines for typograph-
ical convenience, but it is intended to be read as one unit without line breaks. In
particular, //section is embedded under //article.
The query in Figure 3.14 specifies a search for sections about the summer
holidays that are part of articles from 2001 to 2002. As in XPath double slashes
indicate that an arbitrary number of elements can intervene on a path. The dot in a
clause in square brackets refers to the element the clause modifies. The clause
Figure 3.13.
The XML document in Figure 10.1 as a simplified DOM object.
Figure 3.14.
An XML query in NEXI format and its partial representation as a tree.
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[.//yr = 2001 or.//yr = 2002] modifies //article. Thus, the dot refers to //article in
this case. Similarly, the dot in [about(., summer holidays)] refers to the section that
the clause modifies.
The 2-year conditions are relational attribute constraints. Only articles whose
year attribute is 2001 or 2002 (or that contain an element whose year attribute is
2001 or 2002) are to be considered. The about clause is a ranking constraint:
sections that occur in the right type of article are to be ranked according to how
relevant they are to the topic summer holidays.
We usually handle relational attribute constraints by prefiltering or postfiltering:
we simply exclude all elements from the result set that do not meet the relational
attribute constraints. In this chapter, we will not address how to do this efficiently
and instead focus on the core information retrieval problem in XML retrieval,
namely, how to rank documents according to the relevance criteria expressed in the
about conditions of the NEXI query.
If we discard relational attributes, we can represent documents as trees with only
one type of node: element nodes. In other words, we remove all attribute nodes from
the XML document, such as the number attribute in Figure 3.12. Figure 3.15 shows a
subtree of the document in Figure 3.12 as an element-node tree (labeled d1).
We can represent queries as trees in the same way. This is a query-by-example
approach to query language design because users pose queries by creating objects
that satisfy the same formal description as documents. In Figure 3.15, q1 is a search
for books whose titles score highly for the keywords Julius Caesar. q2 is a search for
books whose author elements score highly for Julius Caesar and whose title ele-
ments score highly for Gallic war. To represent the semantics of NEXI queries fully
we would also need to designate one node in the tree as a “target node”, for
example, the section in the tree in Figure 3.14. Without the designation of a target
node, the tree in Figure 3.14 is not a search for sections embedded in articles (as
specified by NEXI), but a search for articles that contain sections.
3.7.2 Challenges in XML retrieval
In this section, we discuss a number of challenges that make structured retrieval
more difficult than unstructured retrieval. Recall from page 195 the basic setting we
assume in structured retrieval: the collection consists of structured documents, and
queries are either structured (as in Figure 3.14) or unstructured (e.g., summer
holidays).
The first challenge in structured retrieval is that users want us to return parts of
documents (i.e., XML elements), not the entire documents as IR systems usually do
in unstructured retrieval. If we query Shakespeare’s plays for Macbeth’s castle,
should we return the scene, the act, or the entire play in Figure 3.13? In this case,
Figure 3.15.
Tree representation of XML documents and queries.
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the user is probably looking for the scene. On the other hand, another wise
unspecified search for Macbeth should return the play of this name, not a subunit.
One criterion for selecting the most appropriate part of a document is the
structured document retrieval principle:
Structured document retrieval principle. A system should always retrieve the
most specific part of a document answering the query.
This principle motivates a retrieval strategy that returns the smallest unit that
contains the information sought, but does not go below this level. However, it can
be hard to implement this principle algorithmically. Consider the query
title#“Macbeth” applied to Figure 3.13. The title of the tragedy, Macbeth, and the
title of act I, scene vii, Macbeth’s castle, are both good hits because they contain the
matching term Macbeth. But in this case, the title of the tragedy, the higher node, is
preferred. Deciding which level of the tree is right for answering a query is difficult.
Parallel to the issue of which parts of a document to return to the user is the issue
of which parts of a document to index. In Section 2.1.2 (p. 20), we discussed the
need for a document unit or indexing unit in indexing and retrieval. In unstructured
retrieval, it is usually clear what the right document unit is: files on your desktop,
email messages, web pages on the web, etc. In structured retrieval, there are a
number of different approaches to defining the indexing unit.
One approach is to group nodes into non-overlapping pseudo-documents as
shown in Figure 3.16. In the example, books, chapters, and sections have been
designated to be indexing units but without overlap. For example, the leftmost
dashed indexing unit contains only those parts of the tree dominated by book that
are not already part of other indexing units. The disadvantage of this approach is
that pseudo-documents may not make sense to the user because they are not
coherent units. For instance, the leftmost indexing unit in Figure 3.16merges three
disparate elements, the class, author, and title elements.
We can also use one of the largest elements as the indexing unit, for example,
the book element in a collection of books or the play element for Shakespeare’s
works. We can then postprocess search results to find for each book or play the
subelement that is the best hit. For example, the query Macbeth’s castle may return
the play Macbeth, which we can then postprocess to identify act I, scene vii, as the
best-matching subelement. Unfortunately, this two-stage retrieval process fails to
return the best subelement for many queries because the relevance of a whole book
is often not a good predictor of the relevance of small subelements within it.
Instead of retrieving large units and identifying subelements (top-down), we
can also search all leaves, select the most relevant ones, and then extend them to
larger units in postprocessing (bottom-up). For the query Macbeth’s castle in
Figure 3.12, we would retrieve the title Macbeth’s castle in the first pass and then
decide in a postprocessing step whether to return the title, the scene, the actor, or
the play. This approach has a similar problem as the last one: the relevance of a leaf
element is often not a good predictor of the relevance of elements it is contained in.
Figure 3.16.
Partitioning an XML document into non-overlapping indexing units.
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The least restrictive approach is to index all elements. This is also problematic.
Many XML elements are not meaningful search results, for example, typographical
elements like 〈b〉def initely〈=b〉 or an ISBN number which cannot be interpreted
without context. Also, indexing all elements means that search results will be highly
redundant. For the query Macbeth’s castle and the document in Figure 3.12, we
would return all of the play, act, scene, and title elements on the path between the
root node and Macbeth’s castle. The leaf node would then occur four times in the
result set, once directly, and three times as part of other elements. We call elements
that are contained within each other nested. Returning redundant nested elements
in a list of returned hits is not very user-friendly.
Because of the redundancy caused by nested elements, it is common to restrict
the set of elements that are eligible to be returned. Restriction strategies include:
• Discard all small elements.
• Discard all element types that users do not look at (this requires a working
XML retrieval system that logs this information).
• Discard all element types that assessors generally do not judge to be relevant (if
relevance assessments are available).
• Only keep element types that a system designer or librarian has deemed to be
useful search results.
In most of these approaches, result sets will still contain nested elements. Thus,
we may want to remove some elements in a postprocessing step to reduce redun-
dancy. Alternatively, we can collapse several nested elements in the results list and
use highlighting of query terms to draw the user’s attention to the relevant passages.
If query terms are highlighted, then scanning a medium-sized element (e.g., a
section) takes little more time than scanning a small subelement (e.g., a paragraph).
Thus, if the section and the paragraph both occur in the results list, it is sufficient to
show the section. An additional advantage of this approach is that the paragraph is
presented together with its context (i.e., the embedding section). This context may
be helpful in interpreting the paragraph (e.g., the source of the information
reported) even if the paragraph on its own satisfies the query.
If the user knows the schema of the collection and is able to specify the desired
type of element, then the problem of redundancy is alleviated as few nested ele-
ments have the same type. But as we discussed in the introduction, users often don’t
know what the name of an element in the collection is (Is the Vatican a country or a
city?), or they may not know how to compose structured queries at all.
A challenge in XML retrieval related to nesting is that we may need to distinguish
different contexts of a term when we compute term statistics for ranking, in particu-
lar inverse document frequency (idf) statistics as defined in Section 6.2.1 (p. 117). For
example, the term Gates under the node author is unrelated to an occurrence under a
content node like section if used to refer to the plural of gate. It makes little sense to
compute a single document frequency for Gates in this example.
One solution is to compute idf for XML-context/term pairs, for example, to
compute different idf weights for author#“Gates” and section#“Gates.” Unfortu-
nately, this scheme will run into sparse data problems; that is, many XML-context
pairs occur too rarely to reliably estimate df (see Section 13.2, p. 260, for a discus-
sion of sparseness). A compromise is only to consider the parent node x of the term
and not the rest of the path from the root to x to distinguish contexts. There are still
conflations of contexts that are harmful in this scheme. For instance, we do not
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distinguish names of authors and names of corporations if both have the parent
node name. But most important distinctions, like the example contrast
author#“Gates” vs. section#“Gates,” will be respected.
In many cases, several different XML schemas occur in a collection since the
XML documents in an IR application often come from more than one source. This
phenomenon is called schema heterogeneity or schema diversity and presents yet
another challenge. As illustrated in Figure 3.17, comparable elements may have
different names: creator in d2 vs. author in d3. In other cases, the structural organi-
zation of the schemas may be different: author names are direct descendants of the
node author in q3, but there are the intervening nodes firstname and lastname in d3.
If we employ strict matching of trees, then q3 will retrieve neither d2 nor d3
although both documents are relevant. Some form of approximate matching of
element names in combination with semiautomatic matching of different document
structures can help here. Human editing of correspondences of elements in differ-
ent schemas will usually do better than automatic methods.
Schema heterogeneity is one reason for query-document mismatches like q3=d2
and q3=d3. Another reason is that users often are not familiar with the element
names and the structure of the schemas of collections they search as mentioned.
This poses a challenge for interface design in XML retrieval. Ideally, the user
interface should expose the tree structure of the collection and allow users to specify
the elements they are querying. If we take this approach, then designing the query
interface in structured retrieval is more complex than a search box for keyword
queries in unstructured retrieval.
We can also support the user by interpreting all parent-child relationships in
queries as descendant relationships with any number of intervening nodes allowed.
We call such queries extended queries. The tree in Figure 3.14 and q4 in Figure 3.17
are examples of extended queries. We show edges that are interpreted as descen-
dant relationships as dashed arrows. In q4, a dashed arrow connects book and Gates.
As a pseudo-XPath notation for q4, we adopt book//#“Gates”: a book that some-
where in its structure contains the word Gates where the path from the book node
to Gates can be arbitrarily long. The pseudo-XPath notation for the extended query
that in addition specifies that Gates occurs in a section of the book is book//section//
#“Gates.” It is convenient for users to be able to issue such extended queries
without having to specify the exact structural configuration in which a query term
should occur—either because they do not care about the exact configuration or
because they do not know enough about the schema of the collection to be able to
specify it.
Figure 3.17.
Schema heterogeneity: intervening nodes and mismatched names.
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In Figure 3.18, the user is looking for a chapter entitled FFT (q5). Suppose that
there is no such chapter in the collection but that there are references to books on
FFT (d4). A reference to a book on FFT is not exactly what the user is looking for,
but it is better than returning nothing. Extended queries do not help here. The
extended query q6 also returns nothing. This is a case where we may want to
interpret the structural constraints specified in the query as hints as opposed to as
strict conditions. As we will discuss in Section 10.4, users prefer a relaxed interpre-
tation of structural constraints: elements that do not meet structural constraints
perfectly should be ranked lower, but they should not be omitted from search
results.
3.7.3 A vector space model for XML retrieval
In this section, we present a simple vector space model for XML retrieval. It is
not intended to be a complete description of a state-of-the-art system. Instead, we
want to give the reader a flavor of how documents can be represented and retrieved
in XML retrieval.
To take into account the structure in retrieval in Figure 3.15, we want a book
entitled Julius Caesar to be a match for q1 and no match (or a lower-weighted
match) for q2. In unstructured retrieval, there would be a single dimension of the
vector space for Caesar. In XML retrieval, we must separate the title word Caesar
from the author name Caesar. One way of doing this is to have each dimension of
the vector space encode a word together with its position within the XML tree.
Figure 3.19 illustrates this representation. We first take each text node (which in
our setup is always a leaf) and break it into multiple nodes, one for each word. So,
the leaf node Bill Gates is split into two leaves Bill and Gates. Next, we define the
dimensions of the vector space to be lexicalized subtrees of documents-subtrees
that contain at least one vocabulary term. A subset of these possible lexicalized
subtrees is shown in the figure, but there are others, for example, the subtree
corresponding to the whole document with the leaf node Gates removed. We can
now represent queries and documents as vectors in this space of lexicalized subtrees
and compute matches between them. This means that we can use the vector space
formalism from Chapter 6 for XML retrieval. The main difference is that the
dimensions of vector space in unstructured retrieval are vocabulary terms, whereas
they are lexicalized subtrees in XML retrieval.
There is a trade-off between the dimensionality of the space and accuracy of
query results. If we trivially restrict dimensions to vocabulary terms, then we have a
standard vector space retrieval system that will retrieve many documents that do
Figure 3.18.
A structural mismatch between two queries and a document.
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not match the structure of the query (e.g., Gates in the title as opposed to the author
element). If we create a separate dimension for each lexicalized subtree occurring in
the collection, the dimensionality of the space becomes too large. A compromise is
to index all paths that end in a single vocabulary term, in other words, all
XML-context/term pairs. We call such an XML-context/term pair a structural term
and denote it by 〈c, t〉: a pair of XML-context c and vocabulary term t. The docu-
ment in Figure 3.19 has nine structural terms. Seven are shown (e.g., “Bill” and
Author#“Bill”) and two are not shown: /Book/Author#“Bill” and /Book/
Author#“Gates,” The tree with the leaves Bill and Gates is a lexicalized subtree that
is not a structural term. We use the previously introduced pseudo-XPath notation
for structural terms.
As we discussed in the last section, users are bad at remembering details about
the schema and at constructing queries that comply with the schema. We will
therefore interpret all queries as extended queries; that is, there can be an arbitrary
number of intervening nodes in the document for any parent-child node pair in the
query. For example, we interpret q5 in Figure 3.18 as q6.
But we still prefer documents that match the query structure closely by inserting
fewer additional nodes. We ensure that retrieval results respect this preference by
computing a weight for each match. A simple measure of the similarity of a path cq
in a query and a path cd in a document is the following context resemblance
function CR:
CRðcq, cdÞ ¼
1þjcqj
1þjcdj, if  cq matches cd
0 if  cq does not match cd
,
(
(3.21)
where jcqj and jcdj are the number of nodes in the query path and document
path, respectively, and cq matches cd if we can transform cq into cd by inserting
additional nodes. Two examples from Figure 3.17 are CRðcq4, cd2Þ ¼ 3=4 ¼ 0:75 and
CRðcq4, cd3Þ ¼ 3=5 ¼ 0:6 where cq4, cd2 and cd3 are the relevant paths from top to leaf
node in q4, d2 and d3, respectively. The value of CRðcq, cdÞ is 1.0 if q and d are
identical.
The final score for a document is computed as a variant of the cosine measure
[Eq. (6.10), p. 121], which we call SIMNOMERGE for reasons that will become clear
shortly. SIMNOMERGE is defined as follows:
SIMNOMERGEðq, dÞ ¼ ∑
ck ∈B
∑
cl ∈B
CRðck, clÞ ∑
t∈V
weightðq, t, ckÞ weightðd, t, clÞffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑c∈B, t∈Vweight2ðd, t, cÞp : (3.22)
Figure 3.19.
A mapping of an XML document (left) to a set of lexicalized subtrees (right).
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where V is the vocabulary of nonstructural terms, B is the set of all XML
contexts, and weightðq, t, cÞ and weightðd, t, cÞ are the weights of term t in XML
context c in query q and document d, respectively. We compute the weights using
one of the weightings from Chapter 6, such as idf t  wf t,d. The inverse document
frequency idf t depends on which elements we use to compute df t as discussed in
Section 10.2. The similarity measure SIMNOMERGE ðq, dÞ is not a true cosine
measure since its value can be larger than 1.0 (Exercise 10.11). We divide byffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑c∈B, t∈Vweight
2ðd, t, cÞ
q
to normalize for document length (Section 6.3.1, page
121). We have omitted query length normalization to simplify the formula. It has no
effect on ranking since, for a given query, the normalizer
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑c∈B, t∈Vweight
2ðd, t, cÞ
q
is the same for all documents.
The algorithm for computing SIMNOMERGE for all documents in the collection
is shown in Figure 3.22. The array normalizer in Figure 3.22 containsffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑c∈B, t∈Vweight
2ðd, t, cÞ
q
from Eq. (3.22) for each document.
We give an example of how SIMNOMERGE computes query-document similar-
ities in Figure 3.21. 〈c1, t〉 is one of the structural terms in the query. We succes-
sively retrieve all postings lists for structural terms 〈c0, t〉 with the same vocabulary
term t. Three example postings lists are shown. For the first one, we have
CRðc1, c1Þ ¼ 1:0 since the two contexts are identical. The next context has no context
resemblance with c1 : CRðc1, c2Þ ¼ 0, and the corresponding postings list is ignored.
The context match of c1 with c3 is 0:63 ≥0 and it will be processed. In this example,
the highest ranking document is d9 with a similarity of 1:0 0:2þ 0:63 0:6 ¼
0:578. To simplify the figure, the query weight of 〈c1, t〉 is assumed to be 1.0
(Figures 3.20 and 3.21).
The query-document similarity function in Figure 3.22 is called SIMNOMERGE
because different XML contexts are kept separate for the purpose of weighting. An
alternative similarity function is SIMMERGE which relaxes the matching conditions
of query and document further in the following three ways:
• We collect the statistics used for computing weightðq, t, cÞ and weightðd, t, cÞ
from all contexts that have a non-zero resemblance to c (as opposed to just
from c as in SIMNOMERGE). For instance, for computing the document
frequency of the structural term atl#“recognition,” we also count occurrences
of recognition in XML contexts fm/atl, article//atl, etc.
• We modify Eq. (3.22) by merging all structural terms in the document that
have a non-zero context resemblance to a given query structural term. For
Figure 3.20.
The algorithm for scoring documents with SIMNOMERGE.
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example, the contexts /play/act/scene/title and /play/title in the document will
be merged when matching against the query term /play/title#“Macbeth.”
• The context resemblance function is further relaxed: contexts have a non-zero
resemblance in many cases where the definition of CR in Eq. (3.21) returns 0.
These three changes alleviate the problem of sparse term statistics discussed in
Section 3.2 and increase the robustness of the matching function against poorly
posed structural queries. The evaluation of SIMNOMERGE and SIMMERGE in the
next section shows that the relaxed matching conditions of SIMMERGE increase the
effectiveness of XML retrieval.
3.7.4 Evaluation of XML retrieval
The premier venue for research on XML retrieval is the INEX (INitiative for the
Evaluation of XML retrieval) program, a collaborative effort that has produced
reference collections, sets of queries, and relevance judgments. A yearly INEX
meeting is held to present and discuss research results. The INEX 2002 collection
consisted of about 12,000 articles from IEEE journals. We give collection statistics
in Table 3.4 and show part of the schema of the collection in Figure 3.22. The IEEE
journal collection was expanded in 2005. Since 2006 INEX uses the much larger
English Wikipedia as a test collection.
Two types of information needs or topics in INEX are content-only or CO topics
and content-and-structure (CAS) topics. CO topics are regular keyword queries as
in unstructured information retrieval. CAS topics have structural constraints in
addition to keywords. We already encountered an example of a CAS topic in
Figure 3.21.
Scoring of a query with one structural term in SIMNOMERGE.
12,107 Number of documents
494 Mb Size
1995–2002 Time of publication of articles
1532 Average number of XML nodes per document
6.9 Average depth of a node
30 Number of CAS topics
30 Number of CO topics
Table 3.4.
INEX 2002 collection statistics.
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Figure 3.14. The keywords in this case are summer and holidays, and the structural
constraints specify that the keywords occur in a section that in turn is part of an
article and that this article has an embedded year attribute with value 2001 or 2002.
Since CAS queries have both structural and content criteria, relevance assessments
are more complicated than in unstructured retrieval. INEX 2002 defined component
coverage and topical relevance as orthogonal dimensions of relevance. The compo-
nent coverage dimension evaluates whether the element retrieved is structurally
correct, that is, neither too low nor too high in the tree. We distinguish four cases:
• Exact coverage (E). The information sought is the main topic of the
component, and the component is a meaningful unit of information.
• Too small (S). The information sought is the main topic of the component, but
the component is not a meaningful (self-contained) unit of information.
• Too large (L). The information sought is present in the component, but is not
the main topic.
• No coverage (N). The information sought is not a topic of the component.
The topical relevance dimension also has four levels: highly relevant (3), fairly
relevant (2), marginally relevant (1), and nonrelevant (0). Components are judged
on both dimensions, and the judgments are then combined into a digit-letter code.
2S is a fairly relevant component that is too small, and 3E is a highly relevant
component that has exact coverage. In theory, there are 16 combinations of cover-
age and relevance, but many cannot occur. For example, a nonrelevant component
cannot have exact coverage, so the combination 3N is not possible.
The relevance-coverage combinations are quantized as follows:
Qðrel, covÞ ¼
1:00 if  ðrel, covÞ ¼ 3E
0:75 if  ðrel, covÞ∈ {2E; 3L}
0:50 if  ðrel, covÞ∈ {1E; 2L; 2S}
0:25 if  ðrel, covÞ∈ {1S; 1L}
0:00 if  ðrel, covÞ0N
:
8>>>><>>>>:
(3.23)
This evaluation scheme takes into account the fact that binary relevance
judgments, which are standard in unstructured information retrieval, are not
Figure 3.22.
Simplified schema of the documents in the INEX collection.
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appropriate for XML retrieval. A 2S component provides incomplete information
and may be difficult to interpret without more context, but it does answer the
query partially. The quantization function Q does not impose a binary choice
relevant/nonrelevant and instead allows us to grade the component as partially
relevant.
The number of relevant components in a retrieved set A of components can then
be computed as
#ððrelevantitemsretrievedÞ ¼ ∑
c∈A
QðrelðcÞ, covðcÞÞ: (3.24)
As an approximation, the standard definitions of precision, recall, and F from
can be applied to this modified definition of relevant items retrieved, with some
subtleties because we sum graded as opposed to binary relevance assessments.
One flaw of measuring relevance this way is that overlap is not accounted for.
We discussed the concept of marginal relevance in the context of unstructured
retrieval. This problem is worse in XML retrieval because of the problem of multiple
nested elements occurring in a search result as we discussed on p. 80. Much of the
recent focus at INEX has been on developing algorithms and evaluation measures
that return non-redundant results lists and evaluate them properly.
Table 3.5 shows two INEX 2002 runs of the vector space system we described in
Section 3.7.3. The better run is the SIMMERGE run, which incorporates few struc-
tural constraints and mostly relies on keyword matching. SIMMERGE median
average precision (where the median is with respect to average precision numbers
over topics) is only 0.147. Effectiveness in XML retrieval is often lower than in
unstructured retrieval since XML retrieval is harder. Instead of just finding a docu-
ment, we have to find the subpart of a document that is most relevant to the query.
Also, XML retrieval effectiveness—when evaluated as described here—can be lower
than unstructured retrieval effectiveness on a standard evaluation because graded
judgments lower measured performance. Consider a system that returns a docu-
ment with graded relevance 0.6 and binary relevance 1 at the top of the retrieved
list. Then, interpolated precision at 0.00 recall is 1.0 on a binary evaluation but can
be as low as 0.6 on a graded evaluation.
Table 3.5 gives us a sense of the typical performance of XML retrieval, but it
does not compare structured with unstructured retrieval. Table 3.6 directly shows
the effect of using structure in retrieval. The results are for a language model-based
system that is evaluated on a subset of CAS topics from INEX 2003 and 2004. The
evaluation metric is precision at k. The discretization function used for the evalua-
tion maps highly relevant elements (roughly corresponding to the 3E elements
defined for Q) to 1 and all other elements to 0. The content only system treats
queries and documents as unstructured bags of words. The full-structure model
ranks elements that satisfy structural constraints higher than elements that do not.
For instance, for the query in Figure 3.14, an element that contains the phrase
summer holidays in a section will be rated higher than one that contains it in an
abstract.
Algorithm Average precision
SIMNOMERGE 0.242
SIMMERGE 0.271
Table 3.5.
INEX 2002 results of the vector space model in Section 3.7.3 for content and structure (CAS) queries and the
quantization function Q.
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The Table 3.6 shows that structure helps increase precision at the top of the
results list. There is a large increase of precision at k ¼ 5 and at k ¼ 10. There is
almost no improvement at k ¼ 30. These results demonstrate the benefits of
structured retrieval. Structured retrieval imposes additional constraints on what to
return and documents that pass the structural filter are more likely to be relevant.
Recall may suffer because some relevant documents will be filtered out, but for
precision-oriented tasks, structured retrieval is superior.
Content only full structure Improvement
precision at 5 0.2000 0.3265 63.3%
precision at 10 0.1820 0.2531 39.1%
precision at 20 0.1700 0.1796 5.6%
precision at 30 0.1527 0.1531 0.3%
Table 3.6.
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Chapter 4
Classical Machine Learning
This chapter focuses on two major problems in machine learning: classification
and clustering. Classification is based on some given sample of known class labels,
training a learning machine (i.e., to obtain a certain objective function), so that it
can classify unknown samples, and it belongs to supervised learning. However,
clustering is the algorithm that does not know any kind of sample in advance, and it
is desirable to classify a set of unknown categories of samples into several categories
by some algorithm. When we use the clustering, we do not care about what kind it
is. The goal that we need to achieve is just to bring together similar things, which in
the machine learning is called unsupervised learning.
4.1. Classification
4.1.1 Performance evaluation for classification
When we use a classifier to predict, we will encounter a very important question:
how to evaluate the predicted effect of this classifier. The evaluation of classifier
performance is the basis for choosing excellent classifiers. Traditional classifier
performance evaluation, such as accuracy, recall, sensitivity, and specificity, cannot
fully consider a classifier. This book, based on the traditional classifier performance
evaluation criteria, also referred to the confusion matrix, area under curve (AUC)
and other methods of performance evaluation.
4.1.1.1 Performance evaluation of general classification
An instance can be divided into positive or negative. This will result in four
classification results:
True positive (TP): positive data that is correctly marked as positive data.
True negative (TN): negative data that is correctly marked as negative data.
False positive (FP): negative data that is incorrectly marked as positive data.
False negative (FN): positive data that is incorrectly marked as negative data.
The formula for precision is
P ¼ TP
TPþ FP (4.1)
The formula for recall is
P ¼ TP
TPþ FN (4.2)
Sensitivity, also known as true positive rate (TPR), represents the proportion of
positive instances identified by the classifier to all positive instances. The formula
for sensitivity is
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TPR ¼ TP
TPþ FN (4.3)
Specificity, also known as negative rate (FPR), represents the proportion of
negative instances identified into positive classes by the classifier. The formula for
specificity is
FPR ¼ FP
FPþ TN (4.4)
4.1.1.2 ROC curve and AUC
ROC curve is also known as the sensitivity curve. The ROC curve is based on a
series of different binary classification (threshold or threshold), with TP as the
ordinate and FN as the abscissa drawing points.
Area under curve (AUC) is defined as the area under the ROC curve, or it can be
considered as the ratio of the area under the ROC curve to the unit area. It is clear
that the area value is not greater than one. Also, since the ROC curve is generally
above the straight line of y ¼ x, the AUC value ranges from 0.5 to 1. The larger the
AUC is, the higher the accuracy of the classification becomes.
4.1.1.3 Confusion matrix
Confusion matrix is used to sum up the supervision of the classification of the
results. The items on the main diagonal indicate the total number of the correct
categories, and the items of the other non-main diagonals indicate the number of
errors in the classification. As shown in Table 4.1, there are two different types of
errors: “false acceptance” and “false rejection” [100]. If the confusion matrix of the
dichotomous problem is normalized, it is a joint distribution probability for discrete
variables of 0 and 1 binary values. For the two classified issues, confusion matrix
can be expressed in Table 4.1.
4.1.1.4 F-Score
F-Score, also known as F-Measure, is precision and recall weighted harmonic
average and commonly used to evaluate if the classification model is good or bad. In
the F-Score function, when the parameter alpha ¼ 1, F-Score combines the results
of precision and recall; when F-Score is high, it can explain that the test method is
more effective [101]. As the classification accuracy sometimes does not well high-
light the characteristics of the sample set and determines the performance of a
classifier, for the two classification problems, you can use the following two
parameters to evaluate the performance of the classifier:
Category ω2 ϖ2
ω1 Accept correctly Wrongly rejected
ϖ1 Accept correctly Wrongly rejected
ω1, the actual category one; ϖ1, the actual category two; ω1, classifier determines the category one; and ϖ2, classifier
determines the category two.
Table 4.1.
The confusion matrix.
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TNR ¼ TN
TN þ FP ¼ 1 FPR
FNR ¼ FN
TPþ FN ¼ 1 TPR
(4.5)
It is generally believed that the higher the F-Score is, the better the classification
effect of the classifier for the positive sample shows. It should be noted that TNR
and FNR will affect each other. Therefore, the use of a separate parameter to
evaluate the performance of the classifier cannot fully evaluate a classifier.
4.1.2 Decision tree
Decision tree is an important method in data mining classification algorithm. In
a variety of classification algorithms, the decision tree is the most intuitional one.
Decision tree is a method of decision analysis that evaluates the project risk and
determines the feasibility. And it is a graphic method for probabilistic analysis of
intuitive application. Because the decision branch is painted like a tree branch of a
tree, we called it decision tree. In machine learning, the decision tree is a predictive
model, which represents a mapping between attributes and values [102].
4.1.2.1 Model introduction
The classification decision tree model is a tree structure that describes the clas-
sification of instances. The decision tree consists of nodes and directed edges. There
are two types of nodes: internal node and leaf node. An internal node represents a
feature or attribute, and a leaf node represents a class [103]. A decision tree is used
to classify a particular feature of the instance from the root node, and an instance is
assigned to its child node according to the test result. At this time, each child node
corresponds to a value of the feature. The instance is then recursively tested and
assigned until the leaf node is finally assigned to the instance of the leaf node.
Figure 4.1 shows the decision tree, the circle, and the box, respectively, that repre-
sent the internal nodes and leaf nodes.
4.1.2.2 Feature selection
Feature selection is to select the characteristics of classification ability for
training data, which can improve the efficiency of decision tree learning.
Figure 4.1.
Decision tree model.
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The information gain can be used as one of the criteria for the selection of fea-
tures [104]. First, we need to introduce the concept of entropy. In probability
statistics, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty to random variables. Supposing X
is a discrete random variable with a finite number of values, and its probability
distribution is
PðX ¼ xiÞ (4.6)
The entropy of the random variable X is defined as
HðXÞ ¼ ∑
n
i¼1
pilogpi (4.7)
With random variables ðX,YÞ, the joint probability distribution is
PðX ¼ xi, yjÞ ¼ pij, i ¼ 1; 2;⋯, n; j ¼ 1; 2;⋯, m (4.8)
The conditional entropy H represents the uncertainty of the random variable Y
under the condition of the known random variable X. The conditional entropy
HðY|XÞ of the random variable Y under the condition given by the random variable
X is defined as the entropy of the conditional probability distribution of Y under the
given condition of X given the mathematical expectation for X:
HðY|XÞ ¼ ∑
n
i¼1
piHðY |X ¼ xiÞ (4.9)
where pi ¼ PðX ¼ xiÞ, i ¼ 1; 2;⋯, n.
Information gain: The information gain gðD,AÞ of the feature A for the training
data setD is defined as the difference between the empirical entropyHðDÞ of the set
D and the empirical condition entropyHðD|AÞ ofD under the given condition of the
characteristic A, [105] which is
gðD,AÞ ¼ HðDÞ HðD|AÞ (4.10)
According to the information gain criterion, the feature selection method is to
calculate the information gain of each feature and compare the size of the training
data set (or subset) D to select the characteristic of the information gain.
4.1.2.3 Decision tree generation
ID3 algorithm: The core is to apply the selected feature of information gain
criterion to each node of the decision tree and construct the decision tree recur-
sively [106]. The concrete method is to start from the root node, calculate the
information gain of all the possible features to the node, select the feature with the
largest information gain as the characteristic of the node, and establish the subnode
from the different values of the feature. And then the subnodes recursively call the
above method to build the decision tree, until all the information gain is very small
or no features can be selected so far, and finally get a decision tree [107].
4.1.2.4 Decision tree pruning
In the decision tree learning, the process of simplifying the generated tree is
called pruning.
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Pruning algorithm:
Input: Generates the entire tree generated by the algorithm T, the parameter a;
Output: pruned subtree Ta.
1. Calculating the empirical entropy of each node£»
2. Recursively retracting from the leaf node of the tree. Supposing a set of leaf
nodes is retracted to their parent nodes before and after the whole tree is TB
and TA respectively, the corresponding loss function values are CalphaðTBÞ and
CalphaðTAÞ, if CalphaðTBÞleqslantCalphaðTAÞ, then cuts the section, that is, the
parent node becomes a new leaf node.
3. Return (2), before it can end. The subtree with the smallest loss function is
obtained [108].
4.1.3 Bayes-based classification
Bayesian classification algorithm using probability and statistics to classify is a
statistical classification method. Naive Bayes (NB) classification algorithm can be
compared with decision tree and Neural Network Classification algorithm. The
algorithm can be applied to large databases. The method is simple but has high
accuracy and quick classification.
Bayesian theorem is
PðB|AÞ ¼ PðA|BÞPðBÞ
PðAÞ (4.11)
4.1.3.1 Naive Bayesian algorithm model
In machine learning, naive Bayes classifiers are a family of simple probabilistic
classifiers based on applying Bayes’ theorem with strong (naive) independence
assumptions between the features. Naive Bayesian classification is a very simple
classification algorithm. And the thought of naive Bayesian is that we solve the
probability of each category under the conditions. Then we divide the items into the
categories with the highest probability of occurrence. Naive Bayesian classification
model is depicted in Figure 4.2.
Naive Bayes has been studied extensively since the 1950s. It was introduced
under a different name into the text retrieval community in the early 1960s [109]
and remains a popular (baseline) method for text categorization, the problem of
judging documents as belonging to one category or the other (such as spam or
legitimate, sports or politics, etc.) with word frequencies as the features. With
appropriate preprocessing, it is competitive in this domain with more advanced
methods including support vector machines [110]. It also finds application in auto-
matic medical diagnosis [111].
Naive Bayes is a simple technique for constructing classifiers: models that assign
class labels to problem instances, represented as vectors of feature values, where the
class labels are drawn from some finite set. It is not a single algorithm for training
such classifiers, but a family of algorithms based on a common principle: all naive
Bayes classifiers assume that the value of a particular feature is independent of the
value of any other feature, given the class variable [112]. For example, a fruit may
be considered to be an apple if it is red, round, and about 10 cm in diameter. A naive
Bayes classifier considers each of these features to contribute independently to the
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probability that this fruit is an apple, regardless of any possible correlations between
the color, roundness, and diameter features.
Probabilistic model: Abstractly, naive Bayes is a conditional probability
model—given a problem instance to be classified, represented by a vector
x ¼ ðx1,…, xnÞ representing some n features (independent variables), it assigns to
this instance probability
PðCk|x1,…, xnÞ (4.12)
for each of k possible outcomes or classes Ck.
The problem with the above formulation is that if the number of features n is large
or if a feature can take on a large number of values, then basing such a model on
probability tables is infeasible. We therefore reformulate the model to make it more
tractable. Using Bayes’ theorem, the conditional probability can be decomposed as
pðCk|xÞ ¼ pðCkÞpðx|CkÞ
pðxÞ (4.13)
In plain English, using Bayesian probability terminology, the above equation can
be written as
posterior ¼ prior likelihood
evidence
(4.14)
In practice, there is interest only in the numerator of that fraction, because the
denominator does not depend on C and the values of the features Fi are given, so
that the denominator is effectively constant. The numerator is equivalent to the
joint probability model:
pðCk, x1,…, xnÞ (4.15)
which can be rewritten as follows, using the chain rule for repeated applications
of the definition of conditional probability:
Figure 4.2.
Naive Bayesian algorithm model.
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pðCk, x1,…, xnÞ ¼ pðx1,…, xn, CkÞ
¼ pðx1|x2…, xn, CkÞpðx2,…, xn, CkÞ
¼ pðx1|x2…, xn, CkÞpðx2|x3…, xn, CkÞpðx3…, xn, CkÞ
¼ …
¼ pðx1|x2…, xn, CkÞpðx2|x3…, xn, CkÞ…pðxn1|xn, CkÞpðxn|CkÞpðCkÞ
(4.16)
Now the “naive” conditional independence assumptions come into play: assume
that each feature Fi is conditionally independent of every other feature Fj for j 6¼ i,
given the category C. This means that
pðxi|xiþ1…, xn, CkÞ ¼ pðxi|CkÞ (4.17)
Thus, the joint model can be expressed as
pðCk|x1,…, xnÞ∝ pðCk, x1,…, xnÞ
∝ pðCkÞpðx1|CkÞpðx2|CkÞpðx3|CkÞ…
∝ pðCkÞ
Yn
i¼1
pðxi|CkÞ
(4.18)
This means that under the above independence assumptions, the conditional
distribution over the class variable C is
pðCk|x1,…, xnÞ ¼ 1
Z
pðCkÞ
Yn
i¼1
pðxi|CkÞ (4.19)
where the evidence Z ¼ pðxÞ is a scaling factor dependent only on x1,…, xn, that
is, a constant if the values of the feature variables are known.
4.1.3.2 Parameter estimation of naive Bayesian algorithm
In the naive Bayesian algorithm, learning means that PðY ¼ cÞ and Pðx ¼ x ¼ 1Þ;
the maximum likelihood estimation can be used to estimate the prior probability.
The formal of maximum likelihood estimation is
PðY ¼ ckÞ ¼
∑
N
i¼1
Iðyi ¼ ckÞ
N
, k ¼ 1; 2;⋯, K
(4.20)
Supposing the set of the jth feature xj possible values is aj1, aj2,⋯, ajSj , the
maximum likelihood estimation of the conditional probability PðXðjÞ ¼ aji|Y ¼ ckÞ is
PðXðjÞ ¼ aji|Y ¼ ckÞ ¼
∑
N
i¼1
IðxðjÞi ¼ aji, yi ¼ ckÞ
∑
N
i¼1
Iðyi ¼ ckÞ
j ¼ 1; 2;⋯, n; I ¼ 1; 2;⋯, Sj; k ¼ 1; 2;⋯, K
(4.21)
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where x is the jth feature of the ith sample, a is the ith value that the jth feature
may take, and i is the instruction function.
4.1.4 Support vector machine
Support vector machine is a supervised learning model and relates learning
algorithm for analyzing data in classification and regression analysis [113]. Given a
set of training instances, each training instance is marked as belonging to one or the
other of the two categories. The SVM training algorithm creates a model that
assigns the new instance to one of the two categories, making it a nonprobabilistic
two-element linear classifier. The SVM model is to represent an instance as a point
in space, so that the mapping allows instances of different categories to be separated
by as wide a clear interval as possible. Then, the new instances are mapped to the
same space, and the categories are predicted based on which side of the interval
they fall [114].
4.1.4.1 Linear SVM
We consider the following form of point test set:
ðx1! , y1Þ,⋯, ðxn
!
, ynÞ (4.22)
where y
i
is 1 or1, indicating that each one is a p-dimensional real vector. Find a
“maximum interval hyperplane” that separates the point set of y
i
¼ 1 and the set of
points y
i
¼ 1, and maximize the distance between the hyperplane and the nearest
point. Any hyperplane can be written to the following set of points ex:
w
!
: x
! b ¼ 0 (4.23)
where w (not necessarily normalized) is the normal vector.
Hard interval: If these training data are linearly separable, two parallel hyper-
planes of two types of data can be chosen so that the distance between them is as
large as possible. The regions in these two hyperplanes are called “spaces,” and the
maximum interval hyperplane is the hyperplane located in the middle of
them [115]. These hyperplanes can be represented by equation
w
!
: x
! b ¼ 1 w! : x! b ¼ 1 (4.24)
or
w
!
: x
! b ¼ 1 (4.25)
It is not difficult to get the distance between the two hyperplanes by geometry,
so we want to maximize the distance between the two planes; we need to minimize.
At the same time, in order to make the sample data points in the hyperplane
interval, we need to ensure that we meet one that represents all of the conditions:
w
!
: x
! b ≥ 1;yi ¼ 1 (4.26)
or
w
!
: x
! b≤  1;yi ¼ 1 (4.27)
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These formals indicate that each data point must be on the correct side of the
interval. These two formulas can be written as
yiðw
!
: x
! bÞ ≥ 1; 1 ≤ i ≤ n (4.28)
You can use the formulas to get optimization problems: “Under the condition of
minimizing, for i ¼ 1;…;n.” The solution w and b of this problem determines our
classifier.
Soft interval: In order to extend the SVM to the inseparable linearity of the
data, we introduce the hinge loss function:
maxð0; 1 yiðw
!
:xi
!  bÞÞ (4.29)
When the formal 4.28 that satisfies this function is zero, the value of the func-
tion is proportional to the distance from the interval for the data on the wrong side
of the interval. Then we want to minimize it:
1
n
∑
n
i¼1
maxð0; 1 yiðw
!
:xi
!  bÞ
 
þ λ∥ w! ∥2 (4.30)
where the parameter is used to balance the relationship between increasing the
size of the interval and ensuring that the correct side is on the interval. Thus, for
sufficiently small values, the soft-interval SVM and the hard-spaced SVM will
behave the same if the input data is linearly classified. But a feasible classification
rule can be learned even if it is not linearly classified [115].
4.1.4.2 Kernels
Back in our discussion of linear regression, we had a problem in which the input
x was the living area of a house, and we considered performing regression using the
features x, x2, and x3 (say) to obtain a cubic function. To distinguish between these
two sets of variables, we’ll call the “original input value” the input attributes of a
problem (in this case, x, the living area). When that is mapped to some new set of
quantities that are then passed to the learning algorithm, we’ll call those new
quantities the input features. (Unfortunately, different authors use different terms
to describe these two things, but we’ll try to use this terminology consistently in
these notes.) We will also let ϕ denote the feature mapping, which maps from the
attributes to the features. For instance, in our example, we had
ΦðXÞ ¼ ½x, x2, x3T (4.31)
Rather than applying SVMs using the original input attributes x, we may instead
want to learn using some features ϕðxÞ. To do so, we simply need to go over our
previous algorithm and replace x everywhere in it with ϕðxÞ.
Since the algorithm can be written entirely in terms of the inner products
< x, z >, this means that we would replace all those inner products with
< ϕðxÞ,ϕðzÞ >. Specially, given a feature mapping, we define the corresponding
Kernel to be
Kðx, zÞ ¼ ϕðxÞTϕðzÞ (4.32)
Then, everything we previously had< x, z > in our algorithm, which we could
simply replace withKðx, zÞ, and our algorithmwould now be learning using the features.
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Now, given ϕ, we could easily compute Kðx, zÞ by finding ϕðxÞ and ϕðzÞ and
taking their inner product. But what’s more interesting is that often, Kðx, zÞ may be
very inexpensive to calculate, even though ϕðxÞ itself may be very expensive to
calculate (perhaps because it is an extremely high-dimensional vector) [116]. In
such settings, by using in our algorithm an efficient way to calculate Kðx, zÞ, we can
get SVMs to learn in the high-dimensional feature space given by ϕ but without ever
having to explicitly find or represent vectors ϕðxÞ [117].
Let’s see an example. Suppose x, zεRn, and consider
Kðx, zÞ ¼ ðxTzÞ2 (4.33)
We can also write this as
Kðx, zÞ ¼
	
∑
n
i¼1
xizi

	
∑
n
j¼1
xizi


¼ ∑
n
i¼1
∑
n
j¼1
xixjzizj
¼ ∑
n
i, j¼1
ðxixjÞðzizjÞ
(4.34)
Thus, we see that Kðx, zÞ ¼ ϕðxÞTϕðzÞ, where the feature mapping ϕ is given
(shown here for the case of n =3) by
ϕðxÞ ¼ ½x1x1, x1x2, x1x3, x2x1, x2x2, x2x3, x3x1, x3x2, x3x3T (4.35)
Note that whereas calculating the high-dimensional ¦Õ(x) requires Oðn2Þ time,
finding Kðx, zÞ takes only OðnÞ time linear in the dimension of the input attributes.
For a related kernel, also consider
Kðx, zÞ ¼ ðxTzþ cÞ2
¼ ∑
n
i, j¼1
ðxixjÞðzizjÞ þ ∑
n
i¼1
ð
ffiffiffiffi
2c
p
xiÞð
ffiffiffiffi
2c
p
ziÞ þ c2Þ
(4.36)
(Check this yourself.) This corresponds to the feature mapping (again shown for
n ¼ 3):
ϕðxÞ ¼ ½x2x1, x2x2, x2x3, x3x1, x3x2, x3x3,
ffiffiffiffi
2c
p
x1,
ffiffiffiffi
2c
p
x2,
ffiffiffiffi
2c
p
x3, cT (4.37)
and the parameter c controls the relative weighting between the xi (first order)
and the xixj (second order) terms.
More broadly the kernel Kðx, zÞ ¼ ðxTzþ cÞd corresponds to a feature
mapping to a feature space, corresponding of all monomials of the form
xi1, xi2⋯, xik that are up to order d. However, despite working in this O
(nd)-dimensional space, computing Kðx, zÞ still takes only OðnÞ time, and hence
we never need to explicitly represent feature vectors in this very high-dimensional
feature space [118].
Now, let’s talk about a slightly different view of kernels. Intuitively (and there
are things wrong with this intuition, but never mind), if ϕðxÞ and ϕðzÞ are close
together, then we might expect Kðx, zÞ ¼ ϕðxÞTϕðzÞ to be large. Conversely, if ϕðxÞ
and ϕðzÞ are far apart say nearly orthogonal to each other, then Kðx, zÞ ¼ ϕðxÞTϕðzÞ
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will be small [119]. So, we can think of K(x, z) as some measurement of how similar
are ϕðxÞ andϕðzÞ or of how similar are x and z.
Given this intuition, suppose that for some learning problem that you’re work-
ing on, you’ve come up with some function Kðx, zÞ that you think might be a
reasonable measure of how similar x and z are. For instance, perhaps you chose
Kðx, zÞ ¼ exp  ∥x z∥
2
2σ2
 
(4.38)
This is a reasonable measure of x and zs similarity and is close to 1 when x and z
are close and near 0 when x and z are far apart. Can we use this definition of K as the
kernel in an SVM? In this particular example, the answer is yes. (This kernel is called
the Gaussian kernel and corresponds to an infinite dimensional feature mapping ϕ.)
But more broadly, given some function K, how can we tell if it’s a valid kernel, i.e.,
can we tell if there is some feature mapping so that Kðx, zÞ ¼ ϕðxÞTϕðzÞ for all x, z?
Suppose for now that K is indeed a valid kernel corresponding to some feature
mapping ϕ. Now, consider some finite set of m points (not necessarily the training
set) {xð1Þ,⋯, xðmÞ}, and let a square m-by-mmatrix K be defined so that its ði, jÞ-
entry is given by Kij ¼ KðxðiÞ, xðjÞÞ. This matrix is called the Kernel matrix [120].
Note that we’ve overloaded the notation and used K to denote both the kernel
function Kðx, zÞ and the kernel matrix K, due to their obvious close relationship.
4.1.4.3 Regularization and the nonseparable case
The derivation of the SVM as presented so far assumed that the data are linearly
separable. While mapping data to a high-dimensional feature space via ϕ does
generally increase the likelihood that the data is separable, we can’t guarantee that it
always will be so. Also, in some cases it is not clear that finding a separating
hyperplane is exactly what we’d want to do, since that might be susceptible to
outliers. For instance, the left figure below shows an optimal margin classifier, and
when a single outlier is added in the upper-left region (right figure) (Figure 4.3), it
causes the decision boundary to make a dramatic swing, and the resulting classifier
has a much smaller margin [121].
To make the algorithm work for nonlinearly separable data sets as well as be less
sensitive to outliers, we reformulate our optimization (using l1 regularization) as
follows:
minγ,ω,b 
1
2
∥ω∥2 þ C∑
m
i¼1
εi
        s:t:  yðiÞðωTxðiÞ þ bÞ ≥ 1 εi,  i ¼ 1;…, m
εi ≥0; i ¼ 1;…, m:
(4.39)
Figure 4.3.
Linearly separable.
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Thus, examples are now permitted to have (functional) margin less than 1, and
if an example has functional margin 1 εi (with ε > 0), we would pay a cost of the
objective function being increased by Cεi. The parameter C controls the relative
weighting between the twin goals of making the ∥ω∥2 small (which we saw earlier
makes the margin large) and of ensuring that most examples have functional mar-
gin at least 1.
As before, we can form the Lagrangian:
ϒðω, b, ε, α, γÞ ¼ 1
2
ωTωþ C∑
m
i¼1
εi  ∑
m
i¼1
αi½yðiÞðxTωþ bÞ  1þ εi  ∑
m
i¼1
γiεi: (4.40)
Here, the αi0 s and γi0 s are our Lagrange multipliers (constrained to be ¡Ý 0). We
won’t go through the derivation of the dual again in detail, but after setting the
derivatives with respect to w and b to zero as before, substituting them back in, and
simplifying, we obtain the following dual form of the problem:
maxα  WðαÞ ¼ ∑
m
i¼1
αi  12 ∑
m
i, j¼1
yðiÞyðjÞαiαj〈xðiÞ, xðjÞ〉
    s:t:  0 ≤ αi ≤C,  i ¼ 1;…, m
∑
m
i¼1
αiy
ðiÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 1;…, m:
(4.41)
As before, we also have that ω can be expressed in terms of the αi0 s, so that after
solving the dual problem, we can continue making our predictions. Note that,
somewhat surprisingly, in adding l1 regularization, the only change to the dual
problem is that what was originally a constraint that 0 ≤ αi has now become
0 ≤ αi ≤C. Also, the KKT dual-complementarity conditions (which in the next sec-
tion will be useful for testing for the convergence of the SMO algorithm) are
αi ¼ 0 ) yðiÞðωTxðiÞ þ bÞ ≥ 1
αi ¼ C ) yðiÞðωTxðiÞ þ bÞ ≤ 1
0 < αi < C ) yðiÞðωTxðiÞ þ bÞ ¼ 1
(4.42)
Now, all that remains is to give an algorithm for actually solving the dual
problem, which we will do in the next section.
4.1.5 Other classification approaches
4.1.5.1 Random forest
As a newly developed, highly flexible machine learning algorithm, random
forest (RF) has a wide range of application prospects, from marketing to health-
care insurance; both can be used to do marketing modeling, statistics of customer
sources, retention, and loss and can also be used to predict the risk of disease and
the susceptibility of the patient [122]. As the name implies, random forest is a
random way to build a forest, the forest which has lots of decision tree composi-
tions. There is no connection between each decision tree of a random forest. After
setting the forest, when there is a new input sample into the forest, each tree in the
forest makes a separate judgment, to see which class (for the classification algo-
rithm) the sample should belong to and then see which class is selected most to
predict this sample for that class [123].
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Advantage:
1. In all current algorithms, there is excellent accuracy.
2. Can run effectively on large data sets, can handle input samples with high-
dimensional characteristics, and do not need dimensionality reduction.
3.Can assess the importance of each feature in classification issues.
4.In the generation process, an unbiased estimate of the internal generation error
can be obtained.
5. For the default value of the problem can also get very good results [124].
4.1.5.2 K-nearest neighbors
K-nearest neighbor (KNN) classification algorithm is a more mature method
and one of the simplest machine learning algorithms. The idea of this method is as
follows: in the KNN algorithm, the selected neighbors are objects that have been
correctly classified [95]. The method determines the class of the sample to be sorted
only on the classification decision based on the nearest one or several samples.
Although the KNN method relies on the limit theorem in principle, it is only related
to a very small number of adjacent samples in the category decision [125]. The KNN
method mainly depends on the surrounding neighboring samples, rather than by
discriminating the domain method to determine the category; therefore, KNN
method is more suitable for other methods than for crossover or overlapping more
sample sets [126].
KNN algorithm can be used not only for classification but also for regression. By
finding the k-nearest neighbors of a sample and assigning the average of the attri-
butes of those neighbors to the sample, the attributes of the sample can be obtained.
A more useful way is to give different weights to the effects of the neighbors on the
samples, such as the weight and the distance being proportional [127].
The main drawback of the algorithm in the classification is that when the sample
is not balanced, if a class of sample size is large, and other class sample capacities are
very small, it may lead to input when a new sample, the sample K neighbors in the
large-capacity class of samples, is accounted for the majority. So it can be improved
by using the method of weighting (and the neighbor weights with small distance
from the sample) [128]. Another disadvantage of this approach is that the compu-
tational complexity is large because the distance to its known sample is calculated
for each text to be classified in order to obtain its nearest neighbor. The current
common solution is to preknow the sample point of the clip, in advance to remove
the classification of the role of small samples [129]. The algorithm is more suitable
for the automatic classification of the class with relatively large sample size, and the
classification of the class with smaller sample size is more likely to produce
errors [130]. Its advantages are high precision, not sensitive to the outliers, and no
data input assumptions. And it applies to numeric and nominal data.
4.1.5.3 Logistic regression and boosting
In addition to the algorithms described above, there are two more sophisticated
classification algorithms. Logistic regression can also be used for classification. First,
we need to find a suitable predictive function to predict the result of the input data
and then construct a loss function to represent the deviation between the predicted
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output and the training data and use the gradient descent method to complete the
logistic regression to find the minimum value of the loss function. Features are simple
to achieve; the calculation is very small and fast and has low storage resources.
Another boosting algorithm and the above algorithm ideas are not the same; the
classifier is weak. It’s better only in some of the situations or characteristics under the
performance.We need to find some in their respective circumstances performance of
good classifiers; they can be combined to become a strong classifier [131].
4.2. Clustering
Evaluating the performance of a clustering algorithm is not as trivial as counting
the number of errors or the precision and recall of a supervised classification
algorithm. In particular any evaluation metric should not take the absolute values of
the cluster labels into account but rather if this clustering defines separations of the
data similar to some ground-truth set of classes or satisfies some assumption such
that members belong to the same class are more similar than members of different
classes according to some similarity metric [132].
4.2.1 Performance evaluation for clustering
4.2.1.1 Adjusted Rand index
RI ¼ aþ b
C
nsamples
2
(4.43)
where C is the actual category information, K is the result of the clustering, a is
the logarithm of the same class in both C and K, and b is the number of elements in
C and K, where C
nsamples
2 represents the logarithm that can be formed in the data set
and the RI is in the range of [0,1]. The larger the value means that the clustering
result is more consistent with the real situation. The higher the RI is, the higher the
accuracy of the clustering effect, and the higher the purity in each class it will
get [133].
In order to achieve the “random results in the case of clustering results, the
indicators should be close to zero.” If the Rand coefficient (adjusted rand index) is
raised, it has a higher degree of distinction:
ARI ¼ RI  E½RI
maxRI  E½RI (4.44)
The ARI is in the range of [1, 1]. The larger value means that the clustering
results are consistent with the real situation. From a broad perspective, the coinci-
dent degree of the two data distributions is measured by ARI [134].
Advantages:
1. Random (uniform) label assignments have an ARI score close to 0.0.
2. Bounded range in [1, 1].
3.No assumption is made on the cluster structure.
Drawbacks: ARI requires knowledge of the ground-truth classes.
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4.2.1.2 Mutual information-based scores
The mutual information is a function that measures the agreement of the two
assignments, ignoring permutations. Two different normalized versions of this
measure are available, normalized mutual information (NMI) and adjusted mutual
information (AMI) [135]:
IðX,YÞ ¼ ∑
x, y
pðx, yÞ log pðx, yÞ
pðxÞpðyÞ (4.45)
Entropy as the denominator to adjust the MI value between 0 and 1 is used by
standardized mutual information, a more common realization is as follows:
UðX,YÞ ¼ 2R ¼ 2 IðX; YÞ
HðXÞ þHðYÞ (4.46)
HðXÞ ¼ ∑
n
i¼1
pðxiÞIðxiÞ ¼ ∑
n
i¼1
pðxiÞ log b
1
pðxiÞ ¼ ∑
n
i¼1
pðxiÞ log bpðxiÞ (4.47)
Advantages:
1. Random (uniform) label assignments have a AMI score close to 0.0
2. Bounded range in [0, 1].
3.No assumption is made on the cluster structure.
4.Drawbacks:
MI-based measures require the knowledge of the ground-truth classes.
4.2.1.3 Homogeneity, completeness, and V-measure
Homogeneity: Each cluster contains only members of a single class:
h ¼ 1HðC|KÞ
HðCÞ (4.48)
where HðC|KÞ is the conditional entropy of a class given a cluster assignment,
which is obtained by the following formula:
HðC|KÞ ¼ ∑
|C|
c¼1
∑
|K|
k¼1
nc,k
n
log
nc,k
nk
 
(4.49)
HðCÞ is the class entropy, the formula is
HðCÞ ¼ ∑
|C|
c¼1
nc
n
log
nc
n
	 

(4.50)
where n is the total number of samples; nc and nk belong to the number of
samples of class c and class k, respectively; and nc, k is the number of samples
divided from class c to class k.
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Completeness: All members of a given class are assigned to the same cluster:
h ¼ 1HðK|CÞ
HðKÞ (4.51)
where the conditional entropy HðK|CÞ and the class entropy HðKÞ are obtained
symmetrically according to the above formula.
V-measure is homogeneity and completeness of the harmonic mean; the formula is
v ¼ 2  h  c
hþ c (4.52)
Advantages:
1. Bounded scores.
2. Intuitive interpretation.
3.No assumption is made on the cluster structure.
Drawbacks:
1. Not normalized with regard to random labeling.
2. Require the knowledge of the ground-truth classes.
There are many other performance evaluation approaches for clustering:
Fowlkes-Mallows scores, Silhouette Coefficient, and Calinski-Harabasz index [136].
4.2.2 Partition clustering
4.2.2.1 K-means
K-means and KNN are all starting with k, but they are two kinds of algorithms—
KNN is the classification algorithm in supervised learning, while K-means is the
clustering algorithm in unsupervised learning. They both use the neighbor infor-
mation to mark the category.
K-means is the simplest and most efficient in the clustering algorithm. Its core
idea is that the initial centroid is specified by the user to repeat the iteration until
the algorithm converges as a cluster [137].
The K-means algorithm divides a set of N samples X into K disjoint cluster C,
each described by the mean μj of the samples in the cluster. The means are com-
monly called the cluster “centroid”; note that they are not, in general, points from
X, although they live in the same space. The K-means algorithm aims to choose
centroid that minimizes the inertia or within-cluster sum of squared criterion:
∑
n
i¼0
min
μj ∈C
ð||xj|| ||μi||2Þ (4.53)
This algorithm is actually very simple, as shown in Figure 4.4.
From the above figure, we can see that A, B, C, D, and E are five points in the
figure. And the gray point is our seed point, that is, we used to find a point group.
There are two seed points, so K ¼ 2.
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K-means algorithm:
1. Randomly take K (where K ¼ 2) seed points in the graph;
2. Then calculate the distance of the K seed points at all points in the graph. If Pi
is closest to the seed point Si, then Pi belongs to the Si point group. In the
picture above, we can see that A and B belong to the above seed points, C, D, E
belong to the middle of the seed points below);
3.Next, we want to move the seed point to the center of his “point group”.
(See (3) on the Figure 4.4);
4.Then repeat step. 2 and 3 until the seed point does not move (we can see the
fourth step in the figure above the seed points to aggregate A, B, C, the
following seed points are aggregated with D, E) [138].
In general, the algorithm for finding the point group center point can be very
simple to use the average of the X=Y coordinates of each point. However, there are
three other ways to find the center point:
1.Minkowski distance formula—λ can be arbitrary, can be negative, and can be
positive or infinity:
dij ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑
n
k¼1
|xik  xjk|λλ
s
(4.54)
2. Euclidean distance formula—that is, the case of the first formula when λ ¼ 2
dij ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑
n
k¼1
|xik  xjk|2
s
(4.55)
Figure 4.4.
The procedure of K-means.
105
Classical Machine Learning
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79903
3.CityBlock distance formula—that is, the case of the first formula when λ ¼ 1
dij ¼ ∑
n
k¼1
|xik  xjk| (4.56)
Advantage:
1. The principle is simple.
2. It is easy to implement.
3.Clustering effect mainly depends on the choice of K.
Drawbacks:
1. The number of K cannot be determined.
2. It is sensitive to outliers and easily leads to the center point offset.
3.Algorithm complexity is not easy to control OðNKmÞ; the number of iterations
may be more.
4.The algorithm is calculated as a local optimal solution rather than a global optimal.
5. The results are not stable and cannot be calculated incrementally.
4.2.2.2 K-medoids
It looks like K-means, but K-medoids and K-means are different. The difference
is the center of the selection. In K-means, we will be the center of the current cluster
as the average of all data points. In K-medoids algorithm, we will choose from the
current cluster such a point—to all other (the current cluster) points of the sum of
the minimum—as the center point [139].
K-medoids algorithm description:
1. First, randomly select a set of clustering samples as the center point set.
2. Each center point corresponds to a cluster.
3.Calculate the distance from each sample point to each center point (e.g.,
Euclidean distance); place the sample point in the cluster with the shortest
center point.
4.Calculate the point at which the absolute error of the distance from each
sample point in the cluster is the smallest, as the new center point.
5. If the new center point set is the same as the original center point set, the
algorithm terminates; if the new center point set is not exactly the same as the
original center point set, return b [140].
In order to determine whether a non-object representative OðrandomÞ is a better
alternative to the current representative object Oj, consider the following four cases
for each nonrepresentative object P (Figure 4.5):
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1. p is currently attached to the representative object Oj. If Oj is replaced by
OðrandomÞ, and p is closest to oj, i 6¼ j, then p is reassigned to Oi.
2.p is currently attached to the representative object Oj. If Oj is replaced by
OðrandomÞ, and p is closest to OðrandomÞ, then p is reassigned to OðrandomÞ.
3.p is currently attached to the representative object Oi, i 6¼ j. If Oj is replaced by
OðrandomÞ, and p is still closest to Oi, then the membership of the object does
not change.
4.p is currently attached to the representative object Oi, i 6¼ j. If Oj is replaced by
OðrandomÞ and p is nearest, then p is reassigned to OðrandomÞ.
K-medoids algorithm advantages and drawbacks:
1. The K-medoids algorithm has the advantage of being able to handle large
datasets, the result clusters are quite compact, and the clusters are clearly
distinct from the cluster. This is the same as the K-means algorithm.
2. The algorithm’s shortcomings is the same as K-means, for example, must
determine the number of clusters and the central point, the number of clusters
and the choice of the central point of the results of a great impact; generally get
a local optimal solution after the stop; is not suitable for data other than the
value type; only for clustering results for the convex data set and so on.
3.Compared with K-means, the K-medoids algorithm is less sensitive to noise. As a
result, the outliers do not cause the division of the results, even if the deviation is
too large and a small number of data will not cause significant impact.
4.K-medoids are considered to be an improvement over K-means for the above
reasons, but the time complexity of the algorithm is increased by OðnÞ
Figure 4.5.
Examples of the four cases.
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compared to K-means due to the calculation in the way of the center point
selection.
4.2.3 Hierarchical clustering
Hierarchical clustering uses a method to decompose or aggregate the data set
layer by layer, until all the underlying data of the last layer is separated to meet the
requirements. Therefore, according to the different principles of decomposition
between convergence, hierarchical clustering can be divided into agglomerative and
divisive. Hierarchical clustering is used to split the data from top to bottom or
bottom-up into a tree. Hierarchical clustering involves nested clustering [141].
Nested clustering means that R1 contains another R2 in a cluster. That is, R2 is nested
into R1 or R1 nested R2. What specifically does nest mean? Clustering
R1 ¼ {{x1, x2}, {x3}, {x4, x5}} is nested in clustering R2 ¼ {{x1, x2, x3}, {x4, x5}} but is
not nested in clusters R3 ¼ {{x1, x4}, {x3}, {x2, x5}}, that is, each subclass of R2
contains the corresponding subclasses of R1. The hierarchical clustering algorithm
generates a nested clustering hierarchy. The algorithm contains N steps at most. In
step t, the operation generates new clusters by merging or splitting on the basis of
the clustering of the preceding t 1.
4.2.3.1 AGNES
Agglomeration hierarchical clustering: This bottom-up strategy first takes each
object as a separate cluster and then merges these clusters as growing clusters until
all the objects are in a cluster or reach a certain termination condition. Agglomera-
tive nesting (AGNES) is a hierarchical clustering algorithm. If the distance between
an object in cluster C1 and one of the objects in cluster C2 is the smallest among the
inter-object European distances of all clusters, C1 and C2 may be merge. This is a
single join method, where each cluster can be represented by all the objects in the
cluster. The similarity between the two clusters is determined by the similarity of
the nearest pair of data points in the two clusters.
Algorithm description:
Input: the database containing n objects, the number of terminating cluster k;
Output: k clusters.
1. Treat each object as an initial cluster;
2. Repeat the first step;
3. Find the nearest two clusters based on the most recent data points in the two
clusters;
4.Merge two clusters to generate a new set of clusters;
5. Until reaches the number of defined clusters
Algorithm performance:
1. Simple, but faced with the merger point to choose the difficult situation;
2.Once a group of objects are merged, they will not be revoked;
3. The complexity of the algorithm is O (n square), not suitable for large data set
calculation.
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4.2.3.2 BIRCH
Balanced iterative reducing and clustering using hierarchies (BIRCH) is a bal-
anced iterative protocol and clustering using hierarchical methods. First of all,
BIRCH is a clustering algorithm; its biggest feature is the ability to use limited
memory resources to complete the large data set of high-quality clustering, while
single-scan data set can minimize the I=O cost [142].
The BIRCH algorithm introduces two concepts: clustering features and cluster-
ing feature trees. Clustering feature (CF) is the core of the BIRCH incremental
clustering algorithm. The nodes in the CF tree are composed of CF, and one CF is a
triple, which represents all the information of the cluster. Given N d-dimensional
data points {x1, x2,⋯, xn}, CF is defined as follows:
CF ¼ {N, LS, SS} (4.57)
where N is the number of nodes in the subclass, LS is the sum of the N nodes,
and SS is the sum of squares of N nodes:
CF1 ¼ CF2 ¼ ðn1 þ n2, LS1 þ LS2, SS1 þ SS2Þ
CF1 ¼ CF2 ¼ ðn1 þ n2, LS1 þ LS2, SS2Þ
CF1 ¼ SS2:
(4.58)
TheCF tree is structured like a B-tree with two parameters: the internal node
balance factor B, the leaf node balance factor L, and the cluster radius threshold T. Each
node in the tree contains up to B child nodes, denoted as ðCFi, CHILDiÞ; 1 <¼ i <¼ B;
CFi is the ith clustering feature in this node;CHILDi points to the ith child node of the
node, corresponding to the ith clustering feature of this node.
BIRCH algorithm features:
1. BIRCH attempts to use the available resources to generate the best clustering
results. An important consideration is to minimize the I/O time with the
limited memory.
2. BIRCH uses a multistage clustering technique: unilateral scanning of data sets
produces a basic clustering, and one or more additional scans can further
improve the quality of clustering.
3. BIRCH is an incremental clustering method because it makes decisions about
the clustering of each data point based on the data points that have been
processed, rather than the global data points.
4.If the cluster is not spherical, BIRCH does not work well because it uses the
concept of radius or diameter to control the boundaries of the cluster [143].
4.2.3.3 CURE
CURE is a novel hierarchical clustering algorithm that selects intermediate
strategies based on centroid and representative object-based methods. It is different
from a single centroid or object to represent a class, rather a fixed number of
representative points in the data space. A representative point of a class is generated
by first selecting the scattered objects in the class and then “shrinking” or moving
them according to a particular score or contraction factor. At each step of the
algorithm, two classes with the closest distance pair (each point comes from
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different class) are merged. Each class has more than one representative point so
that the CURE can accommodate nonspherical geometries. The contraction or
cohesion of a class can help to control the effects of isolated points. Therefore,
CURE is more robust to the treatment of isolated points and can identify
nonspherical and large changes in the size of the class. For large databases, CURE
combines random sampling with division: a random sample is divided at first; then
each partition is partially clustered [144].
At the beginning, each point is a cluster in CURE’s algorithm, then we continue
merging the nearest cluster until the number of clusters becomes K that the we require.
It is a split hierarchical clustering. The algorithm is divided into the following six steps:
1. Extract a random sample S from the source data object.
2.Divide the sample S into a set of partitions.
3.On the division of local clustering.
4.Propose isolated points by random sampling. If a cluster grows too slowly,
remove it.
5. Cluster local clusters.
6.Mark the data with the corresponding cluster label.
4.2.4 Density-based clustering
4.2.4.1 DBSCAN
DBSCAN defines the cluster as the largest set of densely connected points,
dividing the region with sufficient high density into clusters and finding clusters of
arbitrary shapes in the spatial database of noise.
DBSCAN is based on a set of neighborhoods to describe the degree of compact-
ness of the sample set, and the parameters are used to describe the degree of
tightness of the sample distribution in the neighborhood. Where the neighborhood
distance threshold of a sample is described, MinPts describes the threshold of the
number of samples in the neighborhood of the distance of a sample [145].
DBSCAN clustering algorithm:
Input: sample set D ¼ ðx1, x2,⋯, xmÞ, neighborhood parameters ðε,MinPtsÞ,
sample distance measurement;
Output: cluster division C.
1. Initialize the core object set Ω ¼ ϕ, initialize the cluster number k ¼ 0,
initialize the unattached sample set Γ ¼ D, cluster partition C ¼ ϕ.
2. For j ¼ 1; 2;⋯, m, follow the steps below to find all the core objects: find the
ε-neighborhood subsample set NεðxjÞ of the sample xj by the distance
measurement method; add the sample xj to the core object sample set if the
number of sample samples satisfies jNεðxjÞj⩾MinPts : Ω ¼ Ω∪ fxjg.
3. If the core object set Ω ¼ ϕ, then the algorithm ends, otherwise go to step 4.
4.In the core object set Ω, randomly select a core object o, initialize the current
cluster core object queue Ωcur ¼ o, initialize the class number k = k + 1,
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initialize the current cluster sample set Ck ¼ o Access to sample set Γ ¼ Γ  o
If the current cluster core object queue is Ωcur ¼ ϕ, then the current cluster Ck
is completed, update the cluster partition C ¼ {C1, C2⋯, Ck}, update the core
object set Ω ¼ ΩCk, Step 3.
5. In the current cluster core object queue Ωcur out of a core object o’, through
the neighborhood distance threshold ¦Å to find all the ¦Å-neighborhood
sub-sample set Nεðo0Þ, so that Δ ¼ Nεðo0Þ∩Γ, Update the current cluster sample
set Ck ¼ Ck ∪Δ, update the nonaccess sample set Γ ¼ Γ Δ, and proceed to
step 5.
The output is: cluster partition C ¼ {C1, C2,⋯, Ck}
Advantages of DBSCAN:
1. It can be clustered for any form of dense data set; the relative, K-means
clustering algorithm is generally applicable only to convex data set.
2. It can be found in the cluster at the same time abnormal points; the data set is
not sensitive to the abnormal point.
3. The clustering results are not biased. In contrast, the initial values of clustering
algorithms such as K-Means have a great influence on the clustering results.
Disadvantages of DBSCAN:
1. If the density of the sample set is not uniform, the clustering distance
difference is very large, the clustering quality is poor, and then DBSCAN
clustering is generally not suitable.
2. If the sample set is large, the clustering time is longer, and the KD tree or
spheroid is established to search for the nearest neighbor.
3. Relative to the traditional K-Means clustering algorithm, tuning parameters is
slightly more complex. The main parameters includes distance threshold, the
number of neighborhood samples and the MinPts joint parameters. Different
combinations of parameters have a greate impact on the final clustering.
4.2.4.2 Ordering points to identify the clustering structure (OPTICS)
OPTICS algorithm can get different density clustering. It is directly said that
through the OPTICS algorithm processing, you can get any density clustering.
Because the OPTICS algorithm outputs an ordered queue of samples, a cluster of
arbitrary densities can be obtained from this queue [146].
OPTICS is a density clustering algorithm developing fromDBScan. The core idea
of density clustering is to measure the density of the space in which the point is
located through the number of neighbors in ε neighborhood. If the neighborhood of
ε neighborhood exceeds a certain threshold MinPts, it is considered that the point is
in a cluster called core object; otherwise it is considered to be the boundary of a
cluster called the boundary point (bounder object).
In order to have more elaborate characterization capabilities, OPTICS defines
the concept of core distance and reachable distance: OPTICS defines the core
distance as that suppose the minimum radius of MinPts neighbors is MinPts dis-
tance (p), then the core distance of p is defined as core distance ε.
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In other words, the core distance is the smallest neighborhood radius at which a
point becomes the core point. In this case, the kernel distance is the smallest
neighborhood radius.
4.2.5 Grid-based clustering
4.2.5.1 STING
STING is a grid-based multi-resolution clustering technique that divides the
spatial region into rectangular cells. For different levels of resolution, there are
usually multiple levels of rectangular cells, which form a hierarchical structure: each
unit of the upper layer is divided into multiple lower layers. Statistics (such as
average, maximum, and minimum) for each grid cell attribute are precomputed
and stored. These statistics are used to answer queries.
Statistical information grid (STING) divides the spatial region into rectangular
units. The calculation of the STING algorithm grid is independent of the query; the
grid structure facilitates parallel processing and incremental updating; the effi-
ciency is high: the time complexity is o (n), which is the number of objects. The
granularity of the lowest level of the mesh structure determines the quality of the
STING algorithm clustering. The algorithm handles faster, but the quality and
accuracy of the cluster may be reduced [147].
Common parameters in the grid count are as follows: the number of objects in
the grid mean, the average of all values in the grid stdev, the standard deviation of
the attribute values in the grid min, the minimum value of the attribute value in the
grid max, the maximum value of the attribute value in the grid distribution, and the
distribution type of the attribute values in the grid, such as normal distribution,
even distribution, exponential distribution, or none (distribution type unknown).
4.2.5.2 CLIQUE
The CLIQUE algorithm divides each dimension of the data space into equal-
length intervals to form the same size and disjoint grid cells. Since the points in the
same cell belong to the same class, points in the same grid can be aggregated and
treated as an object. All clustering operations are performed on grid cells, so the
clustering process is independent of the number of data points in the data set, only
about the number of grids.
The central idea of the CLIQUE clustering algorithm is as follows:
1. Given a large set of multidimensional data points, the data points are usually
not evenly distributed in the data space. The CLIQUE distinguishes between
sparse and “crowded” areas (or cells) in the space to discover the global
distribution pattern of the data set.
2. If the unit contains data points that exceed an input model parameter, the unit
is dense. In the CLIQUE algorithm, the cluster is defined as the largest set of
connected dense cells. According to the central idea of this algorithm, grid-
based and density-based clustering algorithm can be defined as follows: the
data space is divided into grid and then the number of points falling into a cell
as the density of this unit. At this time you can specify a value, when a grid unit
of the number of points greater than the value said that the cell is dense.
Finally, clustering is defined as a collection of all “dense” cells that are
connected.
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4.2.6 Self-organizing maps (SOM)
Self-organizing mapping neural network, that is, self-organizing maps (SOM),
can be unsupervised data clustering. Its idea is very simple; in essence, it is only
input layer—hidden layer of the neural network. A node in the hidden layer repre-
sents a class that needs to be clustered. In the case of “competitive learning,” each
input sample is found in the hidden layer and the node that matches it, called its
active node, also called “winning neuron” [148]. The parameter of the active node is
updated immediately by the random gradient descent method. At the same time,
the points close to the active node also update the parameters appropriately
according to their distance from the active node.
So, SOM is a feature of the hidden layer of the node, and also is a topological
relationship. If youwant a two-dimensional topological relationship, then the line is
connected into a plane, as shown below (also known as KohonenNetwork): if youwant
a one-dimensionalmodel, then the hidden nodes are connected into a line (Figure 4.6).
Since the hidden layer has a topological relation, we can also say that the SOM
can discretize the input of any dimension to discrete space of one or two dimensions
(less common dimension). Computation layer inside the nodes and input layer
nodes are fully connected.
After the topological relationship is determined, the calculation process begins
and is roughly divided into several parts:
1. Initialization: Each node randomly initializes its own parameters. The number
of parameters per node is the same as the input dimension.
2. For each input data, find the node that best matches it. Assuming that the
input D is dimension, as a result, X ¼ {xi, i ¼ 1;…;D}, then the discriminant
function can be Euclidean distance:
djðxÞ ¼ Σðxi wijÞ2 (4.59)
Figure 4.6.
SOM.
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3.After finding the activation node I (x), we also want to update its neighboring
nodes. Let Sij denote the distance between nodes i and j and assign an update
weight to the nodes near I (x):
Tj, IðxÞ ¼ expðs2j, iðxÞ|2σ2Þ (4.60)
4.Then update the node parameters. Update by gradient descent method:
Δwji ¼ ηðtÞ  Tj, IðxÞðtÞ  ðxi wijÞ (4.61)
iterates until it converges.
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Chapter 5
Deep Learning
The concept of deep learning originates from the research of artificial neural
networks. Multi-layer perceptions with multiple hidden layers are a deep learning
structure. Depth learning represents the distributed characteristics of data by com-
bining low-level features to form more abstract high-level representations of attri-
bute categories or features [149].
The concept of deep learning was proposed in 2006 by Hinton et al. [150]. Based
on the deep belief network (DBN) [15], the algorithm is proposed to solve the
optimization problem of the deep structure, and then the deep structure of a multi-
layer automatic encoder is proposed. In addition, the convolution neural network
proposed by Lecun et al. [151] is the first real multi-layer structure learning algo-
rithm, which uses the space relative relation to reduce the number of parameters to
improve training performance. Deep learning is a method of representing learning
in machine learning. Observations (such as an image) can be represented in a
variety of ways, such as vectors for each pixel’s strength value, or more abstracted
into a range of edges, specific shapes, etc. It is easier to learn a task from an instance
using some specific presentation methods (for example, face recognition or facial
expression recognition). The advantage of deep learning is to replace the manual
acquisition feature with non-supervised or semi-supervised feature learning and
hierarchical feature extraction.
Deep learning is a new field in the study of machine learning. It is inspired by the
learning process of human brain. It simulates human brain to illustrate the mecha-
nism of data, such as images, sound and text. As with machine learning methods,
deep machine learning methods also have supervised learning and unsupervised
learning. The learning model established under different learning frameworks is
very different. For example, convolutional neural network (CNN) is a supervised
deep learning model, while deep belief network(DBN) is a model of unsupervised
learning.
5.1. The biological mechanism of neurons
The basic unit of the neural network is the neuron, and the mathematical neuron
model corresponds to the nerve cell in biology. Or, artificial neural network the-
ory [152] uses the abstract mathematical model of neurons to describe the biological
cells of the objective world. It is obvious that the nerve cell of biology is the
foundation of the formation of neural network theory. Thus, the mathematical
description of the neuron must be based on the objective behavior of the biological
nerve cells. Therefore, it is important and necessary to understand the behavior
characteristics of the biological nerve cells. The topology of a neural network is also
based on the interconnection of nerve cells in biological anatomy. Disclosure of the
interaction between nerve cells is also important. The neuron is the basic element of
the neural network. Understanding the mechanism of neurons contributes to com-
prehend the nature of neural networks. In this section, biological solutions, infor-
mation processing and transmission methods, working functions and mathematical
models are given.
115
5.1.1 The biological anatomy of a neuron
In humans, the structure of neurons is not exactly the same; however, regardless
of the structure, neurons are composed of some basic components. The neuron is
composed of three parts: the cyton, the dendrite and the axon:
1. Cyton
The cell body is a complex composed of many molecules, including the
nucleus, ribosome, and protoplast structure. It is a kind of energy supply of
neuronal activity, where various biochemical processes such as metabolism are
performed.
2.Dendrite
The branches of the extension of the cell body are called dendrites, which are
the portals of information that receive messages from other neurons.
3.Axon
The longest protruding tubular fibers of the cell body are called axons. Axons can
grow to 1mormore.Axons are the exportationof excitedneurons tootherneurons.
At present, according to neurophysiological research, it has been found that
neurons have four kinds of behavior. They can inhibit or excite, they can produce
eruptions or have a calming effect, they can produce a recoil after transplantation
and they are adaptive. In addition, there are four kinds of behavior: information
synthesis, gradual change, electric contact and chemical contact, which can produce
delayed excitation. Neurons for information processing and as a transmission
mechanism have the following characteristics: they inhibit and excite, they pass
threshold characteristics, they have information comprehensive features and they
are exceptional at digital-to-analog conversion.
A synapse is a structure in which a neuron connects with another neuron and
transmits information. As shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, synapses consist of pre-
synaptic components, a synaptic cleft and postsynaptic components. The presyn-
aptic component is one of the axons of a neuron. The gap between the synapse is the
space between the presynaptic component and the posterior component, and the
gap is usually 200–300 Å. The postsynaptic component can be a cell body, dendrite
or axon. The presence of synapses suggests that the cytoplasm of two neurons is not
Figure 5.1.
Multi-layer feed-forward neural network.
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connected directly, and that the two are connected through the structure of synap-
ses. Sometimes, synapses can be connections between neurons.
5.2. Deep feed-forward neural network
5.2.1 Single-layer feed-forward neural network
A neural network is based on the mathematical model of neurons, and its model
has a network topology, node characteristics and learning rules. It has four qualities:
parallel distribution processing; a high degree of robustness and fault tolerance;
distributed storage and learning ability; and it can fully approximate complex non-
linear relationships.
According to the characteristics of neurons and biological function, neurons are
a multi-input, single output, non-linear information processing unit.
The specific mathematical formula [152] is as follows:
v ¼ ∑mi¼1xiwi þ b
y ¼ ϕðxÞ

(5.1)
The typical activation task has sigmoid, tanh, rectified linear unit (ReLU) and
softplus functions, and the corresponding formula is:
sigmoidðxÞ ¼ 11þex
tanhðxÞ ¼ exexexþex
ReLUðxÞ ¼ maxð0;xÞ
sof tplusðxÞ ¼ logð1þ exÞ
8>><>>: (5.2)
Figure 5.2.
Back propagation.
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It is important to note that neural scientists found that neurons have unilateral
inhibition, a wide excited boundary, sparse activation features compared with other
activation functions and a ReLU function with biological interpretability; ReLU
functions work better than others.
According to the topological structure of network connection, a neural network
can be divided into a forward network (directed loop) and a feedback network
(undirected complete graph, also called a cyclic network). For the feedback net-
work, stability of the network model has a close relationship with associative mem-
ory. A network model of stability and associative memory has close relations. The
Hopfield net and Boltzmann machine network belong to this type.
The forward network comes from the multiple coincidence of simple non-linear
functions, and the network structure is simple and easy to implement. A brief
introduction to a single layer hidden layer in feedforward neural networks is as
follows, and the corresponding mathematical formula is:
hð1Þ ¼ ϕð1Þð∑i¼1n xi  wið1Þ þ bð1ÞÞ
y ¼ ϕð2Þð∑j¼1n hjð1Þ  wjð2Þ þ bð2ÞÞ
8<: (5.3)
The input x∈Rm, the hidden layer output h∈Rn and the outputs y∈Rk,
wð1Þ ∈Rmn and bð1Þ ∈Rn are the weights and biases of the input to the hidden layer;
wð2Þ ∈RnK and bð2Þ ∈RK are the weights and biases of the hidden layer to the output
layer; and ϕð1Þ and ϕð2Þ are the activated functions for each layer.
In practice, suppose that the training data is set up as:
{xð2Þ,yð2Þ}Nn¼1
xn ∈Rm
yn ∈RK
8><>>: (5.4)
The model between input and output is:
y ¼ Tðx, θÞ ¼ ϕð2Þ ∑
n
j¼1
ϕð1Þ ∑
m
i¼1
xi  wð1Þi þ bð1Þ
 
 wð2Þj þ bð2Þ
 !
(5.5)
Using parameter θ ¼ ðwð1Þ, bð1Þ; wð2Þ, bð2ÞÞ to further optimize [153] the target
function (loss, the regular item):
minLðθÞ ¼ 1
N
∑
N
n¼1
||yðnÞ  Tðxn; θÞ||2F þ λ∑
2
i¼1
||wðlÞ||2F (5.6)
Solve θ by gradient descent:
θk ¼ θk1  α  ∇θ|θ¼θk1
∇θ|θ¼θk1 ¼
∂ðθÞ
∂θ

θ
¼ θ k1
8<: (5.7)
With the increase in the number of iterations k, the parameters will converge
(the profile can be visualized by the target function LðθkÞÞ:
lim
k!∞
θk1 ¼ θ (5.8)
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The reason for convergence is that the above objective function is convex. For
optimizing the target function (Eq. 5.6), but when the amount of data is large,
storage and reading are very time-consuming, so the stochastic gradient descent is
usually used to solve the problem. For the determination of the topology of the
neural network, Hornik et al. show that: if the output layer adopts linear activation
function, the hidden layer uses the sigmoid function, and the single hidden layer
neural network can approximate any rational function with any degree of accuracy.
5.2.2 Multi-layer feed-forward neural network
Using the analysis of the single-hidden layer feed-forward neural network, when
the number of hidden layers is more than two, it is called the multi-hidden layer
feed-forward neural network [154], or the deep feed-forward neural network,
whose network structure is shown in Figure 5.1.
It is necessary to point out that the topology of the deep feed-forward neural
network is multi-layer, fully connected, and there is no ring. Based on Figure 5.1,
the network input and output model is given by the following formulas:
input x∈Rm, output y∈Rs, the hidden layer’s output is:
hðlÞ ¼ ϕðlÞð∑nl1i¼1 hðl1Þi wðli þ bðlÞÞ
l ¼ 1; 2;…;L
hð0Þ ¼ x
hðLÞ ¼ y
8>><>>: (5.9)
It is important to note that the input layer hð0Þ, output layer hðlÞ, the number of
hidden layers of the L – 1 layer and the super parameter correspond (layer number,
number of hidden units, activation function):
Lþ 1!  numbers of  layerðinclude input and outputÞ
½n0, n1, n2,…, nL1, nL !  dimension of  every layer
½φð1Þ,φð2Þ, :,φðL1Þ,φðLÞ ! activate f unction
8><>: (5.10)
Note that n0 ¼ m and nL ¼ s. The parameter to be layer is:
θ ¼ ðθ1, θ2;…;θLÞ
θl ¼ ðwðlÞ ∈Rnl1nl , bðlÞ ∈Rnl Þ
l ¼ 1; 2;…;L
8><>: (5.11)
So, the relationship between input and output is:
y ¼ hðLÞ ¼ φðLÞ

∑
nL
iL¼1
 hðL1ÞiL  w
ðLÞ
iL
þ bðLÞ

! remember as φðLÞðhðL1Þ, θLÞ
¼ φðLÞ

∑
nL
iL¼1
φðL1Þ

∑
nL1
iL1¼1
 hðL2ÞiL  w
ðL1Þ
iL1 þ bðL1Þ

w
ðLÞ
iL
þ bðLÞ

! remember as φðLÞðφðL1ÞðhðL2Þ, θL1Þ, θLÞ
¼ … ¼ φðLÞðφðL1Þð…φð1Þðx, θ1Þ…; θL1Þ, θLÞ ! remember as f ðx, θÞ
(5.12)
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In application, the train data set is:
{xð2Þ,yð2Þ}Nn¼1
xn ∈Rm
yn ∈RK
8><>: (5.13)
The optimized objective function (loss and regularization) is:
minjðθÞ ¼ LðθÞ þ λRðθÞ (5.14)
inside byn ¼ f ðxn, θÞ and:
lðyn,bynÞ ¼ kyn  bynk2F
LðθÞ ¼ 1
N
∑Nn¼1lðyn,bynÞ
RðθÞ ¼ ∑Ll¼1kθlk2F ¼ ∑Ll¼1kwðLÞk2F
8>>><>>>:
(5.15)
Loss functions come in many forms: energy loss, cross-entropy, etc. The regular
item R has coefficient regularities (analog biological characteristics) except for use
of the Fubius norm (to prevent overfitting).
5.2.3 Back propagation algorithm
How do you solve the optimization target function formula? First, the convexity
and non-convexity of the objective function are determined. If the parameter
selection range is a convex set, the convex function defined on the set is convex
optimization. The obtained solution does not depend on the initial value selection,
and is the global optimal solution. The optimal objective function of the deep
feedforward neural network is generally non-convex, so the solution of the param-
eters depends on the setting of the initial parameters. If the settings are reasonable,
you can avoid prematurely falling into the local optimal solution. The specific
description of the backpropagation algorithm [155] is as follows:
θk ¼ θk1  α  ∇θ|θ¼θ k
∇θ|θ¼ θk ¼ ∂LðθÞ∂θ þ λ
∂RðθÞ
∂θ
8<: (5.16)
where α is the learning rate. Updating the parameters on each layer gives:
θkl ¼ θk1l  α  ∇θl|θl¼θ k1l
∇θl|θl ¼ θk1l ¼
∂LðθÞ
∂θ
þ λ∂RðθÞ
∂θ
8<: (5.17)
In this case, θkl is the update of the k iteration of the lth layer. For the solution of
the core gradient descent, the error propagation term is introduced. According to
the chain rule, it is expanded as:
φLðθÞ
φθl
¼ φh
l
φθl
 φh
lþ1
φhl
…  φh
L
φhL1
 λLðθÞ
φhL
(5.18)
The error propagation is recorded as:
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δl ¼ φLðθÞ
φhl
(5.19)
Furthermore, using θl ¼ ðwl þ blÞ, the implicit layer output is the derivative of
the corresponding reciprocal:
∂hl
∂wl
¼ ∂φ
lððhl1ÞT  wl þ blÞ
∂wl
¼ hl1  ðφlÞ0
∂hl
∂wl
¼ ∂φ
lððhl1ÞT  wl þ blÞ
∂bl
¼ l  ðφlÞ0
8>><>>: (5.20)
The  is the Hadamard product from Eq. (5.18) and is the derivative of the loss
with respect to the parameter. The derivative of the regular item about the param-
eter is:
∂RðθÞ
∂θl
¼ ∂
∂θl
∑
L
l¼1
kθlk2F
 
¼ ∂kθlk
2
F
∂θl
(5.21)
Normally, the constraints in the regular item are only for the weight matrix, and
the binary values are not regular constraints. So, there are:
∂RðθÞ
∂wl
¼ ∂kw
lk2F
∂wl
¼ 2wl
∂RðθÞ
∂bl
¼ ∂kb
lk2F
∂bl
¼ 0
8>><>>: (5.22)
The core meaning of the back propagation algorithm is to use the optimization
objective function JðθÞ to find the gradient of parameters θ in the lth hidden layer.
The gradient is determined by the loss term LðθÞ, the regular term RðθÞ, parameter
θl of the lth hidden layer, where the back propagation of the error is achieved by
introducing an error propagation term.
So, a feed-forward neural network consists of two steps: one is based on the
current parameter values, forward propagation on each layer in the process of the
output value. Another step is to backpropagate the error propagation term on each
layer by the difference between the actual output and the expected output, and
combine the output with the partial derivative of the parameter of each layer to
achieve an update of each layer parameter. Repeat these two steps until the process
converges.
However, when the number of network layers is deep, the gradient increment of
the parameters of each layer will attenuate with the propagation process from
output to input, making it difficult for the whole network to obtain better results
through training and fall into the local optimal solution. This is called diffusion
problem.
5.3. Deep convolution neural network
A convolution feed-forward neural network [156, 157] has a special kind of
depth to avoid a hierarchy between the connection parameters caused by redun-
dancy, leading to the training of the network model, which depends on the amount
of data that is equal to the number of parameters.
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This local connection design choice, in line with the coefficient of response
characteristics of biological neurons, can greatly reduce the scale of the network
model parameters, and dependence on the amount of training data.
5.3.1 The mathematical representation of convolution
The base modules of convolution neural networks are convolution flows,
including convolution (for dimension expansion), non-linearity (sparseness, satu-
ration, side suppression), pooling (aggregation of control or feature types), and
batch normalization (optimization operation, the purpose of which is to speed up
the training process of convergence speed, while avoiding the local optimum).
A. Convolution
In mathematics, convolution is an important linear operation. There are three
main types of convolution in digital signal processing: full convolution, same con-
volution and vaild convolution. Suppose the input signal is a one-dimensional
signal, x∈Rn; the filter is also one dimensional, w∈Rm.
1. Full convolution
y ¼ convðx,w, 0f ull0Þ ¼ ðyð1Þ,…; yðtÞ,…; yðnþm 1ÞÞ∈Rnþmþ1
yðtÞ ¼ ∑mi¼1xðtþ i 1ÞwðiÞ
(
(5.23)
where t = 1, 2,…, n + m – 1.
2. Same convolution
y ¼ convðx,w, 0same0Þ ¼ centerðconvðx,w, 0f ull0Þ, nÞ∈Rn (5.24)
3.Vaild convolution
y ¼ convðx,w, 0vaild0Þ ¼ ðyð1Þ,…; yðtÞ,…; yðnþm 1ÞÞ∈Rnmþ1
yðtÞ ¼ ∑mi¼1xðtþ i 1ÞwðiÞ
(
(5.25)
where t ¼ 1; 2;===, nmþ 1;n > m.
In convolution flow, valid convolution is commonly used. Valid convolution is
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
The core of the convolution operation is that some weight connections can be
removed. The introduction of sparse or local connections reduces parameters
Figure 5.3.
Valid convolution operation.
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through the weight sharing strategy, thus. Since the convolution operation has
translation invariance, the learned feature has the characteristics of topological
correspondence and robustness.
B. Pooling
In essence, the pooling operation performs control of the feature type, and
reduces spatial dimension. The main significance is to reduce the amount of com-
putation to describe the translation invariance, to reduce the input dimension of the
next layer and to control the risk of over-fitting. The operation of the pool varies
between the average pool, the maximum pool, the number of pools and the proba-
bility of pooling, etc.; max pooling is commonly used (Figure 5.4).
In addition to the pooling methods listed above, there is spatial pyramid pooling,
which is a multi-scale pooling method that can obtain input multi-scale informa-
tion; another spatial pyramid pool can be any scale image of the convolution char-
acteristics into the same latitude, which not only allows the convolution of the
neural network to deal with any scale of the picture, but also avoids the cropping
and wrapping operation caused by the loss of information, which has a very impor-
tant significance.
The spatial pyramid pooling [158] method is used as much as possible in the final
convolution stream to avoid the loss of information from the previous stretching or
vectorization. Examples of spatial pyramid pooling can be found in Figure 5.5.
C. Activation function
The core of the activation function is that the complex non-linearity of the whole
network is improved by simple non-linear mapping. If there is no non-linear oper-
ation in the network, there are more hierarchical combinations to consider: linear
approximation, characterization or mining of high-level semantics whose features
are limited (Figures 5.6 and 5.7).
In applications, the commonly used activation functions are: ReLU, which can
accelerate convergence, sparse content, SoftMax (for the last layer, does not calcu-
late probability response), softplus (ReLU smooth approximation) and the sigmoid
function. The core of the traditional neural network includes the logistic-sigmoid
function and the tanh-sigmoid function.
D. Batch normalization
With regard to the normalization operation, the aim is to avoid the tendency of
information transmission to be attenuated step by step with the deepening of the
hierarchy because the input of the data range in the pattern classification may be
too large and the input range of the data range may be small. In short, the data range
is too large or too small, and may lead to deep neural network convergence, slow
and lengthy training time, a commonly used normalized operation with L2 normal-
ization and sigmoid function normalization. It should be noted that the convolution
Figure 5.4.
Max pooling.
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of the neural network sometimes uses a variety of normalized layers, but recent
studies have shown that this level seems to help very little of the final result, so
many networks have abandoned this operation.
Figure 5.5.
Spatial pyramid pooling.
Figure 5.6.
Sigmoid—the core of the traditional neural network.
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5.3.2 Classical CNN structure
First, we need some of the classic CNN structures.
5.3.2.1 LeNet-5
LeNet-5 is a classic structure to a CNN, which is mainly used for handwriting
recognition.
The input to the network is 32 * 32 handwritten font images, which contain 0 to
9 digits, which is equivalent to 10 categories. The output of the network is a number
between 0 and 9. Therefore, we can see that this is a multi-classification problem,
that is, the number of neurons in the output layer is 10, and the final output layer of
the neural network must be a SoftMax problem. The structure of LeNet-5 is shown
in Figures 5.8.
Input layer: a 32 * 32 picture, which is equivalent to 1024 neurons.
C1 layer: paper author, select the six characteristic convolution kernels, and then
the volume of the convolution kernel. The size of the convolution kernel is 5 * 5, so
we can get six feature maps, and then the size of each feature graph is 32 – 5 + 1 = 28.
Also the number of neurons is reduced from 1024 to 28 * 28 = 784.
Figure 5.7.
Softplus function and ReLU function.
Figure 5.8.
LeNet [151].
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S2 layer: this is the downsampling layer, which is applied by using the max
pooling. The pooled size is (2, 2), and the picture with size of 28 * 28 in the C1 layer
is divided into blocks of size 2 * 2. This way we can get 14 * 14 blocks and then use
the largest value in each 2 * 2 block as the new pixel. Then we can get the result of
the S1 layer: a picture with a size of 14 * 14, a total of six.
C3 layer: convolution layer, with this layer we choose the size of the convolution
kernel to be 5 * 5, so we can get a new picture size of 14 – 5 + 1 = 10, and then we
hope to get a 16 feature map. But the problem here is this is the most difficult to
understand; we know S2 contains six 14 * 14 sizes of the picture, and we hope that
this layer is the result: 16 pictures of 10 * 10.
S4 layer: the lower sampling layer is relatively simple, but is also connected to
the C3 16 10 10 picture for the maximum pool. The pool block size is 2 2, and is the
last S4 layer for the 16 size of 5 5 pictures. At this point our number of neurons has
been reduced to 16 * 5 * 5 = 400.
C5 layer: We continue to convolute with a 5 5 convolution kernel, and then we
want to get 120 feature graphs. The size of the C5 layer image is 5 – 5 + 1 = 1, which
is equivalent to one neuron, a 120 feature map, so there are only 120 neurons left.
This time, the number of neurons is sufficient, and later we can directly use the
fully connected neural network for 120-neuron follow-up processing.
5.3.2.2 AlexNet
AlexNet [21] is a historic network structure. Prior to AlexNet, research on
network depth has been stalled for a long time. However, in 2012, AlexNet won the
ImageNet Image Classification Competition that year, the top 5 error rate dropped
by 10 percentage points comparing with the previous year's champion, and far
exceeded the second place of the year.
AlexNet has shown that the depth of the network can greatly improve the
performance of network.
AlexNet has four innovations which make the deeper network achieve better
results: 1. Using non-linear activation function: ReLU. 2. Using following methods
to prevent overfitting: dropout, data augmentation. 3. Applying a large amount of
data in training: million ImageNet image data. 4.Other: Multiple GPUs for distrib-
uted computing, and local response normalization (LRN) layer to normalize the
input. The structure of AlexNet is shown in Figure 5.9.
Here’s a brief introduction to some of AlexNet’s specifics.
A. Data augmentation
There is a view that the neural network is fed by the data. If there is an increase
in training data, you can improve the accuracy of the algorithm, because it can
avoid overfitting, and therefore increase your network structure. When the training
Figure 5.9.
AlexNet.
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data is limited, some transformations can be used to generate new data from the
existing training data set to expand the size of the training data.
Among them, the simplest way to achieve image data deformation is:
1. From the original image (256, 256), randomize some of the images (224, 224).
(Translate)
2.Horizontal flip image. (Reflex)
3.Add some random light to the image. (Light, color transformation, color
jittering)
B. ReLU activation function
Sigmoid is a commonly used non-linear activation function that compresses the
input to a continuous real value between 0 and 1. In particular, if it is a very large
negative number, then the output is 0; if it is a very large positive number, then the
output is 1. But this has some fatal flaws.
Sigmoids saturate and kill gradients. Worse than this, when the input is very
large or very small, there will be saturation; the gradient of these neurons is
close to 0. If your initial value is large, the gradient is in the reverse propaga-
tion time because you need to multiply a sigmoid derivative. This will make the
gradient smaller and smaller, which will lead to the network becoming difficult
to learn.
The mean of the output of sigmoid is not 0, which is not desirable because it
causes the neurons in the next layer to get the non-zero mean signal from the
previous layer as input. One result is that if the data is positive when it is input to
the neuron, then the calculated gradient will always be positive. But if you are
training by batch, then each batch may get a different signal, so this problem can be
alleviated. In general, the non-zero mean problem has some bad effects, but it is
much better than the kill gradients mentioned above.
The mathematical expression of ReLU is:
f ðxÞ ¼ maxð0;xÞ
C. Dropout
Combining many different pretrained models for prediction is a very successful
way to reduce test errors. But it takes time for each model to be trained, so it is too
expensive for large-scale neural networks.
However, AlexNet [21] proposes a very effective combination of model ver-
sions, which only needs twice as much time as a single model in training. This
technique is called Dropout [159], and is done with a probability of 0.5; the output
of each hidden layer of neurons is set to zero. In this way, the “unfold” neurons are
neither involved in the forward transmission nor participate in the reverse trans-
mission.
So, each time you enter a sample, it is equivalent to the neural network trying a
new structure, but all these structures share weight. Because neurons cannot rely on
other specific neurons to exist, this technique reduces the complex relationship
between neurons.
For this reason, the network needs to be forced to learn more robust features
that are useful when combined with different random subsets of other neurons. At
the time of the test, we multiply the output of all neurons by only 0.5, which is a
reasonable approximation for obtaining the geometric mean of the predicted distri-
bution of the exponential dropout network.
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D. Local response normalization
In general, this layer is also intended to prevent the activation function from
saturating.
Its principle is to make the activation function avoid saturation by regulariza-
tion, and obtain a larger derivative value, and its function is similar to ReLU. From
the experimental results, the LRN operation can improve the generalization ability
of the network and reduce the error rate by about 1%.
5.4. Autoencoders and sparsity network
So far, we have described the application of neural networks to supervised
learning, in which we have labeled training examples. Now suppose we have only a
set of unlabeled training examples {x1, x2, x3,… } where xi ∈Rn. An autoencoder
neural network [160] is an unsupervised learning algorithm that applies back prop-
agation, setting the target values to be equal to the inputs, i.e., it uses yi ¼ xi.
Figure 5.10. is an autoencoder.
The autoencoder tries to learn a function hW,bðxÞ ≈ x. In other words, it tries to
learn the approximate equality function of the output x^ that is similar to x. An
identification function seems to be a particularly important function to try to learn,
but by limiting the network, for example by limiting the number of hidden units,
we can find interesting structures about data. As a concrete example, suppose the
inputs x are the pixel intensity values from a 10 10 image (100 pixels) so n ¼ 100,
and there are s2 ¼ 50 hidden units in layer L2. Note that we also have y∈R100. Since
there are only 50 hidden units, the network is forced to learn the compressed
representation of the input. That is, we only give vectors that activate hidden units
að2Þ ∈R50; it must try to reconstruct the 100-pixel input x. If the input were
completely random—say, each xi comes from an IID Gaussian independent of the
other features—then this compression task would be very difficult. However, if
there is structure in the data, for example if some of the input features are related,
then the algorithm will be able to find some of these dependencies. In fact, the
low-dimensional representation of this simple automatic encoder that is often
learned by principal component analysis (PCA) is very similar.
Figure 5.10.
Autoencoder.
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Our argument relies on s2 small hidden units. However, even though the
number of hidden units is large (even larger than the number of input pixels), we
can still find interesting structures by imposing other restrictions on the web. In
particular, if we impose hidden units of sparse constraints, then self-coding will
still find the interesting structure of the data, even if the number of hidden units
is large.
To put it in a nutshell, we think neurons are “active” (or “triggered”) if the
output is close to 1 or the output is close to 0. We want to limit neuronal inactivity
most of the time. This discussion assumes a sigmoid activation function. If you are
using a hyperbolic tangent function, then we think that the neuron is invalid, and
the output value is close to 1.
Recall that að2Þj denotes the activation of hidden unit j in the autoencoder. How-
ever, this notation doesn’t make explicit what the input x was that led to that
activation. Thus, we will write að2Þj ðxÞ to denote the activation of this hidden unit
when the network is given a specific input x. Furthermore, let:
ρ^j ¼
1
m
∑
m
i¼1
a
ð2Þ
j ðxðiÞÞ
h i
(5.26)
be the average activation of hidden unit j (averaged over the training set). We
would like to (approximately) enforce the constraint:
ρ^j ¼ ρ,
where ρ is a sparsity parameter, typically a small value close to zero (say
ρ ¼ 0:05). In other words, we would like the average activation of each hidden
neuron j to be close to 0.05 (say). To satisfy this constraint, the hidden unit’s
activations must mostly be near 0.
To achieve this, we will add an extra penalty term to our optimization objective
that penalizes ρ^j deviating significantly from ρ. Many choices of the penalty term
will give reasonable results. We will choose the following:
∑
s2
j¼1
ρ log
ρ
ρ^j
þ ð1 ρÞ log 1 ρ
1 ρ^j
:
Here, s2 is the number of neurons in the hidden layer, and the index j is summing
over the hidden units in our network. If you are familiar with the concept of Kullback–
Leibler (KL) divergence, this penalty term is based on it, and can also be written:
∑
s2
j¼1
KLðρ||ρ^jÞ,
where KLðρ||ρ^jÞ ¼ ρ log ρρ^ j þ ð1 ρÞ log 1ρ1ρ^ j is the KL divergence between a
Bernoulli random variable with mean ρ and a Bernoulli random variable with mean
ρ^j. KL divergence is a standard function for measuring how different two distribu-
tions are. (If you have not seen KL divergence before, don’t worry about it; every-
thing you need to know about it is contained in this text.)
This penalty function has the property that KLðρ||ρ^jÞ ¼ 0 if ρ^j ¼ ρ, and other-
wise it increases monotonically as ρ^j diverges from ρ. For example, in Figure 5.11,
we have set ρ ¼ 0:2, and plotted KLðρ||ρ^jÞ for a range of values of ρ^j.
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We see that the KL divergence reaches its minimum of 0 at ρ^j ¼ ρ, and blows up
(it actually approaches∞) as ρ^j approaches 0 or 1. Thus, minimizing this penalty
term has the effect of causing ρ^j to be close to ρ.
Our overall cost function now is:
JsparseðW,bÞ ¼ JðW,bÞ þ β∑
s2
j¼1
KLðρ||ρ^jÞ,
where JðW,bÞ is as defined previously, and β controls the weight of the sparsity
penalty term. The term ρ^j (implicitly) depends onW,b also, because it is the
average activation of hidden unit j, and the activation of a hidden unit depends on
the parameters W,b.
To incorporate the KL divergence term into your derivative calculation, there is
a simple-to-implement trick involving only a small change to your code. Specifi-
cally, where previously for the second layer (l ¼ 2), during back propagation you
would have computed:
δ
ð2Þ
i ¼ ∑
s2
j¼1
W
ð2Þ
ji δ
ð3Þ
j
 !
f 0ðzð2Þi Þ,
you now instead compute:
δ
ð2Þ
i ¼ ∑
s2
j¼1
W
ð2Þ
ji δ
ð3Þ
j
 !
þ β  ρ
ρ^i
þ 1 ρ
1 ρ^i
  !
f 0ðzð2Þi Þ:
One subtlety is that you’ll need to know ρ^i to compute this term. Thus, you’ll
need to compute a forward pass on all the training examples first to compute the
average activations on the training set before computing back propagation on any
example. If your training set is small enough to fit comfortably in computer mem-
ory (this will be the case for the programming assignment), you can compute
forward passes on all your examples and keep the resulting activations in memory
Figure 5.11.
KL penalty example.
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and compute the ρ^is. Then you can use your precomputed activations to perform
back propagation on all your examples. If your data is too large to fit in memory,
you may have to scan through your examples computing a forward pass on each to
accumulate (sum up) the activations and compute ρ^i (discarding the result of each
forward pass after you have taken its activations að2Þi into account for computing ρ^i).
Then after having computed ρ^i, you'd have to redo the forward pass for each
example so that you can do back propagation on that example. In this latter case,
you would end up computing a forward pass twice on each example in your training
set, making it computationally less efficient.
The full derivation showing that the algorithm above results in gradient descent
is beyond the scope of these notes. But if you implement the autoencoder using back
propagation modified this way, you will be performing gradient descent exactly on
the objective JsparseðW,bÞ. Using the derivative checking method, you will be able to
verify this for yourself as well.
5.5. Sparse deep neural network
5.5.1 Data sparsity
Data sparsity [161] has the following three properties: First, the data contains
some topology characteristics, or the target’s non-zero elements are relatively small
relative to the data. Second, the corresponding representation of the data under
some (linear or non-linear) adaptive or non-adaptive transform is sparse and has
fewer non-zero elements. Third, as the size of the data set increases, data with some
statistical or physical characteristics accounts for a small number of the entire data
set. For example, samples with particularly good resolution or samples with partic-
ularly poor resolution have a small proportion in the entire data set.
5.5.2 Sparse regularity
The supervision and machine-learning problem will “minimize your error while
regularizing your parameters,” namely the regularization parameter will minimize
the error at the same time.
The minimization error allows our model to fit our training data, and the regu-
larization parameter prevents our model from overfitting our training data. Because
there are too many parameters, this can lead to an increase in model complexity,
which is easy to fit, but means that our training error will be very small. However,
the training error is not our ultimate goal; our goal is to ensure that the model’s test
error is small, which will predict the new sample accurately. So, we need to make
sure that the “simple” model is based on minimizing the training error, therefore
parameters will have a good generalization performance (i.e., the test error is
small), and the model of “simple” is done by rule function.
In addition, the use of regular terms can also constrain the characteristics of our
model. In this way, the prior knowledge of the model can be exploited during
learning, and then the model can be artificially made with the characteristics we
want, such as sparseness, low rank, and smoothness. There are several ways of
looking at regularization. Regularization is consistent with Occam’s razor. The idea
is that in all possible models, we should choose to be able to interpret the known
data very well with very simple models. From Bayesian estimation, rule-based entry
corresponds to the prior probability of the model. Regularization is the realization
of structural risk minimization strategy, which is to add a regularizer or penalty
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term to the empirical risk. In general, supervised learning can be seen as minimizing
the following objective function:
w ¼ argmin∑
i
Lðyi, f ðxo; wÞÞ þ λωðwÞ (5.27)
where the first term, Lðyi, f ðxo; wÞÞ, measures the error between our model
(classification or regression) for the predicted value of the ith sample f ðxi;WÞ and
real label yi of the previous error. Because the model is to maximally fit the
training samples, this term should be minimized. But not only to ensure the
training error of the model is the smallest, but also to ensure that the test error of
model is small. So, we need to add the second item, which is the regularization
function ωðwÞ of the parameter w, to constrain the model to make it as simple
as possible.
Most of the models of machine learning are similar to this and are just the
transformation of these two terms. For example, you can replace the first loss
function with square loss, then it becomes a least squares problem.
The regulation function is ωðwÞ and there are plenty of options, In general, the
more complex the model, the larger the regularization value. For example, the
regularization term can be the norm of the model parameter vector. Different
choices have different constraints on the parameter w, and the effects obtained are
different. Common norms are: L0 norm, L1 norm, L2 norm, trace norm, Frobenius
norm and norm.
Usually, we use L0 and L1 regularization to make the data sparse.
The L0 norm is the number of elements in the non-zero vector. If we use the L0
norm to rule a parametric matrixW, we hope that most of the elements ofW are 0.
Let the parameter W be sparse:
RðθÞ ¼ kWk0 (5.28)
The L1 norm is the sum of the absolute values of each element in a vector, which
is called the “sparse rule operator” (Lasso regularization):
RðθÞ ¼ kWk1 (5.29)
The L2 norm refers to the square root to the sum of the squares of the elements
in the vector
To further illuminate this problem: for any regularization operator, if it is not
divisible atWi = 0, and can be decomposed into a form of “summation”, then this
regularization operator can achieve the effect of sparseness.
Although the L1 norm and the L0 norm can achieve sparsity, the application of
L1 is more extensive.
There are two reasons for this. First, because the L0 norm is difficult to solve for
optimization, and second, the L1 norm is the optimal convex approximation of the
L0 norm, and it is easier to optimize than the L0 norm. Sparseness is widely used
because it has two following advantages.
1. Feature selection
Sparse regularization enables automatic selection of features. In general, most of the
elements (features) in the input xi have nothing to do with the final output yi.
Considering these additional features in xi while minimizing the objective function,
although smaller training errors can be obtained, these features can cause
interference when predicting new samples. The introduction of the sparse
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regularization operator is to complete the feature selection. It removes the useless
features, which is to reset the weights corresponding to these features to zero.
2. Interpretability
Another reason for sparseness is that the model is easier to explain. So, for example,
the probability of getting a certain disease is y, and then the data that we're
collecting is 1000 dimensions, which is what we need to look for in terms of how
the 1000 factors affect the probability of getting the disease. So, let’s say that this is
a regression model: y ¼ w1  x1 þ w2  x2 þ…þ w1000  x1000þ b(of course, to
limit y to [0, 1], we have to add a logistic function).
5.5.3 Sparse connection
The convolution neural network includes local connection, weight sharing,
translation invariance and all sparseness. First, for local connection, compared with
the full connection strategy, Convolutional neural networks have local connections,
weight sharing, and translation invariance. First of all, for local connections, com-
pared with full connections, it has the characteristics of sparse response. Second is
the weight sharing, the hidden layer has the same activation characteristics, which
can reduce the number of parameters, and Translation invariance can be obtained
by pooling. Moreover, the classic dropout operation, as shown in (Figure 5.12), can
implement sparse connection. The way to implement it is to make some hidden
layer node weights temporarily not working when training the model. The inactive
nodes do not calculate, but retain their weights.
5.5.4 Sparse classifier
Common sparse classifiers are based on learning, such as sparse representation
of the classifier. The core steps are as follows:
1. Construction of the dictionary:
D ¼ ½D1, D2;…;Dk (5.30)
where k is the number of categories, Dk is the construction of the kth class
sample or data set and the sample x is represented as follows:
min
1
2
 kxD  αk22 þ λ  kαk1 ¼
1
2
x ∑K
k¼1
Dk  αkk22 þ λ  kαk1 (5.31)
Figure 5.12.
Dropout connection.
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The indicated coefficients are as follows:
α ¼ ½α1, α2;…;αkT (5.32)
The final class is determined by the following formula:
labelðxÞ ¼ arg min
1 ≤ k ≤K
{kxDk  αkk22} (5.33)
5.6. Generative adversarial nets
5.6.1 Generative model
Machine learning models can be broadly divided into two categories: generative
model and discriminative model [162]. The discriminative model requires the input
variable x to predict pðy|xÞ by a certain model. The generative model is given some
kind of implicit information to randomly generate the observed data. For example.
Discriminant model: Determine whether the animal in a picture is a cat or a dog.
Generative model: Give a picture of a series of cats and generate a new cat.
Using the well-known imagenet-1000 image classification, automatic driving of
the image semantic segmentation, the prediction of human skeleton points belong
to the discriminative model, that is, it gives the input to predict a feature. In fact,
most of the work of the past 12 to 14 years belongs to the discriminative model.
Why? Because one of the reasons is to determine the loss function of the model
(loss) to facilitate the definition.
So what is machine learning? In a word, giving feedback during the training
process, to make the results match our expectations. For the classification problem,
we want the loss to not change after approaching bound, so we choose cross entropy
as feedback. In the regression, we want the loss to remain the same only when the
two are the same, so we choose the Euclidean distance between the points as the
feedback. The choice of loss function (feedback) will obviously affect the quality of
the training results, which is the top priority of the design model. In the past few
years, there have been hundreds of variants of neural networks, but there very few
loss functions are presented.
For discriminant models, the loss function is easy to define because the goal of
the output is simple. But for generative models, the definition of loss functions is
not that easy. For the task of generating a cat picture, if you simply define the loss
function as “European distance from the original picture”, the result will be terrible.
When we want the neural network to generate a picture of a cat, we hope that this
picture has an animal’s outline, textured hair, rather than a simple Euclidean dis-
tance optimal solution. How do we put our expectations for cats into the model?
This is the problem solved by the generative adversarial network (GAN).
5.6.2 Adversarial
For image classification, a bunch of RGB pixel points and N categories of prob-
ability distribution models are difficult to define from a traditional mathematical
perspective. Then why not give the feedback of the generative model to the dis-
criminant model? This is Goodfellow’s idea - he closely combines the two broad
categories of machine learning, generative and discriminant.
A GAN has two parts in it: the generator “G” that generates images and the
discriminator “D” that classifies real and fake images.
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1. Input noise (hidden variable) z
2. Through generator G, we get fake data and refer to it as xf ake ¼ GðzÞ
3.Take a part of data from real data set, and denoted by xreal
4.By mixing real data and fake data, we get x ¼ xf ake þ xreal
5. Enter data into discriminator D and tag the data as xf ake ¼ 0, xreal ¼ 1
(a simple binary classifier)
6.According to the classification results, return loss
In the process above, the discriminator D should try to make DðGðzÞÞ ¼ 0,
and DðxrealÞ ¼ 1, which is to correctly discriminate the fake images from real ones.
However, generator G would try to make DðGðzÞÞ ¼ 1, which is to make the gener-
ated image as fake as possible. Therefore, the whole training process is like two
players fighting each other, which is the source of the name Adversarial.
From a perspective of artificial intelligence, this model is the first to use two
mutually constrained neural networks to guide neural networks. But the simple
requirements make the training process in GAN easily lose direction.
These phenomena are actually three difficulties in the GAN problem caused by
intertwining. One of the difficulties is that the depth of the neural network itself is
difficult to train and is unstable. Although the original GAN theory does not require
G and D to be neural networks, they only need to be able to fit the corresponding
generation and identification function. But this is precisely the depth of the nerve
network.So we all use the neural network as G and D. But the choice of neural
network, design and training is also full of surprises and uncertainties, which has
also brought difficulties for GAN training.
A. Mathematical expression of GAN
The following explains the mathematical principles of GAN. The symbol is
described as random noise z∈Rn, generated data ~x ∈Rn and natural data x∈Rn. The
discriminator has two categories, so y∈ ½0; 12.
The following details comprise four aspects.
B. Data
{ðxt,ztÞ,yt}Tt¼1 (5.34)
For the tth data ðxt, ztÞ, the output is yt ∈ ½0; 1t. The probability that the natural
data is true is 1. The probability that the generated data is false is 0.
C. Model
G : ~x ¼ gðz, θGÞ∈Rn
D :
Feature Learning :
X ¼ DFðx, θFÞ
~X ¼ DFð~x, θFÞ
8<:
Classif ier Design : y ¼
PðLðxÞ ¼ real|X, θCÞ
PðLð~xÞ ¼ real|~X, θCÞ
0@ 1A∈R2
8>>>>><>>>>>:
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(5.35)
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where G is generator. The parameter to be optimized is θG; there is a need to
further quantify the non-linear mapping function gðÞ. D is the discriminator,
divided into two parts: one is feature learning (the parameter to be optimized is θF);
the other is classifier design (the parameter to be optimized is θC). There is no need
to further quantify the functions DFðÞ and PðÞ.
D. Optimization function
Usually, the discriminant model section (Eq. (5.41)) is written as:
y ¼ DðxÞ
Dð~xÞ
 
¼ DðxÞ
DðGðzÞÞ
 
∈R2 (5.36)
where DðxÞ∈ ½0; 1 determines the probability that x is a true sample. The loss
function of the corresponding discriminant model when the model is fixed is:
min
θD
{ ½ ∑
x PðxÞ
logðDðx, θDÞÞ þ ∑
~x Pð~xÞ
logðDð~x, θDÞÞ}
θD ¼ ðθF, θCÞ
8><>: (5.37)
The requirement to generate the model is when the discriminant model is fixed.
The distribution of the generated data is as consistent as possible with the natural
data. PðbxÞ is the same as PðxÞ, maximizing the objective function:
max
θG
∑
~x	Pð~xÞ
logðDð~xÞÞ ¼ ∑
~x	PðxÞ
logðDð~xÞÞ (5.38)
Put x ¼ GðzÞ into the formula:
max
θG
∑
z	PðzÞ
logðDðGðzÞ, θGÞÞ ! dðPð~xÞ, PðxÞÞ (5.39)
under the z 	 PðzÞ conditions. The greater the sum of logðDðGðzÞÞ for zmeans:
ðDðGðZÞÞ 	 Pð~xÞÞ ! dðGðzÞ, xÞ ! ðDðGðZÞÞ 	 PðxÞÞ (5.40)
The smaller the gap dðGðZÞ, xÞ between the generated data and the natural data
results in the generated data finally being judged to be 1.
The optimization function of the discriminant model is:
min
θD
JðθDÞ ¼  1
T
∑Tt¼1δðytð1ÞÞ ¼ realÞ  logðDðxtÞÞ
∑Tt¼1δðytð2ÞÞ ¼ f akeÞ  logð1Dð~xtÞÞ
264
375 (5.41)
Usually, because the natural data and the generated data correspond to the
authenticity class, respectively, the formula contains:
( δðytð1Þ ¼ realÞ ¼ 1
δðytð2Þ ¼ realÞ ¼ 1
δðÞ
(5.42)
which is a Dirichlet function.
So the final optimization objective function is:
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min
θD
min
θG
JðθD, θGÞ ¼ 1T
∑Tt¼1logðDðxt, θDÞÞ
∑Tt¼1logð1DðGðzt, θGÞ, θDÞÞ
24 358<: (5.43)
E. Solution
Use the gradient descent method to optimize the parameter ðθG, θDÞ alternately.
5.7. Deep recurrent neural networks
Although the traditional deep feedforward neural network has achieved excel-
lent performance in tasks such as classification and target recognition. However, the
application of computational models established by its “bionics” is still limited. For
example, the deep feed-forward neural network is powerless for the analysis of the
overall logical characteristic of the input sequences, which have time correlation
between each other (e.g., consider learning a language model to predict the next
word based on the previous ones). This section will introduce the deep recurrent
neural network (RNN) [163], which is different from the deep neural network
previously explored; it can better represent the overall logical characteristic of high
dimensions through the introduction of loops within hidden layers.
5.7.1 Simple recurrent neural network
Figure 5.13 is a simple recurrent neural network (i.e., vanilla loop neural network).
As shown in Figure 5.13(a), a chunk of neural network A looks at a series of
inputs xt and outputs a value ht. The loop structure allows information to be passed
from one step of the network to the next. Moreover, the chain-like structure (as
shown in Figure 5.13(b)) will obviously be obtained while the loop is unfolded.
This chain-like structure reveals that the deep recurrent neural network is inti-
mately related to sequences and lists. They are the natural architecture of a neural
network used for such data. The overall network model and the solution process are
described in the following.
A. Training data
xt ∈R
n
,yt ∈R
m
 T
t¼1 (5.44)
where xt is the input of the moment t, and the length of whole time sequence
is T. The output yt is related to inputs before the moment t (including the
moment t), i.e.:
x1, x2,⋯, xtf g!relationship yt (5.45)
B. Overall model
st ¼ σðU  xt þW  st1 þ bÞ
ht ¼ V  st þ c∈Rm
yt ¼ Sof tmaxðhtÞ∈Rm
8><>: (5.46)
Note that Sof tmax here is not a classifier, but is used as an activation function to
compress an m-dimensional vector into another m-dimensional real number vector,
where the value of each element of the vector is between 0 and 1. That is:
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Sof tmaxðhtÞ ¼ 1
Z
 ½ehtð1Þ,⋯, ehtðmÞT
Z ¼ ∑
m
j¼1
ehtðjÞ
8>><>>: (5.47)
where Z represents the normalization factor. In addition, parameters to be
optimized in Eq. (5.52), including weighted connection U,W, V and bias b, c. σðÞ,
are the activation functions for the hidden layers.
C. Optimization objective function
Based on the relation within training data (Eq. (5.51)) and the overall model
(Eq. (5.52)), the loss function is constructed by negative logarithmic-likelihood
(i.e., cross-entropy), and the optimization objective function is as follows:
min
θ
JðθÞ ¼ ∑
T
t¼1
lossðy^t, ytÞ ¼ ∑
T
t¼1
 ∑
m
j¼1
ytðjÞ  logðy^tðjÞÞ þ ð1 ytðjÞÞ  logð1 y^tðjÞÞ
" # !
(5.48)
where ytðjÞ is the jth element of yt, and the parameter θ is:
θ ¼ ½U,V,W; b, c (5.49)
D. Solution
RNNs are called recurrent because they perform the same task for every element
of a sequence, with the output being depended on the previous computations. The
corresponding loss term is simplified to:
JtðθÞ ¼ lossðy^t, ytÞ (5.50)
As for the solution of optimization objective function (i.e., Eq. (5.54)), it can be
realized through the time back propagation algorithm. The core is the solution to
the following five partial derivatives:
∂JðθÞ
∂V
,
∂JðθÞ
∂c
,
∂JðθÞ
∂W
,
∂JðθÞ
∂U
,
∂JðθÞ
∂b
 
(5.51)
The solution of the first two partial derivatives is based on the following error
propagation terms:
Figure 5.13.
A simple recurrent neural network.
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δht ¼
∂JtðθÞ
∂ht
(5.52)
Notice that δht is the partial derivative of the output ht of objective function at
moment t. The solution of the remaining three partial derivatives is based on the
error propagation:
δst ¼
∂JtðθÞ
∂st
(5.53)
where δst represents the partial derivatives of the output st of the hidden layer
activation function at moment t. The following are the partial derivatives of objec-
tive function with respect toW; the remaining partial derivatives are similar:
∂JðθÞ
∂W
¼ ∑
T
t¼1
∑
t
k¼1
∂sk
∂W
 ∂st
∂sk
 ∂JtðθÞ
∂st
¼ ∑
T
t¼1
∑
t
k¼1
∂sk
∂W
 ∂st
∂sk
 δst (5.54)
Notice that the output st of the hidden layer at moment t is related to the
previous outputs skðk ¼ 1; 2;⋯, tÞ, as shown in Eq. (5.52) while the parameter W
happens to be the intrinsic meaning of this relationship. The equation below can be
easily obtained according to the chain rule:
∂st
∂sk
¼
Yt
j¼kþ1
∂sj
∂sj1
¼
Yt
j¼kþ1
ðWT  diagðσ0ðsj1ÞÞÞ (5.55)
where σ0ðÞ is the partial derivative of the activation function σðÞ. In addition,
function diagðÞ is the vector extension matrix, i.e., the resulting matrix takes the
vectors as diagonal elements.
In practice, the activation function σðÞ of the hidden layer (Eq. (5.52)) often
takes the Tanh ðÞ function, so that the variation of the corresponding gradients of
Eqs. (5.59) and (5.61) is very small in the later stage of training. Furthermore, the
multiplication operation makes the gradient of Eq. (5.60) even smaller, which easily
leads to the gradient vanishing phenomenon. The same is true if σðÞ takes the
SigmoidðÞ function. The common tricks used to avoid gradient vanishing include
parameter initialization strategies, using the ReLUðÞ function as the activation
function, and so on.
5.7.2 The problem of long-term dependencies
Reconsider the language model trying to predict the next word based on the
previous ones. If the recurrent neural network is trying to predict the last word in
“the clouds are in the sky,” it doesn’t need any further context; it’s pretty obvious
the next word is going to be sky. In such cases, where the gap between the relevant
information and the place that it is needed is small, RNNs can learn to use the
previous information, and the process is shown in Figure 5.14.
But there are also cases where the recurrent neural network needs more context.
Consider trying to predict the last word in the text “I grew up in France I speak
fluent French.” Recent information suggests that the next word is probably the
name of a language, but if the recurrent neural network wants to narrow down
which language, it needs the context of France from further back. It’s entirely
possible for the gap between the relevant information and the point where it is
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needed to become very large. Unfortunately, as that gap grows, RNNs become
unable to use the previous information as shown in Figure 5.15.
Despite RNNs being theoretically capable of establishing the dependencies
between long time interval states, as a result of gradient vanishing or gradient
explosion (i.e., the gradient tends to infinity after the multiplication operation,
which makes the system unstable), they can only learn the short-term dependencies
in a practical application, which limits the memory capacity of a recurrent neural
network. This is the so-called long-term dependencies problem.
5.7.3 Long short-term memory networks
Long short-term memory networks [164], usually just called LSTMs, are a spe-
cial kind of RNN, capable of learning long-term dependencies. They were intro-
duced by Hochreiter and Schmidhuber [164], and were refined and popularized by
many people [1]. They work tremendously well on a large variety of problems, and
are now widely used. The core problem of the known simple recurrent neural
network is that the gradient explosion or gradient vanishing phenomenon occurs
easily as the time interval increases. To solve this problem effectively, LSTMs
control the accumulation speed of information by introducing the gate mechanism,
and they can choose to forget the accumulation of previous information.
A. Analysis of improvement motivation
In the simple recurrent neural network, we can see from the Eqs. (5.60) and
(5.61) that if we define:
ζ ¼WT  diagðσ0ðsj1ÞÞ (5.56)
Figure 5.14.
The gap is small so that RNN can successfully use the past information.
Figure 5.15.
A large gap makes RNN unable to use the past information.
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there are:
Yt
j¼kþ1
ðWT  diagðσ0ðsj1ÞÞÞ ! ζtk (5.57)
As for ζ, if it’s a spectral radius kζk > 1, Eq. (5.64) will diverge and cause the
system to appear as the so-called gradient explosion problem. On the contrary, the
gradient vanishing problem will occur as the time difference increases infinitely if
kζk < 1.
To avoid the gradient explosion or gradient vanishing problem, the key is the
spectral radius of ζ set as kζk ¼ 1. Generally, ifW is set as a unit matrix and the
spectral norm of σ0ðsj1Þ is set to 1 at the same time, the relationship of hidden layers
within the model degenerates to:
st ¼ σðU  xt þW  st1 þ bÞ!degenerate st ¼ U  xt þ st1 þ b (5.58)
But in this form the properties of non-linear activation are lost. Therefore, the
improved approach is the introduction of cell state, recorded as ct, to carry out the
non-linear transmission of information, namely:
ct ¼ ct1 þU  xt
st ¼ TanhðctÞ

(5.59)
Note that the non-linear activation function here is Tanh ðÞ.
B. The core idea behind LSTMs
Based on Figure 5.16, the key to LSTMs is the cell state to control the informa-
tion changes. The cell state is like a conveyor belt. It runs straight down the entire
chain, with only some minor linear interactions. It’s very easy for information to
flow along it unchanged. The LSTM does have the ability to remove or add infor-
mation to the cell state, carefully regulated by structures called gates. Note that in
Figure 5.16, the input at the moment t consists of three gates, i.e., xt, ct1 and st1;
the output consists of two gates, i.e., ct and st.
Note that the core design of the network consists of three doors, i.e., forget gate,
input gate and output gate. The overall network structure is shown in Figure 5.17.
C. Forget gate
The first step in LSTM is to decide what information its going to be thrown away
from the cell state. This decision is made by a sigmoid layer called the forget gate
layer. It looks at xt and st1, and outputs a number between 0 and 1 for each element
Figure 5.16.
The improved structure.
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in the cell state ct1. A 1 represents completely keep this, while a 0 represents
completely get rid of this. A detailed equation of the forget gate is as follows:
f t ¼ σðW f  st1, xt½  þ bf Þ (5.60)
where σ is the Sigmoid function, ½ represents the aggregation operation, the
weights of st1 and xt are merged inW f and bf is the bias of the forget gate. The
specific structure of the forget gate is shown in Figure 5.18.
D. Input gate
The next step is to decide what new information LSTM is going to store in the
cell state. This has two parts. First, a sigmoid layer called the input gate layer
decides which values LSTM will update; then, a tanh layer creates a vector of new
candidate values, ~ct, that could be added to the state. The equation for this part is as
follows:
it ¼ σðW i  ½st1, xt þ biÞ
~ct ¼ TanhðWc  ½st1, xt þ bcÞ

(5.61)
where the element values within it are between 0 and 1, indicating the propor-
tion of each element being updated in the state. The value of ~ct depends on st1
Figure 5.17.
An overview of LSTMs.
Figure 5.18.
The forget gate of LSTM.
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and xt. The rest of the parameters are similar to those of the forget gate. A schematic
of this part is shown in Figure 5.19.
Next, LSTM will combine these two to create an update to the state. The detailed
equation is as follows:
ct ¼ f t  ct1 þ it  ~ct (5.62)
The previous term is the old state multiplied by ft, indicating that LSTM forgets
elements that it has already decided. Then it adds it  ~ct; this is the new candidate
value, scaled by how much LSTM decided to update each state value. A schematic
representation of the generation of the new state is shown in Figure 5.20.
E. Output gate
Finally, LSTM needs to decide what it’s going to output. This output will be
based on the cell state, but will be a filtered version. First, there is a sigmoid layer
called the output gate layer, which decides what parts of the cell state it’s going to
output. Then, LSTM will put the cell state through the Tanh layer (to push the
Figure 5.19.
The input gate of LSTM.
Figure 5.20.
LSTM combines the two parts to create the update to the state.
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values between ?1 and 1) and multiply it by the output of the output gate, so that
LSTM only outputs the parts it has decided to. The equation for this step is as
follows:
ot ¼ σðWo  ½st1, xt þ boÞ
st ¼ ot  TanhðctÞ

(5.63)
where ot represents the output of the output gate, and st is the final output state
after filtration. The specific diagram is shown in Figure 5.21.
5.8. Deep reinforce learning
5.8.1 Basic idea of deep reinforce learning
Deep reinforcement learning [165] combines the perception of deep learning
with the decision-making ability of reinforcement learning, and can directly control
the input image. It is an artificial intelligence method that is closer to human
thinking. The criteria for measuring artificial intelligence are perception, aware-
ness, and decision making. It can be considered that deep learning (deep neural
network) [16] is to further enhance and break through the core technology of
perceptual ability. At the same time, the learning mechanism of intensive learning
shows that it is constantly interacting with the environment and constantly trying
to get the best strategy. It is the key technology to make the decision-making ability
to constantly obtain the benefit. The principle of deep reinforce learning is shown in
Figure 5.22.
In addition, it is known that the information processing capacity of the brain is
limited and it is impossible to perform a variety of operations in an instant. To
process a large amount of information smoothly, people can only select specific
information to process at each time according to a certain strategy, and organize a
large number of operations of the whole process of cognition (including feeling,
Figure 5.21.
The output gate of LSTM.
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perception, memory, thinking, imagination, speech, etc.). Therefore, perception,
cognition and decision-making are important for the effective conduct and devel-
opment of cognitive activities.
5.8.2 Deep Q network
Q learning was presented by Watkins [166], which is the earliest and one of the
most important algorithms for online reinforcement learning. The deep Q network
was the first deep reinforcement learning algorithm proposed by Google’s
DeepMind in 2015 [167] and was further refined in 2015; the results are published in
the journal Nature. DeepMind applies the Deep Q network to a video game called
Atari, which have not been used in the past. This method only uses video informa-
tion as input, such as a video of a person playing the game, and the symbol “Q”
indicates the score or quality obtained when the operation is performed in a
certain stage.
5.8.2.1 Basic network model and framework
In the deep Q network, the evaluation module is represented only by the value
network, and no action module is used because the evaluation module can select
and perform the optimal action. The core idea is that based on the value network, a
model can traverse the value of a variety of actions under a certain state, and then
select the action that has the largest value as output, as shown in Figure 5.23.
Note that the deep Q network, as the first algorithm for deep reinforce learning,
only uses the value network, which is characterized by low training efficiency and
Figure 5.22.
The deep reinforce learning framework.
Figure 5.23.
Basic framework of the deep Q network.
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can only deal with low-dimension discrete control problems; in other words, its
generality is limited. But since it’s the first successful combination of deep learning
and enhanced learning to solve the high-dimensional data input problem, and in the
Atari game has made a major breakthrough, it is groundbreaking. As the deep
convolution neural network has a natural advantage in the field of image
processing, it is one of the current mainstreams to deal with image data in combi-
nation with Q learning in reinforce learning. In the DQN training process, the
adjacent four-frame game screen is used as the input of the network, and the Q
values of the optional actions in the current state are output through multiple
convolution layers and allconnected layers, thereby realizing end-to-end learning
control.
A. Mathematical analysis of the deep Q network
1.Analysis of Q learning
For example, a chess game can be divided into a series of steps (the last step is
the result), each step is the action generated by the player based on their current
observations. At the same time, it is expected that the cumulative reward (the sum
of the behavioral reward and the previous behavior) brought by this action is better
than the other. How do you quantify this process using mathematical analysis? First,
the necessary assumption is that the observations or actions performed in each step
of the game are limited. In addition to this, it is impossible to perform new actions
only by observing the current steps, and it is necessary to combine the previous
observations and actions.
For convenience, several symbols are given:
• The symbol xt ∈Rmn represents the corresponding observation in the
tðt ¼ 1; 2;⋯, TÞ step of the game.
• The symbol at ∈Λ is the action performed under observation xt, where Λ is the
set of reasonable actions under the rules of the game.
• The symbol rt is the reward (or penalty) acquired after the action at is taken
under observation xt, and:
Rt ¼ ∑
T
t0¼t
γt
0t  rt0 (5.64)
where γ ∈ ð0; 1Þ is the discount factor, and Rt is the sum of cumulative reward
obtained from step t to the end time T.
• The symbolQðs, aÞ is the state-action value function, where the state s at time t is:
st ¼ ðx1, a1,⋯, xt1, at1, xtÞ (5.65)
Next, the main idea of Q learning is given, that is, according to the following
iterative equation, to implement the optimization learning of the state-action value
function:
Qkþ1ðst, atÞ ¼ Qkðst, atÞ þ ak  δk
δk ¼ rtþ1 þ γ max
a0 ∈Λ
Qkðstþ1, a0Þ Qkðst, atÞ
(
(5.66)
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where ak is the learning rate, the other st and at are the state and action
corresponding to the tth step, respectively, δk is the time difference, γ is the dis-
count factor and a0 are executable actions of the state-action value function under
the kth iteration with respect to the state stþ1 within Λ. It has been shown that when
Eq. (5.72) satisfies the following two conditions, one is:
∑
k
a2k < þ∞,   ∑
k
ak ¼ þ∞ (5.67)
and the other is that all states and actions can be traversed indefinitely, and there
are:
lim
k!∞
 Qk ¼ Q (5.68)
That is, the state-action value function under the optimal control strategy is
obtained when the number of iterations tends to infinity. Similar to the watermelon
task, a set of optimal execution strategies from seeding to result are summarized.
Finally, based on the above description of the Bellman equation, it can be seen
that the strategy of selecting the optimal executable action under a certain state is to
maximize the following expectations:
Qðs, aÞ ¼ Es0	ξðrþ γ max
a0
Qðs0, a0Þ|s, aÞ (5.69)
where ξ is the environment (all states are included), s0 is the state after the action
a is executed for state s and a0 are all possible actions for state s0 under the game
rules.
Note that Eq. (5.75) uses the expectation to analyze the state-action value func-
tion. In practice, the function approximation strategy is often used to estimate the
state-action value function, i.e.:
Qðs, a, θÞ ≈Qðs, aÞ (5.70)
In reinforce learning, the common approximation methods are linear and non-
linear (e.g., the neural networks); note that the weight parameters to be optimized
are θ. Assume that for each iteration k, the Q network implements the parameter
update by minimizing the following objective functions:
LkðθkÞ ¼ Es,a	ρðÞ ðyk  Qðs,a;θkÞÞ2
h i
(5.71)
where ρðÞ is the behavior distribution, i.e., ρðs, aÞ is the probability distribution
of state s and behavior a, and yk is the objective (output) corresponding to the kth
iteration, and there are:
yk ¼ Es0	ξ rþ γ maxa0 Qðs
0, a0; θk1|s, aÞ
 
(5.72)
According to Eqs. (5.77) and (5.78), there are:
θ0!minθ L1ðθ1Þ θ1!minθ L2ðθ2Þ ⋯!minθ LkðθkÞ θk ! ⋯ (5.73)
That is, according to Eq. (5.78), the objective output y1 can be obtained under
the condition that parameter θ0 is known, and the parameters are updated by
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optimizing the objective function in Eq. (5.77) to get θ1. The rest can be done in the
same manner, and the convergence of the parameters is finally realized, namely:
lim
k!∞
  θk ¼ θ (5.74)
Among them, the gradient descent algorithm is used to update the parameters of
Eq. (5.77), where the partial derivative is:
∇θkLkðθkÞ ¼ Es,a	ρðÞ; s0	ξ ðrþ γ max
a0
Qðs0, a0; θk1Þ Qðs, a; θkÞÞ  ∇θkQðs, a; θkÞ
 
(5.75)
Note that the parameter θk1 is fixed here.
1.Analysis of deep Q learning
At present, the deep learning techniques that rely on a large number of training
data sets to succeed have achieved many breakthroughs such as computer vision
and voice processing. The most intuitive conclusion is: feature engineering (includ-
ing feature extraction and feature selection) that relies on a priori knowledge or
physical characteristics of data will be replaced by feature learning based on depth
learning techniques.
In general, the success of Q learning depends on the selection of artificial fea-
tures. Furthermore, the quality of the agent’s learning is critically dependent on the
quality of the feature selection. Can the artificial feature selection techniques in Q
learning be replaced with feature learning under deep learning, such as feature
learning based on convolution neural networks? The answer is yes; this is the
motivation for deep Q learning. For the first time we introduce a concept, Experi-
ence Replay, which stores the experience of an agent in any step, such as:
et ¼ ðst, at, rt, stþ1Þ (5.76)
The symbols appear the same as in Q learning, where et is the experience of the
tth step. Assuming that the step at the end of this agent is N, then the experience
replay can correspond to the set:
D ¼ e1, e2,⋯, eN½  (5.77)
Second, the state-action value function in Q learning is revised as:
Qðs, a, θÞ!correctionQðϕðsÞ, a, θÞ (5.78)
Here, ϕðÞ is the feature learning based on deep learning. Pay attention to two
points: the parameters θ here not only contain the parameters of Q learning, but also
the parameters of deep learning and for the tth step in Q learning, there are:
stþ1 ¼ ðst, at, xtþ1Þ (5.79)
where s1 ¼ x1½  and t ¼ 1; 2;⋯, T. For Eq. (5.84), the left corresponds to Q learn-
ing, where the state input is s; the right corresponds to deep Q learning, where the
“state” input is ϕðsÞ, that is, the corresponding correction of the current experience
replay is:
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D!correction D ¼ ½e1, e2,⋯, eN 
et ¼ ðϕðstÞ, at, rt,ϕðstþ1ÞÞ
(
(5.80)
Moreover, in the corresponding Eq. (5.77) of the optimization objective function
and the corresponding Eq. (5.78) of the expectation output yk, the input state s of
the state-action value function should be corrected to ϕðsÞ. Finally, the solution still
uses the gradient decent algorithm
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Chapter 6
Attribute‐Based Encryption for
Flexible and Fine‐Grained Access
Control
6.1. Introduction
6.1.1 The motivation of ABE
With the development of the Internet and the distributed computing technol-
ogy, there is a growing demand for data sharing and processing in an open distrib-
uted computing environment. The data provider needs to provide expressive access
control and data confidentiality when communicating with customers. What is
more is that it is urgent for large‐scale distributed applications to support one‐to‐
many communication mode to reduce the enormous costs of data encryption
(Figure 6.1).
The traditional encryption mechanism based on public key infrastructure (PKI)
[75] can achieve data confidentiality; however, it has disadvantages. On the one
hand, in order to encrypt data, the data provider needs firstly to obtain the public
keys of authorized users and then sends the encrypted data separately to the
corresponding user, which increases the processing overhead and the bandwidth
demand [168]. On the other hand, although broadcast encryption [169] can solve
the efficiency problem mentioned above, the data provider must obtain the user’s
list before encryption. In addition, if the data provider wants the recipient to be the
one with certain identity not the one who is specified, the public key encryption
will not work anymore. Therefore, more applicable encryption mechanisms are
required. That’s why the ABE scheme was created.
In ABE scheme, attribute plays a very important role. Attributes have been
exploited to generate a public key for encryption data and have been used as an
access policy to control users’ access.
Figure 6.1.
System model.
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6.1.2 History of ABE
After the introduction of fuzzy identity‐based encryption, the notion of ABE
was initially invented by Nali et al. [170] who proposed a threshold ABE scheme.
Although this scheme can prevent the collusion attacks, it introduces new disad-
vantage that the threshold semantics are limited in designing more general systems
which need expressive access control (Figure 6.2).
In ABE scheme, attribute plays a very important role. Attributes have been
exploited to generate a public key for encryption data and have been used as an
access policy to control users’ access. Based on the access policy, subsequent
researches can be roughly categorized as either key policy or ciphertext policy. The
first KP‐ABE scheme that allows any monotone access structures was proposed by
Goyal et al. [171], and the first CP‐ABE scheme was presented by Bethencourt et al.
[172]. After that, several KP‐ABE [173–175] and CP‐ABE schemes [176–184] were
proposed. Goyal et al. [176] presented a bounded CP‐ABE scheme in the standard
model, but the first fully expressive CP‐ABE scheme in the standard model was
proposed by Waters [177]. Subsequently, there are some other versions of ABE that
have been proposed such as the outsourced ABE, the ciphertext‐policy attribute‐
based proxy re‐encryption (CP‐ABPRE), and so on.
Organization. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the formal definitions and security models of attribute‐based encryption
(ABE). Design philosophy is given in Section 3, together with concrete construction
and security proof of several representative attribute‐based encryption schemes.
Comparison and observations are discussed in Section 4.
6.2. Framework and security model of ABE
In this chapter, we present the formal definitions and security models of attri-
bute‐based encryption (ABE) via considering two distinct varieties of attribute‐
based encryption: ciphertext policy (CP‐ABE) and key policy (KP‐ABE).
6.2.1 The formal definition of ABE
Definition 1. (Access structure). Let {P1, P2,⋯, Pn} be a set of parties. A collection
A⊆ 2{P1,P2,⋯,Pn} is monotone if ∨B,C: if B∈A and B⊆C, then C∈A. An access struc-
ture (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone
Figure 6.2.
Evolution of ABE.
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collection)A of non‐empty subsets of {P1, P2,⋯, Pn}, i:e:;A⊆ 2{P1,P2,⋯,Pn}\{∅}. The
sets inA are called the authorized sets, and the sets not inA are called the unauthorized
sets.
In our context, the role of the parties is taken by the attributes. Thus, the access
structure A will contain the authorized sets of attributes. We restrict our attention
to monotone access structures. However, it is also possible to (inefficiently) realize
general access structures using our techniques by having the negative attribute as
the separate attribute altogether. Thus, the number of attributes in the system will
be doubled. From now on, unless stated otherwise, by an access structure, we mean
a monotone access structure.
In CP‐ABE, an access structure (policy) is embedded into the ciphertext
during encryption, and each private key is based on an attribute set S. On the
contrary, KP‐ABE inverts this relationship, embedding S into the ciphertext
and a policy into the key. But in both two varieties of ABE, each interior node
of the tree is a threshold gate, and the leaves are associated with attributes.
(We note that this setting is very expressive. For example, we can represent a
tree with “and” and “or” gates by using, respectively, two of two and one of
two threshold gates.) In CP‐ABE, a user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext
with a given key if and only if there is an assignment of attributes from the
private key (it is the ciphertext in KP‐ABE) to nodes of the tree such that the
tree is satisfied.
Definition 2. (Access tree). Let T be a tree representing an access structure.
Each non‐leaf node of the tree represents a threshold gate, described by its children
and a threshold value. If numx is the number of children of a node x and kx is its
threshold value, then 0 < kx < numx. When kx ¼ 1, the threshold gate is an “or”
gate, and when kx ¼ numx, it is an AND gate. Each leaf node x of the tree is
described by an attribute and a threshold value kx ¼ 1.
To facilitate working with the access trees, we define a few functions. We
denote the parent of the node x in the tree by parentðxÞ. The function attðxÞ is
defined only if x is a leaf node and denotes the attribute associated with the leaf
node x in the tree. The access tree T also defines an ordering between the children
of every node; that is, the children of a node are numbered from 1 to num. The
function indexðxÞ returns such a number associated with the node x, where the
index values are uniquely assigned to nodes in the access structure for a given key in
an arbitrary manner.
Satisfying an access tree. Let T be an access tree with root r. Denote by T x the
subtree of T rooted at the node x. Hence, T is the same as T r. If a set of attributes γ
satisfies the access tree T x, we denote it as T xðγÞ ¼ 1. We compute T xðγÞ recur-
sively as follows. If x is a non‐leaf node, evaluate T x0ðγÞ for all children x0 of node x.
T xðγÞ returns 1 if and only if at least kx children return 1. If x is a leaf node, then
T xðγÞ returns 1 if and only if attðxÞ∈ γ.
1. Ciphertext‐policy attribute‐based encryption (CP‐ABE)
A ciphertext‐policy attribute‐based encryption scheme consists of four
fundamental algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.
• Setup: The setup algorithm takes no input other than the implicit security
parameter. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master keyMK.
• EncryptðPK,M,AÞ: The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M, and an access structure A over the universe
of attributes. The algorithm will encryptM and produce a ciphertext CT
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such that only a user that possesses a set of attributes that satisfies the
access structure will be able to decrypt the message. We will assume that
the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
• KeyGenðMK, SÞ: The key generation algorithm takes as input the master
keyMK and a set of attributes S that describe the key. It outputs a private
key SK.
• DecryptðPK,CT, SKÞ: The decryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK; a ciphertext CT, which contains an access policy A; and a
private key SK, which is a private key for a set S of attributes. If the set S
of attributes satisfies the access structure A, then the algorithm will
decrypt the ciphertext and return a messageM.
2. Key‐policy attribute‐based encryption (KP‐ABE)
Similar to CP‐ABE, a key‐policy attribute‐based encryption scheme consists of
four fundamental algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.
• Setup: The setup algorithm takes no input other than the implicit
security parameter. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master
keyMK.
• EncryptðPK,M, SÞ: The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M, and a set of attributes S. It encryptsM and
outputs the ciphertext CT.
• KeyGenðMK,A, PKÞ: The key generation algorithm takes as input the
master keyMK, an access structure A, and the public parameters PK. It
outputs a private key SK.
• DecryptðCT, SK, PKÞ: The decryption takes as input the ciphertext CT
that was encrypted under the set S of attributes, the private key SK for
access control structure A, and the public parameters PK. It decrypts the
ciphertext and outputs the messageM if the set S of attributes satisfies the
access structure A.
6.2.2 Security model of ABE
1. Ciphertext‐policy attribute‐based encryption (CP‐ABE)
• Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm and gives the public
parameters PK to the adversary.
• Phase 1: The adversary makes repeated private keys corresponding to sets
of attributes S1,⋯, Sq1.
• Challenge: The adversary submits two equal‐length messagesM0 andM1.
In addition the adversary gives a challenge access structure A such that
none of the sets S1,⋯, Sq1 from Phase 1 satisfy the access structure. The
challenger flips a random coin b and encryptsMb under A. The
ciphertext CT is given to the adversary.
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• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that none of sets of
attributes Sq1þ1,⋯, Sq satisfy the access structure corresponding to the
challenge.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b0 of b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr½b0 ¼ b  12.
We note that the model can easily be extended to handle chosen‐ciphertext
attacks by allowing for decryption queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Definition 3. A ciphertext‐policy attribute‐based encryption scheme is secure if all
polynomial‐time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
2. Key‐policy attribute‐based encryption (KP‐ABE)
• Init: The adversary declares the set of attributes S, that he wishes to be
challenged upon.
• Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm and gives the public
parameters PK to the adversary.
• Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue queries for private keys for
many access structures Aj, where S∉Aj for all j.
• Challenge: The adversary submits two equal‐length messagesM0 andM1.
The challenger flips a random coin b and encryptsMb with S. The
ciphertext is passed to the adversary.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b0 of b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr½b0 ¼ b  12.
We note that the model can easily be extended to handle chosen‐ciphertext
attacks by allowing for decryption queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Definition 4. An attribute‐based encryption scheme is secure in the selective‐set
model of security if all polynomial‐time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage
in the selective‐set game.
6.3. State of the art
6.3.1 The first ABE
In 2006, Goyal et al. [171] proposed a new cryptosystem for fine‐grained sharing
of encrypted data called key‐policy attribute‐based encryption (KP‐ABE). In the
scheme, ciphertexts are labeled with sets of attributes, and private keys are associ-
ated with access structures that control which ciphertexts a user is able to decrypt.
In addition, their construction supported delegation of private keys that subsume
hierarchical identity‐based encryption (HIBE).
6.3.1.1 Concrete construction
Let G1 be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G1. In
addition, let e : G1 G1 ! G2 denote the bilinear map. A security parameter, k, will
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determine the size of the groups. We also define the Lagrange coefficient Δi,S for
i∈Zp and a set, S, of elements in Zp : Δi,SðxÞ ¼
Q
j∈ S, j 6¼i
xj
ij. We will associate each
attribute with a unique element in Zp. Our construction follows:
• Setup: Define the universe of attributes U ¼ f1; 2;⋯, ng. Now, for each
attribute i∈U, choose a number ti uniformly at random from Zp. Finally,
choose y uniformly at random in Zp. The published public parameters
PK are
T1 ¼ gt1 ,⋯, T|U | ¼ gt|U | , Y ¼ eðg, gÞy: (6.1)
The master keyMK is
t1,⋯, t|U |, y: (6.2)
• KeyGenðT ,MKÞ: The algorithm outputs a key that enables the user to
decrypt a message encrypted under a set of attributes γ if and only if
T ðγÞ ¼ 1. The algorithm proceeds as follows. First, choose a polynomial qx
for each node x (including the leaves) in the tree T . These polynomials are
chosen in the following way in a top‐down manner, starting from the root
node r.
• EncryptðM, γ, PKÞ: To encrypt a messageM∈G2 under a set of attributes γ,
choose a random value s∈Zp and publish the ciphertext as
E ¼ ðγ, E0 ¼MY s, fEi ¼ Tsigi∈ γÞ: (6.3)
For each node x in the tree, set the degree dx of the polynomial qx to be 1 less than
the threshold value kx of that node, that is, dx ¼ kx  1. Now, for the root node r, set
qrð0Þ ¼ y and dr other points of the polynomial qr randomly to define it completely.
For any other node x, set qxð0Þ ¼ qparentðxÞðindexðxÞÞ and choose dx other points
randomly to completely define qx.
Once the polynomials have been decided, for each leaf node x, we give the
following secret value to the user:
Dx ¼ g
qxð0Þ
ti  where i ¼ attðxÞ: (6.4)
The set of above secret values is the decryption key D.
• DecryptðE,DÞ: We specify our decryption procedure as a recursive algorithm.
For ease of exposition, we present the simplest form of the decryption
algorithm and discuss potential performance improvements in the next
subsection.
We first define a recursive algorithm DecryptNodeðE,D, xÞ that takes as input
the ciphertext E ¼ ðγ, E0, fEigi∈ γÞ, the private key D (we assume that the access tree
T is embedded in the private key), and a node x in the tree. It outputs a group
element of G2 or ⊥.
Let i ¼ attðxÞ. If the node x is a leaf node, then
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DecryptNodeðE,D, xÞ ¼
eðDx, EiÞ ¼ eðg
qxð0Þ
ti , gstiÞ
¼ eðg, gÞsqxð0Þ  if  i∈ γ
⊥  otherwise:
:
8><>>: (6.5)
We now consider the recursive case when x is a non‐leaf node. The algorithm
DecryptNodeðE,D, xÞ then proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that are children of
x, it calls DecryptNodeðE,D, xÞ and stores the output as Fz. Let Sx be an arbitrary kx‐
sized set of child nodes z such that Fz 6¼ ⊥. If no such set exists, then the node was
not satisfied and the function returns ⊥.
Otherwise, we compute
Fx ¼
Y
z∈ Sx
F
Δi,S0xð0Þ
z ,where i ¼ indexðzÞ
S0x¼findexðzÞ:z∈ Sxg
¼
Y
z∈ Sx
ðeðg, gÞsqzð0ÞÞΔi,S0xð0Þ
¼
Y
z∈ Sx
ðeðg, gÞsqparentðzÞðindexðzÞÞÞΔi,S0xð0Þðby   constr:Þ
¼
Y
z∈ Sx
eðg, gÞsqxðiÞ  Δi,S0xð0Þ
¼ eðg, gÞsqxð0Þðusing polynomial interpolationÞ
(6.6)
and return the result.
Now that we have defined our function DecryptNode, the decryption
algorithm simply calls the function on the root of the tree. We observe that
DecryptNodeðE,D, xÞ ¼ eðg, gÞys ¼ Y s if and only if the ciphertext satisfies the tree.
Since E0 ¼ MY s, the decryption algorithm simply divides out Y s and recovers the
message M.
We discuss how to optimize the decryption procedure in the full version of this
paper [171].
6.3.1.2 Security proof
We prove that the security of our scheme in the attribute‐based selective‐set
model reduces to the hardness of the decisional BDH assumption. The intuition of
security proof in the scheme is illustrated in Figure 6.3.
Theorem 1. If an adversary can break our scheme in the attribute‐based selective‐set
model, then a simulator can be constructed to play the decisional BDH game with a non‐
negligible advantage.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a polynomial‐time adversary A that can attack
our scheme in the selective‐set model with advantage ε. We build a simulator B that
can play the decisional BDH game with advantage ε=2. The simulation proceeds as
follows:
We first let the challenger set the groups G1 and G2 with an efficient bilinear
map e and generator g. The challenger flips a fair binary coin μ, outside of B0s view.
If μ ¼ 0, the challenger sets ðA, B, C, ZÞ ¼ ðga, gb, gc, eðg, gÞabcÞ; otherwise, it sets
ðA, B,C, ZÞ ¼ ðga, gb, gc, eðg, gÞzÞ for random a, b, c, z. We assume that the universe,
U, is defined. The whole game is described in Figure 6.4.
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• Init: The simulator B runs A. A chooses the set of attributes γ it wishes to be
challenged upon.
• Setup: The simulator sets the parameter Y ¼ eðA, BÞ ¼ eðg, gÞab. For all i∈U, it
sets Ti as follows: if i∈ γ, it chooses a random ri ∈Zp and sets Ti ¼ gri (thus,
ti ¼ ri); otherwise, it chooses a random βi ∈Zp and sets Ti ¼ gbβi ¼ Bβi (thus,
ti ¼ bβi). It then gives the public parameters to A.
Figure 6.4.
Game in the first KP‐ABE scheme.
Figure 6.3.
Intuition of security proof in the KP‐ABE scheme.
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• Phase 1: A adaptively makes requests for the keys corresponding to any access
structures T such that the challenge set γ does not satisfy T . Suppose that A
makes a request for the secret key for an access structure T where T ðγÞ ¼ 0. To
generate the secret key, B needs to assign a polynomial Qx of degree dx for
every node in the access tree T .
We first define the following two procedures: PolySat and PolyUnsat.
• PolySatðT x, γ, λxÞ: This procedure sets up the polynomials for the nodes of an
access subtree with satisfied root node, that is, T xðγÞ ¼ 1. The procedure
takes an access tree T x (with root node x) as input along with a set of
attributes γ and an integer λx ∈Zp.
It first sets up a polynomial qx of degree dx for the root node x. It sets qxð0Þ ¼ λx
and then sets rest of the points randomly to completely fix qx. Now, it sets
polynomials for each child node x0 of x by calling the procedure PolySatðT x0 ,
γ, qxðindexðx0ÞÞÞ. Notice that in this way, qx0ð0Þ ¼ qxðindexðx0ÞÞ for each child node
x0 of x.
• PolyUnsatðT x, γ, gλxÞ: This procedure sets up the polynomials for the nodes of
an access tree with unsatisfied root node, that is, T xðγÞ ¼ 0. The procedure
takes an access tree T x (with root node x) as input along with a set of
attributes γ and an element gλx ∈G1 (where λx ∈Zp).
It first defines a polynomial qx of degree dx for the root node x such that
qxð0Þ ¼ λx. Because T xðγÞ ¼ 0, no more than dx children of x are satisfied. Let
hx ≤ dx be the number of satisfied children of x. For each satisfied child x0 of x, the
procedure chooses a random point λx0 ∈Zp and sets qxðindexðx0ÞÞ ¼ λx0 . It then fixes
the remaining dx  hx points of qx randomly to completely define qx. Now, the
algorithm recursively defines polynomials for the rest of the nodes in the tree as
follows. For each child node x0 of x, the algorithm calls:
• PolySatðT x0 , γ, qxðindexðx0ÞÞÞ, if x0 is a satisfied node. Notice that qxðindexðx0ÞÞ
is known in this case.
• PolyUnsat(ðT x0 , γ, gqxðindexðx0ÞÞÞ, if x0 is not a satisfied node. Notice that only
gqxðindexðx
0ÞÞ can be obtained by interpolation as only gqxð0Þ is known in this case.
Notice that in this case also, qx0ð0Þ ¼ qxðindexðx0ÞÞ for each child node x0 of x.
To give keys for access structure T , the simulator first runs PolyUnsatðT , γ,AÞ
to define a polynomial qx for each node x of T . Notice that for each leaf node x of T ,
we know qx completely if x is satisfied; if x is not satisfied, then at least g
qxð0Þ is
known (in some cases qx might be known completely). Furthermore, qrð0Þ ¼ a.
The simulator now defines the final polynomial QxðÞ ¼ bqxðÞ for each node x
of T . Notice that this sets y ¼ Q rð0Þ ¼ ab. The key corresponding to each leaf node
is given using its polynomial as follows. Let i ¼ attðxÞ:
Dx ¼
g
Qxð0Þ
ti ¼ gbqxð0Þri ¼ ggxð0Þri  if  i∈ γ
g
Qxð0Þ
ti ¼ gbqxð0Þbβi ¼ ggxð0Þβi  otherwise
:
(
(6.7)
Therefore, the simulator is able to construct a private key for the access
structure T . Furthermore, the distribution of the private key for T is identical to
that in the original scheme.
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• Challenge: The adversary A will submit two challenge messages m0 and m1 to
the simulator. The simulator flips a fair binary coin ν and returns an encryption
of mν. The ciphertext outputs as
E ¼ ðγ, E0 ¼ mνZ, fEi ¼ Crigi∈ γÞ: (6.8)
If μ ¼ 0, then Z ¼ eðg, gÞabc. If we let s ¼ c, then we have Y s ¼ ðeðg, gÞabÞc ¼ eðg, gÞabc
and Ei ¼ ðgriÞc ¼ Cri . Therefore, the ciphertext is a valid random encryption of
message mν.
Otherwise, if μ ¼ 1, then Z ¼ eðg, gÞz. We then have E0 ¼ mνeðg, gÞz. Since z is
random, E0 will be a random element of G2 from the adversary view, and the
message contains no information about mν.
• Phase 2: The simulator acts exactly as it did in Phase 1.
• Guess: A will submit a guess ν0 of ν. If ν0 ¼ ν, the simulator will output μ0 ¼ 0
to indicate that it was given a valid BDH‐tuple; otherwise, it will output μ0 ¼ 1
to indicate it was given a random four‐tuple.
As shown in the construction, the simulator’s generation of public parameters
and private keys is identical to that of the actual scheme.
In the case where μ ¼ 1, the adversary gains no information about ν. Therefore,
we have Pr½ν 6¼ ν0|μ ¼ 1 ¼ 12. Since the simulator guesses μ0 ¼ 1 when ν 6¼ ν0, we
have Pr½μ0 ¼ μ|μ ¼ 1 ¼ 12.
If μ ¼ 0, then the adversary sees an encryption of mν. The adversary’s advantage
in this situation is ε by definition. Therefore, we have Pr½ν ¼ ν0|μ ¼ 0 ¼ 12þ ε. Since
the simulator guesses μ0 ¼ 0 when ν ¼ ν0, we have Pr½μ0 ¼ μ|μ ¼ 0 ¼ 12þ ε.
The overall advantage of the simulator in the decisional BDH game is 12 Pr½μ0 ¼
μ|μ ¼ 0 þ 12 Pr½μ0 ¼ μ|μ ¼ 1  12 ¼ 12 ð12 þ εÞ þ 12 12  12 ¼ 12ε.
Chosen‐ciphertext security. Our security definitions and proofs have been in
the chosen‐plaintext model. Similar to [26], we notice that our construction can be
extended to the chosen‐ciphertext model by applying the technique of using simu-
lation‐sound NIZK proofs to achieve chosen‐ciphertext security [185]. However, in
Section 9 we describe how our delegation mechanism can be used with the tech-
niques of Canetti, et al. [186] to achieve a much more efficient CCA‐2 system.
6.3.2 The CP‐ABE
Bethencourt et al. [172] presented a scheme for realizing complex access control
on encrypted data called ciphertext‐policy attribute‐based encryption (CP‐ABE).
In the scheme, attributes are used to describe user’s credentials, and a party
encrypting data determines a policy for who can decrypt. By using the scenario,
encrypted data can be kept confidential even if the storage server is untrusted;
moreover, their scenario is secure against collusion attacks.
6.3.2.1 Concrete construction
Let G0 be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G0. In
addition, let e : G0 G0 ! G1 denote the bilinear map. A security parameter, k, will
determine the size of the groups. We also define the Lagrange coefficient Δi,S for
i∈Zp and a set, S, of elements in Zp: Δi,SðxÞ ¼
Y
j∈ S, j 6¼i
xj
ij. We will additionally
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employ a hash function H: f0; 1g ! G0 that we will model as a random oracle. The
function will map any attribute described as a binary string to a random group
element. Our construction follows.
• Setup: The setup algorithm will choose a bilinear group G0 of prime order p
with generator g. Next, it will choose two random exponents α, β∈Zp. The
public key is published as
PK ¼ G0, g, h ¼ gβ, f ¼ g1=β, eðg, gÞα (6.9)
and the master key (MK) is ðβ, gαÞ. (Note that f is used only for delegation.)
• EncryptðPK,M, T Þ: The encryption algorithm encrypts a messageM under the
tree access structure T . The algorithm first chooses a polynomial qx for each
node x (including the leaves) in the tree T . These polynomials are chosen in
the following way in a top‐down manner, starting from the root node R. For
each node x in the tree, set the degree dx of the polynomial qx to be one less
than the threshold value kx of that node, that is, dx ¼ kx  1.
Starting with the root node R, the algorithm chooses a random s∈Zp and sets
qRð0Þ ¼ s. Then, it chooses dR other points of the polynomial qR randomly to define
it completely. For any other node x, it sets qxð0Þ ¼ qparentðxÞðindexðxÞÞ and chooses
dx other points randomly to completely define qx.
Let Y be the set of leaf nodes in T . The ciphertext is then constructed by giving
the tree access structure T and computing
CT ¼ ðT , ~C ¼ Meðg, gÞαs, C ¼ hs,∀y∈Y : Cy ¼ gqyð0Þ, C0y ¼ HðattðyÞÞqyð0ÞÞ: (6.10)
• KeyGenðMK, SÞ: The key generation algorithm will take as input a set of
attributes S and output a key that identifies with that set. The algorithm first
chooses a random r∈Zp and then random rj ∈Zp for each attribute j∈ S. Then,
it computes the key as
SK ¼ ðD ¼ gðαþrÞ=β,∀j∈ S : Dj ¼ gr HðjÞrj , D0j ¼ grjÞ: (6.11)
• DelegateðSK, ~SÞ: The delegation algorithm takes in a secret key SK, which is
for a set S of attributes and another set ~S such that ~S ⊆ S. The secret key is of the
form SK ¼ ðD, ∀j∈ S : Dj, D0jÞ. The algorithm chooses random ~r and ~rk∀k∈ ~S.
Then, it creates a new secret key as
~SK ¼ ð~D ¼ Df~r, ∀k∈ ~S : ~Dk ¼ Dkg~rHðkÞ~rk , ~D’k ¼ D0kg~rkÞ: (6.12)
The resulting secret key ~SK is a secret key for the set ~S. Since the algorithm re‐
randomizes the key, a delegated key is equivalent to one received directly from the
authority.
• DecryptðCT, SKÞ: We specify our decryption procedure as a recursive
algorithm. For the ease of exposition, we present the simplest form of the
decryption algorithm and discuss potential performance improvements in the
next subsection.
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We first define a recursive algorithm DecryptNodeðCT, SK, xÞ that takes as
input a ciphertext CT ¼ ðT , ~C,C, ∀y∈Y : Cy, C0yÞ; a private key SK, which is asso-
ciated with a set S of attributes; and a node x from T .
If the node x is a leaf node, then we let i ¼ attðxÞ and define as follows: If i∈ S,
then
DecryptNodeðCT, SK, xÞ ¼ eðDi, CxÞ
eðD0i, C0xÞ
¼ eðg
r HðiÞri , gqxð0ÞÞ
eðgri , HðiÞqxð0ÞÞ
¼ eðg, gÞrqxð0Þ:
(6.13)
If i∉ S, then we define DecryptNode(CT,SK,x) ¼ ⊥.
We now consider the recursive case when x is a non‐leaf node. The algorithm
DecryptNodeðCT, SK, xÞ then proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that are children
of x, it calls DecryptNodeðCT, SK, zÞ and stores the output as Fz. Let Sx be an
arbitrary kx‐sized set of child nodes z such that Fz 6¼ ⊥. If no such set exists, then the
node was not satisfied and the function returns ⊥. Otherwise, we compute
Fx ¼
Y
z∈ Sx
F
Δi,S0xð0Þ
z ,where
i¼indexðzÞ
S0x¼findexðzÞ:z∈ Sxg
¼
Y
z∈ Sx
ðeðg, gÞrqzð0ÞÞΔi,S0xð0Þ
¼
Y
z∈ Sx
ðeðg, gÞrqparentðzÞðindexðzÞÞÞΔi,S0xð0Þ   ðby constructionÞ
¼
Y
z∈ Sx
eðg, gÞrqxðiÞ  Δi,S0xð0Þ
¼ eðg, gÞrqxð0Þ  ðusing polynomial interpolationÞ
(6.14)
and return the result.
Now that we have defined our function DecryptNode, we can define the
decryption algorithm. The algorithm begins by simply calling the function
on the root node R of the tree T . If the tree is satisfied by S, we set
A ¼ DecryptNodeðCT, SK, rÞ ¼ eðg, gÞrqRð0Þ ¼ eðg, gÞrs. The algorithm now decrypts
by computing
~C=ðeðC,DÞ=AÞ ¼ ~C=ðeðhs, gðαþrÞ=βÞ=eðg, gÞrsÞ ¼M: (6.15)
6.3.2.2 Security proof
In this section, we use the generic bilinear group model of [187, 188] and the
random oracle model [189] to argue that no efficient adversary that acts generically
on the groups underlying our scheme can break the security of our scheme with
any reasonable probability. At an intuitive level, this means that if there are any
vulnerabilities in our scheme, then these vulnerabilities must exploit specific
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mathematical properties of elliptic curve groups or cryptographic hash functions
used when instantiating our construction.
While from a security standpoint, it would be preferable to have a proof of
security that reduces the problem of breaking our scheme to a well‐studied com-
plexity‐theoretic problem; there is a reason to believe that such reductions will only
exist for more complex (and less efficient) schemes than the one we give here. We
also stress that ours is the first construction which offers the security properties we
are proposing here; we strongly encourage further research that can place this kind
of security on a firmer theoretical foundation.
The generic bilinear group model.We follow [187] here:We consider two
random encodings ψ0,ψ1 of the additive group Fp, that is, injective maps
ψ0,ψ1:Fp ! {0; 1}m, where m > 3logðpÞ. For i ¼ 0; 1 we write Gi ¼ {ψ iðxÞ : x∈Fp}.
We are given oracles to compute the induced group action on G0,G1 and an oracle to
compute a nondegenerate bilinear map e:G0 G0 ! G1. We are also given a random
oracle to represent the hash function H. We refer to G0 as a generic bilinear group.
The following theorem gives a lower bound on the advantage of a generic
adversary in breaking our CP‐ABE scheme.
Theorem 1. Let ψ0,ψ1,G0,G1 be defined as above. For any adversary A, let q be a
bound on the total number of group elements it receives from queries it makes to the
oracles for the hash function, groups G0 and G1, and the bilinear map e and from its
interaction with the CP‐ABE security game. Then, we have presented that the advantage
of the adversary in the CP‐ABE security game is Oðq2=pÞ.
Proof.We first make the following standard observation, which follows from a
straightforward hybrid argument: In the CP‐ABE security game, the challenge
ciphertext has a component ~C which is randomly eitherM0eðg, gÞαs orM1eðg, gÞαs.
We can instead consider a modified game in which ~C is either eðg, gÞαs or eðg, gÞθ,
where θ is selected uniformly at random from Fp, and the adversary must decide
which is the case. It is clear that any adversary that has advantage ε in the CP‐ABE
game can be transformed into an adversary that has advantage at least ε=2 in the
modified CP‐ABE game. (To see this consider two hybrids: one in which the adver-
sary must distinguish between M0eðg, gÞαs and eðg, gÞθ and another in which it must
distinguish between eðg, gÞθ and textitM1eðg, gÞαs. Clearly, both of these are equiva-
lent to the modified game above.) From now on, we will bind the adversary’s
advantage in the modified game. The intuition of security proof in the scheme is
illustrated in Figure 6.5.
We now introduce some notation for the simulation of the modified CP‐ABE
game. Let g ¼ ψ0ð1Þ (we will write gx to denote ψ0ðxÞ and eðg, gÞy to denote ψ1ðyÞ in
the future). The whole game is described in Figure 6.6.
At setup time, the simulation chooses α, β at random from Fp (which we associ-
ate with the integers from 0 to p 1). Note that if β ¼ 0, an event that happens
with probability 1=p, then setup is aborted, just as it would be in the actual scheme.
The public parameters h ¼ gβ, f ¼ g1=β, and eðg, gÞα are sent to the adversary.
When the adversary (or simulation) calls for the evaluation of H on any string i,
a new random value ti is chosen from Fp (unless it has already been chosen), and the
simulation provides gti as the response to HðiÞ.
When the adversary makes its jth key generation query for the set Sj of attri-
butes, a new random value rðjÞ is chosen from Fp, and for every i∈ Sj, new random
values rðjÞi are chosen from Fp. The simulator then computes D ¼ gðαþr
ðjÞÞ=β, and for
each i∈ Sj, we have Di ¼ grðjÞþtir
ðjÞ
i and D0i ¼ gr
ðjÞ
i . These values are passed onto the
adversary.
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When the adversary asks for a challenge, giving two messages M0,M1 ∈G1, and
the access tree A, the simulator does the following. First, it chooses a random s from
Fp. Then, it uses the linear secret‐sharing scheme associated with A (as described in
Section 4) to construct shares λi of s for all relevant attributes i. We stress again that
λi is all chosen uniformly and independently at random from Fp subject to the linear
conditions imposed on them by the secret‐sharing scheme. In particular, the choice
of the λis can be perfectly simulated by choosing l random values μ1,⋯μl uniformly
and independently from Fp, for some value of l, and then letting λi be fixed public
Figure 6.6.
Game in the CP‐ABE scheme.
Figure 6.5.
Intuition of security proof in the CP‐ABE scheme.
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linear combinations of the μks and s. We will often think of λi as written as such
linear combinations of these independent random variables later.
Finally, the simulation chooses a random θ∈Fp and constructs the encryption as
follows: ~C ¼ eðg, gÞθ and C ¼ hs. For each relevant attribute i, we have Ci ¼ gλi and
C0i ¼ gtiλi . These values are sent to the adversary.
(Note, of course, that if the adversary asks for a decryption key for a set of
attributes that pass the challenge access structure, then the simulation does not issue
the key; similarly, if the adversary asks for a challenge access structure such that one
of the keys already issued pass the access structure, then the simulation aborts and
outputs a random guess on behalf of the adversary, just as it would in the real game.)
We will show that with probability 1 Oðq2=pÞ, taken over the randomness of
the choice of variable values in the simulation, the adversary’s view in this simula-
tion is identically distributed to what its view would have been if it had been given
~C ¼ eðg, gÞαs. We will therefore conclude that the advantage of the adversary is at
most Oðq2=pÞ, as claimed.
When the adversary makes a query to the group oracles, we may condition on
the event that (1) the adversary only provides as input values it received from the
simulation, or intermediate values it already obtained from the oracles, and (2)
there are p distinct values in the ranges of both ψ0 and ψ1. (This event happens with
overwhelming probability 1 Oð1=pÞ.) As such, we may keep track of the algebraic
expressions being called for from the oracles, as long as no “unexpected collisions”
happen. More precisely, we think of an oracle query as being a rational function
ν ¼ η=ξ in the variables θ, α, β, t 0i s, rðjÞs, rðjÞi s, s, and μ
0
k s. An unexpected collision
would be when two queries correspond to two distinct formal rational functions
η=ξ 6¼ η0=ξ0, but due to the random choices of these variables’ values, we have
presented that the values of η=ξ and η
0
=ξ
0
coincide.
We now condition on the event that no such unexpected collisions occur in
either group G0 or G1. For any pair of queries (within a group) corresponding to
distinct rational functions η=ξ and η
0
=ξ
0
, a collision occurs only if the nonzero
polynomial ηξ
0  ξη0 evaluates to zero. Note that the total degree of ηξ0  ξη0 is in our
case at most 5. By the Schwartz‐Zippel lemma [190, 191], the probability of this
event is Oð1=pÞ. By a union bound, the probability that any such collision happens is
at most Oðq2=pÞ. Thus, we can condition on no such collision happening and still
maintain 1Oðq2=pÞ of the probability mass.
Now, we consider what the adversary’s view would have been if we had set
θ ¼ αs. We will show that subject to the conditioning above, the adversary’s view
would have been identically distributed. Since we are in the generic group model
where each group element’s representation is uniformly and independently chosen,
the only way that the adversary’s view can differ in the case of θ ¼ αs is if there are
two queries ν and ν0 into G1 such that ν 6¼ ν0 but ν|θ¼αs ¼ ν0|θ¼αs. We will show that
this never happens. Suppose not.
Recall that since θ only occurs as eðg, gÞθ, which lives in G1, the only dependence
that ν or ν0 can have on θ is by having some additive terms of the form γ
0
θ, where γ
0
is a constant. Therefore, we must have that ν ν0 ¼ γαs γθ, for some constant
γ 6¼ 0. We can then artificially add the query ν ν0 þ γθ ¼ γαs to the adversary’s
queries. But we will now show that the adversary can never construct a query for
eðg, gÞγαs (subject to the conditioning we have already made), which will reach a
contradiction and establish the theorem.
What is left now is to do a case analysis based on the information given to the
adversary by the simulation. For the sake of completeness and ease of reference for
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the reader, in Table 6.1, we enumerate overall rational function queries possible
into G1 by means of the bilinear map and the group elements given the adversary
in the simulation, except those in which every monomial involves the variable β,
since β will not be relevant to constructing a query involving αs. Here, the variables
i and i0 are possible attribute strings, and the variables j and j0 are the indices of
secret key queries made by the adversary. These are given in terms of λis, not μks.
The reader may check the values given in Table 6.1 against the values given in
the simulation above.
In the group G1, in addition to the polynomials in the table above, the adversary
also has access to 1 and α. The adversary can query for arbitrary linear combinations
of these, and we must show that none of these polynomials can be equal to a
polynomial of the form γαs. Recall that γ 6¼ 0 is a constant.
As seen above, the only way that the adversary can create a term containing αs is
by pairing sβ with ðαþ rðjÞÞ=β to get the term αsþ srðjÞ. In this way, the adversary
could create a query polynomial containing γαsþ∑j∈Tγsr
ðjÞ
j , for some set T and
constants γ, γj 6¼ 0.
In order for the adversary to obtain a query polynomial of the form γαs, the
adversary must add other linear combinations in order to cancel the terms of the
form∑j∈Tγ
srðjÞ
j .
We observe (by referencing the table above) that the only other term that the
adversary has access to that could involve monomials of the form srðjÞ is obtained by
pairing rðjÞ þ tirðjÞi with some λi0 , since the λi0 terms are linear combinations of s and
the μks.
In this way, for sets T
0
j and constants γði, j, i0Þ 6¼ 0, the adversary can construct a
query polynomial of the form
γαsþ ∑
j∈T
ðγjsrðjÞ þ ∑
ði, i0Þ∈T0 j
γði, j, i0Þ
	
λi0r
ðjÞ þ λi0 tirðjÞi


Þ þ other  terms: (6.16)
Now, to conclude this proof, we do the following case analysis:
• Case 1: There exists some j∈T such that the set of secret shares Lj ¼ {λi0 :
∃i : ði, i0Þ∈T0j} do not allow for the reconstruction of the secret s.
If this is true, then the term srðjÞ will not be canceled, and so the adversary’s query
polynomial cannot be of the form γαs.
titi0 λiti0 titi0 λi0 tir
ðjÞ þ titi0 r
ðjÞ
i0
tir
ðjÞ
i0
ti α þ rðjÞ αsþ srðjÞ
λiλi0 tiλiλi0 λi0 r
ðjÞ þ λi0 tirðjÞi λirðjÞi
λi titi0 λiλi0 tiλir
ðjÞ
i þ titi0 λir
ðjÞ
i0 tiλir
ðjÞ
i0
tiλi ðrðjÞ þ tirðjÞi ÞðrðjÞ þ ti0 rðj
0Þ
i0 ðrðjÞ þ tir
ðjÞ
i Þrðj
0Þ
i0 r
ðjÞ þ tirðjÞi
r
ðjÞ
i r
ðj0Þ
i0 r
ðjÞ
i
s
Table 6.1.
Possible query types from the adversary.
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• Case 2: For all j∈T, the set of secret shares Lj ¼ {λi0 : ∃i : ði, i0Þ∈T0j} does allow
for the reconstruction of the secret s.
Fix any j∈T. Consider Sj, the set of attributes belonging to the jth adversary key
request. By the assumption that no requested key should pass the challenge access
structure, and the properties of the secret‐sharing scheme, we know that the set
L0j ¼ λi : i∈ Sj cannot allow for the reconstruction of s.
Thus, there must exist at least one share λi0 in Lj such that λi0 is linearly indepen-
dent of L0j when written in terms of s and the μks. By the case analysis, this means
that in the adversary’s query there is a term of the form λi0 tir
ðjÞ
i for some i∈ Sj.
However, (examining the table above), there is no term that the adversary has
access to that can cancel this term. Therefore, any adversary query polynomial of
this form cannot be of the form λαs.
6.3.3 The ABE with outsourced decryption
6.3.3.1 Concrete construction
1. Ciphertext‐policy attribute‐based encryption (CP‐ABE)
• Setupðλ, UÞ: The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter and a
universe description U. To cover the most general case, we let U¼ {0; 1}.
It then chooses a group G of prime order p, a generator g, and a hash
function F that maps 0; 1 to Ga.
In addition, it chooses random exponents α, a∈Zp. The authority sets
MSK ¼ ðgα, PÞ as the master secret key. It publishes the public parameters as
PK ¼ g, eðg, gÞα, ga, F (6.17)
EncryptðPK,M, ðM, ρÞÞ: The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK and a messageM to encrypt. In addition, it takes as input an LSSS
access structure ðM, ρÞ. The function ρ associates rows ofM to attributes. LetM be an
l nmatrix. The algorithm first chooses a random vector v!¼ ðs, y2;…;ynÞ∈Znp. These
values will be used to share the encryption exponent s. For i ¼ 1 to l, it calculates
λi ¼v! Mi, whereMi is the vector corresponding to the ith row ofM. In addition, the
algorithm chooses random r1;…;rl ∈Zp. The ciphertext is published as CT ¼
C ¼M  eðg, gÞαs, C0 ¼ gs,
ðC1 ¼ Gaλ1  Fðρð1ÞÞðr1Þ, D1 ¼ Gr1Þ,⋯, ðCl ¼ gaλl  FðρðlÞÞÞrl , Dl ¼ grl
(6.18)
along with a description of ðM, ρÞ.
• KeyGenoutðMSK, SÞ: The key generation algorithm runs KeyGen ðMSK, SÞ
to obtain SK0 ¼ ðPK,K0 ¼ gαgat0 , L0 ¼ gt0 , {K0X} ¼ FðxÞt
0
x∈ S. It chooses a
random value z∈Zp. It sets the transformation key TK as
PK, K ¼ K01=z ¼ gðα=zÞgaðt0=zÞ ¼ gðα=zÞgat, L ¼ L01=z ¼ gt0=z ¼ gt, {Kx}x∈ s ¼ {K0} (6.19)
and the private key SK as ðz, TKÞ.
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• TransformoutðTK,CTÞ: The transformation algorithm takes as input a
transformation key TK ¼ ðPK,K, L, {Kx}x∈ SÞ for a set S and a ciphertext
CT ¼ ðC,C0, C1, :, ClÞ for access structure ðM, ρÞ. If S does not satisfy the
access structure, it outputs ⊥. Suppose that S satisfies the access structure,
and let I⊂ 1; 2;…;l be defined as I ¼ i : ρðiÞ∈ S. Then, let ωi ∈Zi∈ I be a set
of constants such that if {λi} is a valid share of any secret s according toM,
then∑i∈ Iωiλi ¼ s. The transformation algorithm computes
eðC0, KÞ=ðeð
Y
i∈ I
Cωii , LÞ 
Y
i∈ I
eðDωi,KρðiÞi ÞÞ
¼ eðg, gÞsα=zeðg, gÞast=ð
Y
i∈ I
eðg, gÞtaλiωiÞ ¼ eðg, gÞsα=z:
(6.20)
It outputs the partially decrypted ciphertext CT0 as ðC, eðg, gÞsα=zÞ, which can be
viewed as the ElGamal ciphertext ðM  Gzd, GdÞ where G ¼ eðg, gÞ1=z ∈GT and
d ¼ sα∈Zp.
• DecryptoutðSK,CTÞ: The decryption algorithm takes as input a private
key SK ¼ ðz, TKÞ and a ciphertext CT. If the ciphertext is not partially
decrypted, then the algorithm first executes transformout ðTK,CTÞ. If
the output is ⊥, then this algorithm outputs ⊥ as well. Otherwise, it takes
the ciphertext ðT0, T1Þ and computes T0=Tz1 ¼M.
Notice that if the ciphertext is already partially decrypted for the user, then she
needs to only compute one exponentiation and no pairings to recover the message.
2. Key‐policy attribute‐based encryption (KP‐ABE)
• Setupðλ, UÞ: The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter and a
universe description U. To cover the most general case, we let U¼ {0; 1}.
It then chooses a group G of prime order p, a generator g, and a hash
function F that maps {0; 1} to Ga. In addition, it chooses random
exponents α∈Zp and h∈G. The authority setsMSK ¼ ðα, PKÞ as the
master secret key. It publishes the public parameters as
PK ¼ g, gα, h, F: (6.21)
• EncryptðPK,M, SÞ: The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a messageM to encrypt, and a set of attributes S. It
chooses a random s∈Zp. The ciphertext is published as CT ¼ ðS, CÞ where
C ¼M  eðg,hÞαs, C0 ¼ gs, {Cx ¼ FðxÞs}x∈ S: (6.22)
• KeyGenoutðMSK, ðM, ρÞÞ: ParseMSK ¼ ðα, αPKÞ. The key generation
algorithm runs KeyGen ððα, PKÞ, ðM, ρÞÞ to obtain SK0 ¼ ðPK, ðD01 ¼
hλ1  Fðρð1ÞÞr01 , R10 ¼ gr01Þ,⋯, ðD0l, R0lÞÞ. Next, it chooses a random value
z∈Zp, computes the transformation key TK as below, and outputs the
private key as ðz, TKÞ. Denoting r0i=z as ri, TK is computed as
PK, ðD1 ¼ D
01=z
1 ¼ hλ1=z  Fðρð1ÞÞr1 , R1 ¼ R
01=z
1 ¼ gr1Þ,⋯, ðDl ¼ D
01=z
l , Rl ¼ R
01=z
l Þ: (6.23)
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• TransformoutðTK,CTÞ: The transformation algorithm takes as input a
transformation key TK ¼ ðPK, ðD1, R1Þ,⋯, ðDl, RlÞÞ for access structure
ðM, ρÞ and a ciphertext CT ¼ ðC,C0, Cxx∈ SÞ for set S. If S does not satisfy
the access structure, it outputs ⊥. Suppose that S satisfies the access
structure, and let I⊂ 1; 2;⋯, l be defined as I ¼ i : ρðiÞ∈ S. Then, let
ωi ∈Zpi∈ I be a set of constants such that if λi is a valid share of any
secret s according toM, then∑i∈ Iωiλi ¼ s. The transformation algorithm
computes
eðC0,
Y
i∈ I
Dωii Þ=ð
Y
i∈ I
eðRi, CωiρðiÞÞ ¼ eðgs,
Y
i∈ I
hλiωi=z  FðρðiÞÞriωiÞ=ð
Y
i∈ I
eðgri , FðρðiÞÞsωiÞÞ
¼ eðg,hÞsα=z 
Y
i∈ I
eðgs, FðρðiÞÞriωiÞ=ð
Y
i∈ I
eðgri , FðρðiÞÞsωiÞÞ ¼ eðg,hÞsα=z
(6.24)
It outputs the partially decrypted ciphertext CT0 as ðC, eðg,hÞsα=z), which can be
viewed as the ElGamal ciphertext ðM  Gzd, GdÞ where G ¼ eðg,hÞ1=z ∈GT and
d ¼ sα∈Zp.
• DecryptoutðSK,CTÞ: The decryption algorithm takes as input a private key
SK ¼ ðz, TKÞ and a ciphertext CT. If the ciphertext is not partially
decrypted, then the algorithm first executes Transform outðTK,CTÞ. If the
output is ⊥, then this algorithm outputs ⊥ as well. Otherwise, it takes the
ciphertext ðT0, T1Þ and computes T0=Tz1 ¼M.
6.3.3.2 Security proof
Proof. Suppose that there exists a polynomial‐time adversary A that can
attack our scheme in the selective RCCA‐security model for outsourcing with
advantage ε. We build a simulator B that can attack the Waters scheme of [177]
in the selective CPA‐security model with advantage ε minus a negligible amount.
In [177] the Waters scheme is proven secure under the decisional q‐parallel
BDHE assumption. The intuition of security proof in the scheme is illustrated in
Figure 6.7.
• Init: The simulator B runsA.A chooses the challenge access structure ðM, ρÞ,
in which B passes on to the Waters challenger as the structure on which it
wishes to be challenged.
• Set up: The simulator B obtains the Waters public parameters PK ¼ g,
eðg, gÞα, ga and a description of the hash function F. It sends these to A as the
public parameters.
• Phase 1: The simulator B initializes empty tables T, T1, T2, an empty set D, and
an integer j ¼ 0. It answers the adversary's queries as follows:
• Random oracle hashH1ðR,MÞ: If there is an entry ðR,M, sÞ in T1, return s.
Otherwise, choose a random s∈Zp, record ðR,M, sÞ in T1, and return s.
• Random oracle hash H2ðRÞ: If there is an entry ðR, rÞ in T2, return r.
Otherwise, choose a random r∈ {0; 1}k, record ðR, rÞ in T2, and return r.
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• Create ððSÞÞ: B sets j :¼ jþ 1. It now proceeds one of the two ways.
• If S satisfies ðM, ρÞ, then it chooses a “fake” transformation key as
follows: Choose a random d∈Zp and run KeyGen ððd, PKÞ, SÞ to
obtain SK0. Set TK ¼ SK0 and set SK ¼ ðd, TKÞ. Note that the pair
ðd, TKÞ is not well formed, but that TK is properly distributed if d
was replaced by the unknown value z ¼ α=d.
• Otherwise, it calls the Waters key generation oracle on S to obtain
the key SK0 ¼ ðPK,K0, L0, {K 0x}x∈ SÞ. (Recall that in the non‐
outsourcing CP‐ABE game, the create and corrupt functionalities
are combined in one oracle.) The algorithm chooses a random value
z∈Zp and sets the transformation key TK as ðPK,K ¼ K01=z,
L ¼ L01=z, {Kx}x∈ S ¼ {K01=zx }x∈ SÞ and the private key as ðz, TKÞ.
Finally, store ðj, S, SK, TKÞ in table T and return TK to A.
• Corrupt ðiÞ: A cannot ask to corrupt any key corresponding to the challenge
structure ðM, ρÞ. If there exists an ith entry in table T, then B obtains the
entry ði, S, SK, TKÞ and sets D :¼ D∪ {S}. It then returns SK to A or ⊥ if no
such entry exists.
• Decrypt ði, CTÞ: Without loss of generality, we assume that all ciphertexts
input to this oracle are already partially decrypted. Recall that both B and A
have access to the TK values for all keys created, so either can execute the
transformation operation. Let CT ¼ ðC0, C1, C2Þ be associated with structure
ðM, ρÞ. Obtain the record ði, S, SK, TKÞ from table T. If it is not there or
S∉ ðM, ρÞ, return ⊥ to A (Figure 6.8).
Figure 6.7.
Intuition of security proof in the ABE with outsourced decryption.
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If key i does not satisfy the challenge structure ðM, ρÞ, proceed as follows:
• Parse SK ¼ ðz, TKÞ. Compute R ¼ C0=Cz2.
• Obtain the records ðR,Mi, siÞ from table T1. If none exist, return ⊥ to A.
• If in this set, there exists indices y 6¼ x such that ðR,My, syÞ and ðR,Mx, sxÞ
are in table T1,My 6¼Mx, and sy ¼ sx, then B aborts the simulation.
• Otherwise, obtain the record ðR, rÞ from table T2. If it does not exist, B
outputs ⊥.
• For each i, test if C0 ¼ R  eðg, gÞαsi , C1 ¼Mi⊕ r and C2 ¼ eðg, gÞαsi=z.
• If there is an i that passes the above test, output the messageMi; otherwise,
output ⊥. (Note: at most one value of si, and thereby one index i, can satisfy
the third check of the above test.)
If key i does satisfy the challenge structure ðM, ρÞ, proceed as follows:
• Parse SK ¼ ðd, TKÞ. Compute β ¼ C1=d2 .
• For each record ðRi,Mi, siÞ in table T1, test if β ¼ eðg, gÞsi .
• If zero matches are found, B outputs ⊥ to A.
• If more than one matches are found, B aborts the simulation.
• Otherwise, let ðR,M, sÞ be the sole match. Obtain the record ðR, rÞ from
table T2. If it does not exist, B outputs ⊥.
• Test if C0 ¼ R  eðg, gÞαs, C1 ¼M⊕ r and C2 ¼ eðg, gÞds.
• If all tests pass, outputM; else, output ⊥.
Figure 6.8.
Game in the ABE with outsourced decryption scheme.
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• Challenge: Eventually, A submits a message pair ðM0,M1Þ∈ {0; 1}2k. B acts
as follows:
• B chooses random “messages” ðR0,R1Þ∈G2T and passes them on to the
Waters challenger to obtain a ciphertext CT ¼ ðC,C0, {Ci}i∈ ½1, lÞ.
• B chooses a random value C″ ∈ {0; 1}k.
• B sends to A the challenge ciphertext CT ¼ ðC,C0, C″, {Ci}i∈ ½1, lÞ.
• Phase 2: The simulator B continues to answer queries as in Phase 1, except that
if the response to a Decrypt query would be eitherM0 orM

1, then B responds
with the message test instead.
• Guess: Eventually, Amust either output a bit or abort, either way B ignores it.
Next, B searches through tables T1 and T2 to see if the valuesR0 and R1 appear
as the first element of any entry (i.e., that A issued a query of the form H1ðRiÞ
orH2ðRiÞ.) If neither or both values appear, B outputs a random bit as its guess.
If only value Rb appears, then B outputs b as its guess.
6.3.4 The ABE with outsourced encryption
In 2012, Li et al. [28] formulized the paradigm of outsourcing encryption of ABE
in cloud computing. They utilized MapReduce to propose a security‐enhanced con-
struction which is secure under the assumption that the master node as well as at
least one of the slave nodes in cloud is honest. Another advantage of the proposed
construction is that it is able to delegate encryption for any access policy, instead of
a special hybrid access policy.
6.3.4.1 Concrete construction
• SetupðλÞ: The setup algorithm is executed by authority. Select a bilinear group
G of prime order q with generator g and two random integers α, β∈Zq, and
define a hash function H: {0; 1} ! G modeled as a random oracle. Finally,
output the public key PK ¼ ðG, HðÞ, g, h ¼ gβ, eðg, gÞαÞ and the master key
MK ¼ ðβ, gαÞ.
• KeyGenðω,MKÞ: For each user’s private key request, the authority runs the
key generation algorithm. Choose r∈ RZq and rj ∈ RZq for each attribute
j∈ω∪ {attrðθÞ}. Finally, compute and output the private key as
SK ¼ ðd ¼ gαþrβ ,dj0 ¼ gr HðjÞrj ,dj1 ¼ grj}j∈ω∪ {attrðθÞ}Þ: (6.25)
• EncryptUðT U,MÞ: To encrypt a messageM with access policy T U, firstly pick
an integer s∈ RZq, and randomly select a 1‐degree polynomial qRðÞ such that
qRð0Þ ¼ s. Furthermore, let s1 ¼ qRð1Þ and s2 ¼ qRð2Þ. Then, make n‐splits on s1
by randomly selecting s11,…, s1n ∈Zq with s11 þ…þ s1n ¼ s1, and set OEKi ¼ s1i
for i ¼ 1;…, n. Finally, it outputs the partially encrypted ciphertext at local
CTU ¼ ðT U ∧ T θ, ~E ¼Meðg, gÞαs, E ¼ hs, ðEθ0 ¼ gs2 , Eθ1 ¼ HðattrðθÞÞs2ÞÞ and the
set of outsourcing keys {OEKi}
n
i¼1.
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• EncryptMRðT U, {OEKi}ni¼1Þ: The delegated encryption algorithm is executed
by the MapReduce cloud. User uploads ðT U, {OEKi}Þ which is scanned as
the key‐value pair to the ith slave node. Then, the MapReduce is
triggered.
• Map: The slave node i finishes the partial encryption task by choosing a
ðkx  1Þ‐degree polynomial qðiÞx ðÞ for each node x (including the leaves)
in the tree T U in a top‐down manner. The selected polynomial qðiÞx ðÞ
must satisfy the restriction that qðiÞx ð0Þ ¼ s1i if x is the root node in T U;
otherwise, qðiÞx ð0Þ ¼ qðiÞparentðxÞðindexðxÞÞ. Let YU denote the set of leaf
nodes in T U; then, the partially encrypted ciphertext at slave node i is
computed as CTðiÞMR ¼ ð{EðiÞy0 ¼ gq
ðiÞ
y ð0Þ,EðiÞy1 ¼ HðattrðyÞÞq
ðiÞ
y ð0Þ}y∈YU . The map
function for outsourced encryption is described as
MapðT U, OEKiÞ ! ðT U, CTðiÞMRÞ.
• Reduce: Let qyðxÞ ¼ ∑ni¼0qðiÞy ðxÞ for y∈YU. The master node is selected as
the reducer. Then, after gathering all the intermediate key‐value pairs
{ðT U ,CTðiÞMRÞ}ni¼1 sent from the other slave nodes, reducer computes
CTMR ¼ ð{Ey0 ¼
Yn
i¼1 E
ðiÞ
y0 ¼ gqyð0Þ,Ey1 ¼
Yn
i¼1 E
ðiÞ
y1 ¼ HðattrðyÞÞqyð0Þ}y∈YU Þ.
The reduce function for outsourced encryption can be described as
Reduceð{ðT U ,CTðiÞMRÞ}ni¼1Þ ! CTMR.
Finally, such ciphertext CTMR is sent back to user.
• DecryptðCT, SKÞ: The recursive decryption algorithm is executed by user.
Suppose that CT ¼ ðCTU, CTMRÞ is encrypted under the policy corresponding
to SK; then, the decryption is followed in a down‐top manner.
• For each leaf node y in the hybrid access tree T U ∧ T θ, let i ¼ attrðyÞ and the
decryption is presented as follows:
Fy ¼
eðEy0, di0Þ
eðdi1, Ey1Þ ¼
eðgqyð0Þ, grHðiÞriÞ
gri , HðattrðyÞÞqyð0Þ
¼ eðg, gÞrqyð0Þ: (6.26)
• For each interior node y, let Sy be an arbitrary ky‐sized set of child nodes z
such that Fz 6¼ ⊥. If no such set exists, then the node is not satisfied and the
function returns ⊥. Then, the decryption is presented as follows:
Fy ¼ ð
Y
z∈ Sy
FzÞΔi,Sy ð0Þ
¼ ðeðg, gÞ
∑
z∈ Sy
rqzð0ÞΔi,Syð0Þ
¼ ðeðg, gÞ
∑
z∈ Sy
rqparentðzÞðindexðzÞÞΔi,Syð0Þ
¼ eðg, gÞ
r ∑
z∈ Sy
qyðiÞΔi,Syð0Þ
¼ eðg, gÞrqyð0Þ
(6.27)
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Finally, we are able to decrypt the root node by computing FR ¼ eðg, gÞrqRð0Þ ¼
eðg, gÞrs. Then, the ciphertext can be decrypted by computing
M ¼
~E
eðE, dÞ
FR
¼Meðg, gÞ
αs
eðhs, g
αþr
β Þ
eðg, gÞrs
: (6.28)
6.3.4.2 Security proof
Adversary model. The authors follow the replayable chosen‐ciphertext attack
(RCCA) security and define RCCA security for their setting. The intuition of secu-
rity proof in the scheme is illustrated in Figure 6.9. The whole game is described in
Figure 6.10.
• Setup: The challenger runs setup algorithm and gives the public key PK to the
adversary.
• Phase 1: The challenger initializes an empty set Dkey. Proceedingly, adversary is
allowed to make the following queries for several times.
• Private key query: Upon receiving Ikey, challenger runs key generation
algorithm on Ikey to obtain SK and returns SK after setting
Dkey ¼ Dkey ∪ {Ikey}.
• Encryption query: Upon receivingM, j and Ienc, challenger runs encryption
algorithm totally to obtain CT and {OEKi}
n
i¼1. But only return CT and
{OEKi}
n
i¼1, i 6¼j to adversary.
• Decryption query: Upon receiving CT encrypted under Ienc, challenger
generates SK for Ikey and performs decryption on CT to obtainM. Finally,
returnM.
Figure 6.9.
Intuition of security proof in the ABE with outsourced encryption scheme.
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• Challenge: Adversary submits two messagesM0 andM1. In addition the
adversary gives Ienc satisfying that γðIkey, IencÞ ¼ 0 for all Ikey ∈Dkey. Challenger
flips a random coin b and encryptsMb under Ienc totally. Finally, return the
resulting ciphertext CT.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated with the restrictions.
• Adversary cannot issue private key query on iKey where γðIkey, IencÞ ¼ 1.
• Decryption query will be answered normally except that the response would
be eitherM0 orM1; then, challenger responds with a special message
instead.
• Guess: Adversary outputs a guess b0 of b.
Definition. A CP‐ABE or KP‐ABE scheme with outsourced encryption is secure
against replayable chosen‐ciphertext attack if all polynomial‐time adversaries have at
most a negligible advantage in the game defined above.
Theorem. The proposed construction is CPA‐security model under the assumption
that the master node as well as at least one of the slave nodes in MapReduce cloud is
“honest but curious” in the generic group model.
Proof.We observe that in the security game shown, the challenge ciphertext has
a component ~E which is randomly eitherM0eðg, gÞαs orM1eðg, gÞαs. We can instead
consider a modified game in which ~E is either eðg, gÞαs or eðg, gÞν, where ν is selected
uniformly at random from Zq, and the adversary must decide which is the case. It is
clear that any adversary has advantage ε in the original game that can be
transformed into an adversary that has advantage at least ε2 in the modified game.
Then, we would like to bound the adversary’s advantage in the modified game.
Then, we are to denote ϕ0 : Zq ! {0; 1} log q as a random encoding for the group
operation gx ∈G and ϕ1 : Zq ! {0; 1} log q as a random encoding for eðg, gÞx ∈GT . Let
g ¼ ϕ0ð1Þ.
At setup time, simulator chooses α, β∈ RFq. Note that if β ¼ 0 which happens
with probability 1q, then setup is aborted. Finally, publish public parameters h ¼ gβ
and eðg, gÞα to adversary.
Figure 6.10.
Game in the ABE with outsourced encryption scheme.
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When the adversary calls for the evaluation of H on any string i, simulator
maintains a list L to store the response to hash query. Upon receiving a string i, if
the entry ði, gtiÞ exists in L, straightforwardly return gti . Otherwise, pick ti ∈ RFq and
return gti after adding the entry ði, gtiÞ into T .
When the adversary makes its jth private key request on ωj of attributes, chal-
lenger picks rðjÞ ∈ RFq and computes d ¼ gαþr
ðjÞ
β , and we have di0 ¼ grðjÞþtir
ðjÞ
i and
di1 ¼ gr
ðjÞ
i for i∈ωj ∪ {attrðθÞ} and rðjÞi ∈ RZq.
When the adversary makes encryption request onM, j as well as T U, the simu-
lator chooses s∈ RFq. Then, it splits s into s1 and s2 with linear secret sharing. (i) For
s1, the simulator continues to split it into s11,⋯, s1n and uses the linear secret‐sharing
scheme associated with T U to construct shares λ
ðjÞ
i of s1jðj ¼ 1;⋯, nÞ for all relevant
attributes i. Then, the simulator makes a reduction by computing Ei0 ¼ g∑
k
j¼1λ
ðjÞ
i and
Ei1 ¼ gti∑
k
j¼1λ
ðjÞ
i for each relevant attribute i. (ii) For s2, the simulation performs
computation to obtain Eθ0 ¼ gs2 and Eθ1 ¼ gtθs2 . Finally, these values along with
~E ¼Meðg, gÞαs, E ¼ gs and {s1i}ni¼1;i 6¼j are sent to adversary.
When adversary asks for a challenge onM0,M1, and T , simulator’s action is
identical to the response to encryption query, except that it picks u∈ RZq and
constructs the encryption as follows: ~E ¼ eðg, gÞu and E ¼ hs. For each relevant
attribute i, Ei0 ¼ gλi and Ei1 ¼ gtiλi .
Therefore, using the generic bilinear group model, it is able to be shown that
with probability 1 Oðp2q Þ taken over the randomness of the choice of variable
values in the simulation, adversary’s view in this simulation is identically distributed
to what its view would have been if it had been given ~E ¼Meðg, gÞαs, where p is the
bound on the total number of group elements received from queries to hash func-
tions, group G,GT, and the bilinear map e and from its interaction with security
game. Therefore, the proposed construction is secure in the proposed model.
In the construction, the reduced operation is run by the master node which is
honest. Moreover, a further split on s1 is performed to “map” the “partial encryp-
tion” task onto n slave nodes to allow for concurrent execution. Since at least one of
the slave nodes is honest, they are not able to recover s1 to fake access policy even if
n 1 slave nodes collude.
Finally, we specify that though the proposed construction is secure against
chosen‐plaintext attack, it is allowed to be extended to the stronger RCCA‐security
guarantee by using simulation‐sound NIZK proofs [173]. Alternatively, if we are
willing to use random oracle, then we can use standard techniques such as the
Fujisaki‐Okamoto transformation.
6.3.5 The ABE with updated policy
The algorithms include AttributeAuthoritySetUp (AASetUp), UserKeyGen,
Root Decryption Key Generation (RDKGen), Encryption (ENC), and Decryption
(DEC). Basically, bilinear map is a major construct in our system setup and user key
generation protocol. In our scheme, the proposed cryptographic algorithms are
developed based on the extension of the original CP‐ABE by introducing more
system parameters based on the role‐based access control management and dual
encryption (symmetric encryption and ABE). In practice, AttributeAuthoritySetUp
(AASetUp), UserKeyGen, and RDKGen are run by the AA, while ENC and DEC are
executed by data owners or users.
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6.3.5.1 Concrete construction
• AASetup: Each AAk (k∈ set of all authority SA). Let S be a set of attributes
issued and managed by the authority AAk. The AA setup ðAAkÞ chooses two
random numbers α, β∈Zp. Then, the public key ðPKkÞ ¼ G1, g, h ¼ gβk,
f ¼ g1=βk , eðg, gÞαk , and the secret key SKk is ðβk, gαkÞ.
• UserKeyGenðSuid,k, SKk, CertuidÞ ! EDKuid,k, RDKoid. The UserKeyGen
algorithm consists of the UDKGen and EDKGen algorithms to produce the
UDKuid,k and EDKuid,k, respectively.
• UDKGen takes as input a set of attributes Suid,k, attribute authority’s secret
key SKk, and user’s certificate Certuid, and then it returns a set of user
decryption keys UDKuid,aid. The algorithm first chooses a random r∈Zp and
then random ri ∈Zp for each attribute i∈ Suid,k. Then, the key is computed
as UDKuid,k ¼ ðD ¼ g
αkþr
βk , Ai ∈ S : Di ¼ gr HðiÞri , D0t ¼ griÞ.
• EDKGen then encrypts the UDKuid,k with the public key of the user Certuid
and outputs an encrypted decryption key EDKuid,k. The encryption function
is expressed as UDKuid,k ! ENCRSAðCertuid, UDKuid,aidÞ  EDKuid,k.
The derived EDKuid,k is then stored in the cloud, and it can be requested anytime
by the legitimate user who has the matched GSKuid.
• RDKGenðSKk, oid, Owner0sDSÞ ! RDKoid. RDKGen takes as inputs an
attribute authority’s secret key SKk, an identity attribute of data owner oid, and
a data owner’s digital signature ðOwner0sDSÞ; then, it produces a root
decryption key RDKoid for further use in re‐encryption key generation process.
• ENCðPKk, SS,M,ACP, CertuidÞ ! SCT. Before the file is encrypted, it is
compressed into a gzip format. Then, the encryption algorithm is applied over
the compressed file with two consecutive steps as follows:
• Encrypt message M:
M! ENCCCPARBEðPKaid, ACP,MÞ  CT: (6.29)
The algorithm takes as inputs authority public key PKk, access control policy ACP,
and dataM. Then, it returns a ciphertext CT.
• Encrypt ciphertext CT and SS:
CT ! ENCAESðSS, CTÞ  SCT
SS! ENCRSAðCertuid, SSÞ  ESS:
(6.30)
Then, the algorithm takes group role parameter GRP as a key together with AES
algorithm to generate the session key referred to as a secret seal SS to encrypt the
ciphertext CT. Then, the algorithm returns sealed ciphertext SCT.
Finally, the SS is encrypted with user’s public key Certuid, the algorithm will return
encrypted SSðESSÞ, and it is stored in a cloud server.
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• DECðPKk, SCT,GSKuid, EDKuid,kÞ ! M. The decryption algorithm performs
two consecutive steps as follows:
• Decrypt SS and SCT:
SS ¼ DECRSAðGSKuid, ENCRSAðCertuid, SSÞÞ
CT ¼ DECAESðSS, SCTÞ:
(6.31)
The algorithm takes user’s global secret key GSKuid, and it returns the session key
SS. Then, the algorithm takes SS to decrypt SCT and gets the CT.
• Decrypt CT
The user ðuidÞ requests a cloud EDKuid,k for decryption. The decryption step is
conducted as follows:
UDKuid,k ¼ DECðGSKuid, EDKuid,kÞ
M ¼ DECCCPARBEðUDKuid,k, CTÞ  DECðUDKuid,k, ENCðPKk, ACP,MÞÞ:
(6.32)
The algorithm takes user’s global secret key GSKuid to decrypt the encrypted
user decryption key EDKuid,k. Then, the algorithm returns UDKuid,k. Finally,
the UDKuid,k is used to decrypt the ciphertext CT. Together with the PKk, if
the set of attribute S satisfies the ACP structure, the algorithm returns the com-
pressed messageM. Finally, the algorithm decompresses M and returns the
originalM.
6.3.5.2 Security model
Our proposed PRE process embedded in the C‐CP‐ARBE is secure under the
random oracle model as shown in the following security game. The whole game is
described in Figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11.
Game in the ABE with updated policy scheme.
177
Attribute‐Based Encryption for Flexible and Fine‐Grained Access Control
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79903
• Init: Adversary A outputs a challenge access policy ACPC to challenger C.
• Setup: C runs the CreateAttributeAuthority algorithm and gives a public keys
PK to the adversary A. For corrupted authorities S
0
A, the challenger sends both
the public keys and secret keys to adversary.
• Query Phase 1:
• Private key extraction :  C runs UserKeyGen on the attribute set SðSuid,kÞ of
the corrupted AA and returns UDK to A.
• Re‐encryption key extraction oracle OrkðS,ACPCÞ:   With attribute set S, and
an access control policy ACPC, C returns reKeyGen(param; SS, RvnðRDKoidÞ,
(ACPCÞ)! rk
s2;vn!ðM0 ,ACP0 Þ to A, where rks2;vn is a generated re‐encryption
key and ðS, SKaidÞ ! UDK.
• RE‐encryption oracle OrkðS, ACPC, CTðM,ACPÞÞ:   With the input an attribute
set S, an access control policy ACPC, and an original ciphertext CTðM,ACPÞ, C
returns rk
s2!ðM0 ,ACP0 Þ, CTðM,ACPÞ ! CTRðM0 ,ACP0 Þ, where reKeyGenðparam,
SS, RvnðRDKoidÞ, ðACPRvnvn ÞÞ ! rks2!ðM0 ,ACP0 Þ, ðS, SKkÞ ! UDK, and S⊨ACP.
• Original ciphertext decryption oracle Od1ðS, CTðM,ACPÞÞ :   With the input an
attribute set S and an original ciphertext CTðM,ACPÞ, C returns Decrypt
ðS,UDK,CTðM,ACPÞÞ !M to A, where ðS, SKkÞ ! UDK and S⊨ACP.
• Re‐encrypted ciphertext decryption oracle Od2ðS0 , CTRðM0 ,ACP0 ÞÞ:   With the input
an attribute set S
0
and a re‐encrypted ciphertext CTRðM0 ,ACP0 Þ, C returns
Decrypt ðS0 , UDK 0 , CTRðM0 ,ACP0 ÞÞ ! M
0
, where ðS0 , SKkÞ ! UDK 0 and
S
0
⊨ACP
0
.
Note that if the ciphertexts queried to oracles Ork, Od2, and Od1 are invalid, C
simply outputs a ⊥.
• Challenge: A outputs two equal‐length messagesM0 andM1 to C. C returns
CTðM, ACPÞ ¼ ENCCCPARBEðPKk, ACP,MbÞ to A, where b∈ {0; 1}.
Query Phase 2: A performs as it did in Phase 1.
• Guess:A submits a guess bit b
0
∈ {0; 1}. If b
0 ¼ b,Awins. The advantage ofA
in this game is defined as Pr½b0 ¼ b|μ ¼ 0 ¼ 12.
In the security point of view of VL‐PRE, we generate random as a key used with
AES algorithm to encrypt re‐encryption key component, while our core access
control enforcement is based on CP‐ABE. The detailed security proof is as presented
in the original CP‐ABE [172].
6.3.6 The attribute‐based proxy re‐encryption
The description of our new CP‐ABPRE scheme with adaptive CCA security is as
follows. Unless stated otherwise, we let U be an attribute universe and S be an
attribute set, S⊆U .
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6.3.6.1 Concrete construction
• Setup(1k,U): The setup algorithm runs (N, G, GT, e) Gð1kÞ, where N ¼
p1p2p3 is the order of group G and p1, p2, p3 are distinct primes. Let Gpi denote
the subgroup of order pi in group G. It chooses a, α, κ, β, ε∈ RZN, g, g^1 ∈ RGp1,
two TCR hash functions TCR1 : GT ! ZN, TCR2 : GT ! {0; 1}polyð1
kÞ, a CCA‐
secure one‐time symmetric encryption system SYM, and a strongly existential
unforgeable one‐time signature system OTS. For each attribute i∈U, it chooses
hi ∈ RZN . The public parameters param are ðN, g, g^1, ga, gκ, gβ, gε, eðg, gÞα,
∀i∈UHi ¼ ghi , TCR1, TCR2, SYM,OTSÞ, and the master secret key msk is
ðgα, g3Þ, where g3 is a generator of Gp3.
• KeyGen(param, msk, S): The key generation algorithm chooses t, u∈ RZN, and
R, R0, R
00
, {Ri}i∈ S ∈ RGp3. The secret key skS is ðS, K ¼ gαgatgκuR,K0 ¼
guR0,K
00 ¼ gt,  R00 ,∀i∈ S Ki ¼ HtiRiÞ.
• Encrypt (param, (A, ρ), M): Given an LSSS access structure (A, ρ) and a
message M∈GT in which A is an ln matrix and ρ is a map from each row Aj
to an attribute ρ(j), the encryption algorithm works as follows.
• Choose a random vector v ¼ ðs, v2,⋯, vnÞ∈ RZnN .
• For each row Aj, choose rj ∈ RZN, run ðssk, svkÞ  OTS.KeyGenð1kÞ, and set
B0 ¼M  eðg, gÞαs, B1 ¼ gs, B2 ¼ ðgκÞs, B3 ¼ ðg^1svkgβÞs, B4 ¼ ðgεÞs, ∀j∈ ½1, l
ðCj ¼ ðgaÞAjvHrjρðjÞ, Dj ¼ grjÞ, E ¼ Signðssk, ðB0, B1, B3,∀j∈ ½1, lðCj, DjÞÞÞ.
• Output the original ciphertext C ¼ ðsvk, B0, B1, B2, B3, B4,∀j∈
½1;lðCj, DjÞ, EÞ. Note that {ρðjÞ|1 ≤ j ≤ l} are the attributes used in (A, ρ).
• ReKeyGen(param,skS, (A
0
,ρ
0
)): Given a secret key
skS ¼ ðS, K, K0, K 00 , ∀i∈ S KiÞ and an LSSS access structure ðA0, ρ0Þ, the
re‐encryption key rkS ! ðA0, ρ0Þ is generated as follows.
• Choose θ1,  θ2,  θ3 ∈ RZN,  δ∈ RGT, and set rk1 ¼ ðKgκθ1gaθ2ÞTCR1ðδÞgϵθ3 , rk2 ¼
ðK0gθ1ÞTCR1ðδÞ, rk3 ¼ ðK″gθ2ÞTCR1ðδÞ, rk4 ¼ gθ3 , ∀i∈ Srk5, i ¼ ðKiHθ2i ÞTCR1ðδÞ:
• Choose a random vector vðrkÞ ¼ ðsðrkÞ, vðrkÞ2 ,⋯, vðrkÞn Þ∈ RZnN. For each row Aj0
of A0, choose rðrkÞj ∈ RZN, run (ssk
ðrkÞ, svkðrkÞÞ  OTS:KeyGenð1kÞ, and set rk6
as svkðrkÞ, BðrkÞ0 ¼ δ  eðg, gÞαs
ðrkÞ
, BðrkÞ1 ¼ gs
ðrkÞ
, BðrkÞ2 ¼ ðgκÞs
ðrkÞ
, BðrkÞ3 ¼ ðg^ svk
ðrkÞ
1
gβÞsðrkÞ , ∀j∈ ½1, lðCðrkÞj ¼ ðgaÞA
0
jv
ðrkÞ
H
rðrkÞ
j
ρ0ðjÞ , D
ðrkÞ
j ¼ gr
ðrkÞ
j Þ, EðrkÞ ¼ SignðsskðrkÞ,
ðBðrkÞ0 , BðrkÞ1 , BðrkÞ3 , ∀j∈ ½1, lðCðrkÞj , DðrkÞj ÞÞÞ.
• Output the re‐encryption key rk
S!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ¼ ðrk1, rk2, rk3, rk4, ∀i∈ Srk5;i, rk6Þ.
• ReEnc(param, rk
S!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ, C): Parse the original ciphertext C under (A, ρ) as
ðsvk, B0, B1, B2, B3, B4,∀j∈ ½1;lðCj, DjÞ, EÞ and the re‐encryption key rkS!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ
as ðrk1, rk2, rk3, rk4, ∀i∈ Srk5;i, rk6Þ.
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• Check the validity of the original ciphertext C as eðB1, gκÞ ¼? eðB2, gÞ,
eðB1, g^ svk1 gβÞ ¼
?
eðB3, gÞ, eðB1, gϵÞ ¼? eðB4, gÞ, eð
Y
ρðjÞ∈ S
C
wj
j , gÞ ¼? eðB1, gaÞY
ρðjÞ∈ S
ðeðD1j , H
wj
ρðjÞÞÞ, S⊨
? ðA, ρÞ
Verif yðsvk, ðE, ðB0, B1, B3, ∀j∈ ½1;lðCj, DjÞÞÞÞ ¼? 1,
where wj are the constants chosen by the proxy such that the following holds
∑ρðjÞ∈ SwjAj ¼ ð1;0;⋯;0Þ. If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
• Compute F ¼ eðB1, rk1ÞeðB2, rk2Þ1eðB4, rk4Þ1
ð
Y
ρðjÞ∈ SðeðCj, rk3ÞeðDj, rk5;jÞÞ
wj Þ
, and further run σ1 ¼ SYM:
EncðTCR2ðkeyÞ, GÞ, where G ¼ ðC||rk6||FÞ and key ∈ RGT.
• Choose a random vector vðreÞ ¼ ðsðreÞ, vðreÞ2 ,⋯, vðreÞn Þ∈ RZnN . For each row of A0,
choose rðreÞj ∈ RZN, and run ðsskðreÞ, svkðreÞÞ  OTS. KeyGen(1k) and set σ2 as
svkðreÞ, BðreÞ0 ¼ key  eðg, gÞαs
ðreÞ
, BðreÞ1 ¼ gs
ðreÞ
, BðreÞ2 ¼ ðgκÞs
ðreÞ
, BðreÞ3 ¼ ðg^ svk
ðreÞ
1 g
βÞsðreÞ ,
∀j∈ ½1, lðCðreÞj ¼ ðgaÞA
0
jv
ðreÞ
H
rðreÞ
j
ρ0 ðjÞ
, DðreÞj ¼ gr
ðreÞ
j Þ, EðreÞ ¼ SignðsskðreÞ,
ðBðreÞ0 , BðreÞ1 , BðreÞ3 , ∀j∈ ½1, lðCðreÞj , DðreÞj ÞÞÞ.
• Output the re‐encrypted ciphertext CR ¼ ðσ1, σ2Þ under ðA0 , ρ0Þ.
• Dec(param,skS, C): Parse the original ciphertext C under (A,ρ) as ðsvk, B0,
B1, B2, B3, B4, ∀j∈ ½1;lðCj, DjÞ, EÞ and the secret key skS as ðS, K, K0, K 00 ,
∀i∈ S  KiÞ. The decryption algorithm chooses a set of constants wj ∈ RZN
such that∑ρðjÞ∈ SwjAj ¼ ð1;0;⋯;0Þ, and next recovers the message as
follows.
• If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
• Compute eðB1, KÞeðB2,K0Þ1=ð
Y
ρðjÞ∈ SðeðCj,K
00ÞeðDj,KρðjÞÞÞwjÞ ¼ eðg, gÞαs, and
output the message M ¼ B0=eðg, gÞαs.
• DecR(param,skS,CR): Parse the re‐encrypted ciphertext CR under ðA0 , ρ0Þ as
ðσ1, σ2Þ and the secret key skS as ðS, K, K 0 , K 00 ,∀i∈ S KiÞ.
• Check the validity of σ2 as eðBðreÞ1 , gκÞ ¼? eðBðreÞ2 , gÞ, eðBðreÞ1 , g^ svk
ðreÞ
1
gβÞ ¼? eðBðreÞ3 , gÞ, S ¼? ðA
0
, ρ
0Þ, eð
Y
ρðjÞ∈ S
ðCðreÞj Þw
ðreÞ
j , gÞ ¼? eðBðreÞ1 , gaÞ
Y
ρ0ðjÞ∈ S
ðeððDðreÞj Þ1, H
w
ðreÞ
j
ρ
0 ðjÞÞÞ
Verif yðsvkðreÞ, ðEðreÞ, ðBðreÞ0 , BðreÞ1 , BðreÞ3 , ∀j∈ ½1;lðCðreÞj , DðreÞj ÞÞÞÞ ¼? 1,
where wðreÞj are the constants chosen by the decryptor such that
∑ρ0 ðjÞ∈ Sw
ðreÞ
j A
0
j ¼ ð1;0;⋯;0Þ. If Eq. (2) does not hold, output⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
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• Compute eðBðreÞ1 , KÞeðBðreÞ2 ,K0Þ1=ð
Y
ρ0ðjÞ∈ SðeðC
ðreÞ
j ,K
00ÞeðDðreÞj ,
Kρ0ðjÞÞÞw
ðreÞ
j Þ ¼ eðg, gÞαsðreÞ , and output key ¼ BðreÞ0 =eðg, gÞαs
ðreÞ
.
• Run G ¼ SYM:DecðTCR2ðkeyÞ, σ1Þ.
• Parse G as (C, rk6, F). If either Eq. (1) or the following verification for rk6
does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
eðBðrkÞ1 , gκÞ ¼? eðBðrkÞ2 , gÞ, eðBðrkÞ1 , g^ svk
ðrkÞ
1 g
βÞ ¼? eðBðrkÞ3 , gÞ,
eð
Y
ρ0ðjÞ∈ S
ðCðrkÞj Þw
ðrkÞ
j , gÞ ¼? eðBðrkÞ1 , gaÞ 
Y
ρ
0 ðjÞ∈ S
ðeððDðrkÞj Þ1, H
w
ðrkÞ
j
ρ
0 ðjÞ ÞÞ
Verif yðsvkðrkÞ, ðEðrkÞ, ðBðrkÞ0 , BðrkÞ1 , BðrkÞ3 ,∀j∈ ½1;lðCðrkÞj , DðrkÞj ÞÞÞÞ ¼? 1;S ¼? ðA
0
, ρ
0Þ,
where wðrkÞj are the constants chosen by the decryptor such that∑ρ0 ðjÞ∈ Sw
ðrkÞ
j
A
0
j ¼ ð1;0;⋯;0Þ.
• Compute eðBðrkÞ1 , KÞeðBðrkÞ2 ,K0Þ1=ð
Y
ρ
0 ðjÞ∈ SðeðC
ðrkÞ
j ,K
00ÞeðDðrkÞj ,
Kρ0 ðjÞÞÞw
ðrkÞ
j Þ ¼ eðg, gÞαsðrkÞ and then BðrkÞ0 =eðg, gÞαs
ðrkÞ ¼ δ. Compute
FTCR1ðδÞ
1 ¼ eðg, gÞαs, and finally outputM ¼ B0=eðg, gÞαs.
6.3.6.2 Security model
A single‐hop unidirectional CP‐ABPRE scheme is IND‐CCA secure at original
ciphertext if no probabilistic polynomial‐time (PPT) adversary A can win the
game below with non‐negligible advantage. In the game, C is the challenger, and k
and U are the security parameter and attribute universe. The intuition of security
proof in the scheme is illustrated in Figure 6.12. The whole game is described in
Figure 6.13.
• Setup: C runs Setupð1k,U) and sends param to A.
• Phase 1:
• Secret key extraction oracle OskðSÞ: On input an attribute set S, C runs
skS  KeyGenðparam,msk, SÞ and returns skS to A.
• Re‐encryption key extraction oracle OrkðS, ðA0 , ρ0ÞÞ: On input S, and an access
structure ðA0 , ρ0Þ, C returns rk
S!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ  ReKeyGenðparam, skS, ðA
0
, ρ
0ÞÞ toA,
where skS  KeyGenðparam,msk, SÞ.
• Re‐encryption oracle oracle OreðS, ðA0 , ρ0Þ, CÞ: On input S,,ðA0 , ρ0Þ and an
original ciphertextC under ðA, ρÞ, C returnsCR  ReEncðparam, rkS!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ, CÞ
toA, where rk
S!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ  ReKeyGenðparam, skS, ðA
0
, ρ
0ÞÞ, skS  
KeyGenðparam,msk, SÞ and S⊨ ðA, ρÞ.
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• Original ciphertext decryption oracle OdecðS, CÞ: On input S and an original
ciphertext C under ðA, ρÞ, C returns M Decðparam, skS, CÞ to A, where
skS  KeyGenðparam,msk, SÞ and S⊨ ðA, ρÞ.
• Re‐encrypted ciphertext decryption oracle OdecðS, CRÞ: On input S and a re‐
encrypted ciphertext CR under ðA, ρÞ, C returns M DecRðparam, skS, CRÞ,
where skS  KeyGenðparam,msk, SÞ and S⊨ ðA, ρÞ.
Figure 6.12.
Intuition of security proof in the attribute‐based proxy re‐encryption.
Figure 6.13.
Game in the attribute‐based proxy re‐encryption scheme.
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If the ciphertexts issued to Ore, Odec, and OdecR are invalid, C simply outputs ⊥.
• Challenge: A outputs two equal‐length messagesM0 andM1 and a challenge
access structure ðA, ρÞ to C. If the following queries
OskðSÞ for any S⊨ ðA, ρÞ, OrkðS, ðA0 , ρ0ÞÞ for any S⊨ ðA, ρÞ, and
OskðS0Þ for any S⊨ ðA0 , ρ0Þ
are never made, C returns C ¼ Encryptðparam, ðA, ρÞ,MbÞ to A, where
b∈ R{0; 1}.
• Phase 2: A continues making queries as in Phase 1 except the following:
• OskðSÞ for any S⊨ ðA, ρÞ.
• OrkðS, ðA0 , ρ0ÞÞ for any S⊨ ðA, ρÞ and OskðS0Þ for any S⊨ ðA0 , ρ0Þ.
• OreðS, ðA0 , ρ0Þ, CÞ for any S⊨ ðA, ρÞ and OskðS0Þ for any S⊨ ðA0 , ρ0Þ.
• OdecðS, CÞfor anyS⊨ ðA, ρÞ.
• OdecRðS, CRÞ for any CR under ðA, ρÞ, S⊨ ðA, ρÞ where CR is a derivative of C.
As of [3], the derivative of C is defined as follows.
• C is a derivative of itself.
• If A has issued a re‐encryption key query on ðS, ðA0 , ρ0ÞÞ to get rk
S!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ,
and obtained CR  ReEncðparam, rkS!ðA0 ,ρ0 Þ, CÞ such that
DecRðparam, sks0 , CRÞ∈ {M0,M1}, then CR is a derivative of C, where
S ⊨ ðA, ρÞ and S0 ⊨ ðA0 , ρ0Þ.
• If A has issued a re‐encryption query on ðS, ðA0 , ρ0Þ, CÞ and obtained the
re‐encrypted ciphertext CR, then CR is a derivative of C, where S⊨ ðA, ρÞ.
• Guess: A outputs a guess bit b
0
∈ {0; 1}. If b
0 ¼ b, A wins.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvINDCCAOrCPABPRE,A ð1k,UÞ ¼ |Pr½b
0 ¼ b  12|.
6.4. Comparison and observations
The first KP‐ABE scheme that allows any monotone access structures was pro-
posed by Goyal et al. [171]. In their cryptosystem, ciphertexts are labeled with sets
of attributes, and private keys are associated with access structures that control
which ciphertexts a user is able to decrypt. They demonstrated the applicability of
our construction to sharing of audit‐log information and broadcast encryption.
Their construction supports delegation of private keys which subsumes hierarchical
identity‐based encryption (HIBE).
The CP‐ABE scheme was presented by Waters et al. [177]. In that paper they
presented a system for realizing complex access control on encrypted data. By using
their techniques, encrypted data can be kept confidential even if the storage server
is untrusted; moreover, their methods are secure against collusion attacks. Previous
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attribute‐based encryption systems used attributes to describe the encrypted data
and built policies into user’s keys, while in their system, attributes are used to
describe a user’s credentials, and a party encrypting data determines a policy for
who can decrypt. Thus, their methods are conceptually closer to traditional access
control methods such as role‐based access control (RBAC).
Subsequently, there are some other versions of ABE that have been proposed
such as the outsourced ABE. In outsourcing the decryption of ABE ciphertexts, they
proposed a new paradigm for ABE that largely eliminates the size of the ciphertext,
and the time required to decrypt it grows with the complexity of the access formula
for users. Suppose that ABE ciphertexts are stored in the cloud. They showed how a
user can provide the cloud with a single transformation key that allows the cloud to
translate any ABE ciphertext satisfied by that user’s attributes into a (constant‐size)
ElGamal‐style ciphertext, without the cloud being able to read any part of the user’s
messages. In outsourcing encryption of attribute‐based encryption with
MapReduce, they formulized a novel paradigm of outsourcing encryption of ABE to
cloud service provider to relieve local computation burden. They proposed an
optimized construction with MapReduce cloud which is secure under the assump-
tion that the master node as well as at least one of the slave nodes is honest. After
outsourcing, the computational cost at the user’s side during encryption is reduced
to approximate four exponentiations, which is constant. Another advantage of the
proposed construction is that the user is able to delegate encryption for any policy.
In 2014, Liang et al. [49] proposed a new the ciphertext‐policy attribute‐based
proxy re‐encryption (CP‐ABPRE) to tackle the problem by integrating the dual‐
system encryption technology with selective proof technique. Although the new
scheme supporting any monotonic access structures is built in the composite‐order
bilinear group, CCA security in the standard model without jeopardizing the
expressiveness of access policy is proven adaptively. They further make an
improvement for the scheme to achieve more efficiency in the re‐encryption key
generation and re‐encryption phases.
In 2017, Fugkeaw et al. [192] extended the capability of their access control
scheme: collaborative‐ciphertext policy‐attribute role‐based encryption (C‐CP‐
ARBE) to be capable of supporting secure and flexible policy updates in the big data
outsourcing environment. They developed a secure policy updating algorithm and
proposed a very lightweight proxy re‐encryption (VL‐PRE) technique to enable the
policy updating to be done in the cloud in an efficient and computationally cost‐
effective manner.
Observations on the ABE with delegated capacity in terms of efficiency and
verifiability are described as follows. Let SK denote secret key, and let CT denote
ciphertexts. In addition, let ENC denote encryption and DEC denote decryption.
From Tables 6.2 and 6.3, we compare the six schemes with respect to the user
key, the ciphertext length, the encryption, and the decryption.
ABE CP‐ABE CP‐ABPRE
SK |Au|þ LG1 ð2|Au|þ 1ÞLG1 3G1
CT |Act |LG1 þ LG2 ð2|A|CT þ 1ÞLG1 þ LG2 ð2Lþ 3ÞG1 þ G2
ENC |Act |G1 þ G2 ð2|ACT |þ 1ÞG1 þ 2G2 ð2Lþ 3ÞG1 þ G2
DEC dCe þ dG2 2|Au|Ce þ ð2|m|þ 2ÞG2 ð2Lþ 2ÞG2
Table 6.2.
Comparison 1.
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The previous sections discuss the research process of ABE which has received
substantial achievements. However, there still exist many problems worth further
study. According to application requirements and the shortcoming of the existing
algorithms, some possible future works remain open.
OD CP‐ABE OD KP‐ABE OE ABE
SK Zp þ 5G1 þ G2 Zp þ ð3þ 2lÞG1 4G1
C ð2Lþ 1ÞG1 þG2 2G1 þ G2 3G1 þ G2
ENC ð2Lþ 1ÞG1 þG2 2G1 þ G2 3G1 þ G2
DEC G2 G2 G2
Table 6.3.
Comparison 2.
185
Attribute‐Based Encryption for Flexible and Fine‐Grained Access Control
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79903
Chapter 7
Proxy Re-Encryption for Secure
Access Delegation
7.1. Introduction
The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) dates back to the work of Blaze et al.
[36]. The goal of such systems is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertext
from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties. PRE provides a secure
and flexible method for a sender to store and share data. A user may encrypt his file
with his own public key and then store the ciphertext in an honest-but-curious
server. When the receiver is decided, the sender can delegate a re-encryption key
associated with the receiver to the server as a proxy. Then the proxy re-encrypts the
initial ciphertext to the intended receiver. Finally, the receiver can decrypt the
resulting ciphertext with her private key. The security of PRE usually assures that
(1) neither the server/proxy nor non-intended receivers can learn any useful infor-
mation about the (re-)encrypted file, and (2) before receiving the re-encryption
key, the proxy cannot re-encrypt the initial ciphertext in a meaningful way.
7.1.1 The motivation of PRE
The PRE has a significant application in the cloud computing environment. In
the cloud computing environment, users can rent the storage space of cloud service
providers to store data in order to save the cost of equipment purchase and mainte-
nance. For security reasons, users usually encrypt the data before storing it in the
cloud storage space. In many applications, users need to share certain data with the
specified user, and they want to avoid other people, including the cloud server
provider to get the data. One of the most simple ways is that data downloaded to the
local users put those lines of cipher decryption, then use to specify the user’s public
key to encrypt, and then send to the specified user; the latter can decrypt the data.
This method, then, requires a lot of communication overhead and computing costs
and requires users to increase the local storage space, which is not in line with the
original intention of the user to save the cost of equipment through cloud comput-
ing. Using the PRE, one can solve the problem more effectively: the user need only
the agent for the key to the cloud computing service providers, which can convert
encrypted data to specify users against ciphertext; then the specified user that uses
its own private key can access the shared data. This can be done: even if the cloud
service provider owns the agent key, he cannot know the content of the shared data.
Users do not need to download the data to local, so they do not need to purchase
additional local storage devices. Figure 7.1 is a scenario that describes data sharing
using the PRE in a cloud computing environment to achieve security.
7.1.2 History of PRE
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) was first formulated by Blaze et al. [36]. They pro-
posed the first PRE scheme based on ElGamal cryptosystem, in which the proxy
does not know the underlying messages in the re-encrypted ciphertext. Ateniese
et al. [37] remarked that Blaze et al.’s scheme is inherent bidirectional, that is, the
re-encryption key allows translating ciphertexts not only from Alice to Bob but also
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from Bob to Alice, which would damage the security of Bob’s data. Jakobsson [193]
proposed a quorum-based protocol which divides the proxy into many isolated
components. The delegators’ keys will be safe if the number of honest proxies
arrives the set quorum. The notion of distributed proxies was also considered
in [194].
Many works have been done to achieve unidirectional schemes, where the col-
lusion between delegators and the proxy cannot compromise the delegatee. Ivan
and Dodis [195] constructed a unidirectional proxy encryption by splitting a
decryption key into two parts, one of which is for the proxy and the other is for Bob.
This scheme protects delegatee’s security, although the delegatee Bob is required to
store additional secrets. The unidirectional PRE scheme presented by Ateniese et al.
[37] eliminates the storage need of extra secrets before re-encryption. They also
enumerated several properties that are often used to evaluate a PRE system. These
desirable properties include unidirectionality, permitting Alice to delegate to Bob
without making Alice able to decrypt Bob’s ciphertext, noninteractivity, allowing
Alice generating re-encryption key offline and multiuse capability and permitting a
proxy to perform multiple re-encryptions on a ciphertext; key optimization, not
expanding Bob’s secret storage, regardless of how many delegations he can accept;
and original accessibility, allowing Alice to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext that
were originally encrypted by her.
It is an open problem left by the work of [37] to construct a PRE scheme secure
against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). Canetti and Hohenberger [38] proposed a
CCA-secure PRE scheme in bilinear groups, although this scheme is bidirectional.
Libert and Vergnaud [39] presented the first replayable CCA-secure unidirectional
PRE scheme in the standard model. Deng et al. [43] presented a PRE scheme
without resorting to bilinear pairings and proved its CCA security in the random
oracle model. By using signature of knowledge and Fujisaki Okamoto conversion,
Shao and Cao [42] constructed a unidirectional PRE scheme that is proved CCA-
secure in the random oracle. Subsequently, Matsuda et al. [41] proposed a CCA-
secure PRE scheme in the standard model by applying the reapplicable lossy trap-
door function, while Weng et al. [44] specified some security drawbacks of
Matsuda et al.’s scheme.
Figure 7.1.
Using PRE to achieve secure data sharing in a cloud computing environment.
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There are many extensions of PRE from different aspects. Green and
Ateniese [45] proposed the notion of identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE)
by mixing PRE with identity-based cryptography. They constructed an IBPRE
scheme that is proved to be CCA-secure in the random oracle. Han et al. [48]
proposed an IBPRE storage scheme where both queries from the intra-domain and
inter-domain are considered and collusion attacks can be resisted. Moreover, the
owner can determine the access permission independently. Chu and Tzeng [46]
proposed an IBPRE scheme and proved its CCA security in the standard model.
Matsuo [196] proposed a hybrid proxy re-encryption system that can re-encrypt a
ciphertext in traditional public-key systems to a ciphertext of identity-based
encryption. Due to the limitation of the public-key and identity-based encryption,
this scheme does not support the broadcasting mechanism. To reduce security risks
on the proxy, Libert and Vergnaud [39] provided a method to trace the malicious
proxies in proxy re-encryption systems. Shao et al. [197] proposed an anonymous
IBPRE (AIBPRE) to achieve the anonymity of recipients, and Kawai and
Takashima [198] proposed a fully anonymous functional PRE scheme. Recently,
Deng et al. [199] proposed an asymmetric cross-cryptosystem re-encryption which
is similar with our IBPRE2, while their scheme does not achieve the CCA security.
Some attribute-based proxy re-encryption schemes [200, 201] have been proposed
to enforce more flexible access control on outsourced data. Liang et al. [202]
presented a ciphertext-policy attribute-based re-encryption scheme which employs
the PRE technology in the attribute-based encryption cryptographic setting and
proves its adaptively CCA security in the standard model. Usually, attribute-based
cryptosystem requires complicated computations for encryption and decryption,
which makes them unaffordable to resource-limited users.
The existing PRE schemes do not provide a re-encryption from a complicated
cryptosystem to a simple cryptosystem with higher security (i.e., CCA security),
which limits their applications in cloud computing environments. Due to high demand
on data mining and analytics activities, some new and developing systems are highly
demanded like the Internet of things (IoT) [203] combined with the secret and
reliable local storage system as well as the scalable IoT storage systems. The proposed
IBPRE2 can transform ciphertext of an IBBE system into ciphertext of an IBE system,
without requiring any interaction between delegator and delegatee, nor extra secret
storage of the delegatee. Hence, users can directly forward their data decryptable by a
set of users to a specific user, without performing decryption nor requiring the specific
one to take any extra efforts. Zhou et al. [204] proposed a framework of identity-
based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE2) system for cloud computing. Xu et al. [205] built
the encrypted cloud email system based on our CIBPRE scheme.
7.1.3 Roadmap
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
formal definitions and security models of proxy re-encryption (PRE). Design phi-
losophy is given in Section 3, together with concrete construction and security proof
of several representative proxy re-encryption schemes. Comparison and observa-
tions are discussed in Section 4.
7.2. Framework and security model of PRE
7.2.1 The formal definition of PRE
There are eight algorithms in a PRE model:
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• Setup(λ). In this algorithm, we can give a security parameter λ and get a
parameter (par).
• Keygen(par). User i sets his public key and the private key (pki, ski).
• ReKeygen(pki, skj). The algorithm returns a re-encryption key rki!j from pki
and ski.
• Enc1(m, pkj, par). The algorithm encrypts a message m under the public key
pkj at the first level and returns the ciphertext CTj.
• Enc2(m, pki, par). The algorithm encrypts a message m under the public key
pki at the second level and returns the ciphertext CTi.
• ReEnc(rki!j, CTi). The algorithm re-encrypts the second level ciphertext CTi
under the re-encryption key and returns the first-level ciphertext CTj.
• Dec1(CTj, sk). The algorithm decrypts the first-level ciphertext CTj under the
private-key sk and returns the massage m or ⊥(when CTi is an illegal
ciphertext).
• Dec2(CTi, sk). The algorithm decrypts the second-level ciphertext CTi under
the private-key sk and returns the massage m or ⊥(when CTi is an illegal
ciphertext).
7.2.2 The security properties of PRE
In this part, we will discuss the most useful properties of proxy re-encryption
protocols:
• Unidirectional: Delegation from Alice to Bob does not allow re-encryption
from Bob to Alice.
Noninteractive: Re-encryption keys can be generated by Alice using Bob’s public
key. No trusted third party or interaction is required.
• Proxy invisibility: The proxy is transparent in the sense that neither the
sender of an encrypted message nor any of the delegates have to be aware of
the existence of the proxy.
• Original access: Alice can decrypt re-encrypted ciphertext that were originally
sent to her. In some applications, it may be desirable to maintain access to her
re-encrypted ciphertext.
• Temporary: Bob is only able to decrypt messages intended for Alice that were
authored during some specific time period i.
• Non-transitive: The proxy, alone, cannot re-delegate decryption rights. For
example, from rka!b and rkb!c, he cannot produce rka!c.
• Nontransferable: The proxy and a set of colluding delegates cannot re-
delegate decryption rights. For example, from rka!b, skb, and pkc, they cannot
produce rka!c.
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7.2.3 Security model of PRE
Setup. Challenger C runs Setup (λ) and gives the parameters to attacker A.
Phase 1. Then attacker A can search for the information below:
• Public key: Attacker A gives an index i to challenger C and gets the public key
pki from C.
• Private key: Attacker A gives an index j to challenger C and gets the private
key skj from C.
• Re-encryption key: Attacker A gives two public keys to challenger C. Then,
challenger C runs ReKeygen(pki, skj) and gives the re-encryption key to
attacker.
• Re-encrypt: Attacker A gives a ciphertext to challenger C. Challenger C runs
ReEnc(rki!j, CTi) and returns the answer to A.
• Decrypt: Challenger C gets the ciphertext from attacker A and returns the
message to A.
Challenge.When phase 1 is finished, attacker gives a public key pk and two
messages m0, m1 to challenger. Challenger chooses a message mδ randomly and runs
Enc1(mδ, pk, par). At last, give the ciphertext to attacker A.
Phase 2. Attacker A can do the same things like phase 1 without encrypt.
Guess. Finally, attacker A guesses which message challenger has chosen.
In this game, A’s advantage is
adv ¼ |Pr½δ0 ¼ δ  1=2|:
If adv can be ignored in polynomial time, we can call it an ACC2-secure scheme.
7.3. State of the art
7.3.1 The bidirectional PRE
A basic goal of public-key encryption is to allow only the key or keys selected at
the time of encryption to decrypt the ciphertext. To change the ciphertext to a
different key requires re-encryption of the message with the new key, which
implies access to the original cleartext and to a reliable copy of the new encryption
key. Intuitively, this seems a fundamental, and quite desirable, property of good
cryptography; it should not be possible for an untrusted party to change the key
with which a message can be decrypted.
Blaze et al. [36] consider atomic proxy schemes for encryption, identification,
and signatures. An encryption proxy key allows B to decrypt messages encrypted
for A, and an identification or signature proxy key πA!B allows A to identify herself
as B or to sign for B (i.e., transforms A’s signature into B’s signature). Generating
encryption proxy key πA!B obviously requires knowledge of at least the secret
component of A (otherwise the underlying system is not secure), and similarly
generating identification or signature proxy key πA!B requires B’s secret, but the
proxy key itself, once generated, can be published safely.
190
Data Service Outsourcing and Privacy Protection in Mobile Internet
7.3.1.1 Concrete construction
7.3.1.1.1 Proxy encryption
7.3.1.1.1.1 Cryptosystem X (encryption)
Let p be a prime of the form 2q + 1 for a prime q and let g be a generator in Zp; p and
g are global parameters shared by all users.A’s secret key a, 0 < a < p  1, is selected
at random and must be in Z2p, i.e., relatively prime to p-1 (A also calculates the
inverse a1 mod 2q). A publishes the public key ga mod p. Message encryption
requires a unique randomly selected secret parameter k ∈ Z2p. To encrypt m with
A’s key, the sender computes and sends two ciphertext values (c1, c2):
c1 = mgk mod p
c2 = (ga)k mod p.
Decryption reverses the process; since
c2ða
1Þ = gk (mod p),
it is easy for A (who knows a1) to calculate gk and recover m:
m = c1((c2ða
1Þ)1)mod p.
The efficiency of this scheme is comparable to standard ELGamal encryption.
The whole game is described in Figure 7.2.
7.3.1.1.1.2 Symmetric proxy function for X
Observe that the c1 ciphertext component produced by cryptosystem χ is indepen-
dent of the recipient’s public key. Recipient A’s key is embedded only in the c2
exponent; it is sufficient for a proxy function to convert ciphertext for A into cipher-
text for B to remove A’s key a from c2 and replace it with B’s key b. Part of what a
proxy function must do, then, is similar to the first step of the decryption function,
raising c2 to a1 to remove a. The proxy function must also contribute a factor of b to
the exponent. Clearly, simply raising c2 to a1 and then to b would accomplish this,
but obviously such a scheme would not qualify as a secure proxy function; anyone
who examines the proxy key learns the secret keys for both A and B.
This problem is avoided, of course, by combining the two steps into one. Hence,
the proxy key πA!B is a1b and the proxy function is simply c
πA!B
2 . Note that this is a
symmetric proxy function; A and B must trust one another bilaterally. B can learn
A’s secret (by multiplying the proxy key by b?1), and A can similarly discover B’s
Figure 7.2.
Game in PRE scheme.
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key. Observe that applying the proxy function is more efficient than decryption and
re-encryption, in that only one exponentiation is required.
7.3.1.1.2 Proxy identification
In this section we describe a discrete-log-based identification scheme. With p, g,
and a as before, Alice wishes to convince Charlotte that she controls a; Charlotte will
verify using public key ga. As before, the proxy key πA!B will be a/b—it will be safe
to publish a/b, and Alice and Charlotte can easily use a/b to transform the protocol,
so Charlotte is convinced that Alice controls b.
Note that in the case of a secure identification proxy key that transforms identifi-
cation by A into identification by B, it is B whose secret is required to construct the
proxy key because identification as B should not be possible without B’s cooperation.
7.3.1.1.2.1 Cryptosystem Y (identification)
Let p and g be a prime and a generator in Zp, respectively. Alice picks random a ∈
Z2p
 to be her secret key and publishes ga as her public key. Each round of the
identification protocol is as follows:
• Alice picks a random k ∈ Z2p and sends Charlotte s1 = gk.
• Charlotte picks a random bit and sends it to Alice.
• Depending on the bit received, Alice sends Charlotte either s2 = k or s02 = k/a.
• Depending on the bit, Charlotte checks that (ga)s
0
2 = s1 or that gs2 = gk.
Via the above steps, Charlotte can identify the message sent by Alice.
7.3.1.1.2.2 Symmetric proxy function for Y
A symmetric proxy key is a/b. Suppose Charlotte wants to run the protocol with gb
instead of ga, either Alice or Charlotte or any intermediary can use the proxy key to
convert Alice’s responses k/a to k/b.
7.3.1.1.3 Proxy signature
Now we will see how to use the proxy identification scheme to construct a proxy
signature scheme. We suppose there exists a hash function h whose exact security
requirements will be discussed below. The parameters p, g, a, and b are as before.
7.3.1.1.3.1 Cryptosystem Z (signature)
To sign amessagem, Alice picks k1, k2,…, kℓ at random and computes gk1 ,…, gkℓ . Next
Alice computes h(gk1 ,…, gkℓ) and extracts ℓ pseudorandom bits β1,…βℓ. For each i,
depending on the ith pseudorandom bit, Alice (who knows a) computes s2;i = (ki 
mβℓ)/a, that is, s2;i = (ki m)/a or s2;i = ki/a. The signature consists of two components:
s1 = (gk1 , …, gkℓ)
s2 = ((k1  mβ1)/a, …, (kℓ  mβℓ)/a).
To verify the signature, first, βis are recovered using the hash function. The
signature is then verified one “round” at a time, where the ith round is (gk1 , (ki 
mβi)/a). To verify (gk, (k  mβ)/a) using public key ga, the recipient Charlotte
raises (ga) to the power (k  mβ)/a and checks that it matches gk/gmβ.
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7.3.1.1.3.2. Symmetric proxy function for Z
A symmetric proxy key πA!B for this signature scheme is a/b. The proxy function
Q
leaves s1 alone and maps each component s2;i to s2;iπA!B.
7.3.1.2 Security proof
7.3.1.2.1 Secure of X
First, we will prove the cryptosystem X is secure by confirming that cleartext
and secret keys cannot be recovered from ciphertext and public keys. Beyond that,
we also show that publishing the proxy key compromises neither messages nor
secret keys. Since recovering a secret key enables an adversary to recover a message
and since cryptanalysis is easier with more information (i.e., a proxy key), it is
sufficient to show that no cleartext is recoverable from ciphertext, public keys, and
proxy keys. Specifically, we will show that the problem of recovering m from
(ga, gb, gc, …, mgk, gak, a1b, a1c, …),
is at least as hard as Diffie-Hellman.
The intuition of security proof in the scheme is illustrated in Figure 7.3.
7.3.1.2.2 Secure of Y
Protocol Y, with or without proxy keys published, is a zero knowledge protocol
that convinces the verifier that the prover knows the secret key.
Proof. The proof is found in [36].
7.3.1.2.3 Secure of Z
This scheme relies on the existence of a hash function h. Specifically (hash
assumption), we assume there exists a function h such that:
Figure 7.3.
Intuition of security proof in PRE scheme.
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• On random input (ga, m), it is difficult to generate ri and βi such that
h(gðar1þmβ1Þ, …, gðarℓþmβℓÞ=¡β1…, βℓ¿.
• More generally, it is difficult to generate such ri and βi on input ga, m, and
samples of signatures on random messages signed with a.
It is not our intention to conjecture about the existence of such functions h. In
particular, we do not know the relationship between the hash assumption and
assumptions about collision freedom or hardness to invert. We note that this
generic transformation of a protocol to a signature scheme has appeared in the
literature written by [206].
We now analyze the hash assumption. Note that in order to produce a legitimate
signature on m that verifies with ga, a signer needs to produce <gki> and <(ki 
mβi)/a>. Thus, putting <βi> = h(<gki>) and then <ri> = <(ki - mβi)/a>, it is
straightforward to see that the signer could actually produce ri’s and βi’s of the
stated type in the course of producing the signature.
While we do not address the security of h, we can state that issuing proxy keys
does not weaken the system.
7.3.2 The unidirectional PRE
Aswe discussed before, a bidirectional PRE scheme can only be used in a limited
situation. As a result, a new concrete unidirectional scheme is proposed by [39] to
resolve the problem. A unidirectional re-encryption schememeans the re-encryption
key is used to transform the ciphertext from for Alice’s key into for Bob’s, while it
cannot transform it from for Bob to for Alice. The authors introduce a concrete unidi-
rectional mechanism involving some significant security properties such as collusion
resistance (one of themost essential goals in the design of unidirectional schemes)
without abandoning the property of chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security in the
standardmodel. Although like other unidirectional schemes, the new introduced
scheme is single hopwhile it is still efficient, and a noninteractive complexity assump-
tion in bilinear groups is required when proving the security of the scheme.
7.3.2.1 Concrete construction
Like the construction proposed by [38], the presented scheme uses a strongly
unforgeable one-time signature to tie several ciphertext components altogether and
offers a safeguard against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the fashion of [186]. For
simplicity, the description below assumes that verification keys of the one-time
signature are encoded as elements from Zp. In practice, such verification keys are
typically much longer than jpj, and a collision-resistant hash function should be
applied to map them onto Zp:
• Setup(λ). The algorithm is given a security parameter λ and chooses several
bilinear map groups ðG,GTÞ of prime order p2λ. Then it generates g, u, v R G
and chooses a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme Sig = (G,S,V)
(Sig means one-time signatures and you can learn more details in [39]’s work).
The global parameters are
par :¼ {G,GT, g, u, v, Sig}:
• Keygen(λ). User i sets his public key as Xi ¼ gxi for a random xi R Zp.
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• ReKeygen(xi, Xj). The algorithm is given user i’s private key xi and user j’s
public key Xj and generates the unidirectional re-encryption key
Rij ¼ X1=xij ¼ gxj=xi .
• Enc1(m,Xi, par). The encryptor encrypts a message m∈GT under the public
key Xi at the first level and proceeds as follows.
1. Select a one-time signature key pair ðssk, svkÞ R GðλÞ and set C1 ¼ svk.
2. Pick r, t R Zp and compute
C02 ¼ Xti  C″2 ¼ g1=t  C
000
2 ¼ Xrti   C3 ¼ eðg, gÞr m  C4 ¼ ðusvk  vÞr:
3.Generate a one-time signature σ ¼ Sðssk, ðC3, C4ÞÞ on ðC3, C4Þ.
The ciphertext is Ci ¼ ðC1, C02, C″2, C
000
2 , C3, C4, σÞ.
• Enc2(m,Xi, par). The encryptor encrypts a message m∈GT under the public
key Xi at level 2 and conducts the following steps:
1. Select a one-time signature key pair ðssk, svkÞ R GðλÞ and set C1 ¼ svk.
2. Choose r R Zp and compute
C2 ¼ Xri   C3 ¼ eðg, gÞr m  C4 ¼ ðusvk  vÞr:
3.Generate a one-time signature σ ¼ Sðssk, ðC3, C4ÞÞ on the pair ðC3, C4Þ.
The ciphertext is Ci ¼ ðC1, C2, C3, C4, σÞ.
• ReEnc(Rij, Ci). The algorithm is given the re-encryption key Rij ¼ gxj=xi and a
ciphertext Ci ¼ ðC1, C2, C3, C4, σÞ, and check the validity of the latter by
testing the following conditions:
eðC2, uC1  vÞ ¼ eðXi, C4Þ (7.1)
VðC1, σ, ðC3, C4ÞÞ ¼ 1: (7.2)
If all the steps are well formed, Ci is re-encrypted by choosing t R Zp and computing
C
0
2 ¼ Xti  C″2 ¼ R1=tij ¼ gðxj=xiÞt1  C
000
2 ¼ Ct2 ¼ Xrti   :
The re-encrypted ciphertext is
Cj ¼ ðC1, C02, C″2, C
000
2 , C3, C4, σÞ:
If they are ill formed, Ci is declared “invalid.”
• Dec1(Cj, skj). The validity of a level 1 ciphertext Cj is checked by testing if
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eðC02, C″2Þ ¼ eðXj, gÞ (7.3)
eðC0002 , uC1  vÞ ¼ eðC
0
2, C4Þ (7.4)
VðC1, σ, ðC3, C4ÞÞ ¼ 1: (7.5)
If relations (7.3)–(7.5) hold, the plaintext m ¼ C3=eðC″2,C0002 Þ1=xj will be output.
Otherwise, the algorithm exports “invalid.”
• Dec2(Ci, ski). If the level 2 ciphertext Ci ¼ ðC1, C2, C3, C4, σÞ satisfies relations
(7.1)–(7.2), receiver i can obtain m ¼ C3=eðC2, gÞ1=xi . The algorithm outputs
“invalid” otherwise.
Outputs of the re-encryption algorithm are perfectly indistinguishable from
level 1 ciphertext produced by the sender. Indeed, if ~t ¼ txi=xj, we can write
C
0
2 ¼ Xti ¼ X~t  j C″2 ¼ gðxj=xiÞt1 ¼ g~t1  C
000
3 ¼ Xrti ¼ Xr~t:j
As in the original scheme described in [37], second-level ciphertext, which is
stored in remote untrusted severs, can be changed into first-level ciphertext
encrypted for the same receiver if the identity element of G is used as a re-
encryption key.
In the first-level decryption algorithm, relations (7.3)–(7.5) guarantee that re-
encrypted ciphertext have the correct shape. Indeed, since the relation
C4 ¼ ðuC1  vÞr holds for some unknown exponent r∈Zp, equality (7.4) implies that
C
000
2 ¼ C
0r
2 . From (7.3), it comes that eðC″2, C
000
2 Þ ¼ eðXj, gÞr.
We finally note that first-level ciphertext can be publicly re-randomized by
converting ðC02, C″2, C″3Þ into ðC0s2 , C
001=s
2 , C
000s
3 Þ for a random s∈Zp. However, the
pairing value eðC″2, C0002 Þ remains constant and re-randomizations of a given first-
level ciphertext are publicly detectable.
7.3.2.2 Security proof
For convenience, we will prove security under an equivalent formulation of the
3-wDBDHI assumption.
Lemma 7.1. The 3-wDBDHI problem is equivalent to decide whether T equals
eðg, gÞb=a2 or a random value given ðg, g1=a, ga, gða2Þ, gbÞ as input.
Proof 7.1.With the given elements ðg, g1=a, ga, gða2Þ, gb, TÞ, we can construct a
3-wDBDHI instance by setting ðy ¼ g1=a, yA ¼ g, yðA2Þ ¼ ga, yðA3Þ ¼ gða2Þ, yB ¼ gbÞ,
which implicitly defines A ¼ a and B ¼ ab. Then, we compute eðy,yÞB=A ¼ eðg, gÞb=a2 .
The converse implication is easily established and demonstrates the equivalence
between both problems.
The intuition of security proof in the scheme is illustrated in Figure 7.4.
Theorem 7.1. Assuming the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature, the
scheme is RCCA-secure at level 2 under the 3-wDBDHI assumption.
Proof 7.2. Let ðg, A1 ¼ g1=a, A1 ¼ ga, A2 ¼ gða2Þ, B ¼ gb, TÞ be a modified
3-wDBDHI instance. We build an algorithm B deciding if T ¼ eðg, gÞb=a2 .
Before presenting B, we assume an event called FOTS and observe the probability
it may occurs. Let C ¼ ðsvk, C2, C3, C4, σÞ denote the challenge ciphertext given
to A in the game. Let FOTS be the event that, at some point, A issues a decryption
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query for a first-level ciphertext C ¼ ðsvk, C02, C″2, C
000
2 , C3, C4, σÞ or a re-encryption
query C ¼ ðsvk, C2, C3, C4, σÞ where ðC3, C4, σÞ 6¼ ðC3, C4, σÞ but
Vðσ, svk, ðC3, C4ÞÞ ¼ 1. In the “find” stage, A cannot learn any information about
svk. Hence, the probability of a pre-challenge occurrence of FOTS does not exceed
qO  δ if qO is the overall number of oracle queries and δ denotes the maximal
probability (which does not exceed 1=p according to the assumption) that any one-
time verification key svk is output by G. In the “guess” stage, FOTS clearly gives rise
to an algorithm breaking the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature.
Therefore, the probability Pr½FOTS ≤ qO=pþ AdvOTS, where the second term
accounts for the probability of definition 5, must be negligible by assumption.
We now proceed with the description of B that simply halts and outputs a
random bit if FOTS occurs. In a preparation phase, B generates a one-time signature
key pair ðssk, svkÞ  GðλÞ and provides A with public parameters including
u ¼ Aα11 and v ¼ Aα1svk

1  Aα22 for random α1, α2 
R
Z

p. Observe that u and v define a
“hash function” FðsvkÞ ¼ usvk  v ¼ Aα1ðsvksvkÞ1  Aα22 . In the following, we call HU as
the set of honest parties, including user i that is assigned the target public key pk,
and CU as the set of corrupt parties. Throughout the game, A’s environment is
simulated as follows:
• Key generation. Public keys of honest users i∈HU\ if g are defined as
Xi ¼ Axi1 ¼ gaxi for a randomly chosen xi 
R
Z

p. The target user’s public key is set
as Xi ¼ Axi2 ¼ gðxia
2Þ with xi R Zp. The key pair of a corrupt user i∈CU is set
Figure 7.4.
Intuition of security proof in IUCCS-PRE scheme.
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as ðXi ¼ gxi , xiÞ, for a random xi R Zp, so that pairs ðXi, xiÞ can be given toA. To
generate re-encryption keys Rij from player i to player j, B has to distinguish
several situations:
• If i∈HU\fig and j ¼ i, B returns Rii ¼ Axi=xi1 ¼ gxia
2=ðaxiÞ which is a
valid re-encryption key.
• If i ¼ i and j∈HU\fig, B responds with Rij ¼ Axi=xi1 ¼ gðaxi=ðxia
2ÞÞ that
has also the correct distribution.
• If i, j∈HU\fig, B returns Rij ¼ gxj=xi ¼ gðaxjÞ=ðaxiÞ.
• If i∈HU\fig and j∈CU, B outputs Rij ¼ Axj=xi1 ¼ gxj=ðaxiÞ which is also
computable.
• Re-encryption queries. When receiving a re-encryption query from user i to
user j for a second-level ciphertext Ci ¼ ðC1, C2, C3, C4, σÞ, B returns “invalid”
if relations (7.1)–(7.2) are not satisfied.
• If i 6¼ i or if i ¼ i and j∈HU\fig, B simply re-encrypts the
corresponding ciphertext with the re-encryption key Rij which is available
in either case.
• If i ¼ i and j∈CU.
• If C1 ¼ svk, B can observe the occurrence of FOTS and abort from the
game. Indeed, re-encryptions of the challenge ciphertext toward corrupt
users are disallowed in the “guess” stage. Therefore, ðC3, C4, σÞ 6¼
ðC3, C4, σÞ since we would have C2 6¼ C2 and i 6¼ i if ðC3, C4, σÞ ¼
ðC3, C4, σÞ.
• We now discuss the left case C1 6¼ svk, i ¼ i, and j∈CU. With the given
ciphertext C1=xi2 ¼ Ar2 and C4 ¼ FðsvkÞr ¼ ðAα1ðsvksvk
Þ
1  Aα22 Þr, B can compute
Ar1 ¼ ðgaÞr ¼
C4
C
α2=xi
2
 ! 1
α1ðsvksvkÞ
(7.6)
Knowing gar and user j’s private key xj, B picks t R Zp to compute
C
0
2 ¼ At1 ¼ gat  C20 0 ¼ A
xj=t
1 ¼ ðg1=aÞxj=t  C
000
2 ¼ ðAr1Þt ¼ ðgarÞt
and returns Cj ¼ ðC1, C02, C20 0 , C
000
2 , C3, C4, σÞ which has the proper distribution.
Indeed, if we set ~t ¼ at=xj, we have
C
0
2 ¼ Xj~t   C″2 ¼ g1=~t   C
000
2 ¼ Xr~t:j
• First-level decryption queries. At any time, Amay ask for the decryption of a
first-level ciphertext Cj ¼ ðC1, C02, C20 0 , C
000
2 , C3, C4, σÞ under a public key Xj. For
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such a request, B returns “invalid” if relations (7.3)–(7.5) do not hold. We
assume that j∈HU since B can decrypt using the known private key otherwise.
Let us first assume that C1 ¼ C1 ¼ svk. If ðC3, C4, σÞ 6¼ ðC3, C4, σÞ, B is
presented with an occurrence of FOTS and halts. If ðC3, C4, σÞ ¼ ðC3, C4, σÞ, B
outputs ⊥ which deems Cj as a derivative of the challenge pair ðC, XiÞ.
Indeed, it must be the case that eðC20 0 , C
000
2 Þ ¼ eðg,XjÞr for the same underlying
exponent r as in the challenge phase. We now assume C1 6¼ svk.
• If j∈HU\fig, Xj ¼ gaxj for a known xj ∈Zp. The validity of the ciphertext
ensures that eðC20 0 , C
000
2 Þ ¼ eðXj, gÞr ¼ eðg, gÞarxj and C4 ¼ FðsvkÞr ¼
gα1arðsvksvk
Þ  ga2rα2 for some r∈Zp. Therefore,
eðC4, A1Þ ¼ eðC4, g1=aÞ ¼ eðg, gÞα1rðsvksvkÞ  eðg, gÞarα2 , (7.7)
and
eðg, gÞr ¼ eðC4,A1Þ
eðC20 0 ,C
000
2 Þα2=xj
 ! 1
α1ðsvksvkÞ
, (7.8)
reveals the plaintext m since svk 6¼ svk.
• If j ¼ i, we have Xj ¼ gðxia2Þ for a known exponent xi ∈Zp. Since we
know that
eðC20 0 , C
000
2 Þ ¼ eðXi , gÞr ¼ eðg, gÞa
2rxi ,
eðC4, gÞ ¼ eðg, gÞα1arðsvksvkÞ  eðg, gÞa
2rα2 ,
B can first obtain
γ ¼ eðg, gÞar ¼ eðC4, gÞ
eðC20 0 ,C
000
2 Þα2=xi
 ! 1
α1ðsvksvkÞ
:
Together with relation (7.7), γ in turn uncovers
eðg, gÞr ¼ eðC4,A1Þ
γα2=xi
  1
α1ðsvksvkÞ
and gets the plaintext m ¼ C3=eðg, gÞr:
In the “guess” stage,Bmust check thatm differs frommessagesm0;m1 involved in the
challenge query. Ifm∈ {m0, m1}, B returns ⊥ according to the RCCA security rules.
• Challenge. When she decides that the first phase is over, A chooses messages
ðm0, m1). At this stage, B flips a coin d R {0; 1} and generates the challenge
ciphertext C as
C1 ¼ svk  C2 ¼ Bxi   C3 ¼ md  T  C4 ¼ Bα2 ,
and σ ¼ Sðssk, ðC3, C4ÞÞ:
199
Proxy Re-Encryption for Secure Access Delegation
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79903
The whole game is described in Figure 7.5.
Since Xi ¼ Axi2 ¼ gxia
2
and B ¼ gb, C is a valid encryption of md with the
random exponent r ¼ b=a2 if T ¼ eðg, gÞb=a2 . In contrast, if T is a random element in
GT, C perfectly hides md , and A cannot guess d
 with better probability than 1=2.
When A eventually outputs her result d
0
∈ {0; 1}, B decides that T ¼ eðg, gÞb=a2 if
d
0 ¼ d or T is random otherwise.
Theorem 7.2. Assuming the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature, the
scheme is RCCA-secure at level 1 under the 3-wDBDHI assumption.
Proof 7.3. The proof is very similar to the one of theorem 1. We construct an
algorithm; B is given a 3-wDBDHI instance ðg, A1 ¼ g1=a, A1 ¼ ga, A2 ¼ gða2Þ,
B ¼ gb, TÞ and uses the adversary A to decide if T ¼ eðg, gÞb=a2 .
Before describing B, we consider the same event FOTS as the one in the proof of
theorem 1 except that it can only arise during a decryption query (since there is no
re-encryption oracle). Assuming the strong unforgeability of the one-time signa-
ture, such an event occurs with negligible probability as detailed in the proof of
Theorem 1. We can now describe our simulator B that simply aborts and outputs a
random bit if FOTS ever occurs. Let also C ¼ ðC1, C
0
2 , C
00
2 , C
000
2 , C

3, C

4, σ
Þ denote
the challenge ciphertext at the first level.
Algorithm B generates a one-time key pair ðssk, svkÞ  GðλÞ and the same
public parameters as in theorem 1. Namely, it sets u ¼ Aα11 and v ¼ Aα1svk

1  Aα22
with α1, α2 R Zp so that FðsvkÞ ¼ usvk¡¤  v ¼ Aα1ðsvksvk
Þ
1  Aα22 . As in the proof of the-
orem 1, i identifies the target receiver. The attack environment is simulated as
follows:
• Key generation. For corrupt users i∈CU and honest ones, i∈HU\{i},B sets
Xi ¼ gxi for a random xi R Zp. The target user’s public key is defined as
Xi ¼ A1. For corrupt users i∈CU, Xi and xi are both revealed. All
Figure 7.5.
RCCA game in IUCCS-PRE scheme.
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re-encryption keys are computable and given to A. Namely, Rij ¼ gxj=xi if
i, j 6¼ i; Rij ¼ Axj1 and Rji ¼ A
1=xj
1 for j 6¼ i.
• First-level decryption queries. When a ciphertext Cj ¼ ðC1, C02, C
00
2, C
000
2 , C3,
C4, σÞ is queried for decryption with a public key Xj, B returns “invalid” if
relations (7.3)–(7.5) do not hold. We assume that j ¼ i since B can decrypt
using the known private key xj otherwise. We have C
0
2 ¼ At1, C
00
2 ¼ g1=t,
C
000
2 ¼ Art1 for unknown exponents r, t∈Zp. Since eðC
00
2, C
000
2 Þ ¼ eðg, gÞar and
eðC4, A1Þ ¼ eðg, gÞα1rðsvksvk
Þ  eðg, gÞarα2 ,
B can obtain
eðg, gÞr ¼ eðC4,A1Þ
eðC200 ,C0002 Þα2
 ! 1
α1ðsvksvkÞ
,
which reveals the plaintext m ¼ C3=eðg, gÞr as long as svk 6¼ svk. In the event that
C1 ¼ svk holds in a post-challenge query:
• If eðC200 , C
000
2 Þ ¼ eðC
00
2 , C
000
2 Þ, B returns ⊥ which means that Cj is merely a re-
randomization (and thus a derivative) of the challenge ciphertext.
• Otherwise, we necessarily have ðC3, C4, σÞ 6¼ ðC3, C4, σÞ, which is an
occurrence of FOTS and implies B’s termination.
In the “guess” stage, B must ensure that m differs from messages m0, m1 of the
challenge phase before answering the query.
• Challenge. When the first phase is over, A outputs messages ðm0;m1Þ and B
flips a bit d R {0; 1}. Then, it chooses μ R Zp and sets
C
0
2 ¼ Aμ2   C
00
2 ¼ A1=μ1   C
000
2 ¼ Bμ
C1 ¼ svk  C3 ¼ md  T  C4 ¼ Bα2 ,
and σ ¼ Sðssk, ðC3, C4ÞÞ.
Since Xi ¼ A1 and B ¼ gb, C is a valid encryption of md with the random
exponents r ¼ b=a2 and t ¼ aμ whenever T ¼ eðg, gÞb=a2 . When T is a random mes-
sage, C perfectly hides md and A cannot guess d
 with better probability than 1=2.
Eventually, B bets that T ¼ eðg, gÞb=a2 if A correctly guesses d and that T is random
otherwise.
7.3.3 Identity-based PRE
In an identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) scheme, Alice can give proxy
a re-encryption key. Proxy can convert an encryption computed under Alice’s
public key into an encryption intended for Bob. Proxy isn’t trusted, so it cannot
get Alice’s and Bob’s private key and it also cannot get any information from
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ciphertexts. Green and Ateniese [45] firstly use PRE to deal with this problem.
Now, we will talk about a kind of IBPRE scheme with CCA security.
7.3.3.1 Concrete construction
• Setup(k). Let n be a polynomial in the security parameter k. Let
e:G1  G1 ! GT be a bilinear map, where G1, GT have order q and G1 = <g>.
Selecting a parameter s $ Zp and output par = (H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, g, gs),
msk = s. H1!6 is defined as
H1 : f0, 1g ! G1, H2 :: f0, 1g ! G1, H3 :: f0, 1g ! G1
H4 : GT  f0,1gn ! Zq, H5 : GT ! f0,1gn
.
• Keygen(par, msk, id). To add identity information into the key, return
skid ¼ H1ðidÞs, id∈ {0; 1}.
• Enc(par, id, {0; 1}n). To encrypt m under id∈ {0; 1}, the steps are in the
following words:
• Select δ $ GT, and set r = H4ðδ, mÞ.
• Compute c
0 ¼ ðgr, δ•eðgs, H1ðidÞrÞ, m⊕H5ðδÞÞ.
• Compute S ¼ H3ðid||c0Þr.
• Output the ciphertext c ¼< S, c0>.
• ReKeygen(par, skid1 , id1, id2). To compute the re-encryption key from di1 to
id2:
• Select N $ {1;0}n, and compute K ¼ eðskid, H1ðid2Þ).
• Output rkid1!id2 ¼< N,H2ðK||id1||id2||NÞ•skid1 >
• ReEnc(par, rkid1!id2, cid1 ). To re-encrypt a first-level ciphertext, first parse cid1
as (S, A, B, C), and parse rkid1!id2 as <N, R>. Next:
• Let h ¼ H3ðid1|| < A, B, C >Þ.
• Check if e(g, S) = e(h, A). If not, return ⊥.
• Otherwise, select t $ Zq and compute B
0 ¼ B=ðeðA,R•htÞ=eðgt, SÞÞ.
• Output the re-encrypted ciphertext cid2 ¼ ðA, B
0
, C, id1, NÞ.
• Dec1(par, skid, cid). To decrypt a first-level ciphertext, first parse cid as (S, A,
B, C). Next:
• Let h ¼ H3ðid, < A, B, C >Þ.
• Select t $ Zq, and compute δ0 ¼ B=eðA, skid•htÞ=eðgt, SÞ.
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• Compute m
0 ¼ C⊕H5ðδ0Þ, and r0 ¼ H4ðδ0 , m0).
• Verify that S ¼ hr
0
and A ¼ gr0 . If either check fails, return ⊥; otherwise
output m
0
.
• Dec2(par, skid, cid). To decrypt a second-level ciphertext, first parse cid as (A,
B, C, idsrc, N). Next:
• Compute K ¼ eðH1ðidsrc, skidÞÞ.
• Compute δ
0 ¼ B•eðA,H2ðK||idsrc||id||NÞÞ.
• Compute m
0 ¼ C⊕H5ðδ0 , m0).
• Verify that A ¼ gr0 . If this check fails, return ⊥; otherwise output m0 .
Now, we talk about the correctness of this scheme. Firstly, we show correctness
for first-level ciphertext. Let cid1 ¼< S, A, B,C >¼< hr, gr, δ•eðgs, H1ðidÞrÞ, m
⊕H5ðδÞÞ > be the first-level encryption of m under id1, with h ¼ H3ðid1||
< A, B, C >Þ. Let sk1 ¼ H1ðid1Þs be the decryption key. For a random t∈Zq, the
decryption process proceeds as follows:
ðδ•eðgs,H1ðid1ÞÞrÞ=ðeðgr, H1ðid1Þs•htÞ=eðgt, hrÞÞ ¼ δ,
H5ðδÞ⊕ ðm⊕H5ðδÞÞ ¼ m
gH4ðδ,mÞ ¼? gr
hH4ðδ,mÞ ¼? hr.
The correctness under re-encryption is shown as follows. Given a first-level
ciphertext and a correctly formed re-encryption key rkid1!id2 ¼ < N,R >, then we
check the ciphertext as
eðg, hrÞ ¼? eðh, grÞ.
Recall that R ¼ skid1•Wwhere W ¼ H2ðeðH1ðid1Þs, H1ðid2ÞÞ||id1||id2||NÞ. To gen-
erate the second-level ciphertext cid2 ¼ ðA, B
0
, C, id1, NÞ, for some t∈ RZq, we obtain
B
0 ¼ ðδ•eðgs,H1ðid1ÞÞrÞ=ðeðgr, R•htÞ=eðgt, hrÞÞ ¼ δ=eðgr,WÞ.
Given skid2 ¼ H1ðid2Þs we decrypt cid2 ¼ ðA, B
0
, C, id1, NÞ ¼ ðgr, δ=eðgr,WÞ,
m⊕H5ðδÞ, NÞ as follows:
H2ðeðH1ðid1Þ, H1ðid2ÞsÞ||id1||id2||NÞ ¼W
ðδ=eðgr,WÞÞ • eðgr,WÞ ¼ δ
H5ðδÞ⊕ ðm⊕H5ðδÞÞ ¼ m
gH4ðδ,mÞ ¼? gr.
7.3.3.2 Security proof
We will prove the security of this scheme. The intuition of security proof in the
scheme is illustrated in Figure 7.6.
203
Proxy Re-Encryption for Secure Access Delegation
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79903
Let A be a p.p.t. algorithm that has a non-negligible advantage ε in attacking the
scheme. We use A in order to construct a second algorithm B which has a non-
negligible advantage at solving the DBDH problem in G1, GT . Algorithm B accepts
as input a properly distributed tuple < G1 ¼< g > , ga, gb, gc, T > ∈G41  GT and
outputs 1 if T ¼ eðg, gÞabc. We now describe algorithm B, which interacts with
algorithm A via the IND-Pr-ID-CPA interface.
Oracle Queries. B simulates the random oracles H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 as follows:
• H1: {0; 1}
 ! G1: On receipt of a new query for id, select y, z $ Zq and
randomly set α∈0=1 such that Pr½α ¼ 0 ¼ γ. If α ¼ 0 compute h ðgcÞz; if
α ¼ 1 compute h gz. Record the tuple (id, h, y, z, α) and return h. Notice that
h is correctly distributed.
• H2: {0; 1}
 ! G1. On a new query X ∈ {0; 1}, return x $ G1 and record (X, x).
• H3: {0; 1}
 ! G1. On receipt of a new query s∈ {0; 1} of the form (id||<A, B,
C>), select z $ Zq and randomly set α∈ {0; 1} such that Pr½α ¼ 0 ¼ γ. Compute
H1ðidÞ to obtain the tuple ðid, h1, y1, z1, α1Þ: Ifα ¼ α1; then set h ¼ gz; if α ¼ 0
and α1 ¼ 1, then set hðgcÞz; if α ¼ 1 and α1 ¼ 0, then set h ¼ gz=ðgcÞy
1
1 z1 . Record
the tuple ðs, h, z, αÞ and return h. Notice that h is correctly distributed.
Figure 7.6.
Intuition of security proof in IUCCS-PRE scheme.
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• H4 : GT  {0; 1}n ! Zq. On a receipt of a new query ðδ, mÞ, return r 
$
Zq and
record ðδ, m, r, grÞ.
• H5 : GT ! {0; 1}n. On receipt of a newquery δ, return p $ {0; 1}n and record ðδ, pÞ.
The game between attacker A and challenger B is running as follows:
• Select. Choose i $ {0; 1}.
• Setup. B generates the scheme’s master parameters par ¼ ðG1, H1, H2, H3, H4,
H5, g, g
aÞ and gives par to A.
• Find. In this stage, A can issue any things without restriction.
• Challenge. After finishing the find stage, A submits ðid, m0, m1Þ. B forms the
challenge ciphertext as follows:
• Choose δ $ GT, p $ {0; 1}n, and insert ðδ, pÞ into the H5 table. Insert
ðδ, mb, •, gbÞ into the H4 table. Evaluate H1ðidÞ and obtain the recorded
value z.
• Compute ðA, B, CÞ ¼< gb, δ•Tz, p⊕mi >.
• Select z1 $ Zpandinsertðid|| < ðA, B, C > , z1, gz1 , α1 ¼ 1Þ into the H3
table, and compute S ¼ ðgbÞz1 .
B outputs the challenge ciphertext c ¼ ðS, A, B, CÞ ¼ ðgby, gb, δ•Tz, p⊕miÞ to A
and begins the guess stage.
Guess. In the guess stage, A is restricted from issuing the following queries:
• ðextract, idÞ:id is the challenge identity.
• ðdecrypt, id, cÞ:c is the challenge ciphertext.
• Any pair of queries < ðrkextract, id, idiÞ, ðextract, idiÞ >.
• Any pair of queries < ðreencrypt, id, idi, cÞ, ðextract, idiÞ >.
• Any pair of queries < ðrkextract, id, idiÞ, ðdecrypt, idi, ciÞ > :ci ¼
ReEncðrkid!idi , cÞ:
Now, we let id be the target identity, and parse the challenge ciphertext c as
ðS, A, B, CÞ. In both phases, B responds to A’s queries as follows:
• On (decrypt, id, c), where stage id 6¼ id, b evaluates H1ðidÞ to obtain ðz, αÞ. B
outputs skid ¼ ðgaÞz to A.
• On ðrkextract, id1, id2Þ, B selects N $ {0; 1}n and returns the value:
rkid1!id2 ¼< ðgaÞz1•H2ðeðgaz1 , H1ðid2ÞÞ||id1||id2||NÞ, N >.
• On (decrypt, id, c), if ðid, cÞ 6¼ ðid, cÞ, check whether c is a level-1 or level-2
ciphertext.
For a level-1 ciphertext, B parses c as (S, A, B, C) and:
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• Looks up the value A in the H4 table, to obtain the tuple ðδ, m, rÞ. If A is
not in the table, or A ¼ A, then B returns ⊥ to A.
• Checks that S ¼ H3ðid|| < A,B,C >Þr. If not, B returns ⊥ to A.
• Checks that δ ¼ B=eðga, H1ðidÞrÞ. If not, B returns ⊥ to A.
• Checks that C ¼ H5ðδÞ⊕m. If not, B returns ⊥ to A.
• Otherwise, B returns m to A.
For a level-2 ciphertext, B parses c as ðA, B,C, idsrc, NÞ and:
• Computes H1ðidsrcÞ, H1ðidÞ to obtain ðh1, z1, α1Þ, ðh2, z2, α2Þ. If both
α1 ¼ α2 ¼ 0, then stop the game. If id ¼ id, let
K ¼ eðH1ðidÞ, ðgaÞz1Þ. Otherwise, let K ¼ eðH1ðidsrcÞ, ðgaÞz2Þ.
• Let δ
0 ¼ B=eðA,H2ðK||idsrc||id||NÞÞ. Let m0 ¼ C⊕H5ðδ0Þ, and let
r
0 ¼ H4ðδ0 , m0Þ. If gr
0 ¼ A, return m0 to A.
• If not, look up A in the H4 table to obtain ðr, δ, mÞ. Check that
C ¼ H5ðδÞ⊕m and B ¼ eðga, H1ðidsrcÞrÞ•m=eðA, rkidsrc!idÞ. If the
answer is yes, return m. Otherwise, return ⊥.
• On ðreencrypt, id1, id2Þ, B parses c as (S, A, B, C) and:
• Computes H ¼ H3ðid1|| < A,B, C >Þ, and performs the ciphertext validity
check eðg, SÞ ¼ eðH,AÞ.If this check does not succeed, B returns ⊥ to A.
• If ðid1, AÞ ¼ ðid, AÞ and c 6¼ c, then B runs a forgery event that will be
described in the next section.
• B selects N $ {0; 1}n, and:
If id1 ¼ id, B computes H1ðid1Þ to obtain ðh1, y1, z1, α1Þ and evaluates
H3ðid1 || < A,B, C >Þ to obtain ðH, z2, α2Þ. If α2 ¼ 0, stop the game.
Otherwise, B selects t $ {0; 1}q and computes δ
0 ¼ B=ðeðA,Hy1tÞ=eðgy1t,SÞÞ.
Finally, B outputs
cid2 ¼ ðA, δ
0
•eðA,H2ðeðH1ðid1Þ, ðgaÞz2Þ||id1||id2||NÞÞ, C, id1, NÞ.
If id1 6¼ id, B outputs cid2 ¼ ReEncðpar, rkid1!id2 , cÞ.
At the end, A outputs its guess bit i
0
.
Forgery events. In this section, B operates as follows. On values
id1, id
, c ¼ ðS, A, B, CÞ, and c ¼ ðS, A, B, CÞ. Let H ¼ H3ðid1|| < A, B, C >Þ and
extract the H3 table value y.
By the definition of H3, it holds that Pr½H ¼ gcz ≥ γ. In this case we substitute into
the validity check to obtain eðg, SÞ ¼ eðgcz, gbÞ which finds S ¼ gbcz. B computes
S
0 ¼ Sz1 ¼ gbc, and solves DBDH as if orge  ðeðS0, gaÞ ¼? TÞ. If all conditions are satis-
fied, B returns if orge as the result. Lemma. If there exists a p.p.t. algorithm A
0
with
non-negligible advantage ε
0
at distinguishing the simulation above from a “correct”
simulation (in which all values are correctly formed), then we can construct an
algorithm B
0
that solves the DBDHproblem in ðG1, GTÞwith non-negligible advantage.
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Proof. Let P1 ¼ Pr½i ¼ i0  when A0 is given correctly distributed values as in the
real attack, and P2 ¼ Pr½i ¼ i0  when A0 is given one or more invalid re-encryption
key(s) of the form described above. Let A
0
be an algorithm such that |P1?P2| > νðkÞ :
i:e:; A
0
has this advantage at distinguishing the simulations. We use distinguishing
A
0
to construct B
0
that solves DBDH with probability > νðkÞ.
We do not specify the full details of B
0
’s simulation but instead reuse much of the
simulation above. Given a tuple ðg, ga, gb, gc, TÞ, let ðg, gaÞ be the public key given to
A
0
. We contrive the H1 oracle to (probabilistically) output gbzi (for some known zi)
on input H1ðidiÞ and gcz1 (for known z1) on input H1ðidÞ. When A0 extracts a single
re-encryption key, rkid?!idi , B
0
computes the key as gaz1•W where
W ¼ H2ðTz1zi ||id||id1||NÞ: that ðz1, ziÞ are randomly distributed and outside of
the view of A
0
. Note also that when T ¼ eðg, gÞabc, then Tz1zi is correctly distributed;
otherwise Tz1zi is a random element.
When T is random, then A
0
has a negligible probability of issuing an oracle call
on H2ðTz1zi ||id||id1||NÞ. Conversely, when T ¼ eðg, gÞabc, it must be the case that A0
issues a call on H2ðTz1zi ||id||id1||NÞ with probability > νðkÞ:B0 examines the trace to
find such a call, and if it is present, outputs 1, and otherwise outputs 0. Using
standard arguments, we may extend this claim to address a case where A
0
extracts
multiple incorrectly formed re-encryption keys.
The whole game is described in Figure 7.7.
7.3.4 The identity-based PRE with mobile access
Zhou et al. [204] introduce an impressive proxy re-encryption scheme,
referred to as identity-based proxy re-encryption version 2 (IBPRE2). The
IBPRE2 successfully creates a hybrid identity-based re-encryption scheme
adopting two separating mechanisms, IBBE and IBE, which require different
parameters and algorithms. In the scheme, a user could authorize a proxy to
Figure 7.7.
CCA game in IBPRE scheme.
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transform an encrypted data computed by an IBBE algorithm into an encrypted
data which can be recognized by IBE scheme; meanwhile the proxy cannot
learn any information about the plaintext nor receive any assistance from the
cloud service provider. The authors introduce the framework of the IBPRE2 and
define its security. An IBPRE2 mechanism exploits the re-encryption method
connecting an IBBE system and an IBE system. At the system setup stage, the
system initializes the parameters required by the two subsystems (IBBE and
IBE) and performs the two systems in the standard way. And an IBBE user
can allow a specified IBE user to decrypt a ciphertext by directly generating
a re-encryption key and sending it to the proxy, which could convert an
IBBE-encrypted data into an IBE-encrypted data.
Considering the IBBE and IBE’s CCA security, the authors also define the same
selective-identity and adaptively chosen ciphertext security of the IBPRE2 (selec-
tive CCA security) as the two schemes. Considering the re-encryption mechanism is
proposed, additionally queries involving re-encryption algorithm and re-encryption
key generation algorithm, as well as the decryption algorithm for re-encrypted
ciphertext, are provided to the attackers in the challenge game, while the attackers
still cannot distinguish the re-encrypted messages.
7.3.4.1 Concrete construction
We now describe the IBPRE2 scheme which converts a ciphertext of the
IBBE scheme introduced by [207] into a ciphertext of the tamed IBE scheme. The
construction is built from prime-order bilinear groups. The PKG runs ðp,G,GT, eÞ
 Gð1λÞ to generate two cyclic groupsG andGT of prime order p and a bilinear map
e : GG! GT with an input security parameter λ. IBPRE2 scheme proposed
by [204] is described as follows:
• Setup(1λ). Let l ≤ |p| 2. Choose two coding functions F1 : {0; 1}lþ1 ! GT and
F2 : {0; 1}l ! GT. Choose a generator g∈G and two random elements α∈Zp
and h∈G. Set ðm 1Þ as the maximal size of the broadcasting receiver set, and
compute g1 ¼ gα, hα, hα
2
;…;hα
m
. For the IBBE system, define the public key
PKIBBE ¼
	
g1, eðg, hÞ, h, hα;…;hα
m
, HðÞ, F1ðÞ, F2ðÞ


and themaster secret keyMSKIBBE ¼ ðg, αÞ, where the hash functionH: {0; 1} ! Zp.
Then, define the public key and master secret key for the IBE system as
PKIBE ¼
	
g1, eðg, hÞ, h, hα:;HðÞ, F1ðÞ


,
MSKIBE ¼ ðg, αÞ:
Note that PKIBE is a part of PKIBBE andMSKIBE ¼MSKIBBE. We setMSK ¼
MSKIBBE ¼MSKIBE:
• KeyGenIBBEðPKIBBE,MSK, IDÞ ¼ KeyGenIBEðPKIBE,MSK, IDÞ. Given an
identity ID andMSK ¼ ðg, αÞ, the algorithm outputs the secret key
SKID ¼ SKIBE, ID ¼ SKIBBE, ID ¼ g
1
αþHðIDÞ:
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• EncryptIBBE (PKIBBE, S, Msg). To encrypt a message Msg with the set of
identities, S ¼ {IDi}ni¼1, where n < m, the algorithm computesM ¼ F1ðMsg||0Þ.
Choose a random s∈Zp and compute
C0 ¼ M  eðg,hÞs,   C1 ¼ gs1 ,
and a hash value V ¼ HðC0, C1Þ. Form
C2 ¼ hs
Qn
i¼1ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþVÞ:
Output CTS ¼ ðC0, C1, C2Þ:
The IBE encryption EncryptIBEðPKIBE, ID,MsgÞ is defined the same as the proposed
IBE scheme except that the message to be encrypted isM ¼ F1ðMsg||0Þ.
• RKGenðPKIBBE, SKIDj , S, IDÞ. This step would convert CTS into a ciphertext
for ID. Given the public key PKIBBE, a set of identities S ¼ {IDi}ni¼1 with n < m,
and a secret key SKIDj for IDj ∈ S, the re-encryption key generation algorithm
chooses a random k∈ {0; 1}l, computes F2ðkÞ, and obtains
R Encrypt0IBEðPKIBE, ID, kÞ, where Encrypt
0
IBE is identical to EncryptIBE
except that the message to be encrypted isM ¼ F1ðk||1Þ. Finally, output the
re-encryption key as
RKS!ID ¼ ðSKIDj  F2ðkÞ, RÞ:
ReEnc(PKIBE, RKS!ID, CTS). Parse RKS!ID ¼ ðd, RÞ that is given by the user IDj ∈ S,
to re-encrypt CTS ¼ ðC0, C1, C2Þ. And then compute V ¼ HðC0, C1Þ and check if
eðg1, C2Þ ¼ e
	
C11 , h
Qn
i¼1ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþVÞ


holds. If not, output a false symbol ⊥. Otherwise, select a random t∈Zp and compute
d1 ¼ d  gt1,   d2 ¼ h
Qn
i¼1ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþVÞ
d3 ¼ ðd2Þt ¼ ht
Qn
i¼1ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþVÞ:
Also compute
K ¼ h
1
α
	Qn
i¼1;i 6¼jðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþVÞ
Qn
i¼1;i 6¼j HðIDiÞV


:
Then, output CTID ¼ ðCTS, R, d1, d2, d3, KÞ.
• Decrypt(PK,CT, SKID). Given the public key PK ¼ PKIBBE⊃PKIBE, a ciphertext
CT, and a secret key SKID for identity ID, the algorithm runs as follows.
• If CT is a ciphertext of the IBE system, the algorithm performs the same
executions of the decryption of the IBE scheme to outputM ¼ F1ðMsg||0Þ.
Then recover Msg by removing the last bit from F11 ðMÞ.
• If CT is a ciphertext of the IBBE system, the algorithm performs the same
executions of the decryption of the CCA-secure IBBE scheme described
by [207] to outputM ¼ F1ðMsg||0Þ. Then recover Msg by removing the
last bit from F11 ðMÞ.
209
Proxy Re-Encryption for Secure Access Delegation
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79903
• If CT is a re-encrypted ciphertext, let CT ¼ CTID ¼ ðC0, C1, C2, R, d1,
d2, d3, KÞ for identity ID. Suppose that CTID is re-encrypted by the re-
encryption key that is generated by the user IDj ∈ S. Check if the following
equations holds:
• eðg1, C2Þ ¼ e
	
C11 , h
Qn
i¼1ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþVÞ


and
• eðd1F12 ðkÞ, d2Þ ¼ eðg1, d3Þ  eðg1, KÞ  eðg,hÞ
Qn
i¼1;i6¼j HðIDiÞV , where V ¼ HðC0, C1Þ
and k Decrypt0ðPKIBE, SKID, RÞ.
We define Decrypt
0
the same as Decrypt except that it outputs k if the
decrypted message ends with bit “1” and outputs ⊥ if it ends with bit “0.” If any one
of the equations does not hold, output ⊥; otherwise, compute
M
0 ¼
	
eðC1,KÞ  eðd1F12 ðkÞ,C2Þ  eðC1,d3Þ

 1Qn
i¼1;i 6¼j HðIDjÞV,
andM ¼ C0=M0 . Compute F11 ðMÞ ¼Msg||B. If B ¼ 0, output message Msg;
otherwise, output ⊥.
Remark 7.1. In the encryption algorithm, we append an additional bit (0 or 1)
onto the end of the message in order to distinguish the encryption of a message and
the encryption of a random value used in the re-encryption key generation, so that
in the security proof, the adversary is unable to take the challenge ciphertext as R in
the re-encrypted ciphertext to query the decryption oracle and obtain some useful
information.
Remark 7.2. In the re-encryption algorithm, the proxy computes the component
K in order to reduce the burden of decryption for re-encrypted ciphertext on the
delegatee’s side. Since in the original IBBE scheme this component can be publicly
computed, it will not damage the security of the message encrypted in the ciphertext.
Correctness 1. If CT is a ciphertext of IBBE or IBE, the correctness follows the
correctness of the IBBE proposed by [208] and the tamed IBE, respectively.
If CT is a properly re-encrypted ciphertext, the correctness follows from the
following validations:
eðd1F11 ðkÞ, d2Þ ¼ e g
1
αþHðIDjÞF2ðkÞ  gt1  F12 ðkÞ, h
Yn
i¼1
ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþ VÞ
0BB@
1CCA
¼ e
	
gt1, h
Yn
i¼1
ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþ VÞ

 eðg, hΔjðaÞÞ
¼ e
	
g1, h
t
Yn
i¼1
ðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþ VÞ

 e gα, h
1
α
	
ΔjðαÞ
Yn
i¼1, i 6¼j
HðIDjÞV

0BBB@
1CCCA
 e
	
g, h
Yn
i¼1, i 6¼j
HðIDjÞV

¼ eðg1, d3Þ  eðg1, KÞ  eðg,hÞ
Yn
i¼1, i 6¼j
HðIDiÞV
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where ΔjðαÞ ¼
Qn
i¼1;i 6¼jðαþHðIDiÞÞðαþ VÞ. If the checks pass, observe that
M″¼ eðC1, KÞ  eðd1F12 ðkÞ, C2Þ  eðC1, d3Þ
¼ e gαs, h
1
α
	
ΔjðαÞ
Yn
i¼1, i 6¼j
HðIDiÞV

0BBB@
1CCCA
¼ e g
1
αþHðIDjÞ  gt1, h
s
Yn
i¼1
ðαþ hðIDiÞÞðαþ VÞ
0BB@
1CCA,
¼ e
	
g, h
s
	
ΔjðαÞ
Yn
i¼1, i6¼j
HðIDiÞV



 eðg, hsΔjðαÞÞ
¼ eðg,hÞ
s
Yn
i¼1, i 6¼j
HðIDiÞV
andM
0 ¼ ðM00Þ
1Qn
i¼1;i 6¼j HðIDiÞV ¼ eðg,hÞs. It then follows thatM ¼ C0=M0 .
The game between A and challenger is introduced in Figure 7.8.
7.3.4.2 Security model
We now show the selective CCA security of the IBPRE2 scheme. The CCA
security of the IBBE scheme introduced by [207] can be easily achieved by follow-
ing the [209] approach. Similar with the tamed CCA-secure IBE, an additional
“identity” that is only used for ciphertext validity test is also introduced into the
Figure 7.8.
Security game in IBPRE2 scheme.
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secret keys and ciphertexts of the IBBE scheme. We can use the same technique in
the proof of Theorem 1 to prove the CCA security of the IBBE scheme.
The following theorem shows that the proposed IBPRE2 scheme is selectively
secure against chosen-ciphertext attack if the proposed IBE scheme and the IBBE
scheme introduced by [207] are selectively CCA-secure.
Theorem 7.3. If there exists an adversary A which has an advantage AdvIBPRE2
A
in
breaking the CCA security of the IBPRE2 system, then we can construct an algorithm B
that breaks the CCA security of the IBBE scheme proposed by [208] and the proposed IBE
scheme with advantage ?ε1 and ε2, respectively, satisfying
ε1þ ε2 ≥AdvIBPRE2A =eð1þ qKÞ,
where e is the base of natural logarithm and qK is the maximum number of A’s secret
key queries.
Proof 7.4. Given an adversary A breaking the IBPRE2 scheme, we build an
algorithm B which interacts with A to break the selective CCA security of the
IBBE scheme introduced by [207] or the proposed IBE scheme. The adversary is
allowed to query the re-encryption for identity sets of its choice. To respond to
A
0RKRevealðS! IDÞ queries, algorithm B has to call the key generation oracle of
the IBBE scheme and then applies the output keys to run the RKGen algorithm to
obtain the requested re-encryption keys. In an unwanted case, B is queried by the
adversary to generate re-encryption key for the challenge identity set S. Unfortu-
nately, algorithm B cannot respond by giving the queried key. This is because that
the security definition of IBBE forbids key queries for the challenge identity set and
B cannot obtain the correct IBBE secret key. We let B generate real keys with a
determined probability and output random keys with the complementary probabil-
ity. To this end, we create a table Z ¼ ðβ∈ {0; 1}, S, ID, RKÞ to record queried keys,
and let B output a real key when β ¼ 1 and output a random key when β ¼ 0. The
real re-encryption keys and random ones need to be proved indistinguishable in
A’s view.
The algorithm B first runs the setup algorithm of the IBBE scheme introduced
by [207] with input m to get public key PK
0
. It also picks two encoding functions F1
and F2 to form public key PK ¼ ðPK 0 , F1, F2Þ. We no longer discriminate PKIBBE and
PKIBE since the former includes the latter. The algorithm B also maintains a table
Z ¼ ðβ, S, ID, RKÞ initialized to be empty. Algorithm B interacts with adversaryA as
follows:
• Init. The adversary A outputs an identity S to be attacked.
• Setup. Algorithm B gives the public key PK to A.
• Phase 1. The adversary A makes the following queries:
• Reveal(ID∉ S). Algorithm B flips a random β∈ {0; 1}, so that Pr½β ¼ 1
with a probability θ which will be determined later. If β ¼ 0, or
ð0;  , ID, Þ exists on the table, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise, it runs
the key generation algorithm of the IBBE scheme to create a secret key for
ID. B returns this key to A and records ðβ,  , ID,⊥Þ on table Z.
• RKReveal(S! ID). Algorithm B flips a random β∈ {0; 1}. If β ¼ 1 and
S 6¼ S, or ð1;S,  ,⊥Þ exists on the table, algorithm B first calls the key
generation algorithm of the IBBE scheme to output a secret key for an
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identity in S and then uses this key to generate a re-encryption key RK
with S to ID. B sends RK to A. Otherwise, B returns a random
re-encryption key RK ¼ ðD,Encrypt0IBEðPK, ID, zÞÞ, where D is a random
element of G and z is a random string. Finally, B writes ðβ, S, ID, RKÞ in
table Z.
• Re-Encryption(S, ID,CTS). If ð, S, ID, Þ does not exist on the table,
which means that A has not queried the re-encryption key from S to ID,
algorithm B runs the RKGen algorithm to obtain a re-encryption key
RKS!ID and writes ð, S, ID, RKS!DÞ on the table. Then, B runs the ReEnc
algorithm using RKS!ID to re-encrypt CTS and returns the re-encrypted
ciphertext to A.
• Decryption(CT). If CT is a regular ciphertext for S, algorithm B forwards
it to the decryption oracle of the IBBE scheme and returns the plaintext if
it ends with bit “0.” If CT is a re-encrypted ciphertext for an identity ID,
let CTID ¼ ðCTS, R, d1, d2, d3, KÞ. If there is a record ð, S, ID, RK 0Þ on the
table, B examines whether CTID is the real ciphertext re-encrypted by
RK
0
S!ID. To do so, parsing RK
0
ID!S ¼ ðd
0
, R
0Þ, B checks if the following
equations holds
eðd1, d2Þ ¼ e
	
d
0
, h
	Qn
i¼1ðαþHðIDiÞÞ


ðαþVÞ
  eðg1, d3Þ,
and R
0 ¼ R. If so, algorithm B calls the decryption oracle of the IBBE scheme to
decrypt CTS and returns the plaintext if it ends with a bit “0.” Otherwise, algorithm
B calls the decryption oracle of the IBE scheme to decrypt R and obtains k if k||1 is
the output of the decryption oracle. Then, it computes M as in the decryption
algorithm of the proposed scheme. SetMsg||B ¼ F11 ðMÞ. If B ¼ 0, output Msg to A;
otherwise, output ⊥.
• Challenge. The adversary A outputs two messagesMsg0 andMsg1. If there is a
record ð1;S, ID0 , RK 0Þ for any ID0 and RK 0 on the table, B aborts. Otherwise, B
gives the challenge ðS,Msg0||0;Msg1||0Þ to the encryption oracle of the IBBE
scheme and returns the challenge ciphertext to A.
• Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated except the not allowed queries described in
Definition 1.
• Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess b
0
∈ {0; 1} and B outputs the same bit.
During the whole game above, B perfectly simulates the real scheme if it does
not abort and always outputs real keys. Let qK denote the number of A secret key
queries. Then B does not abort in phase 1 or 2 with probability θqK and does not
abort in the challenge phase with probability 1 θ. Therefore, B does not abort in
the whole game with the probability θqK ð1 θÞ. This value is maximized at
1 1=ðqK þ 1Þ, from which we can obtain the probability that B does not abort is at
least 1=eð1þ qKÞ.
It remains to show that no adversary can distinguish the real keys from random
keys. The random re-encryption key is ðD,EncryptIBE 0ðPK, ID, zÞÞ, where D R GT
and z∈ {0; 1}l; the real re-encryption key is ðSKIDjF2ðkÞ,EncryptIBE
0ðPK, ID, kÞÞ,
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where SKIDj is randomized by F2ðkÞ. The distinguishability of these two keys is
equivalent to distinguishing the IBE ciphertext, which breaks the security of the IBE
scheme. Therefore, A successfully distinguishes the real keys from random keys
with a negligible probability.
To sum up, algorithm B can use the advantage AdvIBPRE2
A
of A attacking IBPRE2
system to break the security of the IBBE and the IBE systems with advantage ε1 and
ε2, respectively, satisfying ε1þ ε2≥AdvIBPRE2
A
=eð1þ qKÞ.
The intuition of security proof is described in Figure 7.9.
7.3.5 Conditional identity-based PRE with mobile access
Xu et al. [205] introduce a promising and more flexible mechanism of condi-
tional identity-based broadcast PRE (CIBPRE), involving the advantages of IPRE,
CPRE, and BPRE. In the system, the environment of the CIBPRE will be prepared
by an honest key generation center (KGC), and the system parameters required by
CIBPRE and private keys for users will be generated either. A user can broadcast an
encrypted message securely and merely those receivers who possess a certain iden-
tity and file-sharing conditions could extract the plaintext. Moreover, if the sender
would like to authorize other users to access the message with the same condition,
the sender could grant a re-encryption key associated with the condition, which
would be used to transform the ciphertext, to the proxy. And the proxy will choose
some parameters independent of prior receivers when generating the key. And the
original encrypted data matching the condition could be converted to a new
Figure 7.9.
Intuition of security proof in IBPRE2 scheme.
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ciphertext for the new set of users by the proxy. Except for the original authorized
receivers, the new authorized user could transform the new computed ciphertext
into plaintext with their private keys with CIBPRE. It is worthy to note that the
initial ciphertext are securely stored in the cloud service provider and the sender
can only grant a small-size key to the proxy to authorize new set of user without
downloading the ciphertext from the proxy again. So we can observe from the
above example that the CIBPRE with those features could impressively
guarantee the security of files especially there are multiple users who could access
those files.
7.3.5.1 Concrete construction
Referring to the concept of CIBPRE, both the initial CIBPRE ciphertext and the
re-encrypted CIBPRE ciphertext are the IBBE ciphertext. But it is different with an
IBBE scheme that CIBPRE would provide several algorithms to transform an IBBE
ciphertext (corresponding to an initial CIBPRE ciphertext) into another IBBE
ciphertext (corresponding to an re-encrypted CIBPRE ciphertext). Moreover, the
transformation is correct if it satisfies the consistencies defined by CIBPRE. There-
fore, in order to construct a CIBPRE scheme, we refer to the D07 scheme which was
reviewed in Section 2. Compared with the D07 scheme introduced by [208], the
proposed CIBPRE scheme associates a D07 IBBE ciphertext with a new part to
generate an initial CIBPRE ciphertext. This new part will be used to realize the
capability “conditional” of CIBPRE. In addition, it provides some new algorithms,
which are, respectively, to generate a re-encryption key, re-encrypt an initial
CIBPRE ciphertext, and decrypt a re-encrypted CIBPRE ciphertext. The decryption
of an initial CIBPRE ciphertext is the same with the D07 scheme. The proposed
CIBPRE scheme is as follows:
• SetupPRE(λ, N). Given a security parameter λ∈ℕ and value N (the maximum
number of receivers in each encryption), this algorithm probabilistically
constructs a bilinear map e : GG! GT, where G and GT are two
multiplicative groups with prime order pð|p| ¼ λÞ, randomly chooses
ðg, h, u, tÞ∈G4 and γ ∈Zp, chooses two cryptographic hash functions
H: {0; 1} ! Zp and H
0
: GT ! G, finally outputs a master public key
PKPRE ¼ ðp,G,GT, e, w, v, h, hγ;…;hγ
N
, u, uγ;…;uγ
N
, t, tγ;…;tγ
N
H,H
0Þ and a
master secret keyMKPRE ¼ ðg, γÞ, where w ¼ gγ and v ¼ eðg, hÞ.
• ExtractPREðMKPRE, IDÞ. GivenMKPRE and an identity ID, this algorithm
outputs the private key SKIDPRE ¼ g
1
γþHðIDÞ.
• EncPREðPKPRE, S,m, αÞ. Given PKPRE, a set S of some identities (where |S|≤N),
a plaintext m∈GT, and a condition α∈Zp, this algorithm randomly picks
k∈Zp and outputs an initial CIBPRE ciphertext C ¼ ðc1, c2, c3, c4Þ, where
c1 ¼ wk, c2 ¼ hk
Q
IDi ∈S
ðγþHðIDiÞÞ,
c3 ¼ vk m, c4 ¼ ðu  tαÞk
Q
IDi ∈S

γþHðIDiÞ
HðIDiÞ

:
• RKExtractPREðPKPRE, ID, SKIDPRE, S
0
, αÞ. Given PKPRE, an identity ID and its
private key SKIDPRE, a set S
0
of some identities (where |S
0
| ≤N), and a condition
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α∈Zp, this algorithm randomly picks ðk
0
, sÞ∈Zp2 and outputs a re-encryption
key d
ID!S0 |α ¼ ðd1, d2, d3, d4Þ, where
d1 ¼ wk0 , d2 ¼ h
k0
Y
IDi ∈S
0
ðγ þHðIDiÞÞ
,
d3 ¼ H0ðvk0Þ  hs, d4 ¼ SKIDPRE  ðu  tαÞ
s
HðIDÞ:
• ReEncPREðPKPRE, dID!S0 |α, C,SÞ. Given PKPRE, a re-encryption key dID!S0 |α ¼
ðd1, d2, d3, d4Þ, an initial CIBPRE ciphertext C ¼ ðc1, c2, c3, c4Þ, and a set S of
some identities (where |S|∈N), this algorithm outputs a re-encrypted CIBPRE
ciphertext ~C ¼ ð~c1,~c2,~c3,~c4,~c5Þ, where ~c1 ¼ d1,~c2 ¼ d2,~c3 ¼ d3,~c4 ¼ c4 and
~c5 ¼ c3  ðeðc1, hΔγðID,SÞÞÞ  eðd4, c2Þ
1Q
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
HðIDiÞ,
with
ΔγðID, SÞ ¼ γ1 
 Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
ðγ þHðIDiÞÞ 
Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
HðIDiÞ

:
Dec 1PREðPKPRE, ID, SKIDPRE, C, SÞ. Given PKPRE, an identity ID and its private key
SKIDPRE, an initial CIBPRE ciphertext C ¼ ðc1, c2, c3, c4Þ, and a set S of some identities
(where |S|≤N), this algorithm computes
K ¼ ðeðc1, hΔγðID,SÞÞ  eðSKIDPRE, c2ÞÞ
1Q
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
HðIDiÞ,
with
ΔγðID, SÞ ¼ γ1 
 Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
ðγ þHðIDiÞÞ 
Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
HðIDiÞ

:
Dec2PREðPKPRE, ID0 , SKID
0
PRE, C, S
0Þ. Given PKPRE, an identity ID0 and its private key
SKID
0
PRE, an initial CIBPRE ciphertext C ¼ ðc1, c2, c3, c4, c5Þ, and a set S
0
of some
identities (where |S
0
|≤N), this algorithm computes
K ¼ ðeðc1, hΔγðID
0
,S
0 ÞÞ  eðSKID
0
PRE, c2ÞÞ
1Y
IDi ∈ S
0
∧ IDi 6¼ID0HðIDiÞ,
with
ΔγðID0 , S0Þ ¼ γ1 
 Y
IDi ∈ S
0
∧ IDi 6¼ID0
ðγ þHðIDiÞÞ 
Y
IDi ∈ S
0
∧ IDi 6¼ID0
HðIDiÞ

,
computes K
0 ¼ c3
H
0 ðKÞ, and finally outputs plaintext m ¼ c5  eðK
0
, c4Þ.
The consistency of the proposed CIBPRE scheme is guaranteed by the Theorems
4 and 5.
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Theorem 7.4. For any initial CIBPRE ciphertext C EncPREðPKPRE, S,m, αÞ
and any private key SKIDPRE  ExtractPREðMKPRE, IDÞ, if ID∈ S, then algorithm
Dec1PREðPKPRE, ID, SKIDPRE, C, SÞ always outputs the plaintext m.
Proof 7.5. For any initial CIBPRE ciphertext C EncPREðPKPRE, S,m, αÞ
and any private key SKIDPRE  ExtractPREðMKPRE, IDÞ, we have a C ¼ ðc1, c2, c3, c4Þ
and SKIDPRE ¼ g
1
γþHðIDÞ without loss of generality, where c1 ¼ wk, c2 ¼
h
kQ
IDi ∈S
ðγþHðIDiÞÞ, c3 ¼ vk m and c4 ¼ uk
Q
IDi ∈S
ðγþHðIDiÞ
HðIDiÞ Þ. We next prove
Dec1PREðPKPRE, ID, SKIDPRE, C, SÞ ¼ m if ID∈ S. When ID∈ S, we have
ðeðc1,hΔγðID,SÞÞ  eðSKIDPRE, c2ÞÞ
1Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼IDHðIDiÞ
¼ ðeðgkγ ,hΔγðID,SÞÞ  eðg 1γþHðIDÞ,hk
Y
IDi ∈S
ðγ þHðIDiÞÞÞÞ
1Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼IDHðIDiÞ
¼ ðeðgkγ ,hΔγðID,SÞÞ  eðg,hÞk
Y
IDI ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼IDðγ þHðIDiÞÞÞ
1Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼IDHðIDiÞ
¼ ðeðg,hÞ
k
Y
IDI ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
ðHðIDiÞÞ
Þ
1Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼IDHðIDiÞ ¼ vk,
with
ΔγðID, SÞ ¼ γ1 
 Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
ðγ þHðIDiÞÞ 
Y
IDi ∈ S∧ IDi 6¼ID
HðIDiÞ

:
Since m ¼ c3=vk, we proved that Dec 1PREðPKPRE, ID, SKIDPRE, C, SÞ ¼ m if
ID∈ S.
Theorem 7.5. For any re-encrypted CIBPRE ciphertext ~C  ReEncPRE
ðPKPRE, dID!S0 |α0 , C,SÞ and any private key SKID
0
PRE  ExtractPREðMKPRE, ID
0Þ, where
d
ID!S0 |α0  RKExtractPREðPKPRE, ID, SKIDPRE, S
0
, α
0Þ, C EncPREðPKPRE, S,m, αÞ,
and SKIDPRE  ExtractPREðMKPRE, IDÞ, if ID∈ S∧ α ¼ α0 ∧ ID0 ∈ S0 , then algorithm
Dec2PREðPKPRE, ID0 , SKID
0
PRE, C, SÞ always outputs the plaintext m.
Theorem 5 is proved by [205]. The whole game is described in Figure 7.10.
7.3.5.2 Security proof
In addition to the DBDH assumption, the security of our proposed CIBPRE
scheme also relies on the IND-sID-CPA security of the D07 scheme. In other words,
the IND-sID-CPA security of the proposed CIBPRE scheme will be reduced to the
DBDH assumption and the IND-sID-CPA security of the D07 scheme. Let ⊥ denote
to abort an algorithm. The proof is as follows.
Theorem 7.6. Suppose that the DBDH assumption holds. Since the D07 scheme is
IND-sID-CPA-secure in the RO model, the proposed CIBPRE scheme is IND-sID-CPA-
secure in the RO model.
Proof 7.6. Suppose that there is an adversary A having advantage
AdvINDsIDCPACIBPRE,A to break the IND-sID-CPA security of the proposed CIBPRE
scheme. To prove this theorem, we will construct an adversary B, who
leverages adversary A to break the IND-sID-CPA security of the D07
scheme with advantage AdvINDsIDCPAD07;B . Moreover, we will prove that
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AdvINDsIDCPAD07;B ¼ AdvINDsIDCPACIBPRE,A ð1 T  AdvINDDBDH,A  T  AdvINDsIDCPAD07;A Þ holds,
where value T will be defined latterly.
Let C be the challenger defined in D07’s IND-sID-CPA security. Next, we will
describe a game among adversary A, adversary B, and challenger C. In this game,
challenger C tests adversary B’s ability in breaking D07’s IND-sID-CPA security;
adversary B also serves as a challenger to test adversary A’s ability in breaking the
IND-sID-CPA security of the proposed CIBPRE scheme. So in this game, adversary
B aims to utilize adversary A’s ability to break the IND-sID-CPA security of D07.
The details of this game are as follows:
• InitializationPhase: Adversary A chooses a set S of challenge identities
(where |S|≤N) and a challenge condition α that he wants to attack and sends
S and α to adversary B; then adversary B forwards set S to challenger C. In
addition, adversary B prepares the following two tables:
• LSK to store the identities which private keys have been queried by
adversary A
• LRK with columns (Identity, ReceiverSet, Re-EncryptionKey, Condition) to
store the related information of the re-encryption keys queried by
adversary A
• SetupPhase: This phase consists of two parts: Firstly challenger C generates
D07’s master public and secret keys for adversary B; secondly adversary B
generates the proposed CIBPRE scheme’s master public key for adversary A. In
these two parts, three hash functions are modeled as random oracles,
respectively, by challenger C and adversary B. So above master public keys do
not contain any hash function in this proof. The details are as follows:
• Challenger C runs D07’s algorithm SetupIBBEðλ, NÞ to generate a master
public key PKIBBE and a master secret keyMKIBBE, where PKIBBE ¼
ðp,G,GT, e, w ¼ gγ, v ¼ eðg, hÞ, h, hγ;…;hγ
N
, HÞ andMKIBBE ¼ ðg, γÞ. Since
Figure 7.10.
IND-sID-CPA game in CIBPRE scheme.
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the hash function H is modeled as a random oracle in this proof,
challenger C sends the reduced master public key PKIBBE ¼ ðp,G,GT, e,
w ¼ gγ, v ¼ eðg, hÞ, h, hγ;…;hγN Þ to adversary B. And challenger C provides
hash query service QHIBBEðIDÞ for adversary B and models the hash
function H as a random oracle. He prepares a table LH for QHIBBEðIDÞ with
columns (Identity, HashValue) to store the queried identities and their
responses.
• Adversary B randomly picks ðx, yÞ∈Zp2 and generates the proposed
CIBPRE scheme’s master public key PKPRE ¼ ðPKIBBE, u, uγ;…;uγN , t,
tγ;…;tγ
N
, H,H
0Þ, where uγi ¼ hγix and tγi ¼ hγiy for i∈ ½0;N. Since the hash
functions H and H
0
also are modeled as two random oracles in this proof,
adversary B sends the reduced master public key PKPRE ¼ ðPKIBBE, u,
uγ;…;uγ
N
, t, tγ;…;tγ
N Þ to adversary A. And adversary B provides the hash
query services QHPREðIDÞ and QH
0
PREðYÞ (where Y ∈GT) for adversaryA and
models the hash functions H and H
0
as two random oracles. Indeed,
QHPREðIDÞ is a copy of QHIBBEðIDÞ. Any query of adversary A to QHPREðIDÞ
will be forwarded by adversary B to challenger C, and any response from
challenger C also will be forwarded by adversary B to adversary A. In
addition, adversary B prepares a table L
H
0 for QH
0
PRE with columns
(GroupElement, HashValueÞ to store the queried group elements and their
responses.
• Query Phase 1: Adversary B can issue hash query QHIBBEðIDÞ and private-key
query QSKIBBEðIDÞ to challenger C. Adversary A can issue hash queries QHPREðIDÞ
and QH
0
PREðYÞ, private-key query QSKPREðIDÞ, and re-encryption key query
QRKPREðID, S
0
, aÞ to adversary B. These queries work as follows:
• Hash query QHIBBEðIDÞ: To answer the query “ID,” if there is a tuple
ðID, X ∈ZpÞ∈LH, challenger C responds X; otherwise challenger C
randomly chooses a value X ∈Zp, adds tuple ðID, XÞ into table LH, and
responds X.
• Private-key query QSKIBBEðIDÞ: To answer the query “ID,” if ID∈ S,
challenger C responds ⊥; otherwise, challenger C responds
SKIDIBBE ¼ g
1
γþQH
IBBE
ðIDÞ.
• Hash query QHPREðIDÞ: To answer the query “ID,” adversary B forwards
the query to QHIBBEðIDÞ and returns the response of QHIBBEðIDÞ.
• Hash query QH
0
PREðY ∈GTÞ: To answer the query “Y,” if there is a tuple
ðY, Z ∈GÞ∈L
H
0 , adversary B responds Z; otherwise adversary B
randomly chooses a value Z ∈G, adds tuple ðY, ZÞ into table L
H
0 , and
responds Z.
• Private-key query QSKPREðIDÞ: To answer the query “ID,” if ID∈ S,
adversary B responds ⊥; if there is a tuple ðID0 , S0 ,  , αÞ in table LRK
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and it has ID
0
∈ S and ID∈ S
0
, adversary B responds ⊥; otherwise,
adversary B forwards the query to QSKIBBEðIDÞ and obtains SKIDIBBE,
returns SKIDPRE ¼ SKIDIBBE, and adds ID into table LSK .
• Re-encryption key query QRKPREðID, S
0
, αÞ: Adversary A queries the re-
encryption key from the identity ID to the identity set S
0
with the
condition α. To answer this query, if there is a tuple ðID, S0 , d
ID!S0 |α, αÞ in
table LRK, adversary B responds dID!S0 |α to adversary A; otherwise, we
have the following cases:
• ID∉ S: Adversary B queries QSKIBBEðIDÞ to get the private key SKIDIBBE,
randomly chooses ðk0 , sÞ∈Zp2, computes the re-encryption key
d
ID!S0 |α ¼ ðwk
0
, h
k
0 Q
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγþQHPREðIDiÞÞ, QH
0
PREðvk
0
Þ  hs, SKIDIBBE
ðu  tαÞ
S
QH
PRE
ðIDÞ, responds d
ID!S0 |α to adversary A, and adds tuple
ðID, S0 , d
ID!S0 |α, αÞ into table LRK .
• ID∈ S, α ¼ α and S0∩LSK 6¼ ∅: Adversary B responds ⊥.
• In the following three cases—(a) ID∈ S, α 6¼ α, and S0∩LSK 6¼ ∅;
(b) ID∈ S, α 6¼ α, and S0∩LSK ¼ ∅; and (c) ID∈ S, α ¼ α, and
S
0
∩LSK ¼ ∅—adversary B randomly chooses d4 ∈G and
ðk0 , sÞ∈Zp2, responds the re-encryption key dID!S0 |α ¼ ðw??k
0
,
h
k
0Q
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγþQHPREðIDiÞÞ, QH
0
PREðvk
0
Þ  hs, d4Þ to adversary A, and adds tuple
ðID, S0 , d
ID!S0 |α, αÞ into table LRK .
• Challenge phase: When adversary A decides that query Phase 1 is over, he
sends two challenge messages ðm0;m1Þ to adversary B. Adversary B forwards
ðm0;m1Þ to challenger C. Challenger C generates the challenge ciphertext
CIBBE  EncIBBEðPKIBBE, S, mbÞ (where b is randomly chosen in {0, 1}) and
sends CIBBE to adversary B. According to the structure of the ciphertext
CIBBE, let C

IBBE ¼ ðc1, c2, c3Þ. And without loss of generality, let c1 ¼ wk, c2 ¼
h
k
Q
IDi ∈ S
 ðγþQHIBBEðIDiÞÞ and c3 ¼ vk mb. Recall that in setup phase, adversary B
randomly choses ðx:yÞ∈Zp2 and sets u ¼ hx and t ¼ hy. Adversary B can extend
the ciphertext CIBBE to a valid initial CIBPRE ciphertext by computing
c4 ¼ ðcx2  cyα2 Þ
Q
IDi ∈ S
 1
QH
PRE
ðIDiÞ. And let CPRE ¼ ðCIBBE, c4Þ. The ciphertext CPRE is
a valid challenge ciphertext which was defined in the IND-sID-CPA security
of CIBPRE, since we have QHIBBE ¼ QHPRE and c4 ¼ ðcx2  cyα2 Þ
Q
IDi ∈ S
 1
QH
PRE
ðIDiÞ ¼
ðu  tαÞk
Q
IDI ∈ S
 ð
γþQH
IBBE
ðIDiÞ
QH
PRE
ðIDiÞÞ . Finally adversary B sends the challenge ciphertext CPRE
to adversary A.
• Query Phase 2: This phase is the same with query phase 1.
• Guess phase: When adversary A outputs a guess b
0
∈ {0; 1}, adversary B
forwards b
0
to challenger C.
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We can find that adversary B successfully and efficiently simulates A’s view in
attacking the IND-sID-CPA security of the proposed CIBPRE scheme, except the re-
encryption key query QRKPREðID, S
0
, αÞ in the following three cases:
1.Case 1 : ID∈ S, α 6¼ α and S0∩LSK 6¼ ∅;
2.Case 2 : ID∈ S, α 6¼ α and S0∩LSK ¼ ∅;
3.Case 3 : ID∈ S, α ¼ α and S0∩LSK ¼ ∅:
In other words, if we suppose the exception in above three cases is not found by
adversary A. Then adversary B successfully breaks the IND-sID-CPA security of
D07 scheme, if adversary A successfully breaks the IND-sID-CPA security of the
proposed CIBPRE scheme. Next, we compute the probability of adversary A to find
the exception.
In the exception, adversary B forges a re-encryption key:
d
ID!S0 |α ¼ ðw??k
0
, h
k
0 
Y
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγ þQHPREðIDiÞÞ, QH
0
PREðvk
0
Þ  hs, d4Þ,
by randomly choosing d4 ∈G and ðk
0
, sÞ∈Zp2. Suppose adversary A totally
queries QRKPRET times. We next prove that the probability of adversary A to find the
exception is no more than T  ðAdvINDDBDH,A þ AdvINDsIDCPAD07;A Þ by following the
following two lemmas. Let ADisðA, BÞ denote the event that adversary A can
distinguish event A and event B.
Lemma 7.2. In Case 1, the probability of adversaryA to find the exception of d
ID∈ S
0
|α
is no more than AdvINDDBDH,A.
Proof 7.7. Suppose adversary A can find the exception of d
ID∈ S
0
|α in this case.
In Case 1, since S
0
∩LSK 6¼ ∅, adversary A can decrypt out hs; we have that ADisðd4,
SKIDIBBE  ðu  tαÞ
S
QH
PRE
ðIDÞÞ holds. Since adversary A can compute hðγþQHPREðIDÞÞ, we have
ADisðd4, SKIDIBBE  ðu  tαÞ
S
QH
PRE
ðIDÞÞ holds and) ADisðeðd4, hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞ, eðSKIDIBBE
ðu  tαÞ
1
QH
PRE
ðIDÞ, hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞÞ holds. Since eðg, hÞ is a public value, we have ADisðeðd4,
hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞ, eðSKIDIBBE  ðu  tαÞ
1
QH
PRE
ðIDÞ, hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞÞ holds and) ADisðeðd4,
hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞ  eðg,hÞ1, eððu  tαÞ
S
QH
PRE
ðIDÞ, hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞÞ holds. Since d4 was randomly
chosen in G, there is a value r∈Zp having eðd4, hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞ  eðg,hÞ1 ¼ eðh,hÞr.
And since u ¼ hx and t ¼ hy, we have ADisðeðd4, hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞ  eðg,hÞ1, eððu
tαÞ
S
QH
PRE
ðIDÞ, hðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞÞÞ ) ADisðeðh,hÞr, eðh,hÞ
ðxþyαÞSðγþQHPREðIDÞÞ 1QH
PRE
ðIDÞÞ holds. In
addition, it is clear that adversary A knows hxþyα, hs and h
ðγþQHPREðIDÞÞ 1QH
PRE
ðIDÞ. Now we
compute the probability of the event thatADisðeðh,hÞr, eðh,hÞ
ðxþyαÞSðγþQHPREðIDÞÞ 1QH
PRE
ðIDÞÞ
holds. When ADisðeðh,hÞr, eðh,hÞ
ðxþyαÞSðγþQHPREðIDÞÞ 1QH
PRE
ðIDÞÞ holds, it means that taking
hxþyα, hs and h
ðγþQHPREðIDÞÞ 1QH
PRE
ðIDÞ as input, adversary A can solve an instance of the
DBDH problem by distinguishing eðh,hÞr and eðh,hÞðxþyαÞSðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞ 1QH
PRE
ðIDÞ.
According to the definition of the DBDH problem, we have that ADisðeðh,hÞr,
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eðh,hÞðxþyαÞSðγþQ
H
PREðIDÞÞ 1QH
PRE
ðIDÞÞ holds with the probability no more than AdvINDDBDH,A.
Therefore, adversary A has the probability no more than AdvINDDBDH,A to find the
exception of d
ID!S0 |α in Case 1.
Lemma 7.3. In Cases 2 and 3, the probability of adversary A to find the exception of
d
ID!S0 |α is no more than Adv
INDsIDCPA
D07;A .
Proof 7.8. Since d4 is randomly chosen in G, it is clear that there is a value
s
0
∈Zp having d4 ¼ SKIDIBBE  ðu  tαÞ
s
0
QH
PRE
ðIDÞ. If adversary A can find the exception
in Cases 2 and 3, it means that adversary A can find that s
0 6¼ s. Recall that in
d
ID!S0 |α the part ðw??k
0
, h
k
0 
Y
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγþQHPREðIDiÞÞ, QH
0
PREðvk
0
Þ  hsÞ indeed is an encryp-
tion of hs. If adversary A can find that s
0 6¼ s, we have that ADisðA, BÞ holds, where
A ¼ ðw??k
0
, h
k
0 
Y
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγþQHPREðIDiÞÞ, QH
0
PREðvk
0
Þ  hsÞ, B ¼ ðw??k0 0 , hk
0 0 
Y
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγþQHPREðIDiÞÞ, QH
0
PREðvk
0 0 Þ  hsÞ
and k00 is randomly chosen in Zp. Next, we prove that ADisðA, BÞ holds only when
adversary A can break the IND-sID-CPA security of the D07 scheme.
Since QH
0
PRE is a random oracle, there is a value R∈GT having Q
H
0
PREðvk″Þ
hs
0
¼ QH
0
PREðvk″  RÞ  hs. So when ADisðA, BÞ holds, we have that ADisðA
0
, B
0Þ
holds, where A
0 ¼ ðw??k
0
, h
k
0 
Y
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγ þ QHPREðIDiÞÞ, vk
0
Þ and B0 ¼ ðw??k00 , hk00 Y
IDi ∈ S
0 ðγ þ QHPREðIDiÞÞ, vk
0 0  RÞ. It is clear that A0 and B0 are two ciphertext gener-
ated by the D07 scheme. Furthermore, since we have S
0
∩LSK ¼ ∅ both in Cases 2
and 3, it means that when adversary A takes S
0
as the set of challenge identities and
takes 1∈GT and R as two challenge messages, he can break the IND-sID-CPA
security of the D07 scheme without knowing the private key SKIDIBBE of any ID∈ S
0
.
According to the definition of D07’s IND-sID-CPA security, the probability of adver-
sary A to find the exception is no more than AdvINDsIDCPAD07;A in Cases 2 and 3.
According to above two lemmas, we clearly have the following result.
Lemma 7.4.When adversary A totally queries QRKPRET times, adversary B
successfully simulates adversary A’s view in attacking the IND-sID-CPA security of our
proposed CIBPRE scheme, except the probability no more than T  ðAdvINDDBDH,Aþ
AdvINDsIDCPAD07;A Þ.
Since we suppose that adversary A has the advantage AdvINDsIDCPACIBPRE,A to break
our scheme, we have that adversary B has the advantage AdvINDsIDCPAD07;B ¼
AdvINDsIDCPACIBPRE,A ð1 ??T  AdvINDDBDH,A  ??T  AdvINDsIDCPAD07;A Þ to break the IND-sID-
CPA security of the D07 scheme.
Since the D07 scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure in the RO model, both
AdvINDsIDCPAD07;B and Adv
INDsIDCPA
D07;A are negligible. In addition, since the DBDH
assumption holds, AdvINDDBDH,A also is negligible. So it demonstrates that
AdvINDsIDCPACIBPRE,A must be negligible. In other words, the proposed CIBPRE scheme is
IND-sID-CPA secure in the RO model.
The intuition of security proof is described in Figure 7.11.
7.4. Comparison and observations
Blaze et al. [36] proposed the notion of “atomic proxy cryptography,” in
which a user could flexibly authorize a set of users to access files stored in
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remote server and the original authorized users change nothing. However, the
scheme involves a non-ignorable limitation noted by the authors. The scheme is
bidirectional so that the apply scenarios will be limited to the situation that the
message sender and receiver should trust each other. This problem could be
resolved by generating a pair of delegation key, but that would increase some
computation overload of the proxy. Moreover, the scheme remains several
sensitive problems. There exists a problem that a medium proxy could create a
non-existent delegation between two users without knowing each other.
Another drawback of this scheme is not resistant to the collusion attack
between the proxy and the sender.
Ateniese et al. [37] propose a notion of improved proxy re-encryption from both
theoretical and practical perspectives. Theoretically, the authors introduce the con-
struction of the scheme and give the security proof to describe the CPA security and
demonstrate the usefulness of proxy re-encryption as a method of adding access
control to a secure file system. Practically, they also implement a concrete crypto-
graphic file system and measure the performance measurements of the experimen-
tal file system guarantee the efficiency of the scheme.
The first unidirectional PRE realizations with chosen-ciphertext security in the
standard model is explored by [39]. By permitting attacker’s query to any delega-
tees’ public key, they can provide the security guarantee. To the best of our knowl-
edge, these are the first security results in the so-called chosen key model for the
proxy re-encryption primitive. While the scheme still remains a mount of open
questions. For example, the system cannot guarantee the security if some users and
proxy collude with each other. That would be an interesting remaining problem to
resolve by proposing a new scheme resisting the collusion.
Figure 7.11.
Intuition of security proof in CIBPRE scheme.
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Green and Ateniese [45] introduce the notion of identity-based encryption
(IBE) to proxy re-encryption, in which senders use the an identity information as
the public key to compute the encrypted data. For instance, Charles could encrypt a
message for Alice by just using her email address. And the constructions are com-
patible with existing IBE schemes and can be implemented by running on the
existing cryptographic system. And the authors give a concrete security proof
shown that the identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme is IND-PrID-CCA-
secure. One challenging open problem is to explore an efficient constructions for
multiuse CCA-secure IBE-PRE schemes.
Zhou et al. [204] creatively explore a promising proxy re-encryption mecha-
nism, identity-based proxy re-encryption version 2 (IBPRE2), which allows the
proxy to convert from a ciphertext in one cryptosystem (IBBE) into another cryp-
tosystem (IBE). With IBPRE2, a sender can utilize the IBBE to securely broadcast a
message to a group of receivers. Furthermore, if another user requests to access the
encrypted data, it is simple to authorize the privilege to those users by delegating a
re-encryption key to proxy to convert the ciphertext, without decrypting the IBBE
ciphertext nor leaking any sensitive information. Based on formalizing the security
requirements in IBPRE2, the introduced mechanism is probably chosen-ciphertext
attack secure.
By taking the advantage of conditional PRE (CPRE), identity-based PRE (IPRE),
and broadcast PRE (BPRE), Xu et al. [205] describe a versatile primitive called
conditional identity-based broadcast PRE (CIBPRE) and formalize its semantic
Schemes Unidirectional CPA security CCA2 security Collusion-safe
BBS-PRE NO YES NO NO
ASDS-IPRE YES YES NO YES
IUCCS-PRE YES YES YES YES
IBPRE YES YES YES YES
IBPRE2 YES YES YES NO
CIBB-PRE YES YES NO NO
Table 7.1.
Property comparison.
Steps BBS-
PRE
ASDS-IPRE IUCCS-PRE IBPRE IBPRE2 CIBB-PRE
Enc1 2Exp1 3Exp1 5Exp1+1P+1Exp2 4Exp1+1P 2Exp1+1P
+Exp2
5Exp1
Enc2 X 2Exp1 3Exp1+1P+1Exp2 X X X
Re-
Encryption
1Exp1 1P 4Exp1 2Exp1+2P 5Exp1+1P 1Exp1+2P+1Exp2
Dec1 1Exp1 2Exp1+1P
+1Exp2
1Exp1+1P+1Exp2 2Exp1+2P 1Exp1+9P
+2Exp2
1Exp1+2P+1Exp2
Dec2 X 2Exp1+1P
+1Exp2
1Exp1+1P+1Exp2 X X 1Exp1+2P+1Exp2
aExp1 denotes a modular exponentiation on Group G1; Exp2 denotes a modular exponentiation on Group G2.
bP denotes a paring computation.
Table 7.2.
Efficiency comparison.
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security. It allows a sender to broadcast his outsourced ciphertext to some other
receivers in a fine-grained manner. Compared with the previous techniques such as
PGP and IBE, the CIBPRE-based system is much more efficient in the aspect of
communication and more practical in user experience.
In Table 7.1, we make a comparison of properties of the schemes. And we give
the efficiency analysis in Table 7.2.
Symbol description
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
CA Certificate Authority
ID-PKC Identity-based Public Key Cryptography
CL-PKC Certificateless Public Key Cryptography
PKG Private Key Generator
ICA Identity Certifying Authority
KGC Key Generation Center
CLE Certificateless Encryption
CLS Certificateless Signature
CL-AKA Certificateless Authenticated Key Agreement
CB-PKC Certificate-based Public Key Cryptography
SGC-PKC Self-generated-certificate Public Key Cryptography
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